¿Está la guerra a punto de estallar entre Azerbaiyán y Armenia?

Nagorno-Karabakh tensions fester
Armenians and Azerbaijanis continue to stake claim over territory amid uneasy standoff.
Matthew Collin in Nagorno-Karabakh Last Modified: 05 Feb 2010 13:10 GMT


War-damaged houses, burnt out during the 1990s, still stand derelict [Matthew Collin]

In the frontline trenches of Nagorno-Karabakh, the long-running conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the disputed mountain enclave continues.

In the village of Khramort, children make their way home from school for lunch, some laughing and joking with each other, others holding on tightly to their mothers' hands.

But further along the rocky track which winds its way upwards towards the snow-covered mountain overshadowing the village, there is no more laughter to be heard, and no human life to be seen either.

Here, rows of houses stand derelict; burnt out during the war in the 1990s, when Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenians, backed by Armenia itself, seized control over the region from Azerbaijan.

Khramort is not far from the frontline, where the Karabakh Armenians and the Azerbaijanis have been dug in to their fortified positions amidst an uneasy standoff since the ceasefire in 1994.

Ghost town

Armen Grigorian, a local labourer who was chopping wood in his front yard, watched by his four young children, said he wasn't worried that two armies were facing each other just a couple of kilometres away.

"After going through a war, there's no fear in us anymore, and even if fighting did start again, where could we escape to?" he asked.

No final peace deal has yet been signed, and although Nagorno-Karabakh is now under ethnic Armenian control and claims to be independent, it is still internationally recognised as being part of Azerbaijan.


Nagorno-Karabakh remains under Armenian control [Matthew Collin]
Armen Grigorian's garden offered a grim view of the nearby "ghost town" of Aghdam, which was utterly demolished after its Azerbaijani population fled when it fell to the Armenians during the war.

It's a bleak symbol of a conflict which is estimated to have driven more than a million Azerbaijanis and Armenians from their homes, as well as leaving up to 30,000 people dead.

Grigorian insisted that Azerbaijanis should never be allowed to return to Nagorno-Karabakh, and that the two peoples should never live alongside each other again.

"Remember the history – when we lived together, there was war," he said.

"If we live together again, sooner or later, there will be war again, so of course it’s better this way."

Rising tensions

A short drive from Khramort, Nagorno-Karabakh's frontline troops were running through one of their daily weapons drills in the muddy trenches.

Many of them are teenage conscripts who are too young to remember the war.

But 18-year-old Rafik Melkonian insisted that he and his fellow soldiers were "ready to destroy" the Azerbaijanis.

"Our mission is to defend the borders of our homeland, protect families, and stop our enemies moving forward," he said.


Exhanges of gunfire are often seen on the frontline trenches [Matthew Collin]
There are often exchanges of gunfire across the ceasefire line, and soldiers are occasionally killed.

Tensions have risen in recent months after a series of tough statements from Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan's president, who has warned that if peace talks don't deliver results, he could order a new offensive to retake Nagorno-Karabakh and areas around it which were also seized by the Armenians during the war.

Energy-rich Azerbaijan has been using some of its income from oil and gas sales to fund huge increases in defence expenditure.

"We are spending billions on buying new weapons and hardware, and strengthening our army's position," Aliyev said in November.

"We have the full right to liberate our land by military means."

Georgi Petrosian, the foreign minister in the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh government, said he was "concerned but not afraid" about Azerbaijan's military build-up.

"We managed to stand up and find the strength in ourselves to declare our independence and defend our freedom in much more difficult situations than the one we're in today," Petrosian said, promising fierce defence of the self-proclaimed republic.

If fighting did resume, the Nagorno-Karabakh military would again be backed up by Armenian troops.

Serzh Sarkisian, the president of Armenia, is a former Nagorno-Karabakh military commander, as is Armenia's defence minister, Seyran Ohanian, who recently promised that his forces would get involved "in all hot spots which might, God forbid, emerge".

The dramatic landscape of Nagorno-Karabakh – its name means "mountainous black garden" - continues to inspire intense passions on both sides.

