Un país de espejos rotos: ataque, intervención y retirada de Afganistán.

Exclusive: A US-backed militia runs amok in Afghanistan

Afghan militias have accumulated a lengthy record of human rights abuses, including murders and rapes
July 23, 2014 5:00AM ET
by Matthieu Aikins @mattaikins
GHAZNI, June 13, 2014 (Xinhua) -- A policeman searches a person in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, June 13, 2014.
A policeman searches a person in Ghazni province, Afghanistan.Xinhua / Eyevine / Redux

KABUL, Afghanistan — Before dawn on June 1, a group of U.S. special forces and Afghan army commandos arrived by helicopter to the east of Alizai, a farming hamlet in Andar district in Taliban-controlled territory in central Afghanistan. They moved from house to house, arresting any fighting-age men they found, while the local Taliban fighters, who had been sleeping in a mosque at the other end of the village, fled without a fight.

By sunrise, the soldiers had gathered more than 100 men in the yard of a house belonging to a local man named Hajji Badruddin. As is typical in rural Afghanistan, the house had two large adjoining courtyards fenced in by high mud walls. The villagers were kept in one yard, while in the next yard the Americans and Afghan commandos had set up their four-wheeled ATVs, other vehicles and equipment.

“This operation was Afghan planned and led,” Lt. Col. Christopher Belcher, a spokesperson for the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force, explained in a written statement. “ISAF was there in an advisory role, advising the Afghan security forces conducting the operation.”

Night raids are common in Andar, and the villagers assumed they’d be let go once the soldiers were finished with their operation. “When we saw that we all shared the same fate, we felt comforted,” said Yousuf, one of the villagers. (The names of Alizai residents quoted in this article have been changed for their protection.)
Militia leader Abdullah
Militia leader Abdullah, in a film still from a documentary about the 2012 Andar uprising that aired on Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera

Then, around 11 a.m., they heard the sound of motorcycles, and a group of roughly 30 armed men entered the yard, some wearing the tan uniforms of the U.S.-funded Afghan Local Police (ALP) program, others in traditional robes and turbans. Leading them was Abdullah, a well-known local commander of a pro-government militia that is not part of any formal government entity. In his eyes, the villagers of Alizai were all Taliban sympathizers. “All of the people were afraid when they came,” Yousuf recalled.

Abdullah and his militia left Alizai to join a battle against the Taliban in a neighboring village, but returned that same afternoon. According to eyewitnesses, when he returned, Abdullah first went into the yard where the soldiers had set up their vehicles and equipment; then he walked over to three men and a boy of 14 who had been kept separate from the rest of the villagers in the second yard. They had been rounded up with everyone else that morning and were suspected of having links to the Taliban.

All but one of them, the boy, were bound and blindfolded. According to eyewitnesses, Abdullah and his men put the three captives — Mohammad Gul, Nasrullah and Fazaldin — on the back of motorcycles and drove away as U.S. and Afghan soldiers looked on from rooftop positions. Soon afterward, the villagers said, they heard gunfire.

A shopkeeper from Telbeh, a village about two miles from Alizai, was returning from his store in Andar district center when he encountered the group of militiamen. He watched from a distance, he says, as they led three men, blindfolded and bound, to the side of the road and shot them. “They immediately fired on them,” he said. “They fired an uncountable number of times, more than 100.”

Several other witnesses were present, he and other locals said, and the killings have become widely known in the area. The United Nations, which conducted its own investigation of the executions in Andar, confirmed that the killings had taken place. “The U.N. has investigated and verified allegations of extrajudicial killings of three men by a pro-government militia,” said Georgette Gagnon, the head of the U.N. human rights unit in Afghanistan. “There has so far been no accountability for these executions.”

“Three individuals were removed from the area of operations by Afghan security personnel for further questioning,” Belcher said. “Postoperational briefings/summaries gave no indication of detainee mistreatment.”

Belcher also denied that ISAF worked with any unofficial militias. “ISAF advisers do not partner with militias,” he said. “Rather, they work with legitimate MOD [Ministry of Defense], MOI [Ministry of Interior] and ALP partners.”

According to Belcher, ISAF had not heard allegations of the killings in Andar until they were raised by Al Jazeera, but it subsequently conducted an inquiry. “The inquiry found no information that substantiates the allegations. We have passed the allegations to our Afghan counterparts to conduct their own inquiry,” he said. “According to Afghan officials with whom we spoke after receiving your inquiry, these individuals were questioned and later released without harm.”

Spokespersons at the both the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior declined to comment on the allegations. But when reached by telephone, Abdullah, the militia commander, acknowledged killing the men. “I killed these three people,” he said when asked about them by name. “Those three were Taliban.” He also claimed that he has received, and continues to receive, backing from the U.S. special forces for his unofficial militia. “Everything is provided by the foreigners, including the weapons, salaries and other equipment.”
The patsoonian don’t belong to the Ministry of the Interior like the Afghan Local Police do. The patsoonian don’t belong at all to the government.

Abdullah

Pro-government militia leader

Since the beginning of the war, the U.S. military has worked with local militias and other informal armed groups in Afghanistan, and in recent years it has made them a cornerstone of its exit strategy. In 2010 the American and Afghan governments established the ALP program, under which local militias would be trained by U.S. special forces and placed under the command of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. U.S. commanders came to see the ALP program as an effective means of taking territory from the Taliban, and by June of this year there were 26,451 registered members across the country.

But the militias have also accumulated a lengthy record of human rights abuses, including murders and rapes. And while the ALP program is supposed to provide training and supervision to prevent such abuses and — should they occur — accountability through a defined chain of command, the events in Alizai raise questions as to whether U.S. forces are adhering to the program or whether, by failing to do so, they have become complicit in the abuses of unofficial militias like Abdullah’s.

Andar district, which abuts a strategic national highway that passes through Ghazni province, has long been a Taliban stronghold. However, in the spring of 2012, villagers in southern Andar rose up and drove out the Taliban insurgents. At the time, Kabul hailed it as a “people’s uprising,” a sort of third way that would sweep the country and appeal to rural Afghans who were tired of the Taliban but wary of the government. But while the instigators of the movement were unaffiliated with the government, they were soon bolstered by pro-government commanders and co-opted, in a common pattern, with funding and weapons from the country’s intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security (NDS).
December 18, 2012, Afghan Local Police (ALP) personnel patrol at their base in Goshta district of Nangarhar province.
In 2012, Afghan Local Police personnel patrol at their base in Goshta district of Nangarhar province. Shah Marai / AFP / Getty Images

In October 2012, an ALP unit was established in Andar, with training provided by a U.S. special forces team in the district center. In accordance with ALP program rules, the recruits were to be registered and vetted for past crimes. While some were drawn from the ranks of the anti-Taliban militias, others declined to join, either because of the stigma still attached to the government or because they wanted to escape oversight and control. “In Andar, we have the ALP and the uprisers,” said Mohammad Ali Ahmadi, deputy provincial governor of Ghazni, using the local term for the latter, “patsoonian.” “The ALP is under the supervision of the national police, and the uprisers are controlled by NDS.”

The U.S. special forces, residents and officials allege, have supported the patsoonian as well as the ALP members. “They have given them money and from time to time provide them with supplies,” said Ahmadi. “They do this to achieve their own military objectives.”

Over the telephone, Abdullah said he and his men are not part of the ALP program. “The patsoonian don’t belong to the Ministry of the Interior like the ALP do,” he said. “The patsoonian don’t belong at all to the government.” A former member of the Taliban who is adept at spotting his enemies, Abdullah said he and his militia work closely on operations with the American military, having recently returned from an operation with U.S. special forces in neighboring Giru district. “Wherever we are going in Andar, they’re going with us,” he said. “Anytime we call on them, they’re ready to help us and go out with us. If one of us is wounded, they help us and take him from the battlefield.”

When asked about the upriser militias in Andar, Belcher, the ISAF spokesman, said: “ISAF does not arm such groups. We conduct operations with legitimate GIROA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] security forces.”

The Taliban responded to the uprising with a violent counteroffensive of assassinations and bombings. In one incident last October, a roadside bomb killed 19 members of a wedding party from the family of an ALP member. In another incident, 17 ALP members were drugged and murdered by turncoats at their own post. In this increasingly bloody conflict, the militias, backed by U.S. special forces, have slowly expanded into territory that has been under Taliban control for much of the last decade — like Alizai village.

The Americans were the leaders. They would tell their interpreter to tell us to move or sit or do something.

