Irak en crisis: yihadistas avanzan para tomar el control. +18 (IMAGENES FUERTES)

Huida desde las montañas de Sinjar, pero ¿qué viene después?
La asesora general de Amnistía Internacional en el norte de Irak relata las peripecias de los que huyen del terror con lo puesto

Consulta todas las historias En primera línea

Donatella Rovera (AI) Dohuk (Irak) 22 AGO 2014 - 18:05 CEST


Integrantes del grupo religioso minoritario Yazidi huídos de Mosul reciben ayuda humanitaria en la ciudad de
Tras una angustiosa huida, primero desde su ciudad natal, Qahtanya, y luego desde las montañas de Sinjar —donde permanecieron cercados durante ocho días con muy pocos alimentos y muy poca agua— Suleiman Shaibo Sido, su esposa y sus ocho hijos, todos ellos miembros de la minoría yazidí, se encuentran refugiados actualmente bajo un puente en la ciudad de Dohuk, en el norte de Irak, junto con más de 20 familias.
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La situación de las mujeres en Irak: cuestión de conciencia mundial
Las difusa división de las minorías en Irak
Los iraquíes huyen del terror yihadista

El lugar es polvoriento, ruidoso y peligroso. Por la carretera que pasa por debajo del puente, circulan coches a toda velocidad día y noche. "Tenemos que estar continuamente alerta para que los niños no se salgan a la carretera”, me dice. "Los coches y los camiones van muy rápido". No hay electricidad, agua ni servicios de saneamiento. "Vamos a buscar el agua a la mezquita más cercana y la gente nos trae alimentos. Estamos muy agradecidos a los vecinos de Dohuk; son verdaderos hermanos", dice Suleiman. "Llegamos tan solo con la ropa que llevábamos puesta. La gente, y también una organización, nos trajeron algunas mantas y otras cosas. Por ahora nos arreglamos. Lo más importante es que estamos a salvo."

Tras lograr huir del asalto del Estado Islámico a su ciudad natal, en la región de Sinjar, el 3 de agosto, Suleiman y su familia se encontraron varados en las montañas de Sinjar junto con decenas de miles de otros civiles. Atrapados por los militantes, que los cercaron y cortaron todas las carreteras de acceso a las montañas, pasaron ocho días extenuantes bajo un sol abrasador. "Comía hojas y hierba", dice Suleiman. "Cuando huimos, llevamos toda el agua que pudimos. Los niños pequeños llevaban, cada uno, un litro de agua; yo llevaba 15 y mi hijo mayor, 20. Los racionamos rigurosamente durante los días que pasamos en las montañas, y eso fue lo que nos salvó."

Cuando finalmente se rompió el asedio de las montañas, gracias, principalmente, a un grupo de combatientes kurdos sirios que abrieron una vía de tránsito segura desde el norte, miles de personas desesperadas empezaron a salir en caravanas. "No había suficiente espacio para todo el mundo en los vehículos que enviaron a rescatarnos. Mi familia y yo caminamos durante 13 horas", recuerda Suleiman. "El más pequeño de mis hijos enfermó. Cuando llegamos al campamento de refugiados de Siria, pasó dos días en el hospital. Aún no ha cumplido el año; su primer cumpleaños será el 1 de septiembre". El pequeño ha vuelto a sentirse mal estos últimos días, y las condiciones de vida peligrosas e insalubres bajo el puente están empeorando las cosas.

¿Qué se está haciendo? Ayer, el Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados anunció una inminente operación de ayuda a gran escala para el medio millón de personas desplazadas por el conflicto en el norte de Irak, y, la semana pasada, las Naciones Unidas declararon la crisis humanitaria en Irak, una "emergencia de nivel 3" (la alerta de mayor nivel). Reconocieron que ya se habían producido retrasos críticos en la respuesta y prometieron el envío de recursos adicionales.

Esos recursos adicionales no pueden hacerse esperar más. Son necesarios para decenas de miles de personas desplazadas que, como Suleiman y su familia, viven en condiciones extremas y han perdido la esperanza de poder regresar a sus hogares en un futuro próximo.

Suleiman, como muchas otras personas pertenecientes a comunidades minoritarias, dice que ahora no quiere quedarse en Irak. “Los yazidíes hemos soportado años de persecución. Mi hija aún tiene cicatrices de la lesión que sufrió en los bombardeos a nuestra ciudad natal el 14 de agosto. Ahora hemos perdido nuestros hogares, todo aquello por lo que habíamos trabajado durante toda nuestra vida. No nos queda nada por lo que regresar."

Los cristianos desplazados desde Sinjar y Mosul me han contado historias muy similares. Fadi Khachik, un residente cristiano de Sinjar que ahora vive refugiado en un pueblo cercano a Dohuk con su esposa y su familia, me dijo:

“Abandoné mi casa de Sinjar el 2 de agosto para casarme en la vecina Bartallah, la ciudad natal de mi esposa. El Estado Islámico atacó Sinjar al día siguiente y Bartallah unos días después. Ahora, nosotros y nuestras familias estamos viviendo como refugiados. Han saqueado nuestras casas y nuestras propiedades. Creo que jamás podré regresar a mi hogar. Lo mejor es que nos vayamos a otro país en el que podamos estar a salvo."

Huimos con la ropa que llevábamos puesta", dice un refugiado

Mientras tanto, la Dra. Houda, una médica del hospital de Mosul que huyó de la ciudad tras el ultimátum del Estado Islámico el 18 de julio, me contó que los militantes del Estado Islámico les robaron el dinero y las joyas a ella y a otros cristianos cuando abandonaban Mosul. Dijo que no podía imaginarse volver a Mosul tras lo sucedido.

Las condiciones de las minorías del norte de Irak ya se habían deteriorado significativamente durante los últimos años, lo cual había llevado a muchas personas a abandonar el país. Ahora, la situación se ha convertido en una crisis grave, en la que los militantes armados del Estado Islámico atacan sistemáticamente a las comunidades musulmanas que no son suníes, forzándolas a abandonar las áreas que mantienen bajo su control. Sus primeros blancos fueron las comunidades turcomana chií y shabak. Luego les llegó el turno a los residentes cristianos de Mosul, a quienes dieron de plazo hasta el 18 de julio para convertirse a su interpretación del islam, pagar un impuesto para las minorías, marcharse o morir. Más recientemente, desde comienzos de este mes, el Estado Islámico la ha emprendido contra la minoría yazidí, a cuyos miembros consideran "adoradores del diablo", y les han exigido que se “conviertan” bajo amenaza de muerte.

En el norte de Irak, el futuro de muchas personas pende de un hilo.

Las comunidades minoritarias de Irak y miles de otras personas desplazadas necesitan urgentemente un alojamiento seguro y asistencia humanitaria. La comunidad internacional no debe escatimar esfuerzos en proporcionárselos sin más dilación.

Donatella Rovera es asesora general sobre respuesta a las crisis de Amnistía Internacional en el norte de Irak.

Extorsiones y robos financian al califato
Polémica en Berlín porque un ministro culpa a Qatar de sostener al Estado Islámico
Ángeles Espinosa Erbil (Irak) 22 AGO 2014 - 21:52 CEST




El Gobierno alemán desautorizó el viernes al ministro que atribuyó a Qatar la financiación del Estado Islámico (EI). Pero el desliz del titular de Desarrollo, Gerd Müller, ha sacado a la luz una sospecha que a menudo se repite en Irak. Incluso su primer ministro, ahora en funciones, Nuri al Maliki, ha señalado al rico emirato y a Arabia Saudí como culpables de la situación actual. ¿En qué se funda esa grave alegación?

Por supuesto, los dos países, ambos aliados de EE UU —de quien dependen para su defensa—, rechazan esas acusaciones. Existen sin embargo algunos elementos que permiten a sus enemigos establecer conexiones que, aunque embarazosas, no prueban la causalidad que buscan.

Tanto Qatar como Arabia Saudí siguen la doctrina wahabí (ellos prefieren llamarla salafista), una interpretación del islam suní en la que muchos analistas encuentran la base doctrinal del radicalismo religioso que barre el mundo islámico. Aunque no todos los piadosos wahabíes apoyan el uso de la violencia, todos los grupos islamistas violentos han bebido de fuentes salafistas.

Esa ideología resultó extremadamente útil a EE UU en los años ochenta del siglo pasado cuando justificó la llamada a frenar a la infiel y comunista Unión Soviética en Afganistán. A los entregados saudíes y otros musulmanes que respondieron se les llamó muyahidín, literalmente “los que hacen la yihad”, término religioso imprecisamente traducido como guerra santa. Ellos fueron la semilla de Al Qaeda.

Algo similar estaría sucediendo ahora. Cuando se hizo evidente que EE UU (y Occidente por extensión) no tenía intención de intervenir en Siria para frenar la brutal represión con que Bachar el Asad acalló las iniciales protestas pacíficas, Riad y Doha —especialmente entusiasta con las primaveras árabes— facilitaron financiación y armas al revoltijo de grupos que intentaban formar el Ejército Libre de Siria, con la aprobación más o menos tácita de Washington.

Nadie sabe con certeza adónde fue a parar todo aquello. En el fragor del combate, las posiciones se radicalizaron y los diferentes grupos empezaron a competir por la ayuda. Siria se convirtió en una pieza apetitosa para Al Qaeda, además de un imán para musulmanes extremistas con prisa por llegar al cielo, o simples idealistas deseosos de ayudar a los hermanos sirios. En la prensa, empezamos a llamarles yihadistas; brigadistas hubiera sido más adecuado, aunque al final se han revelado meros terroristas.

Tal como ha documentado Rania Abouzeid en The Jihad Next Door (La yihad de al lado), los dirigentes de Al Qaeda encargaron inicialmente a su afiliado iraquí, el Estado Islámico en Irak (EII), que formara un grupo similar en Siria. Fue así como surgió el Al Nusra, cuyo éxito terminó produciendo una fractura en el frente yihadista. Cuando la central de Al Qaeda pidió al líder del EII, Abubaker al Bagdadi, que dejara Siria y se concentrara en Irak, éste respondió creando, en abril de 2013, el Estado Islámico en Irak y el Levante (EIIL, ahora Estado Islámico) y adoptó una línea aún más dura que la de sus mentores.

Entretanto, el grupo fue ampliando su negocio de extorsión con el control de campos de petróleo en Siria y, el pasado junio, con los depósitos de la cámara acorazada del Banco de Irak en Mosul. Hoy, después de que por casualidad se interceptaran varios lápices de memoria con las cuentas del grupo, sus activos se estiman en 2.000 millones de dólares (unos 1.500 millones de euros).

Una coalición enviará armas a los kurdos de Irak contra el Estado Islámico
España, a pesar del beneplácito de la UE, no participará en la operación de ocho países
Miguel González / Agencias Madrid 27 AGO 2014 - 17:25 CEST


El secretario de Defensa de EE UU, Chuck Hagel, ha anunciado este martes que Estados Unidos y varios países europeos intensificarán el envío de armas a las fuerzas kurdas de Irak que combaten al grupo yihadista del Estado islámico (EI).

"Completando el apoyo de los Estados Unidos y el Gobierno de Irak, siete naciones — Albania, Canadá, Croacia, Dinamarca, Italia, Francia y el Reino Unido—se han comprometido a suministrar armas y equipamiento a las fuerzas kurdas, que los necesitan con urgencia”, anunció Hagel. Según el secretario de Defensa, las operaciones de armamento “ han comenzado y se acelerarán en los próximos días con más países que se espera que contribuyan”.
más información

Alemania ultima el envío de armas a los kurdos del norte de Irak
La UE respalda que sus miembros envíen armas a los kurdos de Irak
Francia anuncia la entrega de armas a los kurdos de Irak

La Unión Europea ya dio hace 10 días el sí para el suministro de material bélico a las autoridades del Kurdistán iraquí en la defensa de la minoría yazidí y contra los planes de los yihadistas de crear un califato. Francia e Italia —favorables desde un primer momento al proyecto, auspiciado por EE UU— se impusieron a las reticencias iniciales del Gobierno alemán. Del acuerdo se derivó que la UE respalda a los Estados miembros para que suministren a las tropas kurdas “de acuerdo con sus posibilidades individuales” y extiende un paraguas político que las capitales podrán exhibir ante sus respectivas opiniones públicas.

A pesar de este consenso, España no piensa sumarse al plan de rearme. Fuentes diplomáticas alegaron que los suministros solicitados por los kurdos (munición, repuestos y equipos) son en su mayor parte de origen soviético, como las armas que los peshmergas están entrenados para utilizar, y no figuran en el stock de las Fuerzas Armadas españolas. Lo cierto es que algunos de los países que suministrarán material militar al Kurdistán iraquí (Italia, Francia, Dinamarca) tampoco disponen de armamento ruso, pero España parece haberse agarrado a la excusa “técnica” antes que abordar la cuestión política de fondo.

Mientras, el Gobierno alemán continúa enredado en sus dudas sobre lo idóneo de introducir más armas y municiones en una de las zonas más conflictivas del planeta. Alemania anunció el pasado miércoles su decisión de enviar material militar a Irak, pero siempre después de estudiar con detenimiento la situación.

La decisión final se tomará en una reunión entre la canciller Angela Merkel, sus ministros de Exteriores, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Defensa, Ursula von der Leyen, Economía, Sigmar Gabriel, y Finanzas, Wolfgang Schäuble.

Posteriormente, se consensuará con los líderes de los tres partidos que forman la gran coalición de gobierno en Berlín: Unión Cristianodemócrata, Partido Socialdemócrata y la Unión Socialcristiana. Finalmente, el lunes la canciller acudirá al Bundestag (cámara baja) para una declaración oficial sobre este asunto.

El portavoz del Ministerio de Defensa, Jens Flosdorff, ha evitado pronunciarse sobre el tipo de armamento que Berlín está contemplando enviar y tan sólo ha indicado que el Ejecutivo estudia qué es lo más conveniente teniendo en cuenta "qué tiene" Irak, "que se necesita" y "qué es lo que están enviando" otros países.

Flosdorff apuntó que Alemania ya ha enviado material militar "no letal" como chalecos antibala, detectores de explosivos, cascos y gafas de visión nocturna, entre otros.

La ONU enviará una misión a Irak para investigar los crímenes del EI
Cifra en 1.420 los iraquíes muertos en agosto por el conflicto

Lea aquí el comunicado de la ONU (en inglés)

Agencias Ginebra 1 SEP 2014 - 15:06 CEST


El avance del Estado Islámico (EI) en Irak se hizo especialmente cruento el pasado mes. Tan solo en agosto, 1.420 iraquíes han perdido la vida como consecuencia de los combates entre las milicias yihadistas del EI —fuertes en el norte y oeste del país— y el Ejército del recién nombrado primer ministro, el chií Haider Al Abadi, según los últimos datos de Naciones Unidas. La Alta Comisionada adjunta para los Derechos Humanos, Flavia Pansieri, ha afirmado este lunes en un debate en la sede de Naciones Unidas, en Ginebra (Suiza), que hay "pruebas sólidas" de que tanto los yihadistas como milicias asociadas han perpetrado atrocidades "en una escala inimaginable" durante los tres últimos meses de conflicto. Al final de la sesión de emergencia del Consejo de Derechos Humanos, la ONU aprobó de manera unánime enviar de manera urgente a Irak una misión de derechos humanos para investigar los crímenes perpetrados por los yihadistas del Estado Islámico.