Rehabilitation

But away from the frontline, in the region's quiet little capital, Stepanakert, there is a greater feeling of security.


Stepanakert now resembles an ordinary post-Soviet town [Matthew Collin]
Stepanakert has been rebuilt, with financial support from Armenia and the huge Armenian diaspora, and now resembles an ordinary, provincial post-Soviet town.

Its first western-style shopping mall opened recently, enabling affluent locals to buy imported Italian sportswear, upmarket beauty products and replica football shirts from Europe's top clubs.

"This town might be quiet, but that's better than when we were being shelled during the war and we had to hide in basements with rats running around," said one young woman who was visiting the mall.

Petrosian said it was time to "move forward from survival to development", but admitted that it would take much longer to rebuild the rest of this isolated and impoverished region.

"There is not a single place which has not suffered, and not a single family which doesn't need social and psychological rehabilitation," he explained.

Despite the hostile rhetoric, both Armenia and Azerbaijan insist that they are committed to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, and negotiations have intensified over the past year-and-a-half.

But even if progress is made, they completely disagree about the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, with Azerbaijan maintaining that the region must not be allowed to secede.

"We will not give our land away to anyone," Ramiz Mehdiyev, the head of Azerbaijan’s presidential administration, said recently.

The ethnic Armenians who now control the region, however, say they will never return to Azerbaijani rule.

"Time is irreversible," Petrosian declared. "You can't turn back the clock."

Is this an opportune moment for Eurasian powers to tackle the festering Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
Last updated: 22 Apr 2014 11:27


Diba Nigar Goksel

Diba Nigar Goksel is editor in chief at Turkish Policy Quarterly. She writes mainly on Turkish foreign policy, Turkey-EU relations, the Caucasus, democratisation and gender rights.


The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the single leading hindrance to further integration of the South Caucasus with the West, writes Goksel [AFP]

The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the continued crisis in Ukraine has stirred the Western policy community to rethink other unresolved conflicts in the post-Soviet space, such as those in Moldova and Georgia. Among these conflicts is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflictbetween Armenia and Azerbaijan. The dispute has been "frozen" since a ceasefire in 1994 to end the war which had broken out during the dissolution of the Soviet Union over the territory formerly known as "Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast" in Soviet Azerbaijan.

April 24 will mark the 99th anniversary of the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Anatolia, Turkey, bringing the troubled relations between Turkey and Armenia to the front. As these two stalemates limit Euro-Atlantic leverage in the South Caucasus, it is timely to take stock of the risks and opportunities involved in revisiting resolution scenarios.

At the beginning of this year, 20 years after the ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a promising new start towards the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was hailed. Meeting in November 2013 for the first time in nearly two years, the two presidents made statements that were interpreted as refreshingly positive. Moreover, Switzerland taking on the presidency of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2014 fed into the short-lived cautious optimism about the chances of a negotiated settlement to the Karabakh conflict.

The Swiss facilitated the 2008-2010 Turkish-Armenian normalisation process, which did not reach fruition, and illuminated the interconnection of Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey relations. This experience, it was thought, might enable Swiss diplomats to breathe fresh air into the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has been ongoing since 1997.

US domestic politics

Enter US domestic politics. Every year as April nears, pressure mounts in Washington for the recognition of April 24 as a day of Armenian genocide commemoration. On April 3, a new resolution that "condemn[s] and commemorate[s] the Armenian Genocide", came to the floor of the US Congress. On April 10, it passed the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

If there were a functioning independent commission that could bridge the gap between Armenian and Turkish historical accounts, the White House would supposedly hold off on characterising these events as "genocide". Because Yerevan has linked its support for such a joint historical study to Turkey opening its border with Armenia, and because Azerbaijan sees this prospect as a blow to its negotiating position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a Gordian Knot has been tied.

In 2009, the protocols signed between Ankara and Yerevan, which - had they been enacted - would have restored diplomatic relations and opened the border, strained Ankara's relations with Azerbaijan. Since then, to ensure neither is lost to the other, Ankara and Baku have embarked on further political alignment and economic integration between the two countries.