Saleh

Alizai villager who witnessed the operation

Four villagers who were present in Alizai on June 1 — each interviewed separately in person — estimated there were at least a dozen Americans and as many as 30 Afghan soldiers at Badruddin’s house, some of them in firing positions on the roof, which commanded a view of the surrounding area. “The Americans were the leaders,” said Saleh, one of the villagers who was detained. “They would tell their interpreter to tell us to move or sit or do something.”

According to Belcher, a “team-sized” element of ISAF forces was present in Alizai that day, along with about three to four times as many Afghan forces. “The operation in question was led by GIROA security forces,” he said. “Temporary detention of these individuals occurred under the authority of the proper Afghan National Security Forces personnel, in this case the provincial chief of police, provincial NDS chief and district chief of police, who were present during the operation.”
Andar district police Chief, Lutfullah Kamran
The Andar district police chief, Lutfullah Kamran, in a film still from a documentary about the 2012 Andar uprising that aired on Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera

The Americans were bearded and wore U.S. military uniforms, according to villagers who were shown photos of camouflage patterns common to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Based on the location and nature of the operations, they were likely members of ISAF’s Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, which is responsible for training both the ALP and the Afghan special-operations forces. The Afghan commandos told Yousuf that they had come from Forward Operating Base Sharana, a large site in eastern Afghanistan that was transferred to Afghan control last fall. They had traveled by helicopter, after stopping in the Andar district center to pick up the district police chief, Lutfullah Kamran, who could provide local knowledge and represent the Afghan government.

According to the four witnesses, Kamran and the Americans jointly interrogated a number of the detained villagers. “There were two Americans looking at the photos they had brought with them,” said Saleh. According to these witnesses, the Americans recorded biometric information on some of the villagers, as is standard practice with detainees. “One had a camera, and the other had a device for fingerprints,” said Haseeb, a resident who claimed he had his picture taken by the Americans. “The collection of biometric data was done by Afghan National Security Forces, not ISAF,” said Belcher.

After entering the compound and conferring with Kamran and the Americans, Abdullah led about half his militiamen on an attack against Taliban positions in nearby Khadokhel village, the villagers said. For the rest of the afternoon, the prisoners sat in the yard and listened to the nearby gun battle and the sounds of ISAF aircraft bombarding the village. According to U.N. reports, 11 Taliban were killed in the battle. Belcher said that three members of Afghan National Security Forces, along with one ISAF soldier, were wounded and evacuated by ISAF helicopters.

When the battle ended, Abdullah returned to Alizai. The four witnesses said they saw him first go into the yard where American special forces, Afghan commandos and Kamran had set up before taking Fazaldin, Mohammad Gul, and Nasrullah — even though, under Afghan law, the ALP does not have the legal right to detain prisoners.

After witnessing the executions, the villagers in Telbeh, fearful of the militiamen, waited until nightfall to retrieve the bodies of the three men. By then, the U.S. and Afghan soldiers had left by helicopter. “His body was found in a small water drain,” said one of Fazaldin’s relatives, who buried him the next day in Alizai. “Half of his face was gone, and he had bullet holes from head to toe.”

Abdullah was unapologetic about executing the three men. “It was a raid and I caught them,” he said. “If anyone is saying these were civilians, that person is pro-Taliban, a Talib himself, or is spreading Pakistani propaganda.”
Under national and international law, the government is obliged to investigate any unlawful killing, including those committed by pro-government armed groups.

Georgette Gagnon

U.N. human rights unit, Afghanistan

Critics of the ALP program have argued that its short-term gains in territory will come at the expense of future stability, as armed groups proliferate outside of the state’s control. “The introduction of ALP also spawned other militias,” said Rachel Reid, a research director at the Open Society Foundations who led an investigation into the ALP program for Human Rights Watch. “Suddenly it was the ‘must have’ for every local power broker to have his own band of armed men.”

In the case of Abdullah and his men, those fears already seem to have been realized. “Our concern is armed groups operating outside of official security structures where there’s a chain of command and through which they can be held accountable,” said the U.N.’s Gagnon. “Under national and international law, the government is obliged to investigate any unlawful killing, including those committed by pro-government armed groups.”

With ISAF ending its mission this year, Afghanistan’s future remains uncertain, a fact highlighted by the controversy over the presidential election, with both candidates claiming victory — an impasse that has revived the specter of civil war. “We’re currently in a tense political standoff, and there’s an acute awareness that all sides are armed. ALP and all the other internationally backed armed groups have contributed to this state of play,” said Reid. “It’s not enough for the U.S. to point to the Afghan government and say they must rein them in. The U.S. created this force, the U.S. is paying for it, and U.S. special forces continue in places to partner with them.”

An Afghan journalist, unnamed for security reasons, contributed reporting from Andar.

Amnesty slams US over Afghan civilian deaths
A new report by Amnesty International looks at civilian casualties by US troops and the ongoing lack of accountability.
Bethany Matta Last updated: 11 Aug 2014 11:48
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Thousands of Afghan civilians have been killed by military operations since 2011 [AFP]

Kabul, Afghanistan - On September 16, 2012, at three in the morning, Mohammad Zahir Shah, received a phone call.

There were air strikes in the mountains near his home in Lagham province.

For the next two hours, Shah and fellow villagers waited for the shelling to come to an end. Then they set out looking for the dead and wounded.

Seven were killed, including Shah's daughter, 22-year-old Khan Bibi, who was five months pregnant.

"Just one of them had children," Shah told Al Jazeera. "All the others were very young; we are very upset about that. I lost my young daughter."

The group of women had been out collecting wood that night. According to Shah, someone informed the US military that the Taliban district governor would be travelling the same route that night.

US forces explained the air strike was a mistake - an extraordinary miscalculation.

"Obviously it was a mistake, no one would bomb women," Shah said. "But they told us they would punish the killer, and they have not. We want justice."

'Lack of accountability'

The US military has failed to provide accountability, information, and transparency in the vast majority of military operations in Afghanistan resulting in the death and injury of Afghan civilians, according to a report released on August 11 by Amnesty International.

The report compiled from a database of 70 incidences from 2009 to 2013, investigates 10 cases, in which at least 140 civilians, including 50 children, were killed by military operations across the country.

"We found a shocking level of lack of accountability towards civilian casualties in Afghanistan, particularly in cases where US forces were involved," said Horia Mosadiq, a researcher at Amnesty International, who also noted a lack of transparency in the cases.

"Many Afghans whose family members were killed or wounded by a military operation had no information to tell them who did it, why it happened and what was the proof that they or any of their family members were linked to the Taliban or insurgents."

According to Amnesty International, US military investigators never showed up to interview the families or any eyewitnesses in nine out of ten cases.

There are only six reported instances in which military forces have been criminally prosecuted for the unlawful killing of civilians.

Many Afghans whose family members were killed or wounded by a military operation had no information to tell them who did it, why it happened and what was the proof that they or any of their family members were linked to the Taliban or insurgents.

- Horia Mosadiq, researcher at Amnesty International

Removed bullets from bodies

In February 2010, US Special forces raided the home of Haji Sharabuddin, a tribal elder in the Khataba village as he celebrated the birth of his grandson.

The botched operation resulted in the killing of five civilians including two pregnant women.

Before leaving the patriarch's home, US troops removed the bullets from the bodies of the victims and those stuck in the walls of the house.

"I begged them not to touch the bodies of the women," Sharabuddin told Amnesty, explaining how he watched the soldiers use a metallic instrument to remove the bullets, "but they didn't listen".

US senior officials later claimed the women were the victims of honour killings, or had possibly been killed by the Taliban.

After two months of issuing false statements and discrediting journalists' reports, NATO finally took responsibility for the deaths.

Admiral William McRaven, the commander of Joint Special Operations Command, visited the victims, bringing with him money and sheep, a customary gesture in the Pashtun culture when asking for forgiveness.

Sharabuddin who lost several of his family members in the attack accepted the apology, but said what he wanted most was to see those guilty of the killings tried for their crimes.

McRaven and the US embassy in Kabul declined to respond to questions sent by Al Jazeera regarding the case.

The families of victims who saw some sort of accountability still said they felt justice had not been served.

Panjwai massacre

The Panjwai massacre, one of the most well-known incidents involves Robert Bales, a US Army Staff Sergeant serving with the Joint Base Lewis-McChord Stryker Brigade.

After a night of drinking, Bales entered two Afghan villages and methodically killed 16 villagers in their sleep, mostly women and children.