La mayoría de las víctimas mortales registradas son civiles: al menos 1.265 murieron y 1.198 sufrieron heridas, frente a los 155 muertos y 172 heridos en las filas de las fuerzas de seguridad del país. En un comunicado, la UNAMI (la misión de Naciones Unidas en Irak), señaló que la cifra de víctimas puede ser "significativamente más alta" debido a las dificultades para verificar estos datos en las zonas bajo control del EI y otros grupos armados.
más información

La vida fracasa bajo el califato
La huida de iraquíes por el peligro yihadista desborda el Kurdistán
Guerra psicológica del yihadismo
Una coalición enviará armas a los kurdos contra los yihadistas

El recuento excluye a los muertos en la provincia occidental de Al Anbar, que los extremistas disputan desde enero pasado, y donde se cree perdieron la vida el pasado mes 268 iraquíes. Un total de 625 personas perecieron en la provincia de Nínive, en el norte del país, capturada por el EI en junio pasado y escenario de combates entre los yihadistas y las fuerzas iraquíes y kurdas.

"Solo en agosto la ONU estima que 600.000 personas se han visto desplazadas y que miles continúan siendo asesinadas por el EI y otros grupos aliados por razones de etnia y religión", denunció el representante de la ONU en Irak, Nickolay Mladenov. Las comunidades cristianas, yazidíes, turcomanas, kakais, shabaks, y musulmanes chiíes han sido los principales blancos de la represión del Estado Islámico.

"Estas comunidades han convivido en el mismo territorio durante siglos y en algunos casos milenios", puntualiza la Alta Comisionada adjunta para los Derechos Humanos, que ha calificado las acciones del EI como "limpieza étnica y religiosa". Aunque no ha podido verificar esos datos, la UNAMI reconoció que ha recibido informes de cientos de víctimas en algunas zonas, y casos de civiles fallecidos tanto por la violencia como por falta de agua, alimentos y medicinas en su huida o como resultado de asedios.

La ONU también denunció los bombardeos aereos y de artillería por parte del Ejército iraquí sobre las poblaciones de Kirkuk, Faluya, and Salahudin. "Los ataques sistemáticos e intencionales sobre civiles podrían constituir crímenes de guerra y contra la humanidad. Los responsables de estos actos son los individuos, incluso los comandantes" advirtió Pansieri.

"El verdadero coste humano de esta tragedia es impactante", lamentó el representante de la ONU en Irak, que se congratuló por los esfuerzos humanitarios efectuados por las autoridades del Kurdistán iraquí y la comunidad internacional. Sumándose al apoyo de EE UU e Irak, ocho países - Albania, Canadá, Croacia, Dinamarca, Italia, Francia, Reino Unido y Alemania - se han comprometido a suministrar armas a las fuerzas kurdas del norte para contrarrestar el avance yihadista del EI.

Londres se plantea armar directamente a los kurdos de Irak contra el califato
Londres había aceptado transportar material militar de países terceros a Kurdistán

Londres contempla la posibilidad de atacar por aire a los yihadistas

Walter Oppenheimer Londres 4 SEP 2014 - 21:26 CEST



El primer ministro británico, David Cameron, se ha declarado por primera vez dispuesto a armar directamente a los kurdos para afrontar la ofensiva de los radicales yihadistas en Irak. Hasta ahora, Londres ha aceptado hacerse cargo del transporte a Kurdistán de material militar de países terceros, aunque no armas propiamente dichas. El primer ministro, sin embargo, condicionó las ayudas a Irak al establecimiento en Bagdad de un Gobierno inclusivo.

A pesar de la retórica con la que Cameron está afrontando las crisis paralelas de Irak y de Siria, Londres ha sido hasta ahora reticente a armar directamente a los kurdos, algo que sí han decidido por su cuenta países como Alemania, Francia, Italia, Estados Unidos o Australia. Sin embargo, las reticencias británicas parecen haber desparecido casi por completo y el propio primer ministro así lo dio a entender en unas declaraciones en Newport (Gales), donde es anfitrión de la cumbre de jefes de Estado o de Gobierno de la OTAN. “Estamos preparados para hacer más, y estamos considerando activamente si les damos armas nosotros y si podemos entrenar más directamente a la milicia kurda, ya estamos jugando allí un papel pero queremos hacer más”, declaró el primer ministro.
más información

España rehúye la intervención directa o el rearme de los kurdos
La OTAN, contra el Ejército islámico
Un enemigo difícil de golpear, por JESUS A. NÚÑEZ VILLAVERDE
Londres contempla la posibilidad de atacar por aire a los yihadistas

Downing Street ya confirmó el pasado día 25 el nombramiento del teniente general Simon Mayall como enviado especial del Gobierno británico en la región de Kurdistán. Mayall viajó la semana pasada a la zona y se entrevistó con el presidente Masoud Barzani para discutir cómo los británicos pueden ayudar a la milicia kurda a combatir al Estado Islámico.

El primer ministro, no obstante, pareció condicionar cualquier ayuda directa a Irak a que se forme antes un Gobierno plural e inclusivo en el país. “Una de las razones por las que hemos llegado a la situación actual es que en Irak no tenemos un Gobierno de esa naturaleza”, declaró Cameron. “Lo que hace más falta es un Gobierno en Bagdad que represente a todos los iraquíes”, añadió.

La presión política para que Reino Unido tenga un papel más activo en la zona se ha multiplicado desde la ejecución de dos periodistas de Estados Unidos que estaban secuestrados en Siria por el Estado Islámico, sobre todo por el hecho de que el yihadista que aparentemente degüella a los rehenes occidentales es un británico. Y porque la última filmación, difundida esta misma semana, da a entender que la próxima víctima puede ser un rehén británico que aparece en las imágenes finales.

Aunque su identidad ya había sido ampliamente divulgada en el exterior, los medios británicos no han publicado hasta este jueves que se trata de David Haines, un escocés de 44 años y con dos hijos que lleva 15 años trabajando con distintas organizaciones humanitarias en Libia, Sudán del Sur y la antigua Yugoslavia.

Fue secuestrado en Siria en marzo pasado junto al italiano Federico Motka apenas dos semanas después de haber llegado al país de la mano de la organización humanitaria francesa Acted. Trabajaban en un campo de refugiados en la provincia de Idlib, junto a la frontera con Turquía. Motka fue liberado en mayo.

La Alianza discute medidas para frenar a los yihadistas en Irak y Siria
Obama y Cameron presionan para una intervención armada con respaldo de la OTAN
Lucía Abellán Newport 4 SEP 2014 - 21:50 CEST


El régimen del terror que imponen los islamistas radicales en Oriente Próximo alarma a la OTAN tanto o más que Rusia, aunque la estrategia para frenarlos sea aún difusa. El avance del llamado Estado Islámico (EI), que ha instalado un califato represor en zonas de Irak y Siria, presidió el jueves buena parte de las reuniones bilaterales que mantuvieron los líderes de la organización atlántica, así como la cena oficial que celebraron cerca de Cardiff (Gales). La presión crece para que los países aliados intervengan en la zona, una idea que la Alianza Atlántica rechaza como organización. Los mandatarios de Estados Unidos, Barack Obama, y de Reino Unido, David Cameron, instaron a la Alianza a abandonar impulsos “aislacionistas”.

La OTAN mantiene una postura ambigua ante el avance yihadista en Oriente Próximo. Su secretario general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, aplaude las iniciativas individuales para contrarrestar a ese régimen, pero elude comprometer una acción conjunta. “Celebro que los Estados hayan dado pasos individuales para ayudar a Irak. Celebro la acción militar estadounidense para frenar el avance del Estado Islámico. Celebro que otros países hayan contribuido de diversas formas. Creo que la comunidad internacional en su conjunto tiene la obligación de impedir que el Estado Islámico avance más, pero en lo que respecta a la OTAN, no hemos recibido ninguna petición para un compromiso”, justificó Rasmussen en el arranque de la cumbre.
más información

Londres se plantea armar a los kurdos de Irak contra el califato
Adaptación y competición, por F. REINARES

Esa petición llegó a través de los medios de comunicación —y también estaba prevista para la cena de jefes de Estado y de Gobierno— personificada en Obama y Cameron. Ambos líderes publicaron un artículo en el diario británico The Times en el que llamaban a la colaboración aliada. Lo único que ha ofrecido hasta ahora la organización es cooperar con Irak sin intervenir en el conflicto. Rasmussen recordó que la OTAN ya mantuvo una misión de adiestramiento de las fuerzas iraquíes hasta 2011, que podría reanudarse. “Si el Gobierno iraquí lo solicitara, los aliados lo considerarían seriamente”, aseguró ante la prensa.

Esa ayuda resulta ahora escasa y casi inviable con las estructuras del Estado iraquí claramente desbordadas por el desafío suní del Estado Islámico. Obama aspira a mucho más cuando pide respaldo a los bombardeos que está efectuando en la zona. “Sabemos que si se une la comunidad internacional podemos seguir reduciendo la esfera de influencia del EI hasta que se convierta en un problema manejable. Se trata de estar seguros de que tenemos la estrategia correcta, pero también de que tenemos la voluntad internacional de hacerlo”, aseguró el presidente estadounidense antes de la cumbre.

A su llegada al encuentro, Cameron dijo estar sopesando unirse a la ronda de ataques aéreos de Estados Unidos en la zona. “Deberíamos hacer lo que podamos para ayudar a quienes quieren construir un Irak para todos los iraquíes”. El líder británico es el único que de momento ha considerado públicamente esa opción y ha preparado a su opinión pública con una serie de entrevistas a los principales medios británicos. Reino Unido y Estados Unidos son los países más directamente concernidos por el horror islamista después de que la organización haya decapitado a dos periodistas estadounidenses secuestrados en Siria y amague con hacer lo mismo con otro reportero británico cautivo en la zona.

Más tibiamente, también Francia ha abierto la puerta a una mayor intervención en este conflicto porque los radicales suníes representan “una amenaza para toda la región y más allá de ella”, según su presidente, François Hollande.

La daga
La asepsia informática de las armas modernas parece eximirlas del odio y del fanatismo
Manuel Vicent 7 SEP 2014 - 00:00 CEST


He aquí una imagen sagrada, absolutamente atroz. El verdugo yihadista del Estado Islámico exhibe una daga dispuesto a decapitar a una segunda víctima inocente, arrodillada a sus pies, el periodista norteamericano Steve Joel Sotloff, vestido con uniforme naranja, como los prisioneros de Guantánamo. Un tercer prisionero se halla ya preparado para el degüello ritual. Se trata de una ceremonia escenificada como un sacrificio litúrgico, una mezcla de venganza, oración y desafío, en honor al presidente Obama. Frente al diseño zen de los misiles y de los drones, en los que solo se valora su eficacia bélica y su rentabilidad en la industria armamentística, la imagen de la daga exhibida por el sicario yihadista nos lleva a la zona más oscura de nuestra cultura religiosa. En la historia sagrada la daga preside los lances de Judit y Holofernes, de Herodías y la cabeza del Bautista; también la llevamos asociada a muchos mártires cristianos y a relatos sarracenos del antiguo califato de Damasco. Da la sensación de que las armas modernas combaten entre ellas al margen del ejército al que pertenecen. Su asepsia informática parece eximirlas del odio y del fanatismo. A un misil de cualquier bando se le da la orden y después de apretar el botón su servidor puede irse tranquilamente a tomarse un gin-tonic. El misil sabe lo que tiene que hacer. Buscará por su cuenta el arma contraria sin que le importe nada la carnicería que provoque. En cambio, el verdugo acerca el cuchillo al cuello de la víctima y antes de separarle la cabeza del cuerpo le invita a condenar a toda nuestra civilización con palabras rituales, patéticas. A su vez el verdugo con una oración culpa de la sangre que va a derramar a un enemigo concreto. La acción de la daga en este sacrificio de un cordero humano tiene un impacto más demoledor que cualquier bombardeo.

Estados Unidos amplía operaciones de combate a yihadistas en el oeste de Irak
Afp, Dpa, Reuters y Ap

Periódico La Jornada
Lunes 8 de septiembre de 2014, p. 28
Bagdad, 7 de septiembre.

Con el apoyo de la aviación militar estadunidense, tropas iraquíes y combatientes sunitas lanzaron una ofensiva contra posiciones del Estado Islámico (EI) para alejarlos de la presa Haditha, mientras el presidente Barack Obama anunció hoy que el miércoles dará a conocer su estrategia contra la organización religiosa-militar que proclamó en junio un califato en Siria e Irak, sin enviar fuerzas terrestres de su país.

En una operación que significó una ampliación de las operaciones estadunidenses hacia el oeste de Irak, aviones no tripulados (drones) y naves de combate destruyeron vehículos y armas del EI, al tiempo que facilitaron a la tropa iraquí la recuperación de la ciudad de Barwana, que desde julio estaba bajo control de los yihadistas.

La presa Haditha es la segunda en importancia de Irak después del embalse de Mosul, que en conjunto representan las principales fuentes de abastecimiento de agua y electricidad para Bagdad.

El portavoz militar estadunidense, John Kirby, dijo que una eventual ocupación de la represa Haditha era una amenaza para las instalaciones de su país en Bagdad, donde actualmente hay 800 elementos del Pentágono que capacitan a soldados de la provincia autónoma del Kurdistán iraquí.

Estados Unidos volvió a intervenir militarmente en Irak el 8 de agosto, luego de que el EI lanzó una ofensiva en junio que le permitió apoderarse de una extensa zona del norte iraquí.

Ese territorio, conectado al norte de Siria, fue proclamado un califato que reclama la autoridad de todos los musulmanes del mundo, estableciendo su capital en Raqa, donde las fuerzas armadas sirias mataron a decenas de milicianos del EU entre sábado y domingo.

Pese a que Washington armó el viernes una coalición de 10 países para combatir al EI, el gobierno de Irán se mostró hoy escéptico respecto de las intenciones estadunidenses.

El canciller iraní, Mohammad Javad Zarif, dijo que Estados Unidos no es muy serio en su lucha contra el EI, puesto que lo ha ayudado de diversas maneras en Siria, durante la guerra civil que lleva tres años.

Mientras, la televisora Al Jazeera alimentó hoy las dudas sobre la relación entre el EI, Washington y Londres, al retirar por incorrecto un reportaje en el que puso en duda la autenticidad de los videos en los que fueron decapitados dos periodistas estadunidenses.

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Islamic State group name raises objection
Islamic State: Fighters: Militant Islamist fighters wave flags as they take part in a military parade along the streets of Syria's northern Raqqa province on June 30, 2014. Reuters
Militant Islamist fighters wave flags as they take part in a military parade along the streets of Syria's northern Raqqa province on June 30, 2014.
AP 51 min ago By VIVIAN SALAMA of Associated Press

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BAGHDAD (AP) — Propaganda has been one of the core strategies of the Sunni militant group in Syria and Iraq that today calls itself the Islamic State — and its name is very much a part of that.

In July, the group's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, announced its rebranding. He declared that the territory under his control would be part of a caliphate, or an Islamic state, shortening its name from Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL — the acronym used by the Obama administration and the British Foreign Office to this day. The Levant can refer to all countries bordering on the eastern Mediterranean, from Greece to Egypt.

Different translations for the name of the al-Qaida splinter group have emerged since the early days of its existence.

Some have chosen to call it the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS. The final word in Arabic — al-Sham — can be translated as Levant, Syria, or as Damascus.

Arab governments have long refrained from using Islamic State, instead referring to it by the Arabic acronym for its full original name, Daesh — short for Dawlat al-Islamiyah f'al-Iraq w Belaad al-Sham.