Finding a formula that will unlock both conflicts at once has been on the agenda for the past few years. Though details of the talks between Armenian and Azerbaijani officials are not made public, the parameters discussed for a negotiated settlement are more or less known: Armenia's withdrawal from a number of districts beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh territory, the return of Azeri internally displaced persons to these territories, a regional integration scheme to open transportation routes and communication channels across the region, including Turkey, and an eventual referendum to settle the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

While stalled on issues such as how many districts will be returned to Azerbaijan and when the referendum will be held, the two sides gamble on strengthening their bargaining hands. Meanwhile, Russia has established itself as the single most decisive player in the Nagorno-Karabakh resolution process, using its leverage to keep this region in its orbit and curb Euro-Atlantic influence in the South Caucasus.

In the last couple of months, the standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has further dimmed hope for constructive cooperation with Moscow regarding other frozen conflicts in the neighbourhood. Arguably, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the single leading hindrance to further integration of the South Caucasus with the West. Energy geopolitics is one reason for the increased attention today. The need to decrease European energy dependence on Russian supplies of gas is a leading take-away from the crisis in Ukraine. Accordingly, Azerbaijan's gas and financing of the Southern Corridor gas pipeline rises in importance.

When the US first got involved in solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, arguably it was to ensure energy companies would not shy away from investing in the East-West corridor due to the risk of renewed violence. The conflict was not solved but actualisation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline has enabled Azerbaijan and Georgia to stand up to Russian pressure at critical junctures. Today an even more strategically important pipeline project is in the making, the Trans Anatolian pipeline (TANAP) and TAP, which will carry Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe, potentially to be joined by Gulf and East Mediterranean natural gas.

Because Turkey closed its borders with Armenia in 1993 in reaction to the Armenia-Azerbaijan war escalating beyond Nagorno-Karabakh into undisputed territories of Azerbaijan, the issue of Turkey-Armenia relations has become interlinked with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia's economic and strategic dependence on Russia has become incrementally deeper, culminating most recently in Yerevan's fall 2013 decision to opt for Russia's Customs Union rather than an association agreement with the EU. Integration between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey with infrastructure projects has gained strategic relevance for the West in this context.

Unlocking the stalemate

Recently, when asked what their expectations from Turkish foreign policy in 2014 are, high-level representatives of both the US and an involved European country cited normalisation of relations with Armenia in the top five expectations. Indeed, it is in Western interests for the Turkey-Armenia border to be open. But opening this border without also unlocking the Armenia-Azerbaijan stalemate can upset regional balances that are shaped around the Turkey-Azerbaijan axis, and provide new inroads for Moscow that are not in line with Western strategic interests on this most Eastern frontier of Europe.

Besides this geopolitical calculus, an additional complexity is Turkey's domestic political situation, with presidential and parliamentary elections to be held by spring 2015. Because the general Turkish public is highly sensitive to any potential fallout for Azerbaijan and genocide resolutions are widely perceived to be hostile, risk of increased tensions can be expected until mid-2015, the centenary of the 1915 genocide, when Armenian leverage over Turkey is expected to peak.

On the Armenian side, the assumption that Turkey can be pressured to open its border with Armenia may hold Yerevan back from so-called compromise on the Nagorno-Karabakh front. As its military gains strength, in terms of power balances, Baku also assumes time is on its side. Accordingly, all sides can be seen holding their breaths. Seen from this perspective, at this time of regional geopolitical flux, for Western capitals to expect Ankara, Yerevan, or Baku to act against their perceived self-interests could backfire in ways that play into Moscow's hand.

On the other hand, for the West not to pay sufficient attention to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict also leaves the scene open to new risks. The current fear is that Russia will use its base in Armenia's Gyumri district and the Armenian minority in Georgia to ignite challenges to the East-West corridor that plugs Georgia and Azerbaijan into Europe.

The Ukraine crisis has fuelled debates about how the West can develop stronger and smarter policies east of Europe. A credible EU enlargement policy is one answer. Although recent Turkish domestic political developments are discouraging, injecting viability into Turkey's EU membership bid can significantly tip regional balances, reduce the range of unpredictability in the region and empower pro-European forces, not only in Turkey, but also in the Caucasus.