Last year, Bales avoided the death penalty and instead received life in prison without parole after pleading guilty to murder and assault.

Mullah Boron, whose brother was killed in Panjwai, told Al Jazeera he now cares for his brothers' children and still suffers from psychological problems.
An Afghan villager points to a spot where a family was shot, allegedly by US soldier Staff Sergeant Robert Bales, in Kandahar province [AFP]

"We are trying to work on our minds and bring change so that we feel better. My brother cannot come back," said Boron.

"I have to explain this to the children and tell them this is the way of life; everybody dies, and it was a day of paradise. We can't do anything about it and we can't get anything from it."

When asked if he felt they had received justice, Boron said: "100 percent not."

"You think about it, 16 people were killed. I went to America twice to try and convince the Americans to execute Bales, but they told me they did not have this law.

"If a member of the Taliban did this, they would kill the killer if he was guilty. If he was a thief, they would cut his hand off, but the Americans cannot kill a person who has killed 16 people. I expected that they would kill the killer and look after the children."

Public animosity

Civilian casualties by international troops during military operations send shock waves across the country - often resulting in large-scale demonstrations. They also play a crucial role in enhancing rebel recruitment.

According to human rights activist Nader Nadery, public reaction towards civilian casualties caused by international forces has always caused anger because of the expectations people have from the international forces to protection them - rather than harm them.

"The people's reactions prompt the forces to carry out criminal investigations, and if these investigations are carried out, details of the outcome, most of the time, have not been released," said Nadery.

"So the public is for the most part unaware of what happened in an incident. This has been one of my major points of advocacy all the time; these reports, and the results of these investigations need to be made public, and people need to know more about them."

As US troops pull out of the country, concerns grow over holding organisations and agencies accountable, including the CIA, private contractors, and special forces who will remain in the country for intelligence gathering and military operations.

Most advocates, victims and officials that spoke to Al Jazeera said chances are small that the family members of the victims killed in military operations in Afghanistan over the past decade will ever receive any sort of justice.

"Unfortunately, looking into the violations and level of accountability that was provided, I see the chances are slim," said Mosadiq.

"When you look at the extent of not only the civilian casualties, but also what I would call negligence - or somehow that US forces can get away with what they are doing - I am really surprised how US authorities can now claim that they are winning hearts and minds of Afghans which was the actual aim."

"But, at the same time I am not hopeless."

Afghan Students Are Becoming Inspired By The Islamic State's Success
Reuters

Hamid Shalizi, Reuters

Dec. 7, 2014, 5:59 PM
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ISIS Flag Iraqi forces retake Saadiya Diyala provinceReutersSmoke raises behind an Islamic State flag after Iraqi security forces and Shiite fighters took control of Saadiya in Diyala province from Islamist State militants, on Nov. 24, 2014.

A quiet student at Kabul University, 25-year-old Abdul Rahim has a dream: to join Islamic State in Syria and fight for the establishment of a global caliphate - a new, alarming form of radicalism in war-weary Afghanistan.

"When hundreds of foreigners, both men and women, leave their comfortable lives and embrace Daish, then why not us?" he asked, using a word for Islamic State common in the region.

Although IS is not believed to have operations in Afghanistan, its influence is growing in a country already mired in daily bombings and attacks by Taliban insurgents.

With most foreign combat troops leaving the country by the end of the year, there is growing uncertainty over what direction Afghanistan will take, with the emergence of IS ideology adding a new risk.

A few dozen students have set up an underground group a few months after IS started making inroads into Central and South Asia this year.

Several hardline insurgent groups in tribal areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan have pledged allegiance to IS, propaganda leaflets have been distributed and some local commanders are said to have met IS members.

But the formation of the clandestine student group is the clearest indication yet that IS ideas are taking hold more broadly.

"Several students who are close to us went to Syria to join our brothers for a holy cause," said student Gul Rahman, holding a mobile phone with IS's black flag logo on the screen.

Islamic State is a violent Sunni group which controls large areas of Iraq and Syria. It announced the establishment of a caliphate in June.

IS also announced intentions to bring Afghanistan, Pakistan and India under its control, although so far only eight Afghan citizens have traveled from Afghanistan to fight in Syria, security sources told Reuters.

The number is tiny compared with the thousands of recruits who have left European countries to join IS, with IS's influence in South Asia still embryonic.

TALIBAN COMPROMISED?

The students, speaking at a tea-shop away from campus and fearing arrest if they are identified, said they drew inspiration from IS's success in the Middle East and saw it as the best chance of bringing Asia under Islamist rule.

They were willing to give their names because they were so common the authorities could not identify them, they added.

Kabul University has long been a cauldron of radical views - both under the Soviet occupation when students sided with the rebels and later when the hardline Taliban took control of the country in the 1990s.

Now IS ideology appears to be spreading, although there is no evidence yet the trend goes beyond gatherings where students discuss ideas. None of the young men who agreed to meet Reuters were armed, nor appeared bent on launching attacks in Afghanistan.

Rahman and Gul said they want to fight in Syria and Iraq because IS does not yet have enough of a presence in Afghanistan to challenge national and foreign armed forces.

They have also abandoned support for the Taliban, saying it strayed from religious doctrine in the pursuit of power.

"The Taliban are more of a political movement but Daish (IS) is purely Islamic," said Rahim, sporting a bushy beard and shaved moustache.

They said the Taliban had little chance of regaining power and was more closely aligned with Pakistan's national interests than their religious ideals.

Despite its radical associations, Kabul University's leafy campus is a place where male and female students freely mingle, along with conservative scholars of religion. President Ashraf Ghani was a former dean.

"TIME BOMB"

The Afghan intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), denied the existence of "systematic and organized networks" among Kabul students, but admitted IS was trying to build support.

"Anyone related to this group (IS) will be apprehended," said Hasib Sediqqi, a spokesman for NDS.

Afghan officials are concerned that IS, a fiercely anti-Shia group, could incite sectarian violence which has been largely avoided in recent years.

‮‮‮‮‮‮‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬Rahman is from Kunar, a mountainous province in the east of Afghanistan that shares a porous border with the tribal areas of Pakistan that serve as a base for Taliban and al Qaeda.

He said several dozen students backed IS. Afghan authorities put the number of IS student supporters between 40 and 50.

The students use grisly posts on Facebook to recruit in the major cities that have internet, and their pages have hundreds of followers. Security officials say 14 students with ties to IS have been arrested, including a woman who ran a Facebook page.

Some professors voiced concern at radicalism on campus, where a strong anti-Western strain is prevalent among students, most of them from rural areas that have borne the brunt of the U.S.-led war.

"They radicalize other students, they are against co-education and incite others against foreigners and the Afghan government," said one professor, who asked not to be named.

"If we do not take care of this time bomb, it will cause damage beyond our control."

Una veintena de muertos en varios ataques talibanes en Afganistán
Los insurgentes intensifican sus ataques a soldados y funcionarios en vísperas de la retirada de las tropas extranjeras
Ángeles Espinosa Dubái 13 DIC 2014 - 17:18 CET


Fuerzas de seguridad inspeccionan la escena de uno de los atentados que

Al menos 20 personas han muerto este sábado en Afganistán en varios atentados talibanes. Ese grupo insurgente ha aumentado sus operaciones en vísperas de la retirada de las tropas internacionales. A partir del 1 de enero, sólo quedará un pequeño contingente extranjero para entrenar a los soldados afganos. Entre las víctimas hubo un alto funcionario del Tribunal Supremo, siete empleados del Ministerio de Defensa y 12 desminadores, lo que confirma su estrategia de atacar a las fuerzas y funcionarios públicos para desalentar a esos trabajadores y socavar la autoridad del Estado.

El atentado más espectacular se produjo a media tarde en Kabul, cuando un suicida se lanzó con su carga de explosivos contra un autobús que transportaba a empleados del Ministerio de Defensa. Dejó siete muertos y 14 heridos, según Hashmat Stanekzai, portavoz de la policía de la capital, citado por la cadena de televisión afgana TOLOnews. Aunque todos los fallecidos eran militares, hay algunos civiles entre los heridos. Según fuentes hospitalarias, una niña se encontraba en estado crítico.

Los talibanes se responsabilizaron del ataque, el segundo del día en Kabul. A las ocho y media de la mañana, dos hombres en una moto mataron al secretario jefe del Tribunal Supremo, Atiqullah Raufi, cuando salía de su domicilio. El comunicado no explicaba el motivo, pero los rebeldes, que gestionan sus propios tribunales, a menudo denuncian como corrupto el sistema judicial estatal. Stanekzai dio a entender que podría tratarse de un “asesinato político”.