Several residents in Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city which fell to the extremist group in June, told The Associated Press that the militants threatened to cut the tongue of anyone who publicly used the acronym Daesh, instead of referring to the group by its full name, saying it shows defiance and disrespect. The residents spoke anonymously out of fear for their safety.

The inconsistency, while confusing for some, has not deterred the group's growing exposure on social media, with so many hashtags, posts and tweets ultimately directing readers and viewers to their news. Despite being associated to about a half-dozen names and acronyms, the group's brutal objectives are becoming increasingly clear.

Prior to the group's self-declared rebranding in July, The Associated Press opted to refer to it as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, believing it was the most accurate translation.

The AP now uses phrases like "the Islamic State group," or "fighters from the Islamic State group," to avoid phrasing that sounds like they could be fighting for an internationally recognized state.

"The word 'state' implies a system of administration and governance," said David L. Phillips, the director of Peace-Building and Rights Program at Columbia University. "It's not a term that would be used to characterize a terrorist group or militia that is merely rolling up territory."

"Part of their strategy is to establish administration over lands that they control so that they demonstrate that they are more than just a fighting force," Phillips added. Equally problematic is the use of the word "Islamic" in its name, with some calling it blasphemous.

On Wednesday, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius referred to the group as Daesh, calling them "butchers" who do not represent Islam or a state. He urged others to do the same.

Egypt's top Islamic authority, Grand Mufti Ibrahim Negm, last month called on the international community to refer to the group as "al-Qaida separatists" and not the Islamic State.

"Their savage acts don't coincide with the name of Islam," said Sunni cleric Hameed Marouf Hameed, an official with Iraq's Sunni religious endowment. "They incite hatred, violence and killing and these acts have no place in any real Islamic state."

___

Associated Press reporters Sameer N. Yacoub in Baghdad, Angela Charlton in Paris and Greg Katz in London contributed to this report.

ISIS tiene más 31 mil combatientes en sus filas, calcula CIA
Redacción 24 HORAS Septiembre 11, 2014 7:37 pm
Estos números suponen un aumento de al menos 10 mil milicianos en los últimos meses

WASHINGTON. La Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA) de Estados Unidos estima que el grupo yihadista Estado Islámico de Irak y el Levante (ISIS, por sus siglas en inglés) tiene hasta entre 20 mil y 31,500 combatientes en sus filas, aproximadamente el doble de lo que calculaba antes del mes de mayo, informó a la agencia de noticias EFE un portavoz de la agencia.

Estos números suponen un aumento de al menos 10 mil milicianos en los últimos meses, debido a un “reclutamiento mayor desde junio tras los éxitos (del EI) en el campo de batalla y la declaración de un califato”, explicó el portavoz bajo la condición de anonimato.

La CIA dio a conocer estas cifras tan sólo 24 horas después de que el presidente de la nación, Barack Obama, anunciara su campaña para frenar a ISIS, una operación que se amplía ahora a Siria e incluye el envío de 475 militares más a Irak.

Los nuevos datos corresponden a los últimos informes de la CIA, elaborados entre mayo y agosto, un intervalo en el que la amenaza del EI se ha hecho lo suficientemente fuerte como para obligar a Obama a intervenir en un escenario al que había sido reticente hasta ahora: Siria.

También hoy se ha conocido que los vuelos de reconocimiento sobre Siria que Obama autorizó a finales de agosto comenzaron este jueves tras el discurso del presidente a la nación la noche anterior, según fuentes oficiales citadas por la cadena CNN.

Obama detalló que enviará 475 soldados adicionales a Irak que “no van a tener una misión de combate”. Los cuales se unirán a más de mil fuerzas que ya están ahí para realizar ataques aéreos sistemáticos.

“Quiero que el pueblo estadounidense comprenda cómo este esfuerzo será diferente a las guerras en Irak y Afganistán”, señaló desde la Casa Blanca en un mensaje televisado a la nación y el mundo.

DE

Estado Islámico decapita ahora a un ciudadano británico
LA REDACCIÓN
13 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2014
DESTACADO

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Imagen tomada del video de la tercera decapitación.
MÉXICO, D.F. (proceso.com.mx).- El Estado Islámico (ISIS, por sus siglas en inglés) difundió este sábado un video que muestra la decapitación del trabajador humanitario británico David Cawthorne Haines.


https://youtu.be/X0wakoYkFFc

Según la cadena estadunidense NBC, Haines, de 44 años, es un exsoldado que trabajaba para organizaciones de ayuda humanitaria. En marzo de 2013 fue capturado por terroristas cerca de un campo de refugiados en la frontera entre Turquía y Siria durante una misión humanitaria con la Agencia de Cooperación Técnica y Desarrollo (ACTED).

Una fuente de la ONG Nonviolent Peaceforce confirmó que Haines había trabajado para ellos en Sudán del Sur en 2012 y estaba contratado por otra firma cuando fue secuestrado.

En el video, titulado “Un mensaje a los aliados de América”, se amenaza también con ejecutar a su compatriota y colega de profesión, Alan Henning, si el primer ministro británico David Cameron “persiste en combatir” al ISIS.

La grabación inicia con un discurso anterior del primer ministro británico seguido por un mensaje a “los aliados de Estados Unidos”.

“Quiero declarar que mantengo en ti, David Cameron, toda la responsabilidad de mi ejecución”, dice Haines, aparentemente siguiendo un guión prestablecido.

“Entraste voluntariamente a una coalición con los Estados Unidos contra el Estado Islámico. De la misma manera que lo hizo tu predecesor, Tony Blair. Es una tendencia entre nuestros Primeros Ministros británicos, la de no tener el coraje de decir que no a los estadunidenses”, continúa.

Haines es el tercer preso occidental que decapita el ISIS desde que, hace tres meses, la fuerza aérea estadunidense inició sus bombardeos sobre posiciones estratégicas de los yihadistas en el norte de Irak.

“Desafortunadamente, somos nosotros, el pueblo británico, el que al final paga el precio de las decisiones egoístas de nuestros parlamentarios”, fueron las últimas palabras de David Haines.

“Tu alianza diabólica con América, que sigue castigando a los Musulmanes en Irak y que más recientemente bombardeó la presa de Hadiza -centro de Irak- sólo acelerará tu destrucción”, afirma el verdugo encapuchado con cuchillo en mano.

En el video se advierte a los aliados de Estados Unidos que no intenten iniciar una acción militar contra el Estado Islámico porque tienen en sus manos a otro británico secuestrado, llamado Alan Henning, que podría ser ejecutado próximamente.

“Si tú, Cameron, insistes en pelear contra el Estado Islámico entonces, al igual que Obama, tendrás en tus manos la sangre de tu pueblo”, advierte.

Why Obama's ISIS Speech Is No Strategy: 5 Concerns Going Forward

"If making a speech served as strategy, then FDR would have checked that block by declaring Pearl Harbor a day of infamy. But not so."
James Jay Carafano

September 11, 2014
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If making a speech served as strategy, then FDR would have checked that block by declaring Pearl Harbor a day of infamy. But not so.

Long before the Japanese bombers and Zeros hit Pearl, Roosevelt’s team had put in months of hard thinking, planning and decision-making to prepare for the nightmare scenario of a two-front conflict with Germany and Japan. And after the outbreak of World War II, the lights in the Oval Office continued to burn long into the nights to hone the life-line of a guiding idea into a war-winning instrument.

Today, we still know little of President Obama's strategy to "destroy” ISIS. He articulated a guiding idea: if you threaten America, there will be no sanctuary. And we heard him pledge to conduct a systematic and sustained counter-terrorism campaign, hunting down terrorists wherever they are (including Syria, if necessary). But these are aspirations, not strategy.

With talk of a nine-member coalition, the White House has surely whipped something together. But we are left wondering if it will be good enough, and if Obama will see it through.

In the best case scenario, last night's speech should mark the start of a bipartisan consensus that the nation hasn't seen since the day after 9/11. That would be welcome development. For far too long the maxim “politics ought to end at the water's edge” has been a tagline for jokes by the Capitol Steps.

Almost everyone shares the president’s recognition that it’s most certainly in our national interest to help the Iraqi people drive ISIS out of Iraq and to limit the potential of ISIS to strike at the U.S. and its friends and allies. Polls suggest the American people support the mission. Congressional leaders in both parties seem anxious for the president to act. The Western allies are in. The Arab States want action. Obama can move forward with as much confidence as any American war leader that his people and our allies have his back.

Message to Mr. Obama: Don't squander a good thing.

Five concerns arise from what was—and wasn’t—said last night. The White House will have to address all five to reassure Americans and our friend abroad that the Oval Office is following a suitable, feasible and acceptable course to victory.

Concern #1:This is not about Syria.

The future of Iraq impacts on the vital national interests of the U.S. The future of Syria does not. If ISIS is defeated and driven back into Syria, the president can go back to calling them the JV team. ISIS became a problem because it took over a third of Iraq. Solve that and… problem solved.

A weakened ISIS driven from Iraq will spend most of its time worrying about how it will survive being attacked by all sides in Syria. Further, there is no near-term military solution to Syria. As long as Iran and Russia are willing to prop up Assad, the Bathists will fight on.

It is conceivable that the U.S. might find some cause to undertake or support some limited military activities in Syria to help complete the mission of driving ISIS out and keeping it on the other side of the Iraqi border. Proportional, reasonable military tasks like that make sense, but that's different from maximalist mission of turning Syria into the land of milk and honey.

U.S. activities might involve aiding some rebel groups within Syria. That should be nothing new. It always made sense to provide some support to rebel groups to help defend innocents, prevent genocide and fight for freedom—as long as the U.S. took reasonable precautions that the aid was used responsibly, served a purpose, and didn't fall into the hands of Islamists. Nothing much has changed, rebels might serve some ancillary role in driving ISIS out of Iraq, but they can’t serve as a centerpiece of the U.S. strategy. That's unrealistic and unnecessary.

The Syrian civil war is related, but a sideshow to what has to be the main effort. Even if we wanted to undertake robust operations in Syria, it is doubtful that we have the intelligence and support networks necessary to conduct them effectively. The whole discussion on Syria is a bit of a strategic distraction.

Concern #2: Don't empower the Iranian regime and Assad.

They are equal with ISIS on the evil meter. ISIS can and should be squashed without doing Tehran and Damascus any favors. After all, Obama has already "helped" both bad regimes--and ISIS broke out anyway. The chemical weapons “deal" with Assad allowed Moscow to prop up the Syrian strongman even more and relieved some of the international pressure on his regime. Meanwhile, the nuclear negotiations have given Iran’s mullahs much needed financial relief. Such “smart diplomacy” has only strengthened both countries and complicated the strategic chaos in the region.

Conversely, crushing ISIS won't be of much good to either of them. They both have plenty of enemies in the region left to make their life miserable. In fact, Obama should work to belittle ISIS and add to their misery at the same time.

Concern #3: Don't obsess about mission creep.

The president spends more time explaining what he won’t do than what he will. Mission creep becomes a problem only when war leaders have no idea what the mission is or no real appreciation for the force required to get the job done. There is no need for massive U.S. combat ground efforts like there was during the invasion or the surge. The Iraqis, if adequately supported, can win back their country.

Moreover, it is uber irresponsible to spell out what you are not going to do. That just makes your enemies’ job of planning easier because they know what to expect.


There are three aspects of the mission, in particular, where the president ought to be more, not less, aggressive. First, time is not our friend. Taking down ISIS at a cautious, leisurely pace makes no sense. It took them three months to take a third of Iraq. It can't take three years to take it back. The longer ISIS roots in, the harder it will be to root them out.

Second, Obama needs to worry about cities like Mosul. Airpower serves a much more limited role in urban combat. Winning without destroying a city requires seasoned, disciplined troops. The Iraqis don't have much of those.

Third, the pipeline is a problem. Getting a handle on the networks funneling bad guys in and out of Iraq has to be a priority. The administration must focus on the "bottlenecks"—the countries of transit where the bad guys stage to go in and out of the theater.

Concern #4: Worry about what comes after.

Driving ISIS out of Iraq is completely doable. But there needs to be a plan to keep them from coming back, as well as presenting a resurgence of a sectarian divide, a new campaign of terrorism, petty vendettas or more Iranian meddling.

A good answer might look a lot like getting back to 2008, with its international force of sufficient size and authority to deter outside aggression, conduct counterterrorism operations and robustly defend itself. That sounds like 30,000 troops and 10 years--maybe not American or all-American troops, but somebody responsible and capable. Obama needs to start wrapping his head around that one now.

Concern #5: Please don't play politics with Iraq.

Anytime a president ponders putting Americans in harm's way and there is time to consult, he ought to seek a nod from Congress. An Authorization for Use of Military Force would make perfect sense.

But pairing the AUMF with the CR on government funding makes no sense. An AUMF deliberation ought to focus solely on that issue; it should not become a wedge or hammer in debating the myriad of other policies considered in crafting a continuing resolution. It would be the height of irresponsibility to bundle everything into one hurried haphazard debate. Congress ought to do better.

Further, the White House should not slam the CR with massive new bills for Iraq operations on highly controversial matters--like massive funding for the Syrian rebels. The CR will likely be short term. There is time for the Congress to come back and deliberate big, additional funding requests in the course of preparing an appropriations bill or a longer term CR. Should the White House repeat the tactic it tried for “dealing” with the border crisis--pressing Congress to whip out the check book without any serious deliberation—it would likely poison the well again.

If the president can manage these five concerns well, there is a war to be quickly won. If he can't address them, this rare American moment of unity may not last long. It’s really up to the president to act presidential. All he has to remember is: he is sitting in Roosevelt's room.

James Jay Carafano is a Heritage Foundation vice president, in charge of the think tank’s foreign and domestic policy studies.

Image: U.S. Air Force Flickr.

We Have Met the Source of Questionable Strategy and He Is Us
Paul R. Pillar

September 12, 2014
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The voluminous commentary about President Obama's speech on going after ISIS reflects the usual mixture of genuine policy analysis and pursuit of political agendas. A prevalent misdirection exhibited both by those politically opposed to this particular president and those who support him, as well as by many of those who are neutral, is to assume that the strategy laid out in the speech is primarily the product of Barack Obama's thinking and preferences. It isn't. Many of us, if we took full account of current American perceptions and sentiments about ISIS, longer American habits in thinking about terrorism, and the political requirements of serving as U.S. president could have written pretty much the same speech. The strategy in it is primarily the product of those public perceptions, sentiments, and habits, which are too strong for most American politicians, including those in Congress as well as the White House, to resist.

We cannot read Barack Obama's mind, but the frequently voiced comment, mostly from confirmed critics of the president, that he only slowly realized ISIS to be a serious menace and is belatedly recognizing the need to act forcefully against it is very likely incorrect. It is far more probable that the president's assessment of the group and of the costs and risks of the various measures that might be taken against it has stayed fairly constant. What evolved, and evolved rapidly, was the public alarm about the group. This latter interpretation conforms more closely to how we have seen Barack Obama operate and how we have seen American public opinion (and the political responses to it) operate. Mr. Obama had tried (somewhat, though not hard enough) to convey a careful and reasonable assessment of the group's significance, and of the downsides of possible further U.S. actions in the Middle East. But reasonableness lost out to a groundswell of public sentiment.

There will be disappointments and failures in some of the measures the president described in his speech, and some of the risks involved are apt to materialize into serious costs to U.S. interests. The failures and costs, as well as whatever successes might come from the measures to be taken, should be attributed less to the mind of Barack Obama than to the collective mental habits of the American public.