Ultimately, it is also a Europeanised outlook on history and minorities that can render the resolution of conflicts in this region sustainable. In the short term, though, the overwhelming view across the South Caucasus is that without firm political commitment and a hard power component in Euro-Atlantic regional policy, Moscow will be the puppet-master.

Diba Nigar Goksel is editor in chief at Turkish Policy Quarterly. She writes mainly on Turkish foreign policy, Turkey-EU relations, the Caucasus, democratisation and gender rights.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
Source:
Al Jazeera

Armenia and Azerbaijan: On the Brink of War?

Ukraine and Iraq have the world's major powers quite busy these days. There might be a new hot spot about to explode.
Ariel Cohen

August 8, 2014
Tweet

The messy business of post-imperial disintegration is not over. The eruption of Russian-Ukrainian hostilities is not the only case in point. The former Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan are at it again, too. And there may be a connection between the two conflicts, experts say.

After fighting a bloody war in 1988-1994, followed by “secession” of Nagorno-Karabakh (unrecognized by everyone, including Armenia), the occupation of seven Azerbaijani districts, known as the Lachin Corridor, and an uneasy cease-fire, the two countries have now been exchanging fire for over about ten days.

In a news environment dominated by much bigger and bloodier conflicts, such as the Islamic State (formerly known as ISIS), Syria, Gaza and Ukraine, the deadly news from the Caucasus is barely noticed.

However, the killing of fifteen Azerbaijani soldiers along the “line of contact” July 29-August 1 signified an escalation in hostilities. Casualties from retaliatory action, Azeri multiple-rocket launcher fire and overflights by the Azerbaijani air force, indicate that the situation may deteriorate quickly.

While the United States and the EU “expressed concern”, Russia’s Vladimir Putin decided to play peacemaker. He will meet with Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev and Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan in Sochi August 8-9 for separate talks. Despite a meeting between Aliyev and Sargsyan in Vienna in November of 2013, there is no progress in getting a permanent settlement—nor should one hold his breath over the Sochi summit.

UN resolutions and declarations to the contrary notwithstanding, the Armenian position remains implacable: no territorial concessions to Azerbaijan in Karabakh. Nor is Yerevan eager to return the seven non-Karabakh districts back to Baku.

Thus, despite the mounting frustration, the current status quo serves Armenia. Azerbaijan, flush with oil cash, has been building its military forces for years. Yet it is still insecure after the defeat twenty years ago.

With a $40 billion investment in onshore and offshore oil and gas, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline spanning the Caspian and the Mediterranean, and the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline, which will export over 30 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe, and will become operational in 2018, Baku is not seeking a new war.

However, the hostilities may not be accidental. Armenia is a faithful Russian ally. Recently, it rejected an Association Agreement with the European Union it painstakingly negotiated for three years, and signed up for membership in the Moscow-led Customs Union. In the future, Armenia is likely to join the Eurasian Union. Russian military bases remain on the Armenian territory through 2043, and Russian troops guard Armenia’s borders with Iran and Turkey.

Moreover, Armenia voted in support of Russia in the UN General Assembly regarding the annexation of Crimea. It may use Russia’s action towards the peninsula as a model for occupation and annexation of Karabakh. After all, Armenians may think, “if the Moscow metropolis expands its network of unrecognized, secessionist satellites or annexed territories (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia—and now the Crimea), why can’t Armenia annex Karabakh?”

Azerbaijan, on its part, cast its lot with the West—for now. Not only has it allowed unprecedented access to its hydrocarbon resources to BP and other Western energy companies, it has strong economic and military ties with the United States.

Baku allowed its airport to become a massive trans-shipment point in the Northern Distribution Network, which supplied Afghanistan, and Azeri troops were deployed there side-by-side with NATO troops. Azerbaijani soldiers also were deployed to Iraq. Azerbaijan, a secular, majority-Shiite country, has close relations with the Sunni Turkey and with Israel, and imports tens of billions of dollars’ and euros’ worth of Western goods, including Boeing airliners.