En el momento en el que las fuerzas afganas están a punto de quedarse solas para mantener la seguridad del país, resulta especialmente preocupante que los insurgentes puedan hacer semejante demostración de fuerza en la capital. Kabul se encuentra teóricamente blindada, en comparación con el resto de las provincias afganas.

De hecho, el ataque más grave se produjo en la provincia de Helmand, al sur del país. Un comando talibán atacó a un grupo de especialistas que estaban desactivando minas. Doce de ellos resultaron muertos. Los soldados respondieron a la agresión y mataron a dos de los atacantes, además de hacer cuatro prisioneros, según informó Omar Zwak, portavoz de la gobernación provincial, citado por la agencia France Presse.

Desde hace algunas semanas, se han multiplicado los atentados. El viernes, dos soldados estadounidenses murieron en un ataque al este de Afganistán. El día anterior, otro suicida mató a un alemán e hirió a otras veinte personas en el centro cultural francés de Kabul.

Pero son los afganos quienes se llevan la peor parte. En lo que va de año, los talibanes han causado la muerte de 1.500 civiles y 4.600 policías y soldados. En un intento de frenar esa sangría, el nuevo presidente, Ashraf Ghani, ha ofrecido negociaciones a los insurgentes, pero estos rechazan el diálogo directo con Kabul, al que ven como una marioneta de EEUU.

Celebra OTAN salida de Afganistán

Soldados de la OTAN participan en la ceremonia. Foto: AP
El General John Campbell (izq.) dirigió la ceremonia. Foto: AP
Soldados de la OTAN participan en la ceremonia. Foto: AP
El General John Campbell (izq.) dirigió la ceremonia. Foto: AP

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AFP
Kabul, Afganistán (28 diciembre 2014).-
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"Juntos hemos sacado al pueblo afgano de las tinieblas de la desesperación y le hemos dado esperanza en el futuro".
General John Campbell
Con una ceremonia oficial, las fuerzas de la OTAN en Afganistán (ISAF) celebraron su salida del país tras 13 años de combates, días antes del final efectivo de su operación previsto el 1 de enero.

"Juntos hemos sacado al pueblo afgano de las tinieblas de la desesperación y le hemos dado esperanza en el futuro", dijo el General John Campbell ante los soldados de la OTAN en una ceremonia solemne.

"Habéis hecho más fuerte a Afganistán y más seguros a nuestros países".

La Alianza Atlántica comunicó los detalles de esta ceremonia en el último momento para evitar eventuales atentados por parte de los talibanes, quienes han atacado la capital afgana en varias ocasiones en los últimos años y mantienen todavía una insurrección armada.

La misión "Apoyo Decidido", de ayuda y formación del Ejército afgano, tomará el relevo el 1 de enero de la misión de combate de la ISAF, que perdió 3 mil 485 soldados desde 2001.

Unos 12 mil 500 militares continuarán, sin embargo, en Afganistán para ayudar a los 350 mil efectivos de las fuerzas de seguridad locales, quienes se enfrentan a partir de ahora en solitario a la insurrección talibán. Los talibanes dirigieron el país entre 1996 y 2001.

En su momento álgido, en 2011, las fuerzas de la OTAN contaron con hasta 130 mil soldados precedentes de unos 50 países.

La ceremonia, que tuvo lugar en el cuartel general de la fuerza aliada en Kabul y en la que se arrió la bandera de la OTAN en Kabul, fue calificada de fracaso por los talibanes.

"Los 13 años de misión estadounidense y de la OTAN han sido un fracaso absoluto en Afganistán. La ceremonia de hoy es su fracaso", dijo el portavoz talibán Zabihullah Mujahid.

Por su parte el Presidente estadounidense, Barack Obama, saludó el fin de la misión de combate, pero advirtió que el país continúa siendo "un lugar peligroso".

"Ahora, gracias al extraordinario sacrificio de nuestros hombres y mujeres uniformados, nuestra misión de combate en Afganistán llega a su fin, y la más larga guerra en la historia de Estados Unidos se acaba de manera responsable", dijo el Mandatario en un comunicado.

Pero la reciente violencia, sobre todo en Kabul, pone de relieve las dificultades que afrontará la próxima fuerza internacional para ayudar en la lucha contra la insurrección de los talibanes.

Según Naciones Unidas, las víctimas civiles aumentaron un 19 por ciento en 2014, con 3 mil 188 muertos hasta finales de noviembre. Asimismo, más de 4 mil 600 miembros de la Policía y del Ejército afganos perdieron la vida en los 10 primeros meses de 2014, es decir, un balance de fallecidos mayor que el de la OTAN desde 2001.

Desde ese año, la comunidad internacional ha destinado miles de millones de dólares a Afganistán, pero su eficacia es relativa ante la corrupción en el país.

En 2014, la elección presidencial, que debía suponer un símbolo de la reconciliación en el país tras una transición democrática sin errores, estuvo caracterizada por las acusaciones de fraude entre los dos candidatos en la segunda vuelta. Finalmente, la comisión electoral otorgó la victoria a Ashraf Ghani frente a su rival Abdulá Abdulá. Ambos hombres, que debían formar un Gobierno de unidad nacional, todavía no se han puesto de acuerdo para nombrar a los Ministros, tres meses después de la investidura del Presidente.

Los talibanes esperan aprovechar este vacío político para mantenerse en una posición de fuerza en caso de eventuales negociaciones con el nuevo Gobierno.

Los ataques de los talibanes estas últimas semanas a Kabul tuvieron como blanco las residencias de los residentes extranjeros, convoyes diplomáticos, autobuses y el Ejército afgano, así como el centro cultural francés.

El ex Presidente afgano Hamid Karzai (2001-2014) entabló negociaciones preliminares con los talibanes, pero fracasaron el año pasado.

Antes de finales de 2015, las tropas estadounidenses se reducirán a la mitad en Afganistán. Y, a finales de 2016, sólo se mantendrá un contingente residual para proteger la Embajada en Kabul.

Estados Unidos continuará aportando apoyo aéreo a los afganos y podrían intervenir directamente en caso de un rápido avance de los talibanes.

Rusia tacha de "inoportuna" la retirada de las tropas occidentales de Afganistán

lainformacion.com

lunes, 29/12/14 - 16:11
[ ]

Moscú, 29 dic (EFE).- Rusia tachó hoy de "extremadamente inoportuna" la retirada de las tropas occidentales de Afganistán, y adujo que los talibanes vuelven a ser ahora tan fuertes como en 2001.
Mueren 6 talibanes afganos en un bombardeo estadounidense tras el fin de la misión de la OTAN

Moscú, 29 dic (EFE).- Rusia tachó hoy de "extremadamente inoportuna" la retirada de las tropas occidentales de Afganistán, y adujo que los talibanes vuelven a ser ahora tan fuertes como en 2001.

"Pese a todo, los miembros de la OTAN se jactan en las sesiones del Consejo de Seguridad de que han cumplido con todos sus objetivos. ¿Pero qué han hecho?. Se van cuando los talibanes son tan fuertes como en 2011", dijo Zamir Kabúlov, emisario del Kremlin para Afganistán.

Además, añadió a la agencia Interfax, "en Afganistán no se ha creado un Ejército autosuficiente, lo que reconocen los propios aliados".

Kabúlov alertó sobre la posibilidad de que los talibanes reagrupen sus fuerzas y hagan acopio de armamento durante el invierno, y lancen una "gran ofensiva" a partir de la primavera para sitiar Kabul.

"Ellos controlan no sólo el sureste del país, sino que ahora cuentan con fuertes posiciones en torno a Kabul, en provincias que casi rodean la capital. Si antes cercaban Kabul sólo desde el este y sureste (...), ahora crean una amenaza desde el norte", señaló.

Es decir, agregó, "esto significa que en cualquier momento si deciden coordinar sus fuerzas pueden cortar todas las carreteras que llevan a Kabul y toda la capital quedaría bajo bloqueo".

Además, recordó la falta de consenso para la formación de un Gobierno de unidad nacional, cuando los afganos necesitan un Ejecutivo fuerte.

"Si la población no confía en este Gobierno, entonces, naturalmente, se inclinará más a apoyar a los talibanes por motivos de supervivencia", advirtió.