The most fundamental respect in which this is true is with the overall degree of alarm about ISIS, which far exceeds what would be warranted by careful and sober analysis of the threat that this group, notwithstanding its abhorrent brutality, poses to U.S. interests. Prevailing public sentiment has equated gains in dusty territory in the Middle East with the threat of a terrorist spectacular in the U.S. homeland. The American public is basing its perception on emotion, and its record in gauging terrorist threats that way is poor. It reacts to the past rather than assessing the future. It is reacting now not only to the past trauma of 9/11 but to also to the gruesomeness of recent videotaped killings of captives—which does not tell us much more about ISIS than we already knew, apart from confirming the group's willingness to do deadly things in response to U.S. use of force against it, which does not constitute an argument to use force.

The American public looks at terrorism in general not as the timeless tactic that it is but rather in terms of its embodiment in specific named groups or individuals—“the terrorists”—whom the public believes must be eliminated. This view overlooks the frequently changing roster of groups emerging and dying, splitting and metastasizing. It also overlooks the whole motivations side of when and why anyone either joins or forms a group that has used terrorism, and when and why a resistance group already in existence would resort to terrorism, especially terrorism against the United States. And it overlooks whether mounting a very visible campaign against a group may play into the group's own plans and ambitions.

The conception of counterterrorism as consisting of the elimination of a fixed group of bad guys is related to the further American inclination to equate counterterrorism with use of military force. The whole “war on terror” metaphor exacerbated this unfortunate tendency. Military force is only one of several counterterrorist instruments, it is not necessarily the best one to use in any one circumstance, and the sorts of terrorist activity that ought to worry us the most present few good military targets. Disproportionate emphasis on the military instrument also tends to be associated with underestimation of the counterproductive effects that ensue when collateral damage leads to more anger and more motivation to resort to terrorism.

This emphasis also has been associated with the argument advanced by political opponents of Mr. Obama that somehow if he had found a way to extend the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq beyond the eight and a half years it had already lasted that ISIS would not have been a problem. This argument has always been rather rich, given that ISIS, under a different name, came into existence as a direct result of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and overthrow of the incumbent regime. The historical amnesia involved with the argument extends as well to events later in the last decade, when even the “surge”—although it temporarily reversed the escalating violence in Iraq, as 30,000 U.S. troops ought to have been able to do—failed to achieve its more fundamental objective of making possible political accommodations in Baghdad that in turn would make possible stability in Iraq. This experience shows how especially fanciful is the notion that a later and smaller presence of U.S. troops would somehow have made Nouri al-Maliki behave like a good prime minister who would practice inclusive and non-authoritarian politics.

Another recurring pattern in the American public philosophy that is not unique to the issue of terrorism but has been been especially apparent with it is that, simply put, any problem has a feasible solution, and that it is within the power of the United States to achieve that solution. If a serious problem persists, according to this view, then it is only because incumbent U.S. policy-makers have lacked the will or the smarts to find and implement the right solution. This mindset will be the basic source of disappointment with any expectation of “destroying” a terrorist group rather than just degrading or containing it.

The same mindset also keeps knocking up against reality in Syria, where there have been no good solutions, for the United States any more than for others to implement. Here is where we hear another recurring “if only”argument from opponents of the administration, to the effect that if only more aid had been given earlier to “moderate” oppositionists, extremists such as ISIS would not have become as much of a problem as they have. This search for, and focus on, the elusive moderates has been such a salient issue for so long that it is a safe bet that it has been one of the most exhaustively studied topics for the administration, well before this week's presidential speech. Among the realities that any such study would have uncovered are that what passes for a moderate Syrian opposition has always been badly divided and lacking in internal support, that the dynamics of civil warfare inherently favor the less inhibited—by definition, less moderate—elements, that it is almost impossible to provide material aid to such elements without some of that aid making its way (as it already has) into the hands of the very forces such as ISIS that we want to counter, and that there is no way of squaring the circle of beating back ISIS without effectively aiding the Syrian regime that we also supposedly would like to be defeated.

But in a larger anti-ISIS arena in which good solutions also may be hard to come by, and in which the popular and political American resistance to reintroducing U.S. combat troops is still a major factor, we keep coming back by default to this business of trying to aid “moderate” Syrian rebels. Congressional pusillanimity plays a significant role here: members of neither party want to vote before midterm elections on an authorization to use U.S. military forces, but supporting anything about aiding the proverbial moderates in Syria is a no-U.S.-boots-on-the-ground way for members to show their anti-ISIS enthusiasm. Bob Corker, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, commented that “since there has been bipartisan support for arming the moderate opposition,” maybe the administration gave it a prominent place in its anti-ISIS package “because they thought this is the one piece that they could get a lot of congressional buy-in on without doing a lot of selling” He's probably right.

Yep, there is a lot in that package that deserves questioning and criticism. In searching for the reasons why, most Americans ought to look first not at the man in the White House but instead in the mirror.

Obama’s Real ISIS Strategy: Reassure a Concerned Public
James M. Lindsay

September 11, 2014
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Anyone who tuned into President Obama’s address to the nation last night expecting to hear a detailed plan to defeat ISIS came away disappointed. The president spoke mostly in generalities and skirted tough questions. But laying out a detailed plan that would pass muster with experts wasn’t his primary purpose. Reassuring a public worried about the ISIS threat, and his response to it, was.

The one specific piece of news Obama announced was that 475 U.S. troops will head to Iraq to support and train Iraqi and Kurdish forces. He also said for the first time that “I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria.” He didn’t, however, elaborate on what that action might look like or what circumstances might trigger it.

Obama was also specific in describing who ISIS currently threatened: people in the Middle East, not Americans. He only granted that ISIS might become a threat to the United States “if left unchecked.”

That assessment puts Obama at odds with his critics. It also puts him at odds with his own advisers. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has called ISIS an “imminent threat to every interest we have,” while Secretary of State John Kerry said it “poses a severe threat.” But Obama’s assessment does reflect the judgment of the U.S. intelligence community.

Obama similarly disagreed with himself, not for the first time, on the powers of the presidency. As a senator he argued that presidents needed congressional authorization before using military force. In 2011 he waged war against Libya without going to Congress. A year ago he did an about face and asked Congress to authorize him to strike chemical weapons sites in Syria. Last night he only said he would “welcome congressional support” for his effort to stop ISIS. He said nothing about what he might do to encourage Congress to give him the support he says he wants.

Obama also left many obvious questions about his strategy unanswered. Why is the new Iraqi government likely to be a more effective partner than its predecessor, which allowed ISIS to conquer a third of the country? Who are the other members of the coalition America is leading and what will they do? Can the United States degrade ISIS without strengthening Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, who Obama has said must go? Have U.S. drone strikes in Yemen and Somalia, which the president held up as a model for attacking ISIS, been as successful as he suggests? And perhaps most important, what will success in the effort to degrade and defeat ISIS look like?

But Obama’s real audience was not the experts who are asking those questions today. It was the two out of three Americans who have come to doubt that he is up to the foreign policy challenges the United States now faces. They do not want another U.S. military intervention abroad, but they also worry that he has been too cautious in responding to a world that seems to be spinning out of control. Obama’s focus on reining in loose talk about the ISIS threat, ruling out the return of U.S. combat troops to Iraq, and stressing American leadership of a global coalition sought to quell the public’s dual fears that he is doing too little—or might do too much.

The question is whether Americans are still listening. Presidents in their sixth year seldom claim public attention in the way they did in their first. They have given too many speeches to move opinion by words alone. The public wants results.

Therein lies Obama’s fundamental problem. Good results could be hard to come by. ISIS became a threat because the very countries the United States needs to help defeat it are weak, ineffective, and (often) duplicitous. ISIS’s vulnerability to U.S. airpower won’t prevent it from using grisly spectacles like the recent beheadings of two American journalists to sow fear and mask its battlefield losses.

So as much as the president hopes to reassure Americans that he is meeting the ISIS challenge with “strength and resolve,” he could well discover, as did several of his predecessors, that events can be hard to tame, even for a leader of a superpower.

James M. Lindsay is Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR). This piece first appeared at CFR’s The Water’s Edge blog here.

Why the American Public Wants to Strike ISIS

"They know a threat when they see one, and they aren’t about to shrink from the challenges and risks inherent in their country’s global role."
Robert W. Merry

September 12, 2014
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A new Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll, released just ahead of President Obama’s address Wednesday night to the American people, suggests a valuable political rule: If you want advice on how to conduct foreign policy, take your cue from the American people and not the editorial pages of the big national newspapers or William Kristol or Victoria Nuland or Dick Cheney or Samantha Power or John McCain or any number of other so-called experts who contributed so mightily to the challenge we now face in the Middle East.

The poll suggested the American people support U.S. military action to thwart the advance in Syria and Iraq of the radical Islamist movement that calls itself the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL). Almost two-thirds of those polled want the United States to confront ISIS, while only 13 percent said such action wasn’t in the national interest. Fully 34 percent even accepted the use of U.S. ground troops if necessary to combat the Islamist forces.

In reporting these results, Wall Street Journal reporters Janet Hook and Carol E. Lee said they represented “a remarkable mood swing for an electorate that just a year ago recoiled at Mr. Obama’s proposal to launch airstrikes against Syria.”

But is it really that remarkable? And is it even a mood swing? The reporters’ language suggests a certain capriciousness on the part of the American people, maybe even fickleness. Just a year ago, they didn’t want to bomb Syria; now they want to bomb ISIS.

But perhaps the American people understand something that many of the experts don’t get. Syrian president Bashar al-Assad is not America’s enemy. He doesn’t want to kill Americans. He just wants to run his country under terms that had been in effect for decades—and generally accepted by America and by his neighbors. That’s no longer possible, of course, but those who have been agitating for U.S. military action against him, including many of those named above, have been advocating essentially for further destabilization in the region. It seems the American electorate didn’t want the United States to contribute to any such destabilization.

But ISIS is America’s enemy. It wants to kill Americans whenever it can muster the resources and capacity to do so. More significantly for the present moment, it has developed a capability to control territory, amass great stores of wealth, accumulate serious military hardware, kill opponents with brutal efficiency, and devastate regional military forces arrayed against it. It represents the enemy of the West that manifested itself with the Al Qaeda attacks of precisely thirteen years ago that killed 2,977 innocent Americans going about their daily lives.

Thus, it appears the American people are making a distinction that has been fuzzed up for years in the country’s foreign-policy discourse. For them, this isn’t about spreading democracy into the lands of Islam or ridding the world of brutal dictators. It isn’t about macho American global leadership. It is about America’s vital national interests and the protection of its sovereignty and the safety of its citizens. ISIS represents a threat to those things; Middle Eastern dictators who have been the focus of much American foreign-policy agitation in recent years don’t.

The foreign-policy debates of recent years have not zoomed in on this distinction. Most often, the arguments on either side have been characterized as the interventionists vs. the isolationists; or those who want a strong America plying the international waters vs. those who don’t want to expend blood and treasure on maintaining America’s role in the world.

In terms of national sentiment, this has been a bogus debate. The collective judgment of the electorate always has been much more sophisticated and nuanced. There is no doubt that Americans want their country to remain the world’s greatest power. They know that will require at times the expenditure of both human and financial resources. They are willing to absorb that cost. But their experiences since 9/11 have taught them that their leaders, if not monitored closely, are likely to get the country into overseas adventures based on wispy ideas and unrealistic goals that ultimately undermine stability in a dangerous region.

That’s why they manifested their displeasure with the idea of attacking Syria’s Assad a year ago. And that’s why they support the necessary effort to take on ISIS today.

All this can be illustrated by a quick look at the history of America’s foreign policy since 9/11. The George W. Bush administration promptly sent forces into Afghanistan to upend the Taliban and disperse Al Qaeda from its secure base of operations. All good. But then the administration argued that the anti-Islamist offensive required an invasion of Iraq. Based on administration representations regarding Iraq’s connection to weapons of mass destruction and to Islamist terrorists, the American people supported the policy.

But, when it turned out that those representations were false and America ended up entangled in a vicious and bloody internal conflict unleashed by the American invasion, the country’s electorate turned against the war. And, when the Afghanistan policy turned into a long-term effort to reform tribal folkways and practices going back centuries, that effort also drew skepticism from the American people.

The result was a new consciousness within the electorate of the need to draw distinctions between overseas activities truly tied to national interest and activities based upon abstract impulses, such as the desire to spread democracy in lands with no democratic tradition or “ending tyranny in our world,” as George W. Bush put it in his second inaugural address.

In his speech Wednesday evening, President Obama articulated a national imperative to “degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy.” He outlined a four-point program aimed at meeting that imperative. Whether his program is equal to the task remains an open question, and we will know whether Obama is truly committed to the destruction of ISIS only through unfolding events. His promise to foreclose any use of U.S. ground troops was questionable, as it served to qualify his definition of the threat and signaled to the enemy that America may not be prepared to go the distance in its resolve.

But the American people will support their president in this mission, so long as he fulfills it effectively and with ongoing prospects for ultimate success. They know a threat when they see one, and they aren’t about to shrink from the challenges and risks inherent in their country’s global role.

Robert W. Merry is political editor of The National Interest and the author of books on American history and foreign policy. His most recent book is Where They Stand: The American Presidents in the Eyes of Voters and Historians.

Image: Flickr/Official U.S. Air Force/CC by-nc 2.0

The Complex
Is the ISIS Laptop of Doom an Operational Threat?

BY Shane Harris
AUGUST 29, 2014 - 04:30 PM

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Weapons of mass destruction are the holy grail for terrorist groups, and over the years a number of organizations have announced their intentions to acquire chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. But the discovery of a laptop purportedly belonging to a member of the Islamic State is raising new questions about whether the terrorist group, which U.S. officials say is more dangerous than al Qaeda, is poised to launch a WMD attack.

U.S. officials and terrorism experts said that the discovery of the laptop raises troubling questions about the Islamic State's intentions and its ability to conduct a WMD strike. But they urged caution, noting that the presence of documents on building biological weapons does not necessarily add up to an actual capability to use them.

"I wouldn't dismiss the idea of a WMD attack by terrorists," said Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. "It's something we should guard against. But in terms of something I worry about, it's far down the list."

Still, the laptop and its more than 35,000 files provide a rare and unsettling window into the Islamist State's inner workings. One U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss developing intelligence, said the files on the laptop offer some of the most precise information to date on the Islamic State's WMD aspirations. The information indicates that the Islamic State likely now has the ability to build at least some form of biological or chemical weapon, the official said.

The laptop, which was examined by correspondents for Foreign Policy, contains thousands of files related to planning and launching terrorist attacks. Most troubling is a document that discusses how to weaponize bubonic plague. But turning that knowledge into a working weapon requires particular expertise, and it's not clear that the Islamic State has it.

"That they have the capabilities and intentions [to build some WMD] is beyond dispute," Gartenstein-Ross said. But the Islamic State would still face considerable obstacles if it actually attempted to build a weapon with bubonic plague. "It's a very dangerous thing to try to harness as an offensive weapon, in part because you might kill all your own guys in the process," Gartenstein-Ross said.

But the risk of building WMD hasn't blunted terrorists' ambition. Only last year, Iraqi officials broke up an al Qaeda cell in Iraq that attempted to build chemical weapons for attacks in the West. Chemical weapons are potentially less dangerous than weaponized biological agents, which is what makes the files on the Islamic State's laptop so concerning.

These Boots Were Made for Fighting
The president is right to be wary of putting troops on the ground in Iraq. But he’s wrong to rule it out.