Yet, it is energy exporting that defines Azerbaijan’s geopolitical importance. The border clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia are likely to remind the West that Russia’s oil- and gas-sector sanctions, imposed because of the occupation of Crimea and the support of pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, may have “unintended consequences.” The distance from the Armenian border to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline can be covered by a day or two of a successful tank corps thrust. Even recurrent rocket and artillery barrages can threaten the BTC and the TANAP gas-pipeline development.

The diplomatic tool to resolve the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the “Minsk Group,” which includes the United States, Russia and France, is now obsolete. It was created in the 1990s, when diplomatic cooperation between the United States and Russia was a norm, not an exception. Alas, times have changed. Hostility between Moscow and Washington, and for that matter, Russia and the EU, unfortunately makes joint diplomacy all but impossible.

With U.S. attention split from China to Ukraine and between Al Qaeda, Hamas, the Islamic State and Al Shabab, there is only so much Washington has the bandwidth to do. Putin’s peacekeeping in Sochi is likely to put a Band-Aid over the current hostilities, while it is not in Russia’s interest to bring the sides to permanent resolution of the conflict, pack up the military base in Gyumri and go home. Nor would Armenia want that, facing Turkish hostility, the unacceptable Turkish narrative over the 1915 tragedy and a closed border with Ankara.

The Obama administration, seeking a diplomatic achievement, may decide to pursue a complex diplomatic scenario, in which Armenia returns the seven occupied Azerbaijani districts to Baku. This can be done in exchange for opening the blocked border for trade with Turkey and the EU, and the regional infrastructure integration for Yerevan, including connections of its energy and transportation grids to Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey networks of pipelines and railroads.

Without trade and investment, Armenia is doomed to underdevelopment and mass emigration to Russia, Europe and the United States. Unfortunately, today, Russia is unlikely to approve such a win-win solution, dooming the long-suffering neighbors to further strife.

Ariel Cohen, PhD, is Principal at International Market Analysis, a Washington-DC based political risk, energy and natural resources advisory firm (www.arielcohen.com)

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Khustup/CC by-sa 3.0

Opinion
Will Armenia and Azerbaijan reach a negotiated solution?
Fighting in Ukraine, and Russia-West rivalries complicate a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabkh conflict.
Last updated: 10 Aug 2014 09:31
Vartan Oskanian

Vartan Oskanian

Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia's National Assembly, a former foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan's Civilitas Foundation.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has hosted a meeting between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan over tensions in the Nagorno-Karabakh region [Reuters]

Given all that is happening in the Middle East and Ukraine, no one seems to have the patience for escalation, casualties and bloodshed any where else.

During the past two weeks, the ceasefire violations at the line of contact between the Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces went well beyond the usual and minor skirmishes, causing two dozen casualties on both sides.

The moment that the long dormant, but simmering, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus began to show signs of eruption, the UN, the US, Russia, the EU, Iran and many other countries rushed to urge restraint, respect of the ceasefire agreement, and an immediate resumption of interrupted negotiations.

Indeed, on August 9 and 10, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, along with Russian President Vladimir Putin, met in the Russian resort city of Sochi. No doubt, respecting the ceasefire and advancing the peace process were the main agenda items. Committing to these goals is one thing, fulfilling them is another. The prevailing circumstances, however, are hardly conducive for their realisation.

The maintenance of the self-regulated ceasefire - the only one of its kind in the world - since 1994, succeeded for two reasons: the military balance between the opposing sides, and hope in the ongoing negotiations. Over the last three years, both of these deterrents have been seriously undermined.

Given today's enormous discrepancy in the defence budgets of Azerbaijan on the one hand, and the Armenian side (Armenia and Karabakh) on the other, and the Azerbaijanis' disproportionate purchases of military hardware, there is, in Azerbaijan, a belief that they have the upper hand in the military equation.

Additionally, the futility of the peace talks in the recent years during which the differences and disagreements between the parties have grown deeper and wider, coupled with long interruption of high level talks, has implanted a sense of despair about the prospects for a peaceful resolution.

So it is highly likely that the recent escalation intended to test the military balance and attract the overstretched attention of the major players back to the conflict and force a resumption of high level talks.

Right to self-determination?