Kabúlov también alertó sobre el riesgo de que se reactive la actividad de los islamistas en las fronteras con Tayikistán y Turkmenistán, junto a las que hay desplegados 4.500 y 2.500 combatientes.

Con todo, descartó de momento un posible despliegue de tropas rusas en la frontera de Tayikistán, que comparte más de 1.300 kilómetros de frontera con Afganistán.

La Fuerza Internacional de Asistencia para la Seguridad en Afganistán de la OTAN (ISAF) pondrá fin el 31 de diciembre a 13 años de misión de combate, que será sustituida por un pequeño contingente de tropas extranjeras que realizará una labor de asesoramiento.

La misión de la ISAF, que comenzó tras la invasión que acabó con el régimen talibán en 2001, llegó a su fin tras la muerte de 3.485 soldados, 2.356 de ellos estadounidenses.

Afganistán atraviesa uno de los momentos más complicados desde la invasión de Estados Unidos y el final del régimen talibán hace trece años, con un aumento en los últimos meses de los ataques insurgentes y el número de víctimas civiles.

Los talibán prometen continuar sus actividades de insurgencia tras el fin de la misión de combate de la OTAN

lainformacion.com

lunes, 29/12/14 - 07:31
[ ]
Los talibán afganos han prometido este domingo continuar sus actividades de insurgencia en una jornada en la que la OTAN ha dado comienzo a la operación 'Apoyo Decidido', por la que los efectivos de la coalición internacional entrenarán a los 350.000 soldados del Ejército afgano que se encargarán a partir de ahora de mantener la seguridad en el país tras la retirada del grueso de las tropas internacionales.

MADRID, 29 (EUROPA PRESS)

Los talibán afganos han prometido este domingo continuar sus actividades de insurgencia en una jornada en la que la OTAN ha dado comienzo a la operación 'Apoyo Decidido', por la que los efectivos de la coalición internacional entrenarán a los 350.000 soldados del Ejército afgano que se encargarán a partir de ahora de mantener la seguridad en el país tras la retirada del grueso de las tropas internacionales.

"Nuestra valiente nación continuará su 'yihad' y su resistencia mientras un solo extranjero permanezca en el país vistiendo uniforme militar, y el resto de los complots de los enemigos serán derrotados, con la voluntad de Dios", han indicado en su comunicado.

"No seremos engañados por las transiciones en las misiones de la ISAF (Fuerza Internacional de Asistencia a la Seguridad en Afganistán). Creemos que nuestra nación seguirá fortaleciendo el camino de la 'yihad' y las desmoralizadas tropas estadounidenses seguirán sufriendo derrotas", ha valorado.

"El salvajismo y los crímenes cometidos bajo la sombra de esta fuerza --en referencia a la ISAF-- y las desafortunadamente llamadas 'tropas de paz' por Naciones Unidas no están ocultos a nadie", han subrayado.

"Miles de afganos inocentes ardieron en el fuego de la barbarie y la crueldad de las 'tropas de paz', sus casas fueron destruidas, la gente fue desplazada, el país se ahogó en una piscina de sangre y este proceso continúa por los invasores y sus marionetas", han lamentado.

Así, han destacado que la ISAF "ha arriado su bandera en una atmósfera de fracaso y decepción, sin haber logrado nada sustancial o tangible, por lo que ha iniciado una transición hacia una nueva misión llamada 'Apoyo Decidido'".

"Consideramos este paso como una clara prueba de su derrota. A pesar de que las fuerzas arrogantes no pueden tener el valor de proclamar su derrota, el mundo entiende que esta misión ha fracasado a la hora de domesticar a la valiente nación afgana a pesar de sus armas, su dinero y su tecnología", han apuntado.

Los talibán han recordado que "tanto Estados Unidos como sus aliados invasores, la ISAF y la OTAN, han sido derrotados claramente". "Decenas de miles de soldados han muerto o han resultado heridos, se han gastado miles de millones de dólares, sus naciones están exhaustas, sus países hacen frente a problemas económicos e incluso recesiones, y los generales han perdido su prestigio internacional", han remachado.

(EuropaPress)

Stoltenberg anuncia que a partir de enero comienza "un nuevo capítulo" en Afganistán

lainformacion.com

domingo, 28/12/14 - 13:25
[ ]

Bruselas, 28 dic (EFE).- El secretario general de la OTAN, Jens Stoltenberg, ha dicho hoy que a partir del próximo 1 de enero comenzará "un nuevo capítulo" en Afganistán, con una misión de apoyo al país centroasiático, que no será de combate sino que entrenará, asesorará y asistirá a las fuerzas militares y de seguridad afganas.
Stoltenberg anuncia que a partir de enero comienza "un nuevo capítulo" en Afganistán

Bruselas, 28 dic (EFE).- El secretario general de la OTAN, Jens Stoltenberg, ha dicho hoy que a partir del próximo 1 de enero comenzará "un nuevo capítulo" en Afganistán, con una misión de apoyo al país centroasiático, que no será de combate sino que entrenará, asesorará y asistirá a las fuerzas militares y de seguridad afganas.

Stoltenberg ha recordado en un comunicado que a finales de 2014 se completará la retirada de la misión de combate de la OTAN, la ISAF, lo que supondrá una nueva etapa en la relación de la Alianza Atlántica con Afganistán.

En adelante, ha añadido, la seguridad en el país "pasará a estar enteramente en manos de los 350.000 soldados y policías afganos", aunque los miembros de la OTAN y otros países aliados, continuarán prestando formación, asesoramiento y ayuda.

En la nueva misión participarán 12.000 efectivos de los aliados de la OTAN y de 14 países asociados.

"Todavía persisten muchos retos, y hay mucho trabajo que hacer. Las fuerzas de seguridad afganas continuarán necesitando nuestra ayuda conforme se vayan desarrollando", ha añadido el secretario general de la OTAN.

Ha recordado asimismo que la Alianza contribuirá también a la financiación de las fuerzas de seguridad afganas y a crear una "asociación duradera con Afganistán".

Asimismo, ha recordado que la misión cuenta con el respaldo del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, que siempre ha subrayado "la importancia de un apoyo internacional continuado para la estabilidad del país".

El secretario general de la OTAN ha recordado la labor llevada a cabo durante cerca de una década en el país centroasiático por los miembros de la Alianza y los países asociados: en total 51 naciones.

Ha considerado que cumplir el mandato del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas para ayudar a las autoridades de Afganistán en la seguridad del país y desarrollar nuevas fuerzas afganas se ha llevado a cabo "con un enorme coste, pero ha sido un gran éxito".

"Hemos hecho a nuestras naciones más seguras, al negar los paraísos a los terroristas internacionales. Hemos hecho a Afganistán más fuerte, al construir a partir fuerzas de seguridad preparadas. Juntos hemos creado las condiciones para un mejor futuro para millones de hombres, mujeres y niños afganos", ha concluido.

(Agencia EFE)

EL TALIBAN DECLARA LA “DERROTA” DE OTAN EN AFGANISTÁN
12/29/2014

EL TALIBAN DECLARA LA “DERROTA” DE OTAN EN AFGANISTÁN

Kabul.- El grupo fundamentalista Talibán declaró la derrota en Afganistán de Estados Unidos y sus aliados, afirmando que “enrollaron su bandera, sin lograr nada sustancial” durante su misión de “fuego de barbarie y crueldad”.

La declaración de los talibanes llegó un día después de que la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN) marcó oficialmente el fin de la misión de su Fuerza Internacional de Asistencia para la Seguridad en Afganistán (ISAF).

La víspera en una discreta ceremonia en Kabul, la capital afgana, la alianza atlántica terminó la misión contra el terrorismo que inició en el país hace 13 años, después de los atentados del 11 de septiembre de 2011 en Estados Unidos.

En una declaración, el vocero del Talibán, Zabihullah Mujahid, afirmó que la ceremonia de la OTAN fue “una clara indicación de su derrota y decepción”, puntualizando que Estados Unidos y sus aliados invasores “han tenido una clara derrota en esta guerra desigual”.

Sostuvo que el Talibán establecería “un sistema islámico puro expulsando a las fuerzas invasoras restantes” y añadió que las tropas occidentales están “desmoralizadas”.

Aunque la OTAN terminó su misión en Afganistán, en la que participaron más de 130 mil soldados de 50 países, alrededor de 13 mil tropas permanecerán en el país para entrenar y apoyar al Ejército nacional a partir del 1 de enero de 2015.