BY James F. Jeffrey
SEPTEMBER 11, 2014

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President Barack Obama's primetime speech last night on his strategy to defeat the Islamic State (IS) was impressive and mainly on target, but it contained a potentially fatal exclusion: the lack of boots on the ground. And it's not just in Iraq or Syria. Whether it's the president's pledge that the campaign to "degrade, and ultimately destroy" IS will "not involve American combat troops fighting on foreign soil," or NATO stopping short of "permanently" stationing ground troops on the alliance's eastern border, or his refusal to keep just a few thousand advisors in Afghanistan after 2016, we are facing an extraordinary phenomenon not seen since the end of the Vietnam War.

Even in the face of truly dangerous threats to global security and to America's influence abroad, ground forces are being ruled out. Yes, there are understandable reasons for reluctance, but when juxtaposed with our critical security needs they must be challenged.

Do we think NATO's Baltic members can be defended with F-16 patrols alone? Will drones keep Afghanistan safe from the Taliban's depredations once troops leave? If U.S. airpower and local allies are not enough to take out an IS stronghold, shall we let this existential threat get a pass rather than commit a few U.S. Army battalions to the cause?

Our fear of casualties, and even more of endless "armed nation building" after Iraq and Afghanistan, have melted America's will to employ what is justly known as "the combat arm of decision." Even President Bill Clinton, who chastened by the debacle in Somalia initially ruled out ground troops in the Balkan conflicts, went on to deploy tens of thousands of soldiers -- stabilizing the region for now almost two decades.

Make no bones about it: America is once again at war in the Middle East. Despite the president's initial reluctance to assume the mission to "destroy" the rampaging Islamic State, he has been rolled -- not just by Joe Biden's "follow them to the gates of hell" and his other top advisors, but by the reality that this is an enemy that won't be beaten without serious U.S. intervention. Likewise, 1,000 or so miles to the north in eastern Ukraine, the West is facing Russian troops who will not stop until confronted by American power.

The administration's response to both, all in all, is deserving of praise. Obama's reluctance to rush in with the 82nd Airborne's guns a blazing is sensible. The downside of deploying ground troops as a first choice would have risked alienating the fragile domestic consensus which the president now has to leverage to act against the Islamic State. After all, fear of a new endless ground troop commitment led the American public to reject last summer's cruise missile strikes against Syria's dictator in the wake of chemical warfare against civilians.

But prudence should not degenerate into the dogma which the president again lapsed in his speech: "As I have said before, these American forces will not have a combat mission -- we will not get dragged into another ground war in Iraq."

We first need to consider why the revulsion against using ground troops is so pervasive; and second, how to use them, if absolute exigency requires U.S. armor and infantry in combat, including against the Islamic State.

Such a commitment would be particularly hard for President Obama. His admonition against new military adventures, as he delineated in his West Point speech this spring, appears mainly targeted at ground campaigns. As an alternative, he has supported drone and manned air strikes, even -- as in Iraq now -- more than 1,000 Special Forces boots on the ground. In his speech, he made clear that the only combat ground troops would be local forces -- the Iraqi army, select Shiite militias, and the Kurdish Peshmerga -- who have the most to lose if aggression and horror roll on unchecked. That combination of forces worked in recent weeks in Iraq, ringing up victories against the Islamic State at the Mosul Dam and Amirli. Similar U.S. air campaigns in conjunction with local troops saw success in Libya in 2011, northern Iraq in 1991 and 2003, Afghanistan in 2001, Kosovo in 1999, and Bosnia in 1995.

But sometimes local forces are not enough. U.S. troops have capabilities they cannot approach, beginning with the crucial combat multipliers: "speed" and "decisiveness." The commitment of even a few U.S. troops with actual ground combat missions signals credibility and seriousness. Such a troop presence can integrate rival local forces (as U.S. joint platoons did with the Kurds and Iraqi Army in 2010-2011), prevent friendly atrocities against civilians, and shape the goals of ground combat.

Still, local forces in Iraq and Syria should be the first choice, with commitment of our ground troops only an emergency contingency. Once in combat they introduce entirely new risks beyond those of drones or F-18 strikes, Special Forces trainers, and Navy SEALs. These risks begin with casualties. Ground combat is bloody. While overall casualty rates are down from Vietnam, thousands have died in each of America's last two wars, and tens of thousands have suffered serious wounds.

Second, ground combat is expensive, particularly in primitive situations with iffy local logistics. In Iraq, the cost was about $1 million per soldier per year, with trucked-in life support and thousands of contractors.

Third is strategic risk. U.S. ground troops in combat -- whatever their announced purpose -- generate both suspicions of permanent occupation and pressure on neighbors. Moreover, force protection to keep our casualties down often alienates the population we seek to win over. It's not just our explicit enemies who have a vested interest in American deployments failing. When the United States defeated the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the Truman administration (urged by Gen. Douglas MacArthur) shifted goals to liberate the North, provoking China's entry. Likewise, in Iraq a half century later, Bush administration officials hinted at what might come after the rapid toppling of Saddam; Iran and Syria responded by supporting insurgencies among the Shiites and Sunnis. And Pakistan acted similarly once NATO forces dug into the conflict in Afghanistan.

But the fourth risk is the most profound: The sacrifice of our young men and women in combat generates an almost messianic urge for an outcome worthy of them. From Gen. MacArthur's "no substitute for victory" approach that hurled 300,000 Americans and allies against China to the nation-building dreams in Afghanistan and Iraq, we repeatedly embrace transformational goals to justify the loss of our most precious resource -- endeavors that then demand ever more such losses without commensurate success.

But when we are realistic and limit our military goals, ground engagement can achieve decisive results. The first Gulf War shaped the entire post-Cold War world to America's favor -- with roughly 6 percent of the U.S. casualties suffered in Afghanistan and Iraq, and less than 1 percent of Vietnam losses. Ground force deployments or mobilization were positive game changers from Berlin in 1948 and 1962 to the Yom Kippur war in 1973; from the Dominican Republic to Granada; from Panama to Haiti. Certainly Somalia in 1993 and Beirut in 1983 were reverses, but those exceptions underline the rule: Don't commit ground troops for vague long-term societal transformation.

With roughly 1 million active and reserve U.S. Army and Marine troops, consuming roughly half of our annual 4 percent of GDP devoted to defense, we have the force structure to do the job in Iraq and Syria.

But how can we avoid getting bogged down? For now, Obama has the right idea: if possible, use primarily local troops. But if that doesn't do the trick and U.S. troops must be used, follow strictly the "Powell Doctrine": Have a clear, attainable military objective; try other means first; ensure international and domestic support; resource the mission; and push to victory.

The world is a more dangerous place than we've seen in decades, and as President Obama said last night, "the greatest threats come from the Middle East and North Africa, where radical groups exploit grievances for their own gain." We thus cannot eschew the most decisive non-nuclear element in our arsenal because of ideological blinders or past misuse. The red line should not be the kind of military force we employ, but the importance and attainability of the objective. If it must be achieved with our bayonets rather than by drones or other people's kids, let's be honest with the American people, and not promise bloodless conflict, particularly if we then must renege.

Erik S. Lesser/Getty Images

Passport
Architects of Old Iraq Surge Propose New Iraq Surge

BY Elias Groll
SEPTEMBER 12, 2014 - 06:22 PM

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If and when American troops arrive in Iraq and Syria to carry out ground combat operations, is this the document that we will look back on as having started it all?

On Friday, Kim Kagan, Fred Kagan, and Jessica Lewis -- all analysts at the Institute for the Study of War -- released a 29-page strategy for defeating the Islamic State. Their plan envisions the deployment of as many as 25,000 American ground troops spread across Iraq and Syria and calls on the U.S. military to forge an alliance with moderate Sunnis in the two countries to overthrow the Assad government and restore stability to Iraq. Most of that force would be deployed in Iraq, but the plan envisions at least a battalion inside Syria.

Riddled with hopeful assumptions about the consequences of American military action and the existence of potential U.S. allies on the ground, the plan might very well be filed away among the sundry think tank reports produced every day in Washington were it not for the identity of its authors. Fred Kagan was one of the intellectual architects of the first U.S. surge in Iraq, the operation widely credited with helping restore stability there ahead of the 2011 U.S. withdrawal.

Together with his wife, Kim, Kagan has emerged as one of the foremost military thinkers of his generation, and this report -- titled a "A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State" -- is sure to generate discussion among those who view President Barack Obama's reliance on airstrikes to roll back Islamic State gains as inadequate to the task of degrading and destroying the powerful militants.

Kagan's latest plan bears important similarities to the 2007 Iraq surge in that it envisions an operation in which U.S. troops are deployed in Iraq's Western provinces to fight alongside Iraqi forces and persuade more moderate Sunni tribal leaders to turn on the Islamic State. The new plan extends that line of thinking by calling for the deployment of at least one American battalion, in addition to Special Forces troops, inside Syria. That battalion would be a so-called "quick reaction force" capable of quickly mobilizing to support other American troops in Syria. Another QRF force would be deployed on the Iraqi side of the border.

With U.S. forces in place, the Kagans envision American troops partnering with Iraqi and tribal forces to battle back against more radical forces. This fight, the Kagans explain, would not be limited to operations against the Islamic State but would also include Jabhat al-Nusra, al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria.

But in calling on U.S. forces to find allies on the ground, the Kagans present a major caveat: It is unclear whether these allies actually exist. "The feasibility of this scenario rests on the availability of willing and capable local partners in the Sunni communities in both countries," the authors write. "The existence of such potential partners and their sufficiency to the tasks are unproven hypotheses. If these hypotheses are false, then this course of action is invalid."

That raises the question about why U.S. forces should deploy in the first place in support of allies the authors aren't sure exist. But as Kagan and his coauthors argue, "it is not possible to validate or invalidate these hypotheses without directly engaging on the ground."

To further complicate matters, the report makes no mention of the immense political challenges that would have to be navigated in order to insert an American force into both Iraq and Syria. Nor does the report explain how American troops get there in the first place.

In its formidable vagueness, the report represents more of a symptom of the current situation in Iraq and Syria than a solution to it. "In these dire circumstances, the next step we take cannot have accomplishing the desired end state as its goal," the authors write. Rather, the authors propose an "iterative" strategy that inserts American troops and tasks them with fighting their way to a solution. "The entire military campaign to defeat or destroy ISIS may not be discernable from the outset," the authors observe.

If American troops arrive in Iraq and Syria and do not find any allies on the ground, it is not clear what course of action the authors would propose. Would American troops at that point simply pull out of Iraq? History would seem to indicate that once they are there, U.S. troops will find it hard to leave Iraq.

One finds it hard not to feel immense pre-emptive pity for the 25,000 American soldiers that the Kagans could help send to Iraq and Syria.

Joe Raedle/Getty Images

Voice
The Blood Brothers of Anbar
Meet Omar: A 43-year-old, well-educated hospital director in Fallujah. Does Iraq have any hope for reconciliation if men like this support the Islamic State?

BY Lauren Bohn
SEPTEMBER 12, 2014

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SHAQLAWA, Iraq — In the past year alone, 43-year-old Omar says he's watched hundreds die. Or as he describes it, "boom, gone, the end."

Omar is an administrator of one of the busiest hospitals in Fallujah, in Iraq's restive Anbar province. First, his brother nearly lost a leg in a mortar attack. Then, his neighbor's home was destroyed in shelling. Soon after, his mother narrowly missed a bombing in their once-placid neighborhood. But it wasn't until he watched a 5-year-old girl in a bright pink shirt take her last gasp of air outside his office, her body torn apart from shelling, that he knew he had to leave his hometown. Life in Iraq, as he puts it, has become an endless flow of "dark, dark red."

"Every day, I saw children watching parents die and parents watching children die," he says, recalling grim scenes from the hospital he's worked at for years. "I couldn't raise my children there any longer ... we all have targets on our head."

Back in January, six months before the Islamic State, then still ISIS, seized the world's attention by capturing Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, the group and its allies took the city of Fallujah and parts of the provincial capital of Ramadi. It was one of the first signs that Iraq's Sunni regions were falling into a state of open rebellion against the Shiite-led government in Baghdad.

The ragtag fighters saw an opening after then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ordered security forces to dismantle a yearlong sit-in camp near Ramadi, claiming it had become a base for al Qaeda-linked militants. Sunnis like Omar had been protesting for the release of Sunni prisoners who they said were detained arbitrarily and without trial; they deeply resented their political exclusion from the Shiite-led central government. This wasn't the first time Anbar province had become a center of revolt: After the 2003 U.S.-led invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein, the region became ground zero for a Sunni-led insurgency against the Iraqi government and U.S. troops.

Omar is one of the hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people who have fled Iraq's largest province since fighting swept the region in January. He and his family have resettled in Shaqlawa, a mountain-ringed city near the regional capital of Erbil. There are so many displaced people from Fallujah that residents jokingly call the town "Shaqlujah." Many live cramped lives in converted hotels, but middle-class families like Omar have rented homes, blending into a town they once traveled to for summer holidays. Christians and Yazidis have also sought refuge from other Islamic State-controlled territories, bringing with them horror stories of mass executions and kidnappings. But as a Sunni Arab, who complains of systemic oppression by Shiites in Baghdad, Omar wasn't fleeing the Islamic State -- in fact, he believes it is necessary in what he calls a renewed fight for the survival of Iraqi Sunnis.

"The government should be the father of the people," he says. "And Iraq's government is a terrorist organization. See, my vocabulary is different. You have to ask yourself: Who are the real terrorists here? When will the world wake up?"

Omar's deep-seated distrust of the Shiite-led government in Baghdad has been the fuel that allows the Islamic State to thrive, as the jihadist organization has exploited Iraq's deeply frayed social fabric in places like Anbar. It's a major hurdle for President Barack Obama's strategy for fighting IS, which hinges upon Sunni buy-in for the new unity government in Baghdad. Iraq's new prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, has vowed to "work with all communities" -- but it's a mammoth task that has tripped up his predecessors and much of the international community.

"National reconciliation for many is a mirage ... it's a utopia," says Ahmed Ali, senior research analyst on Iraq at the Institute for the Study of War. "The problem is, Baghdad hasn't been able to articulate a reconciliatory approach to the residents of Anbar."

The longer the Islamic State is allowed to entrench itself in Anbar, Ali fears, the more difficult it will be to convince Iraqi Sunnis like Omar to give the government another chance. "ISIS wants that distrust to be present," he says. "They live on hatred."

The Baghdad government's actions have been far less than reconciliatory -- in fact, they've often been brutal. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has condemned Iraqi security forces and government-affiliated militias for use of barrel bombs and indiscriminate attacks in Anbar that have resulted in a heavy civilian toll.

"The Iraqi government may be fighting a vicious insurgency, but that's no license to kill civilians anywhere they think ISIS might be lurking," HRW deputy Middle East director

Joe Stork said in a statement in July. "The government's airstrikes are wreaking an awful toll on ordinary residents."

That toll has further entrenched the Islamic State's hold in Fallujah, Omar says. "The Iraqi military is using ISIS as an excuse to commit genocide against Sunnis. For every shelling in Fallujah, I see a new black flag when I return. They're the only way to rule."

About once a week, Omar shuttles between Shaqlawa and Fallujah. It was a five-hour journey before the conflict, but now, with the route riddled with Kurdish, Iraqi government, and IS checkpoints, the drive takes 12 hours. Kurdish authorities are wary that Omar is colluding with the Islamic State: While Iraqi Kurdistan has welcomed a steady flow of internally displaced people, many harbor distrust toward Arabs and worry that violence will spill over and mar their own fight for independence from Iraq. Meanwhile, Omar says, the jihadists are wary he's colluding "with the other side" -- meaning a Kurdish-U.S.-Shiite coalition allied to destroy the Islamic State.