There are three elements that have always affected the peace talks and the settlement process, and continue to do so: One is the global and regional interests of the major powers and their present interrelationships; second is the dominant trend in international relations as manifested in the agendas and decisions of international organisations (such as the UN and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe); third, is the conflicting sides' own present political and economic situations and their capacity and will to shape the peace process.

Over these 20 years, during each successive stage of diplomatic activity, these three factors have always been consequential, although never as significantly as today. Worse, never have they all been in such a state of great and unpredictable flux.
Al Jazeera World - Common Pain

Russia and the US, two of the three mediators in the Nagorno-Karabakh talks, are at odds and can't see eye to eye over major global issues, including Ukraine and Syria. Their interests in the Caucasus are not in harmony either. This situation is interesting and could be a double-edged sword. One might assume that the ongoing tug of war between them will spill over into the Karabakh talks, but it is also possible that both sides use this as an opportunity to mend fences. It all depends on how it will play out. But the waters are further muddied considering the conflicting positions Russia and the US have taken on ethnic conflicts and self-determination movements.

Russia, which opposed what it considered to be the unilateral legitimisation of sovereignty in Kosovo, did the same by recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Most recently, it hurriedly recognised Crimea's referendum results by incorporating the region into Russia.

In other words, while both the West and Russia support self-determination efforts, they do so selectively - and unilaterally. Therein lies the danger. This contradictory situation created by conflicting approaches by the major players will require delicate diplomatic manoeuvring by the sides and the mediators. During the collapse of the Soviet Union, the population of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, 80 percent Armenian, opted for self-determination by conducting a referendum and declaring secession.

Within international organisations, there are conflicting directions. Despite the fact that several self-determination movements achieved independence and statehood in the past decade, such as East Timor, South Sudan and Kosovo - the first two with membership in the United Nations - the global organisation remains selective and ambivalent about the self-determination phenomena and still lacks criteria, guidelines and legal framework for a more evolved and enlightened policy.

One thing is clear however: The very early assumptions about the root causes of self-determination claims (ethnic and religious hatred, extreme nationalism, irrelevant historical claims, outside manipulation) and their resolution framework (one-size-fits-all, fear of the domino effect, quick democratisation, ethnic groups lowering their goals with the promise of democracy, human rights and prosperity) have all been questioned, challenged and undermined. The evidence is the independence of some of the movements and the persistence of the many others, among them Nagorno-Karabakh.

The scenarios

The ultimate question is what is to happen to this no-peace, no-war situation. What is the end game? Is there a viable political solution?

There are three possible - and not very novel - scenarios. One is the continuation of a sustainable status quo. The second is the eruption of war and a new situation on the ground. The third is a negotiated solution.

This is the challenge facing Armenians and the Azerbaijanis. A lasting peace will come when each side acknowledges the other's minimum requirements, not their belligerent and maximalist demands.

Although most of the international community, including the mediators, will automatically reject the first scenario as unacceptable and unsustainable, this is not necessarily the case. There are many historical examples when yesterday's unrealistic alternative became today's preferred and realistic solution.

The second scenario - war - is difficult to imagine. Armenians have no reason to start a war. If the Azerbaijanis start a war, this will be the third time they will have tried, and they will only succeed if they aim for a "final solution". That would be a huge risk for Azerbaijan, greater than for the Armenian side, given their total reliance on their role as an energy producing and transit country.

And finally, there is the third scenario - a negotiated solution. This is obviously the most desirable, but would require substantive compromises. These negotiations have already gone on for 20 long, intense years, during which five serious proposals were presented. Four were rejected; one is still on the table.

Resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict peacefully requires two parallel steps: A guarantee of non-resumption of military hostilities, and a clear, mutually binding blueprint for reaching a final settlement.

This is the challenge facing Armenians and the Azerbaijanis. A lasting peace will come when each side acknowledges the other's minimum requirements, not their belligerent and maximalist demands. Before this can happen, each side must achieve sufficient internal consensus on its bargaining position. This hasn't happened yet.

Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia's National Assembly, a former foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan's Civilitas Foundation.

Follow him on Twitter: @VartanOskanian.