Adicionalmente, Estados Unidos mantendrá cientos de soldados en Afganistán para continuar con operaciones antiterroristas.

Aunque la coalición internacional asegura que las fuerzas de seguridad afganas ya son capaces de enfrentar a los talibanes, la violencia se ha incrementado en los últimos meses.

Este lunes, cuatro soldados afganos perdieron la vida y otros tres resultaron heridos en un ataque perpetrado por los talibanes contra un puesto de control en el distrito de Sangin, en la provincia de Helmand.

What Type of War did the US Fight in Afghanistan?
By Dr Amarjit Singh
Issue Net Edition | Date : 30 Dec , 2014
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Invasion Routes the US Should have taken.

It is confusing that the US fought in Afghanistan the strange type of war it fought. For years, they had nothing more than the equivalent of one division in the whole of Afghanistan – hardly sufficient for the needs of the situation. Then, they came up with a surge around 2009 only to quickly announce they will withdraw by 2014 without ensuring that their worst enemies, the tenacious Taliban, were out of business and out of capabilities to wage military attacks.

…the border town of Peshawar in Pakistan is a teeming arms bazaar where copycat machine guns and all type of hand held armaments are made, including weapons for export to other terror gangs and crime gangs around the world, yet the US did absolutely nothing solid to target that activity.

It is amazing that the Taliban were permitted to get support and funds from across the border south of the Durand Line and that the US was barely able to suppress their activities. A few drone attacks don’t substitute for what ground troops can do. That the US did not take a more stiff approach to the issue is most perplexing from a military perspective.

The fact is that the border town of Peshawar in Pakistan is a teeming arms bazaar where copycat machine guns and all type of hand held armaments are made, including weapons for export to other terror gangs and crime gangs around the world, yet the US did absolutely nothing solid to target that activity. These arms have allegedly been finding their way into South and Central America via the tough Albanian Mafia and eventually into USA through Mexico, smuggled in by the dreaded Mara Salvatrucha crime gang. Many of the guns used in the Mexican drug war were possibly produced in Peshawar.

In addition, these arms are used to arm terrorist outfits emanating from Pakistan’s madrasas. Those outfits plot attacks against India, smuggle drugs and other contraband into India on the strength of those guns from Peshawar, and also export those guns to their jihadi brethren in Yemen and anywhere else they can, including perhaps to the Hezbollah and Chechen groups. It is worthwhile recalling that the latest bombing in Boston was by a Chechen origin person who was likely influenced by the Islamist propaganda emanating from Pakistan’s frontier provinces. So, what good has the USA done by not completely destroying the Peshawar arms bazaar, the terror training camps, and the madrasas where anti-western, anti-secular, and distorted jihadi beliefs are taught?

The Pakistan army continues to play a duplicitous role. And, to the contrary, the US literally allows the Taliban to hop across the Durand Line to Pakistan, where they refresh, regroup, rearm, and return to assault US troops. Which strategic war-planning manual says that you should allow your enemy to regroup and rearm? Was the USA blind, or ignorant? Afghanistan is 100% reminiscent of Vietnam where the US tied its own hands behind its back below the 17th parallel and refrained from invading North Vietnam, from where Russian and Chinese arms were supplied to the North Vietnamese. Again, the US hunted desperately for excuses to not enter Pakistan, implying that their diplomatic intelligence and constraints were thoroughly misplaced for the non-action they took. These were not the signs of a brave nation whose own territorial integrity is being targeted and violated.

Compound this with the fact that the USA allowed Afghans to get away with growing poppy in their fields much, much more than they burned the poppy fields. The income from poppy has directly fed the Taliban, and the US hasn’t realized that the ensuing hashish has found its way to the USA via Mexico, and to other friendly destinations in Europe and USA’s allies, not to mention Punjab in India where drugs have decimated the population, thus serving to destroy the youth of new generations and creating social disorder worldwide.

No army can fight by allowing the enemy to live. As General George Patton said, “the only good enemy is a dead enemy.” But then, the USA never listened to Patton’s advice, either, to invade USSR after WW II, thus resulting in decades’ of cold war, enabling the USSR to steal USA’s nuclear bomb secrets…

Much as Peshawar is the headquarters of military-industrial complex of the Taliban, the Baluch border town of Quetta is their veritable financial capital, where transactions for Afghan marijuana are executed, which bring in an estimated $6-10 billion annually into the Taliban coffers that go to fund the Taliban war machine, partly by starving Pakhtun women behind veils of ignorance. Their madness is matched only by that of the US forces who didn’t fully burn poppy fields in Afghanistan for fear of causing a rural groundswell and backlash. To the contrary, Karzai, reportedly in the pay of the CIA by up to one million dollars per year, strongly chastised the USA for burning poppy fields. Self-interest is still the prime motivation of leaders in South Asia. At one time, Karzai’s own brother, since assassinated, was considered complicit in the silent drug trade. It seems that the US is more scared of Afghan words and politics than Afghan bullets that it didn’t care to push through with its poppy-burning plans. I’ve never known a strong army to willfully allow an enemy to gain wherewithal to replenish its stores to return to fight. You think Chengiz Khan or Sikander would have allowed anything like this? It shocks me to think about the type of war the US fought, which has led to no conclusive military result.

The US should have taken a page or two from the history books. Ever since the onslaught of Islam, only the Mongols, Sikhs, and British – in that order — were ever able to subdue the Afghans. But, they did it in the only way the stout and proud Afghans understood: surrender or die. Genghis Khan personally led the attack on Balkh, one of the largest population centers of the world at the time, and masaccered 400,000 citizens because the city dared to fight him[1]. Thus, when the ruthless Mongols came to the gates of Herat in Western Afghanistan, the 12,000 soldiers of Herat and their multitude of citizens, decided to surrender when given the ultimate choice, learning of the fate that had befallen Balkh. So, the Mongols spared the city of Herat, but true to the military spirit of conquest, they still speared the 12,000 soldiers. No army can fight by allowing the enemy to live. As General George Patton said, “the only good enemy is a dead enemy.”

But then, the USA never listened to Patton’s advice, either, to invade USSR after WW II, thus resulting in decades’ of cold war, enabling the USSR to steal USA’s nuclear bomb secrets, and till even today have Russia to counter American democracy by propping up Syria, construct for Iran a nuclear plant, not to mention the aid Russia gave to North Vietnam against the USA, and to the Arab dictators against democratic Israel.

After entering into an agreement with the Afghan king in 1818 to invade Kashmir and be given Rs. 9 lakhs for the effort from the treasury of Kashmir, Maharaja Ranjit Singh discovered that the treasury had been discretely emptied by the Afghans under instructions from their king with further instructions to withhold payment to Ranjit Singh. Not batting an eyelid at the Afghan’s reneging on their contract, Ranjit Singh quietly withdrew his forces to Attock, near Peshawar, where he waited patiently for the Afghan forces to return via the Khyber to Kabul. Not having intelligence of the movement of the Sikh army, the unwary Afghans under the command of Dost Mohammad, the vizier’s brother — with their 9,000 strong army – charged the superior, 16,000 forces of Ranjit Singh, and were decimated. The oncoming forces of the vizier of Afghanistan were also miserably clobbered. Finally, not only did the Afghans lose the treasury to Ranjit Singh, but lost the entirety of Kashmir to the Sikhs. After that, the Afghans only experienced the strong boot of the Sikhs on their neck, and that is what kept the Afghans subdued.

The lesson in these two examples: strong arm tactics succeed in Afghanistan. The US is NOT using strong arm tactics, but comes in preaching liberty and democracy to a people who understand only Islam and jihad, who laugh and scoff at American liberalism, and end up showing that their boys are better cowboys than the American variety. The Rambo of America is only in Hollywood movies, but the Afghan nationals sacrificing their lives for their pride have shown the world who the real Rambos are.

There was always a high degree of probability that Osama bin Laden was hiding in Pakistan or Pak-occupied Kashmir. Yet, the US refrained from going after bin Laden there with the full force of its army soon after October 2001

In a strange assessment of the situation, the US allowed its enemies in Afghanistan to not only live, but regroup, rearm, and return. In a surprise move, the US returned captured prisoners, such as a few they had in Guantanamo, who then went back to Pakistan and promptly launched new attacks against the US and US forces. This is not a sign of the terrorists gone mad, but of the US losing wisdom. The only consolation the US can have is that it’s not half as crazy as India. Whereas the US just let go a few dozen prisoners, India let go of 90,000 in the aftermath of the 1971 war. As the popular Hindi saying goes, “Hindustan ko chulloo bhar paani me doob jana chahiye.” Now, Pakistan threatens and teases India at every opportunity, castrates Indian soldiers, and India acts impotently. India is reaping what it sowed by returning the prisoners. Somehwat similarly, the US has been much too soft on the Afghans.