The reality? "Maybe a little of both in these times," Omar laughs nervously.

Omar speaks positively about the Islamic State's success in running day-to-day affairs in his home city. The group now oversees the operations of the hospital where he works: While he and colleagues once waited months for government paychecks, he says, they now receive them in a timely fashion.

"They aren't bad guys," he says. "They're us, they're a part of us. We all know them."

Not all Iraqi Sunnis are so sanguine about the Islamic State. Omar's friend Ehab, also displaced from Fallujah, shakes his head at this answer. The jihadist group, he believes, is simply another side of the evil he fled. "ISIS doesn't represent us," he says. The two men share a light debate over orange juice and agree to disagree.

Omar, however, can't muster outrage at the Islamic State's increasingly brutal methods. When asked about the jihadist group's endless parade of gory executions, crucifixions, and beheadings, he shrugs. Then he asks to move to a quieter, more discreet location.

"On the battlefield, ISIS fighting is different than ISIS ruling. So far, they're running things smoothly," he says, when we're out of range of potential eavesdroppers. "They might be moving a bit fast ... but they're what's needed now. Are there other options?"

"Look, I know it's brutal," he admits. "But this is war."

JM LOPEZ/AFP/Getty Images

Dispatch
Meet the Badass Women Fighting the Islamic State
Guerrillas from Turkey's Kurdistan Workers' Party are on the front lines in northern Iraq. Many of the organization's leaders, including 24-year-old Avesta, are women.

BY Mohammed A. Salih
SEPTEMBER 12, 2014

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MAKHMOUR, Iraq — Avesta enters the cramped room in a teachers' residence turned temporary military base, ready for a meeting with her fellow fighters. The six commandos rise to shake her hand. She greets each individually. "Hello, heval," she says, calling them by the Kurdish word for comrade. Then she lays down her Russian sniper rifle, and tea and coffee are served.

The Islamic State's fearsome fighters are just around 10 miles away, but the Kurdish snipers, some still teenagers, are mostly relaxed. They debate the merits of drinking coffee versus tea, discuss the situation in the camp, and joke with each other. "You are very photogenic," one of the fighters tells Avesta cheerfully as she poses for a photo. She smiles shyly as others burst into laughter.

Avesta is only 24, but she looks much older, with piercing gray eyes. Her long face is wrinkled and roughened; her hands are calloused. Her sniper rifle is at her side at all times; when it isn't hanging from her back, it's resting within arm's reach -- a constant companion to her uncertain life as a Kurdish guerrilla.

Avesta, whose nom de guerre is the same as the holy book of Zoroastrianism, a religion that Kurds consider as their original creed, commands a group of 13 fighters, eight of them female, from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) -- a rebel group that has fought the Turkish state for three decades in pursuit of Kurdish rights. They wear olive and gray uniforms of baggy pants and a vest, with a wide cloth belt around their waists.

Avesta's squad arrived in Makhmour, a dusty town in Iraqi Kurdistan, by bus on Aug. 6 from a PKK base in the Qandil Mountains, a range that spans the Iraqi, Turkish, and Iranian borders. They are among the hundreds of Kurdish volunteers from around the region who have descended on Iraqi Kurdistan to fend off the vicious jihadists of the Islamic State.

Following a four-day battle that ended on Aug. 10, the Kurdish guerrillas retook control of their main target, a camp populated until early August by more than 10,000 Kurdish refugees from Turkey, many of whom are believed to be PKK supporters.

During the battle, Avesta used her sniper rifle to shoot at Islamic State fighters, providing cover for her comrades as they advanced toward the jihadists' front lines. "They were not as capable fighters as their propaganda claimed," she said. "They mostly fought from afar with heavy weaponry like mortars and artillery."

Avesta is no stranger to heavy combat. The PKK has fought for three decades against the Turkish military, NATO's second-largest. Avesta fought in major PKK battles against Turkey in 2012, 2008, and 2005. The PKK fighters are up for the challenge of the jihadists, she says. "The Islamic State fought rigorously. But it was not as severe as our previous fights with the Turkish army," she said. "The Turks have warplanes and air power."

Seeing the atrocities committed by the jihadists against Kurds in Sinjar and other areas, Avesta says she and others in her unit volunteered to be among the first group of PKK guerrillas sent to Makhmour. Her unit takes its orders from the PKK command in the Qandil Mountains. But on the ground in Makhmour, the unit also has some "limited" coordination with Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga troops, Avesta says.

Like many who joined the PKK's ranks, she was radicalized at a young age. The trigger came when she saw her brother's mutilated body. He was a PKK fighter, too, and died in a clash with Turkish security forces in 2005. Shortly afterward, she left her hometown, Van, in Turkey's southeast and headed to the mountains to take up arms. She was 15.

Avesta attended an intense boot camp where she was immersed in the party's revolutionary leftist ideology and view of women's role in society, and trained to use weapons. In the mountains, PKK fighters live in isolation in bare-bones camps. The organization's rules prohibit romantic relationships, and the fighters have little access to their families.

It was as a young woman in the rugged mountains of southeast Turkey and northern Iraq that Avesta says she discovered herself. "It was in the mountains that I found out women can be also powerful," said Avesta. The ranks of the PKK, a Marxist organization, are filled with women, a rarity in the conservative cultures of the Muslim world. About half of the organization's leaders are women. And the Kurdish guerrilla group stands in especially stark contrast to the radical fundamentalism of the Islamic State, which confines women's role to mostly domestic tasks such as raising children, cooking, cleaning, and pleasing their husbands.

"It gives us strength and motivation when a woman like Avesta is our commander," says Kendal, a 19-year-old male fighter in Avesta's unit. "She gave us orders during the fighting and instructed us on tactics."

The PKK and its Syrian affiliate, the YPG, played a crucial role in securing an escape route from Mount Sinjar, in Iraq's western Nineveh province, all the way to Syria. Thousands of members of the Yazidi religious minority trapped on the mountain by the Islamic State fled to safety and returned to Iraqi Kurdistan through Syrian Kurdish territory. PKK fighters have also been deployed to Kirkuk, in northern Iraq, to boost Peshmerga lines.

But even if the presence of Avesta and her comrades in Iraq has helped beat back the Islamic State, other challenges lie ahead. For one, there are tensions with the Iraqi Kurds. Relations between the two groups have long been strained. The PKK and Iraqi Kurdish forces have fought each other on numerous occasions, from the late 1980s to the early 2000s. While Avesta said that the PKK liberated the refugee camp and played a major role in capturing the town of Makhmour from the Islamic State, Iraqi Kurdish officials insist that Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga carried out the bulk of the fighting.

The PKK's participation in the fight against the Islamic State has not yet stirred a strong reaction in neighboring Turkey. But given that Turkey considers the PKK a hostile organization and at the same time enjoys close political and economic ties with Iraqi Kurds, Ankara might not react favorably if the PKK decides to establish a long-term presence in Iraqi Kurdistan. A prolonged PKK presence in Iraqi Kurdistan -- especially if the Islamic State is defeated in northern Iraq -- could undermine the authority of the Kurdish government on its territory and give rise to tensions among Turkey, Iraqi Kurds, and the PKK.

The PKK presence could also raise red flags for the West, a critical ally to the Kurds, as the war against the Islamic State moves forward. The PKK is designated a terrorist group by the United States and a host of European countries.

Avesta shrugs off such designations. "We have been called terrorists for years," she said while walking through the camp, returning from a quick tour of inspecting a guard post to make sure it is fortified in case the Islamic State attacks. "But we say to those countries: Come and see this war and then judge for yourselves.… The [Islamic State] beheads civilians.… We have rescued civilians."

With Islamic State jihadists pushed out of the Kurdish areas around Makhmour, the guerrillas at the refugee camp have no plans yet to go back to their bases in the Qandil Mountains. For the time being, they are busy training some of the few hundred camp residents who have returned on how to protect themselves.

Experience has taught these fighters to take no chances. They have used their time since driving out the Islamic State to set up fortifications in and around the camp and at nearby Mount Qarachukh.

The PKK fighters take turns manning the checkpoints and fortifications. After her meeting with her comrades ends, she picks up her sniper rifle and bids them farewell. She and a male comrade get into a dusty car and head off to stand guard at the checkpoint at the camp's entrance. From there, she can see the hazy horizon south of Makhmour, where the Islamic State still maintains a foothold.

UPDATE Sept. 13, 2:20pm: Avesta was killed on Sept. 12. According to a spokesperson for the PKK guerillas in northern Iraq, she was leading a unit in a joint PKK-Peshmerga operation to re-take a village near Makhmour when a bullet fired by an Islamic State militant struck her in the neck. She was put in a Peshmerga Humvee headed for the hospital in Makhmour that was struck by an improvised explosive device. She died soon after, on the way to Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, for further treatment.

Photo by Mohammed A. Salih

Kurds blame Turkey over ISIL offensive
Government accused of failing to offer protection or permission to join fight as battles rage along Syria-Turkey border.
Last updated: 27 Sep 2014 00:33
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As fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) move closer to the Kurdish town of Kobane on the Syrian-Turkish border, Turkish Kurds are blaming the Erdogan government for not protecting them or allowing them to fight back.

Al Jazeera's Stephanie Dekker reports from the border between Turkey and Syria.
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The Virtue of Subtlety: A U.S. Strategy Against the Islamic State
Geopolitical Weekly
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2014 - 03:07 Print Text Size

Stratfor
By George Friedman

U.S. President Barack Obama said recently that he had no strategy as yet toward the Islamic State but that he would present a plan on Wednesday. It is important for a president to know when he has no strategy. It is not necessarily wise to announce it, as friends will be frightened and enemies delighted. A president must know what it is he does not know, and he should remain calm in pursuit of it, but there is no obligation to be honest about it.

This is particularly true because, in a certain sense, Obama has a strategy, though it is not necessarily one he likes. Strategy is something that emerges from reality, while tactics might be chosen. Given the situation, the United States has an unavoidable strategy. There are options and uncertainties for employing it. Let us consider some of the things that Obama does know.

The Formation of National Strategy

There are serious crises on the northern and southern edges of the Black Sea Basin. There is no crisis in the Black Sea itself, but it is surrounded by crises. The United States has been concerned about the status of Russia ever since U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt negotiated the end of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. The United States has been concerned about the Middle East since U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower forced the British to retreat from Suez in 1956. As a result, the United States inherited — or seized — the British position.

A national strategy emerges over the decades and centuries. It becomes a set of national interests into which a great deal has been invested, upon which a great deal depends and upon which many are counting. Presidents inherit national strategies, and they can modify them to some extent. But the idea that a president has the power to craft a new national strategy both overstates his power and understates the power of realities crafted by all those who came before him. We are all trapped in circumstances into which we were born and choices that were made for us. The United States has an inherent interest in Ukraine and in Syria-Iraq. Whether we should have that interest is an interesting philosophical question for a late-night discussion, followed by a sunrise when we return to reality. These places reflexively matter to the United States.

The American strategy is fixed: Allow powers in the region to compete and balance against each other. When that fails, intervene with as little force and risk as possible. For example, the conflict between Iran and Iraq canceled out two rising powers until the war ended. Then Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened to overturn the balance of power in the region. The result was Desert Storm.

This strategy provides a model. In the Syria-Iraq region, the initial strategy is to allow the regional powers to balance each other, while providing as little support as possible to maintain the balance of power. It is crucial to understand the balance of power in detail, and to understand what might undermine it, so that any force can be applied effectively. This is the tactical part, and it is the tactical part that can go wrong. The strategy has a logic of its own. Understanding what that strategy demands is the hard part. Some nations have lost their sovereignty by not understanding what strategy demands. France in 1940 comes to mind. For the United States, there is no threat to sovereignty, but that makes the process harder: Great powers can tend to be casual because the situation is not existential. This increases the cost of doing what is necessary.

The ground where we are talking about applying this model is Syria and Iraq. Both of these central governments have lost control of the country as a whole, but each remains a force. Both countries are divided by religion, and the religions are divided internally as well. In a sense the nations have ceased to exist, and the fragments they consisted of are now smaller but more complex entities.

The issue is whether the United States can live with this situation or whether it must reshape it. The immediate question is whether the United States has the power to reshape it and to what extent. The American interest turns on its ability to balance local forces. If that exists, the question is whether there is any other shape that can be achieved through American power that would be superior. From my point of view, there are many different shapes that can be imagined, but few that can be achieved. The American experience in Iraq highlighted the problems with counterinsurgency or being caught in a local civil war. The idea of major intervention assumes that this time it will be different. This fits one famous definition of insanity.

The Islamic State's Role

There is then the special case of the Islamic State. It is special because its emergence triggered the current crisis. It is special because the brutal murder of two prisoners on video showed a particular cruelty. And it is different because its ideology is similar to that of al Qaeda, which attacked the United States. It has excited particular American passions.

To counter this, I would argue that the uprising by Iraq's Sunni community was inevitable, with its marginalization by Nouri al-Maliki's Shiite regime in Baghdad. That it took this particularly virulent form is because the more conservative elements of the Sunni community were unable or unwilling to challenge al-Maliki. But the fragmentation of Iraq into Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish regions was well underway before the Islamic State, and jihadism was deeply embedded in the Sunni community a long time ago.

Moreover, although the Islamic State is brutal, its cruelty is not unique in the region. Syrian President Bashar al Assad and others may not have killed Americans or uploaded killings to YouTube, but their history of ghastly acts is comparable. Finally, the Islamic State — engaged in war with everyone around it — is much less dangerous to the United States than a small group with time on its hands, planning an attack. In any event, if the Islamic State did not exist, the threat to the United States from jihadist groups in Yemen or Libya or somewhere inside the United States would remain.

Because the Islamic State operates to some extent as a conventional military force, it is vulnerable to U.S. air power. The use of air power against conventional forces that lack anti-aircraft missiles is a useful gambit. It shows that the United States is doing something, while taking little risk, assuming that the Islamic State really does not have anti-aircraft missiles. But it accomplishes little. The Islamic State will disperse its forces, denying conventional aircraft a target. Attempting to defeat the Islamic State by distinguishing its supporters from other Sunni groups and killing them will founder at the first step. The problem of counterinsurgency is identifying the insurgent.

There is no reason not to bomb the Islamic State's forces and leaders. They certainly deserve it. But there should be no illusion that bombing them will force them to capitulate or mend their ways. They are now part of the fabric of the Sunni community, and only the Sunni community can root them out. Identifying Sunnis who are anti-Islamic State and supplying them with weapons is a much better idea. It is the balance-of-power strategy that the United States follows, but this approach doesn't have the dramatic satisfaction of blowing up the enemy. That satisfaction is not trivial, and the United States can certainly blow something up and call it the enemy, but it does not address the strategic problem.

In the first place, is it really a problem for the United States? The American interest is not stability but the existence of a dynamic balance of power in which all players are effectively paralyzed so that no one who would threaten the United States emerges. The Islamic State had real successes at first, but the balance of power with the Kurds and Shia has limited its expansion, and tensions within the Sunni community diverted its attention. Certainly there is the danger of intercontinental terrorism, and U.S. intelligence should be active in identifying and destroying these threats. But the re-occupation of Iraq, or Iraq plus Syria, makes no sense. The United States does not have the force needed to occupy Iraq and Syria at the same time. The demographic imbalance between available forces and the local population makes that impossible.