There was always a high degree of probability that Osama bin Laden was hiding in Pakistan or Pak-occupied Kashmir. Yet, the US refrained from going after bin Laden there with the full force of its army soon after October 2001[2]. Pak-occupied Kashmir does not even belong to Pakistan, as many will argue, so the US could scarcely have been accused of committing international aggression by going in there. Pak-occupied Kashmir is de virtuoso no-man’s land, so it seemed advisable for the US to get in there, especially before the Chinese get in in full force, which they are already beginning to do in the province of Baltistan.

Now, the USA is 100% bent on withdrawing from Afghanistan, but it isn’t after securing a convincing victory. The Taliban stand to surge back to power, propelled by a vindictive ISI bent on taking revenge for past reversals. Karzai may be deposed, or worse, lose his life as Najibullah did, though one can only hope that a torturous fate doesn’t await Karzai. Consequently, after 13 years in Afghanistan, and approximately one trillion dollars later, Afghanistan is on track to return to square one, with the Taliban suppressing women rights and girls’ education, pushing poppy everywhere it can, and supporting jihadi attitudes throughout the middle-east that will only find their way to be exported to India, Europe, and wherever the resistance is least.

By now, the US should have launched a three-pronged invasion to the towns of Quetta, Peshawar, and Gilgit. See the map with this article. By capturing Quetta, they would have quashed the financial power of the Taliban; by grabbing Peshawar, they would have saved the world from much of the scourge that is an export arms bazaar for crime gangs and terrorists; and by putting in a footprint in Kashmir, they could have been where they want to be – in the center of Asia – with a base they could call their own – with an ability to check China’s expansion westward to the oilfields of the middle-east. The war could have potentially been over by 2003 or 2004. But, the USA didn’t have the will or the mental energy.

India is stuck with these neighbors forever. If India cannot live with them, it must learn to live without them, which means that India must gear for war. Even if India does not want war, I am quite certain that war wants to find India, and India does not appear to be ready.

So, the net result is that the war on terror will not have reached a fulfilling conclusion. Instead, this war will be extended to haunt the world for an indefinite amount of future time. USA’s allies in democracy – India particularly – stands to bleed by another thousand cuts thrust on them by the Taliban and ISI-supported terrorists who would have the time and purpose then to continue their jihad against India, having patted themselves on the back for ejecting yet another superpower from their country.

But India has no place to go across the oceans, like the US has. India is stuck with these neighbors forever. If India cannot live with them, it must learn to live without them, which means that India must gear for war. Even if India does not want war, I am quite certain that war wants to find India, and India does not appear to be ready. So, this puts an added burden on India to fill in the shoes that USA leaves behind, who are running as if with their tail between their legs, as if they didn’t have any power between them.

The US simply needed to think realistically, and have fought this war at the enemy’s thinking level to crush their will, if they wished to prevail. Add to such fighting the technological superiority of the US, and victory was guaranteed. But with the US fighting “diplomatically,” hoping to cut a deal with the Taliban, no technological superiority can even be conceived to prevail, and, in that event, only defeat of the US purpose is guaranteed.

Thus, the US is returning home with the full knowledge that the aftermath in Afghanistan is not going to be anything like the aftermath in Iraq. The status quo in Iraq that the US imposed has an assurance to succeed because there was no major external threat to Iraq. Any adventure by Shia Iran had an assurance of retaliation by Sunni Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, thereby maintaining a power balance because both these opposing forces have equal access to Iraq’s borders. In Afghanistan, only Pakistan has direct border access, with China a close ally of Pakistan, while India shares no physical border. The role that Iran may play is still a wild card, largely because Iran has been relegated to a wannabe nation after economic sanctions with little effective military power. Therefore, the power distribution in Afghanistan is far different from the one in Iraq. And, we will see if the USA rues the day it left Afghanistan. For sure, the Afghan environment is very likely to be far from stable.

[1] Peter Tomsen, “The Wars in Afghanistan,” 1st ed., Public Affairs, Perseus Group, pp. 28, 2011

[2] In fact, President Bill Clinton, in his asininity, gave information to Pakistan in 1997 that it had launched missiles from the Indian Ocean to Osama bin Laden’s camp in Afghanistan. Within the one hour it took the missiles to travel to Afghanistan, the ISI had transferred this information to Osama bin Laden and helped him evacuate immediately.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.
About the Author
Dr Amarjit Singh

Dr. Amarjit Singh is an independent security analyst.

Renaming Afghan War, Renaming Murder
Thursday, 01 January 2015 11:26 By David Swanson, War Is a Crime | Op-Ed

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The U.S.-led NATO war on Afghanistan has lasted so long they've decided to rename it, declare the old war over, and announce a brand new war they're just sure you're going to love.

The war thus far has lasted as long as U.S. participation in World War II plus U.S. participation in World War I, plus the Korean War, plus the Spanish American War, plus the full length of the U.S. war on the Philippines, combined with the whole duration of the Mexican American War.

Now, some of those other wars accomplished things, I will admit -- such as stealing half of Mexico. What has Operation Freedom's Sentinel, formerly known as Operation Enduring Freedom, accomplished, other than enduring and enduring and enduring to the point where we're numb enough to completely overlook a new name as Orwellian as Freedom's Sentinel (what -- was "Liberty's Enslaver" already taken)?

Well, according to President Obama, over 13 years of bombing and occupying Afghanistan has made us safer. That seems like a claim someone should request some evidence for. The U.S. government has spent nearly a trillion dollars on this war, plus roughly 13 trillion dollars in standard military spending over 13 years, a rate of spending radically increased by using this war and related wars as the justification. Tens of billions of dollars could end starvation on earth, provide the globe with clean water, etc. We could have saved millions of lives and chose to kill thousands instead. The war has been a leading destroyer of the natural environment. We've tossed our civil liberties out the window in the name of "freedom." We've produced so many weapons they've had to be shuffled off to local police departments, with predictable results. A claim that something good has come and is coming and will continue to come for many future years from this war is worth looking into.

Don't look too closely. The CIA finds that a key component of the war (targeted drone murders -- "murders" is their word) is counterproductive. Before the great opponent of war Fred Branfman died this year he collected a long list of statements by members of the U.S. government and military stating the same thing. That murdering people with drones tends to enrage their friends and families, producing more enemies than you eliminate, may become easier to understand after reading a study that recently found that when the U.S. targets a person for murder, it kills 27 additional people along the way. General Stanley McChrystal said that when you kill an innocent person you create 10 enemies. I'm not a mathematician, but I think that comes to about 270 enemies created each time someone is put on the kill list, or 280 if the person is or is widely believed to be innocent (of what it's not exactly clear).

This war is counterproductive on its own terms. But what are those terms? Usually they are a declaration of vicious revenge and a condemnation of the rule of law -- albeit dressed up to sound like something more respectable. It's worth recalling here how this all began. The United States, for three years prior to September 11, 2001, had been asking the Taliban to turn over Osama bin Laden. The Taliban had asked for evidence of his guilt of any crimes and a commitment to try him in a neutral third country without the death penalty. This continued right into October, 2001. (See, for example "Bush Rejects Taliban Offer to Hand Bin Laden Over" in the Guardian, October 14, 2001.) The Taliban also warned the United States that bin Laden was planning an attack on U.S. soil (this according to the BBC). Former Pakistani Foreign Secretary Niaz Naik told the BBC that senior U.S. officials told him at a U.N.-sponsored summit in Berlin in July 2001 that the United States would take action against the Taliban in mid-October. He said it was doubtful that surrendering bin Laden would change those plans. When the United States attacked Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, the Taliban asked again to negotiate handing over bin Laden to a third country to be tried. The United States rejected the offer and continued a war on Afghanistan for many years, not halting it when bin Laden was believed to have left that country, and not even halting it after announcing bin Laden's death.

So, in opposition to the rule of law, the United States and its accomplices have conducted a record-long killing spree that could have been avoided with a trial in 2001 or by never having armed and trained bin Laden and his associates in the 1980s or by never having provoked the Soviet Union into invading or by never having launched the Cold War, etc.

If this war has not accomplished safety -- with polling around the globe finding the United States now viewed as the greatest threat to world peace -- has it accomplished something else? Maybe. Or maybe it still can -- especially if it is ended and prosecuted as a crime. What this war could still accomplish is the full removal of the distinction between war and what the CIA and the White House call what they're doing in their own reports and legal memos: murder.

A German newspaper has just published a NATO kill list -- a list similar to President Obama's -- of people targeted for murder. On the list are low-level fighters, and even non-fighting drug dealers. We really have replaced incarceration and the accompanying torture and law suits and moral crises and editorial hand-wringing with murder.

Why should murder be more acceptable than imprisonment and torture? Largely I think we're leaning on the vestiges of a long-dead tradition still alive as mythology. War -- which we absurdly imagine has always been and will always be -- didn't used to look like it does today. It did not used to be the case that 90 percent of the dead were non-combatants. We still talk about "battlefields," but they're used to actually be such things. Wars were arranged and planned for like sports matches. Ancient Greek armies could camp next to an enemy without fear of a surprise attack. Spaniards and Moors negotiated the dates for battles. California Indians used accurate arrows for hunting but arrows without feathers for ritual war. War's history is one of ritual and of respect for the "worthy opponent." George Washington could sneak up on the British, or Hessians, and kill them on Christmas night not because nobody had ever thought of crossing the Delaware before, but because that just wasn't what one did.

Well, now it is. Wars are fought in people's towns and villages and cities. Wars are murder on a massive scale. And the particular approach developed in Afghanistan and Pakistan by the U.S. military and CIA has the potential advantage of looking like murder to most people. May that motivate us to end it. May we resolve not to let this go on another decade or another year or another month. May we not engage in the pretense of talking about a mass murder as having ended just because the mass murderer has given the crime a new name. Thus far it is only the dead who have seen an end to the war on Afghanistan.
This piece was reprinted by Truthout with permission or license. It may not be reproduced in any form without permission or license from the source.
David Swanson

David Swanson is the author of "War Is A Lie."
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The Real Reason the US Military Was So Secretive About Afghanistan

By Gary Owen

February 2, 2015 | 6:15 pm
Last week, the New York Times broke a three-month old story on the classification by the American military of previously unclassified Afghan National Security Forces data. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) requested the information as part of an audit of Department of Defense expenditures on Afghan forces. SIGAR, which releases quarterly reports, was asking questions like how much money had been spent on literacy training for the Afghan army, or how many aircraft were currently in the Afghan air force.

In SIGAR's latest report, that information was moved to a classified index available only to officials with certain security clearances. Why? General John F. Campbell, commander of all foreign forces in Afghanistan, wrote in a latter responding to the report: "I cannot comment upon the precise reason why certain information was considered unclassified in the past. However, I am compelled to also protect the lives of those individuals who could be put at risk by the release of sensitive information."

Campbell doesn't want anyone to know how badly things are going in Afghanistan. So he's classified any information related to the capacity of Afghan forces, including how much money is being spent to build the Afghan army. Given the amount of taxpayer dollars that have been funneled into Afghan reconstruction over the years, decreased transparency on how it's being spent is worrisome.

But Campbell's main motivation isn't hiding money. It's hiding people.

The National Unity Government is moving Afghanistan forward at a pace that makes the buffet line at the Boca Raton Ponderosa look like a lap at Talladega.
Based on the numbers publicly reported last fall, by the end of this year there won't be an Afghan National Army (ANA) left to fight the insurgency. In their reporting on the ANA, the Americans define attrition as "killed in action, death, dropped from rolls, retirements, and separations." Dropped from rolls in this case means "Oh that guy? He quit showing up." The ANA has tended to lose almost 1/3 of its personnel every year to attrition. This isn't a new problem, and it's one that the US has admitted to publicly in the past. But it's getting worse.

According to the Department of Defense, ANA attrition from October 2013 to October 2014 was nearly 27 percent. The DOD considers 16.8 percent to be acceptable. According to the DOD, "Although the overall attrition rate is higher than optimal, it is not directly affecting operations in the short-term, as the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] remains sustainable numerically due to robust recruitment."

It's true that losing a small percentage of personnel each month won't affect troop numbers in the "short-term." Some attrition is expected — especially during wartime — and recruiting can keep pace with losses. But that's not happening anymore.

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This chart shows the monthly end strength goal (blue) for the ANA. It's the number of soldiers NATO and the US determined would ensure that the army could keep doing army things. In green is the actual ANA end strength. The ANA is doing pretty well — up until January of 2014.

That's when the Afghans took the lead for all security operations in Afghanistan. The ANA started missing end strength goals at an exponential rate, with a high of 16 percent in August. Granted, NATO and the US increased the end strength goal that month, but the ANA still missed the previous month's goal by 11 percent.

Campbell doesn't care if people know how much America spent on literacy training, or how many planes are in the Afghan air force. What he cares about is people knowing that the army that's supposedly taking over for the US is disappearing. It's impossible for the ANA to miss troop strength goals this badly and survive.

The US tends to see the world in shades of red, white, and taxpayer green, and so outrage has centered around money. Americans are understandably worried that they won't know what they're getting for all the blood and treasure that has been and continues to be invested in Afghanistan.

These numbers are also why Campbell has been reticent to commit to timelines for withdrawal — it's not just because the Pentagon and the White House don't get along. He knows that soon there won't be an army left to defend Afghanistan, and the grand plans put together by the military to make the political plan work are a frightening failure. (Meanwhile, John Kerry's Frankenstein National Unity Government (NUG) is moving Afghanistan forward at a pace that makes the buffet line at the Boca Raton Ponderosa look like a lap at Talladega.)

'Afghanistan: What We're Leaving Behind.' Watch the VICE News documentary here.

American taxpayers are going to foot the bills for US hubris in Afghanistan for a long time to come. But the real losers here are the Afghan people, particularly the Afghan army. Because of our unrealistic timelines — trying to take the Afghan military from zero to hero in a little over five years — Afghanistan now has an army of people silly enough to believe that the US would make all of this right.

And that army is growing smaller by the day.

UPDATE — February 2, 2:30pm ET: The US military has announced it is declassifying the information after SIGAR's objections.

Follow Gary Owen on Twitter: @ElSnarkistani

Military & Defense More: Reuters China Afghanistan Military
China is expanding its influence in Afghanistan
Reuters

Reuters

Feb. 10, 2015, 10:45 AM


Afghanistan ChinaPOOL New/REUTERSChinese President Xi Jinping (R) with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai attend a signing ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing October 28, 2014.
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KABUL/BEIJING (Reuters) - China has promised to help build a hydroelectric power plant in a violent Afghan border region, as well as road and rail links to Pakistan, in the latest sign it is taking a more active role in Afghanistan.

The assistance will include an unspecified amount of financing, an Afghan foreign ministry spokesman, Sirajul Haq Siraj, said on Tuesday, a day after senior Afghan, Chinese and Pakistani diplomats met in Kabul.

"China agreed to support relevant initiatives for projects including the Kunar hydropower plant and strengthening road and rail connections between Afghanistan and Pakistan," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying told a daily news briefing in Beijing.

The planned 1,500 megawatt dam on the Kunar River, was previously supported only by Pakistan, which could buy some of the electricity it generates.

In 2013, Pakistan said it would also build a motorway connecting the Pakistani city of Peshawar to Kabul, as well as a railway line from Chaman, on the Pakistani side of Afghanistan's southeastern border to the southern Afghan city of Kandahar.

Kunar is one of Afghanistan's most active battlefields, with deep valleys and forests near the Pakistan border providing cover for different factions of the Taliban.

China's involvement could speed up work on these projects, though major Chinese investments including a large copper mine and railway link near Kabul have been put on hold partly because of militant violence.

Siraj said the amount of Chinese financing for the dam and other projects would be decided in later trilateral meetings.

At the meeting, the diplomats also discussed ways to bring Taliban militants to the negotiating table, following a Chinese proposal late last year for a "peace and reconciliation" forum.

"The three sides resolved to make concerted efforts in maintaining peace and stability in Afghanistan," Pakistan said in a statement.

China has growing interests in Afghanistan, which offers a possible route to the sea from China's landlocked west.

China wants the country to be stable, both to help it exploit mineral resources and to weaken Islamist militants it says operate in the far western Chinese region of Xinjiang, which borders both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

(Reporting by Frank Jack Daniel and Mirwais Harooni in Kabul, Ben Blanchard in Beijing; Editing by Robert Birsel)