The danger is that other Islamic State franchises might emerge in other countries. But the United States would not be able to block these threats as well as the other countries in the region. Saudi Arabia must cope with any internal threat it faces not because the United States is indifferent, but because the Saudis are much better at dealing with such threats. In the end, the same can be said for the Iranians.

Most important, it can also be said for the Turks. The Turks are emerging as a regional power. Their economy has grown dramatically in the past decade, their military is the largest in the region, and they are part of the Islamic world. Their government is Islamist but in no way similar to the Islamic State, which concerns Ankara. This is partly because of Ankara's fear that the jihadist group might spread to Turkey, but more so because its impact on Iraqi Kurdistan could affect Turkey's long-term energy plans.

Forming a New Balance in the Region

The United States cannot win the game of small mosaic tiles that is emerging in Syria and Iraq. An American intervention at this microscopic level can only fail. But the principle of balance of power does not mean that balance must be maintained directly. Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia have far more at stake in this than the United States. So long as they believe that the United States will attempt to control the situation, it is perfectly rational for them to back off and watch, or act in the margins, or even hinder the Americans.

The United States must turn this from a balance of power between Syria and Iraq to a balance of power among this trio of regional powers. They have far more at stake and, absent the United States, they have no choice but to involve themselves. They cannot stand by and watch a chaos that could spread to them.

It is impossible to forecast how the game is played out. What is important is that the game begins. The Turks do not trust the Iranians, and neither is comfortable with the Saudis. They will cooperate, compete, manipulate and betray, just as the United States or any country might do in such a circumstance. The point is that there is a tactic that will fail: American re-involvement. There is a tactic that will succeed: the United States making it clear that while it might aid the pacification in some way, the responsibility is on regional powers. The inevitable outcome will be a regional competition that the United States can manage far better than the current chaos.

Obama has sought volunteers from NATO for a coalition to fight the Islamic State. It is not clear why he thinks those NATO countries — with the exception of Turkey — will spend their national treasures and lives to contain the Islamic State, or why the Islamic State alone is the issue. The coalition that must form is not a coalition of the symbolic, but a coalition of the urgently involved. That coalition does not have to be recruited. In a real coalition, its members have no choice but to join. And whether they act together or in competition, they will have to act. And not acting will simply increase the risk to them.

U.S. strategy is sound. It is to allow the balance of power to play out, to come in only when it absolutely must — with overwhelming force, as in Kuwait — and to avoid intervention where it cannot succeed. The tactical application of strategy is the problem. In this case the tactic is not direct intervention by the United States, save as a satisfying gesture to avenge murdered Americans. But the solution rests in doing as little as possible and forcing regional powers into the fray, then in maintaining the balance of power in this coalition.

Such an American strategy is not an avoidance of responsibility. It is the use of U.S. power to force a regional solution. Sometimes the best use of American power is to go to war. Far more often, the best use of U.S. power is to withhold it. The United States cannot evade responsibility in the region. But it is enormously unimaginative to assume that carrying out that responsibility is best achieved by direct intervention. Indirect intervention is frequently more efficient and more effective.



Read more: The Virtue of Subtlety: A U.S. Strategy Against the Islamic State | Stratfor
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Turkey Must Tread Carefully Against Islamic State
Analysis
SEPTEMBER 23, 2014 | 0859 Print Text Size

Turkey Must Tread Carefully Against Islamic State

Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (C) speaks Sept. 20 at Esenboga Airport in Ankara to welcome dozens of freed Turkish hostages held by Islamic State militants in northern Iraq for more than three months. (ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary

As the United States begins its full assault against the Islamic State in Syria, backed by Arab allies, the absence of NATO ally Turkey is drawing attention and comment. Just days before the Sept. 22 beginning of U.S. airstrikes, Turkey managed to broker a deal with the Islamic State to return 49 diplomats held in Iraq for 101 days. Contrary to diplomatic and media speculation, however, Turkey is not supporting the transnational, Syria- and Iraq-based jihadist movement known as the Islamic State.

While the details of just how Ankara retrieved its diplomats are sketchy, Ankara likely negotiated their release through its contacts among the Iraqi Sunni community and its ally, Qatar. This influence, especially among Sunni locals in not just Iraq but also Syria, will be critical if Turkey is going to be able to manage the jihadist threat long after the United States declares mission accomplished and moves on.

Analysis

Rumors have long circulated that Turkey has been aiding Islamic State fighters. A New York Times article suggesting Turkey was tolerating an Islamic State recruiting center went viral, as did the subsequent war of words between the government and New York Times management. Another argument heard is that Ankara sees the Syrian Kurds gaining their own autonomous enclave in northeastern Syria as an intolerable security threat for the Turks — making the Islamic State the lesser evil. More recently, Turkey's unwillingness to join the U.S.-led international effort against the Islamic State was also seen as being driven by Turkey's dealings with the jihadist group.

Such perceptions have been reinforced now that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has secured the release of 49 diplomats abducted by the group from the Turkish consulate in the northern Iraqi town of Mosul after the militants seized control of the city. Turkey's dealings with the Islamic State are much more nuanced than has generally been understood. Last year in July, Stratfor shed light on this dynamic, analyzing how the Turks were caught between two very threatening realities — both demanding simultaneous management — on their southern flank: jihadists of various stripes and Syrian Kurdish separatists.

Managing the very difficult geopolitical battle space that is Syria required Ankara to develop relations within both the jihadist and Kurdish landscapes south of their border. Turkey also understands that it cannot allow itself to be a launchpad for an international effort against the Islamic State, the outcome of which is extremely uncertain. Turkey is all too aware of how Pakistan even today, nearly two generations after it agreed to serve as the staging ground for the U.S.-led effort to counter Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, continues to deal with the fallout of that war, which has not yet ended.

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From the Turks' viewpoint, the Americans and their Western and regional allies (with the exception of Jordan) all have the option of walking away from the conflict in Syria. Not only does Turkey feel that it will have to deal with the mess in Syria long after other stakeholders have moved on, it also knows that the United States expects Turkey to manage the Syrians as well as other regional matters. Turkey has not forgotten how, during the days of President Turgut Ozal, Ankara cut Iraq's export pipeline in 1990 at the behest of the United States in the run-up to the 1991 Gulf War but was later left with the aftermath as promises of aid disappeared with the subsequent change of U.S. administrations. This bitter experience informed Turkey's 2003 decision to refuse Washington access to Turkish territory for a northern invasion of Iraq. At the same time Turkey is deeply worried about being caught between Saudi Arabia and Iran, who are engaged in a vicious proxy sectarian war.

It is against this geopolitical backdrop that the Turkish move to negotiate the release of its diplomats must be considered. In an ideal world, one in which the Islamic State does not exist, Turkey would be the lead player with influence among the Sunnis in both Syria and Iraq and in much better shape to dominate Syria and give considerable competition to Iran in Iraq. But in the real world, not only does the Islamic State exist, it is actually in competition with Turkey for influence among the Sunni Arabs to the south of the Turkish Republic.

While the Sunni majority in Syria is much more fragmented than its sectarian kinsmen in Iraq, the neighboring Sunni minority has sought to empower itself by leveraging the Islamic State. This means that the Turks will have to delicately handle weeding out the Islamic State from within the Iraqi Sunni community. But that is a long-term work in progress, while the immediate task has been to secure the release of their diplomats.

The Turks knew that the way in which they dealt with this hostage crisis would greatly determine their ability to shape the behavior of Iraqi Sunnis. Building upon their existing links with Sunni tribes, former Baathists and other political players, they likely negotiated with the Islamic State. It should be noted that Turkey has had close ties with former Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, who was sentenced to death by Nouri al-Maliki's administration in 2012 for alleged links to terrorism. Al-Hashimi, who has been spending a great deal of time in Turkey, openly supported the Sunni insurrection that began in June.

Al-Hashimi is also very close to Turkey's main Arab partner, Qatar. Al-Hashimi periodically frequents Doha, which has significant influence among a range of jihadist groups and very likely played a key role in the release of the diplomats, which happened just days after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Qatar. While there is no evidence of a ransom payment, and Turkish officials deny such, it cannot be ruled out that money changed hands. Meanwhile, reports are surfacing that there may have been a prisoner swap in which Ankara secured the release of some Islamic State members. Hurriyet Daily News reported Sept. 23 that the Turkish government was able to convince Syrian rebel group Liwa Al Tawhid to release 50 Islamic State prisoners being held by the Salafist-jihadist organization, which is a joint Turkish-Qatari proxy. And Erdogan obliquely hinted on Sept. 21 at the possibility of a prisoner exchange when he remarked, in response to a journalist's question, "Whether there was or wasn't a swap — [the consulate] personnel were returned to Turkey."

Clearly Erdogan is not worried about any fallout from a prisoner exchange, especially since the United States recently released five high-profile Afghan Taliban detainees from the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay in exchange for an American soldier, a deal also mediated by Qatar. This experience allows the Turkish spy service to enhance its influence among the Sunnis and develop intelligence on the Islamic State. Between this release of the diplomats from Iraq and the buffer zone that the Turkish military is working to create on the border with Syria, the Turks are looking beyond the U.S.-led airstrikes against the Islamic State and the arming of Syrian rebels on the ground.



Read more: Turkey Must Tread Carefully Against Islamic State | Stratfor
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ISIL behind 'staggering array' of Iraq abuses
New UN report says war crimes may have been committed, accusing armed group of carrying out executions and rape.
Last updated: 02 Oct 2014 15:41

UN accuses ISIL of directly targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure in northern Iraq

The UN has accused the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) of carrying out a "staggering array" of "human rights abuses" in northern Iraq that may amount to war crimes.

In a report released on Thursday, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) listed a litany of abuses perpetrated by ISIL and associated armed groups between July 6 and September 10, "with an apparent systematic and widespread character."

"These include attacks directly targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, executions and other targeted killings of civilians, abductions, rape and other forms of sexual and physical violence perpetrated against women and children, forced recruitment of children, destruction or desecration of places of religious or cultural significance, wanton destruction and looting of property, and denial of fundamental freedoms," the 29-page report said.

Women have been treated particularly harshly, the report said: "ISIL (has) attacked and killed female doctors, lawyers, among other professionals."

In August, it said, ISIL took 450-500 women and girls to the Tal Afar citadel in Iraq's Nineveh region where "150 unmarried girls and women, predominantly from the Yazidi and Christian communities, were reportedly transported to Syria, either to be given to ISIL fighters as a reward or to be sold as sex slaves".

Zeid Ra'ad al Hussein, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said the array of violations and abuses was "staggering, and many of their acts may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity".

The report also detailed rights violations committed by the Iraqi security forces and affiliated armed groups during the same period.

Based on nearly 500 interviews, it said air strikes by the Iraqi government against ISIL had caused "significant civilian deaths", by hitting villages, a school and hospitals in violation of international law.

The report said at least 24,015 civilians had been killed or injured in Iraq during the first eight months of 2014. Of these, at least 8,493 were civilians.

Heavy fighting rages in Iraq's Anbar province
ISIL claims to have captured the town of Heet in Anbar province, but pro-government fighters say the fight is ongoing.
Last updated: 02 Oct 2014 18:55

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Fighting between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Sunni militias is raging in the west of Iraq's Anbar province, with a fierce battle taking place for control of the strategic town of Heet.

ISIL had reportedly seized control of most of the town on Thursday, but Sunni militias, fighting on behalf of Iraq's government, swiftly denied the claim saying the battle was ongoing.

State television said the armed group had occupied the mayor's office and police station but were locked in fighting with the local Sunni Albu Nimr tribe.


Al Jazeera's Imran Khan, reporting from the capital Baghdad, said the town had yet to fall - with ISIL fighters unable to move in and out freely.

"ISIL does control huge chunks of Anbar province... but we're seeing a renewed push by the Iraqi army and those Sunni militia groups," he said.

Khan added that the fighting appeared to have sparked again over the past three days, prompted by US and French air strikes on an ISIL base-camp last week.

"That seems to have weakened them significantly, allowing these ground troops to go in and try and start clearing areas within Anbar province," Khan said.

Heet is a walled market town 30km from Anbar's provincial capital Ramadi, and lies close to the Ain al-Asad military base, one of Iraq's largest defense facilities.

Anbar Province, which borders Syria, has been a major stronghold for ISIL and continues to be largely controlled by the group.

ISIL have captured vast swathes of western and northern Iraq including the north's biggest city Mosul, as well as large areas of the east and north of neighbouring Syria.

Middle East
Iraq's Peshmerga forces push to retake Mosul
Kurdish fighters say they are in high spirits, as they try to reverse gains made by the ISIL.
Last updated: 02 Oct 2014 20:10
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Iraq's Kurdish Peshmerga fighters are trying to reverse gains by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) who have overrun much of the country's north.

The group is in control of Iraq's second biggest city, Mosul; and Kurdish forces are trying to keep up pressure on the group's positions.

As they wait for better weapons, the Kurds say they are in high spirits and are being paid well to fight ISIL.

Al Jazeera's Monica Villamizar reports from Khazir in northern Iraq.

Middle East
Deadly suicide blast hits Baghdad funeral
At least 21 people killed in suspected sectarian attack as army face setback in campaign to retake key city from ISIL.
Last updated: 20 Oct 2014 05:36
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A suicide bomber has killed at least 21 people at a funeral in the Iraqi capital, while an ambush has halted the government forces' advance on a key northern city controlled by ISIL fighters.

Sunday's attack, which also wounded 35 people, occurred outside a Shia house of worship in the western Baghdad neighbourhood of Harthiya, where people were attending a funeral service, a local police officer and a medical official told Reuters news agency.
Check out our complete coverage of the crisis in Iraq

Baghdad has witnessed a surge in bombings in the past month, most of them claimed by ISIL, or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, as the government, headed by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, seeks traction in its effort to subdue Sunni-dominated parts of the country seized by the group.

"The attacker approached the entrance of the mosque and blew himself up among the crowd," the police officer said.

Accounts differed as to whether the bomber struck at the gate or inside the mosque, where some of the sources told the AFP news agency that mourners were gathered at the time of the explosion.

There was no immediate claim for the attack, but suicide bombings are almost exclusively carried out by Sunni fighters, including members of ISIL.

In further violence on Sunday, a roadside bomb exploded near a security patrol in the Tarmiyah area in the north of Baghdad, killing at least four people and wounding at least eight, officials said.

Offensive foiled

Elsewhere in Iraq, government forces attempted to retake the northern city of Baiji, which is adjacent to the country's largest refinery still under government control, despite a siege by ISIL.

The military operation, launched in the early hours of Saturday, was foiled when an armoured vehicle blew up near the security forces' convoy in a village in about 20km south of Baiji, officers said.
Pinpointing military and humanitarian aid from nations in the international struggle against the armed group.

The blast killed four soldiers and wounded seven.

"The attacker surprised our forces as he was driving a military armoured vehicle. We thought it was our vehicle," said an army major participating in the operation.

"We are planning to retake Baiji as soon as possible to secure a key highway and to stop the daily attacks of terrorists on the Baiji refinery," he said.

The offensive looks to bypass the Iraqi city of Tikrit, which lies to the south of Baiji and is controlled by ISIL, and instead to focus on Baiji itself.

Iraqi forces have protected the Baiji refinery since June despite being surrounded on all sides after the Iraqi army imploded in the north in the face of a major ISIL assault.

ISIL holds territory across eastern Syria and northern and western Iraq, with the ambition of establishing rule based upon what it describes as Islamic precepts.

The US is leading an international coalition, conducting air strikes aimed to defeat the group.

EE UU y Turquía alteran su estrategia para frenar el auge del Estado Islámico
Ankara permite el paso de los ‘peshmergas’ y Washington lanza armas en Kobane

Los kurdos resisten mientras Turquía insiste en no intervenir

José Miguel Calatayud / Yolanda Monge Estambul / Washington 20 OCT 2014 - 21:26 CEST

Bombardeos estadounidenses en Kobane / Reuters-Live
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Hasta que Barack Obama llamó a Recep Tayyip Erdogan, el sábado por la noche, Turquía mantenía cerrada su frontera e impedía que las milicias kurdas de Irak, los peshmergas, accedieran a Kobane desde Turquía. Tras la llamada del presidente de EE UU a su homólogo turco, la ciudad siria fronteriza con Turquía, que resiste un mes de asedio del grupo yihadista Estado Islámico (EI), recibía en la madrugada del domingo al lunes suministros por vía aérea —armamento y ayuda médica donados por los kurdos iraquíes— lanzados por el Ejército de EE UU. Y se concretaba la garantía de que los peshmergas podrán acceder a Kobane desde Turquía y unirse a la milicia kurda local, las Unidades de Protección Popular (YPG en sus siglas kurdas).

Por parte de Ankara, el cambio de política es significativo al dar vía libre a las fuerzas de seguridad del Kurdistán iraquí para que refuercen la lucha contra los extremistas suníes del EI y abandonar la razón que esgrimía para denegarles la entrada: que el YPG es la rama siria del Partido de los Trabajadores del Kurdistán (PKK, en kurdo), considerado una organización terrorista tanto por Turquía como por la UE y EE UU.

“Vamos a ayudar a los peshmergas a cruzar a Kobane, los debates aún están en marcha”, confirmaba el lunes en conferencia de prensa Mevlut Cavusoglu, ministro turco de Exteriores. “No tenemos ningún deseo de que Kobane caiga [en manos del Estado Islámico]”, añadió Cavusoglu, que ratificaba a los periodistas la noticia adelantada por medios kurdos iraquíes citando a fuentes anónimas.
más información

Erdogan advierte de que Kobane está a punto de caer en manos del EI
Los milicianos del EI penetran en la ciudad de Kobane
EE UU entra en la guerra civil de Siria

También Washington alteraba su postura y pasaba en menos de dos semanas de considerar Kobane como “objetivo no estratégico” a asegurar que hubiera sido “una irresponsabilidad, además de moralmente muy difícil, dar la espalda a una comunidad que lucha contra el Estado Islámico”. Ambas citas son del secretario de Estado, John Kerry. La primera, del pasado 8 de octubre. La última, del lunes durante un encuentro con la prensa en Yakarta.

Conocedor del importante giro —es la primera vez que el Pentágono entrega armas a los defensores de Kobane, con lo que esto indica sobre la importancia estratégica de la ciudad—, Kerry declaró que se trataba de “una emergencia ante un momento de crisis” y matizó que la medida era “momentánea”. El matiz tiene sentido ya que el 8 de octubre Kerry aseguraba que “por muy horroroso que sea contemplar en tiempo real lo que está sucediendo en Kobane, hay que dar un paso atrás y entender cuál es el objetivo estratégico”.

Kerry informaba de que él mismo había hablado con dirigentes turcos y que también lo había hecho Obama, para “dejar muy, muy claro” que no había un “cambio de política”. Viraje de rumbo o no, la semana pasada el Departamento de Estado informaba de que el fin de semana anterior había habido por primera vez una reunión oficial entre un diplomático de EE UU y las milicias kurdas en Siria, a las que hasta ahora Turquía veía con reticencia por sus posibles nexos con el PKK. Según Reuters, serían esos mismos milicianos kurdos los ojos del Pentágono a la hora de atacar las posiciones del EI en Kobane, que ya ha vivido 135 ataques aéreos contra posiciones de los extremistas suníes.
De Mosul a Kobane

9 de junio. Los yihadistas del Estado Islámico (EI) lanzan una ofensiva relámpago en Irak y toman Mosul.

8 de agosto. EE UU bombardea al EI en Irak. Es su primera operación en el país desde la retirada en 2011.

15 de agosto. La UE autoriza el suministro de arma a los kurdos.

19 de agosto. El EI anuncia la decapitación del periodista James Foley.

5 de septiembre. Barack Obama anuncia una “coalición internacional” contra el EI.

16 de septiembre. Una ofensiva del EI en Siria provoca 300.000 refugiados.

21 de septiembre. El EI comienza el asedio de Kobane.

23 de septiembre. Cuatro días después de Francia, cinco países árabes se suman al bombardeo contra el EI. 10 días después lo hace Londres.

2 de octubre. Turquía se une a la coalición.

6 de octubre. El EI comienza a combatir dentro de Kobane.

El lunes se produjeron seis nuevos bombardeos contra los yihadistas y también para destruir uno de los contenedores con armas que los aviones de EE UU habían lanzado de madrugada, ya que cayó en una zona controlada por los yihadistas por lo que había riesgo de que las armas acabaran en sus manos, explica el Mando Central estadounidense en un comunicado.

Kobane (Ayn el Arab, en árabe) está defendida solo por la milicia kurda local, que ha conseguido resistir el empuje de los yihadistas, más numerosos y mejor armados, en parte gracias a los ataques aéreos de la coalición internacional contra los yihadistas liderada por EE UU.

El avance de los radicales del Estado Islámico hacia Kobane desplazó a cerca de 200.000 personas, que cruzaron al lado turco como refugiadas, y provocó que kurdos turcos acudieran a la zona para ayudar a los desplazados y también para intentar cruzar a Kobane a unirse a la lucha junto con la milicia local YPG.

La presencia de un enemigo común encarnado en los yihadistas del EI ha acercado a las diferentes facciones kurdas, que por ejemplo ya han combatido juntas contra el Estado Islámico en el norte de Irak. Ahora, y gracias al permiso de Turquía, la misma situación podría reproducirse en Kobane.
Ankara distingue entre kurdos

J. M. C., Estambul

El pueblo kurdo, formado por unos 30 millones de personas, se reparte sobre todo entre Siria, Irak, Irán y principalmente Turquía. Aquí viven unos 15 millones de kurdos, concentrados en el sureste del país y que mantienen una relación complicada con el Gobierno de Ankara.

Tras décadas de reclamar sus derechos, en 1984 la milicia del Partido de los Trabajadores del Kurdistán (PKK, en kurdo) se alzó en armas contra el Estado para demandar la independencia. Desde entonces, más de 40.000 personas han muerto en el conflicto. Actualmente el PKK —considerado una organización terrorista por Turquía, la Unión Europea y Estados Unidos— sólo pide más autonomía para la región kurda. En los últimos años el Gobierno ha ampliado los derechos de la esta minoría y en octubre de 2012 inició conversaciones de paz con el PKK.

A pesar de todo esto, la desconfianza mutua se mantiene. Y la situación en Kobane (Ayn el Arab, en árabe), una ciudad kurda en Siria que los kurdos turcos consideran "hermana", ha tensado al máximo el proceso de paz. El Gobierno turco no quiere apoyar a la milicia kurda siria enfrentada al Estado Islámico (EI) en la defensa de Kobane. Para el presidente turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, las Unidades de Protección Popular (YPG, en kurdo) son "lo mismo" que el PKK. Además, una de las condiciones que Ankara ha puesto para implicarse más en la coalición internacional contra el EI, liderada por Estados Unidos, es que los kurdos sirios renuncien a su deseo de autonomía.

Sin embargo, el Gobierno turco sí mantiene buenas relaciones políticas y comerciales con el Gobierno Regional del Kurdistán (KRG, por sus siglas en inglés), como se llama la administración kurda en Irak. Los kurdos iraquíes tienen autonomía desde 1992 y una gran cuota de autogobierno desde 2005. El KRG tiene unas reservas petrolíferas estimadas en 45.000 millones de barriles, que ha empezado a exportar este año desde el puerto turco de Ceyhan (al sur del país). Es esta buena relación la que ha conllevado que Ankara haya dado permiso a las fuerzas de seguridad kurdas iraquíes, los peshmerga, para cruzar a Kobane desde el lado turco.

Los kurdos resisten mientras Turquía insiste en no intervenir en Kobane
Los milicianos y los ataques aéreos de la coalición matan a al menos 31 yihadistas durante el fin de semana
José Miguel Calatayud Estambul 19 OCT 2014 - 23:19 CEST

Los militantes yihadistas del llamado Estado Islámico (EI) han sufrido numerosas bajas en los últimos dos días y siguen sin poder vencer la resistencia de la ciudad siria de Kobane (Ayn el Arab, en árabe).

Al menos 31 combatientes del EI murieron el fin de semana en enfrentamientos con las Unidades de Protección Popular (YPG, en kurdo), la milicia kurda local que defiende Kobane, y en ataques aéreos de la coalición contra el EI liderada por Estados Unidos, según el Observatorio Sirio por los Derechos Humanos.

El EI, que controla buena parte del norte y este de Siria y del oeste de Irak, lleva más de un mes intentado tomar Kobane, que le daría control sobre una larga franja de territorio a lo largo de la frontera con Turquía. Esto ha convertido a la ciudad en un símbolo de la resistencia kurda contra los yihadistas y también por el derecho al autogobierno de los kurdos.

Considerado el mayor pueblo del mundo sin Estado, unos 30 millones de kurdos se reparten en las zonas limítrofes entre Turquía, Siria, Irán e Irak. En este último país, donde también sus milicias —los peshmergas— luchan contra el EI, ya cuentan con mucha autonomía. Además, el hecho de que la batalla por Kobane se pueda seguir fácilmente en directo desde el lado turco de la frontera ha llevado el asedio a esta ciudad y la lucha kurda a las televisiones y a las portadas de los periódicos de muchos países.
más información

Erdogan advierte de que Kobane está a punto de caer en manos del EI
18 muertos en Turquía tras las protestas por el asedio a Kobane
Kobane, ciudad mártir

Por su parte, el Gobierno turco, cuyos tanques están desplegados muy cerca de Kobane, justo al otro lado de la frontera, se niega a intervenir en la batalla o a dar apoyo a la milicia kurda, como querrían Estados Unidos y sus demás aliados en la coalición.

“Crear un frente contra ISIL [como se conocía antes al EI] podría significar dar armas al PYD [Partido de la Unión Democrática, en kurdo, el ala política de las YPG], pero para nosotros el PYD es lo mismo que el PKK [Partido de los Trabajadores del Kurdistán, en kurdo], una organización terrorista”, comentó en la noche del sábado el presidente turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. “No podemos decir sí a eso si Estados Unidos, nuestro aliado y [como Turquía] miembro de la OTAN, espera que consintamos en ese tipo de apoyo”, insistió Erdogan, según la agencia semipública de noticias Anadolu, que lo acompañaba en el avión presidencial de vuelta a Turquía desde Afganistán.

Erdogan también volvió a negar que su país haya dado permiso a Estados Unidos para usar la base militar de Incirlik. Ayer el presidente estadounidense, Barak Obama, lo llamó por teléfono y ambos discutieron “la situación en Kobane y los pasos que se podrían tomar para contrarrestar el avance de ISIL”, según un comunicado de la Casa Blanca.

Multiple car bombings rock Baghdad
Series of bombs targeting restaurants in the Iraqi capital kill 21, police and medical sources say.
Last updated: 21 Oct 2014 14:55
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The bombings are the latest in a series targeting members of Iraq's Shia majority [Reuters]

A series of bombs targeting restaurants across the Iraqi capital Baghdad have killed at least 21 people, police and medics said.

Twelve people were killed in Baghdad's northern Talibiya district on Tuesday when a car bomb blew up directly in front of a restaurant and another in a parking area.

A homemade bomb exploded close to a restaurant in Baghdad's Sheikh Omar neighbourhood, killing two civilians, and two more blasts near restaurants in the south of the capital left a further seven people dead, police and medical sources said.

The bombings are the latest in a series targeting members of Iraq's Shia majority who are considered heretics by fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

ISIL has overrun large parts of Iraq and neighbouring Syria and surged towards Baghdad in June after seizing the northern city of Mosul but have not captured the capital.

How long until foreign troops fight ISIL?
Kurdish Peshmerga troops say that it's time for the world to realise that they can't fight the armed group alone.
Last modified: 21 Sep 2014 21:28
Sue Turton
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Sue Turton is an Al Jazeera correspondent who has covered Afghanistan, Libya and Syria extensively for the network.

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Kurdish Peshmerga troops have been fighting off ISIL advances [Reuters]

How many armchair generals does it take to form a broad coalition? These are men making decisions on the best way to fight what is perceived to be one of the biggest threats to the West for decades, from an arm's length. The countries signing up to the US masterplan may be worried about this dark force visiting their own borders, but not enough to commit to the fight on the ground.

But should they be?

Barack Obama may not want to commit the same mistakes as George W Bush. But ISIL has the potential to engulf much more than parts of Syria and Iraq. Name a western country that doesn't have disaffected Muslim youth ripe for seduction by ISIL's anti-western sentiment.

The Xbox generation was brought up playing games that glorify death and gloss over the awkward bloody reality of war.

The Kurdish Peshmerga fighters are also from the Xbox generation. They know what happens to the side with ancient weapons and scarce ammunition left in the bank. This week, ISIL even turned to Hollywood for extra clout, producing a slick movie-style trailer glamourising the conflict.

The world is upside down when the force battling against you uses a familiar cultural idiom to its own advantage.

The trailer, titled "Flames of War", wasn't a pious message but a naked attempt to make this conflict look every bit as exciting as the latest action-packed, full-throttle outing from the Terminator franchise. Whoever is driving their PR campaign is riding a perfect storm of opportunity, regional fractures, split loyalties and disaffection.

And it's got nothing to do with Islam. For once the US secretary of state, John Kerry, put it perfectly: ISIL is "a militant cult masquerading as a religious movement".

Fighting alone?

So the Peshmerga, peering over the sand berm across no-man's land to the black flags waving in the distance, see an enemy of super-human stature. And their commanders aren't helping to soften this image. I've heard the same words used by Peshmerga generals to describe ISIL's fighting prowess: sophisticated, tactically astute, disciplined and fearless.

The Peshmerga commanders are the first to admit their own limitations. General Hashem Setaie sat in a man-made bunker just 10km from the Rabia crossing into Syria, currently held by ISIL. He said his forces needed to be built from the ground up if they're going to hold back this black tide.

"As an army we need everything from A to Z. Everything from uniforms, small weapons, body armour, rockets, heavy machineguns, tanks, night-vision kits. Even if they send us mortars - if we don't have night vision equipment - we can't see where the enemy is or what he's doing. We need the whole package."

I asked the general if they could win this battle without foreign boots on the ground. "No," he replied. Plain and simple.

He didn't stop there, admitting that he is no tactician and no technical expert, before adding that the Peshmerga needed experienced officers to advise them how to attack the enemy, and with which weapons.

As well as being overwhelmed by ISIL's firepower, the Peshmerga lack another weapon that their foe seemingly has in limitless supply.

"They come to die. When they run out of ammunition, they blow themselves up," said Hajar Nada, a captain who lost both his legs after his vehicle hit an improvised explosive device east of Mosul.

ISIL doesn't just have suicide bombers in abundance. Its infantry is willing to die.

The Peshmerga are not.

Holgert Hikmet, a spokesman for the Kurdish fighters, believes it's time for the world to realise that they can't do it alone: "The international community needs to lead this fight because it is a global fight. Right now we alone are fighting them for the whole world."