El Oso Ruso vuelve a alzar la zarpa: La confrontación entre éste y el Aguila calva no ha terminado

No estamos ante una nueva guerra, porque la Guerra Fría nunca terminó

'Rusia empezó a no hacer tanto caso de los consejos de Occidente. Y eso no gusta'
'Putin tiene una experiencia enorme, ¿cómo puede permitirse que se jubile?'
'El caso Litvinenko fue la tentativa de desacreditar a Rusia'

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Actualizado sábado 15/12/2007 12:09 (CET)

DANIEL UTRILLA

MOSCÚ.- Delgado y con flequillo monacal, Andrei Lugovoi es, para la policía británica, el responsable del asesinato con polonio radiactivo del ex agente ruso Alexander Litvinenko. Para los rusos, es casi un héroe nacional desde se le señaló como sospechoso. A continuación, un resumen de sus declaraciones en la entrevista que ha concedido a EL MUNDO, la primera en un diario español.

No ha empezado ninguna nueva Guerra Fría porque la Guerra Fría nunca terminó (...) Cuando se descompuso la URSS, Rusia logró gracias a Dios mantenerse en pie, en 2000 llegó otra gente al poder y con el aumento del precio del gas y del petróleo, Rusia es ahora quizá el Estado más rico. Por eso Rusia empezó a no hacer tanto caso de los consejos de Occidente. Y eso no gusta. El caso Litvinenko fue la tentativa de desacreditar a Rusia.

No me preocupa en absoluto la inmunidad de diputado. El que viva tranquila y dignamente me lo permite la Constitución de Rusia (...) Como diputado, mi prioridad será devolver a los oficiales rusos el prestigio de élite perdido en los últimos 15 años.

"Rusia tiene solamente dos aliados: su Ejército... y su flota"

Litvinenko, por su carácter, siempre trataba de participar en provocaciones y de meterse donde "ni el perro mete el rabo". Odiaba tanto al Estado ruso, Putin incluido, que estaba listo para cometer cualquier acción. El polonio es muy engañoso, yo leí mucho sobre él. Si aquí hubiera polonio [señala la mesa], y se cubriera con un papel muy fino, o celofán, ya no habría ninguna radiación. Pero si se quitase el papel, podría empezar a evaporarse (...) Litvinenko pudo descuidarse y entrar en contacto con él.

Yo fui víctima de un ataque terrorista radiactivo en el territorio de Gran Bretaña. Pienso que se preparaba una provocación, pero algo no pasó según las reglas con las que jugaba Litvinenko. No sé el qué (...) Litvinenko me decía que estuvo muchas veces en España y que a algún mafioso lo encarcelaron gracias a sus actividades.

Rusia tiene solamente dos aliados: su Ejército y su flota (...) Putin tiene una experiencia enorme de ocho años al frente del Estado. ¿Cómo puede permitirse que se jubile?

Estados Unidos - Rusia: La guerra nunca terminó

Publicado: 28 jun 2013 | 11:49 GMT


Perspectiva Equilibrium

por elDr. Alberto Hutschenreuter



El arribo a Rusia del exanalista de la CIA Edward Snowden sumó otra nueva instancia de discordia entre Estados Unidos y Rusia, puesto que las autoridades de este último país han informado que Snowden, acusado por Estados Unidos de revelar datos oficiales sensibles, no sería deportado a su país de origen mientras permaneciera en Rusia. El hecho, que sigue a la reciente expulsión de Rusia del funcionario estadounidense Ryan Fugle, acusado de realizar actos de espionaje, precipitó un torrente de notas y análisis de expertos y diletantes sobre la erosión de las relaciones ruso-estadounidenses y el "regreso a una nueva confrontación".



Una mirada menos centrada en los eventos y más atenta a los procesos en las relaciones entre los dos países nos proporcionaría un contexto de continuidad que obedece a una lógica de poder que signó las relaciones entre estos dos singulares actores desde la desaparición de la Unión Soviética, en 1991.

Entonces, el (último) Gorbachov y el presidente ruso, Borís Yeltsin, creyeron haberse unido al bando vencedor de la Guerra Fría: según ellos, sobre todo Yeltsin y su joven canciller, Andréi Kozyrev, Estados Unidos "y Rusia" habían ganado la confrontación porque ambos habían derrotado al comunismo, que había sido una elección muy dañina para los rusos (de allí que la experta francesa Héléne Carrere D’Encausse aludiera a la "Rusia victoriosa").

Pero desde la visión estadounidense, no solamente hubo un único ganador, sino que el fin de la Unión Soviética no implicó dejar de considerar a su "Estado continuador", la Federación de Rusia, como un eventual desafío a su singular estado de supremacía.

Ello explica que Estados Unidos, bajo la pátina de una política de cooperación, confianza e incluso de "asociación estratégica" con Rusia, haya impulsado iniciativas relacionadas con maximizar su poder e impedir la recuperación del de Rusia, por caso, alentando la adopción sin cortapisas de la economía de mercado (en un país carente de tradición en la materia); ampliando la OTAN al este de Europa (sin respetar pactos implícitos que comprometían a Occidente a no hacerlo y sobre los que se habría establecido el fin del conflicto); logrando acuerdos en materia de armas estratégicas y convencionales que desfavorecían a Rusia, etc.

Hasta mediados de los años noventa Rusia no solamente creyó que la cooperación era efectiva, sino que, por vez primera en su historia, desestimó la defensa y promoción de sus intereses nacionales en pos de un orden interestatal basado en la defensa de "valores universales". Pero pronto fue comprendiendo la advertencia de Bismarck, respecto a que "una política exterior sentimental jamás reconoce reciprocidad".

Durante la segunda mitad de aquella década, Rusia asumió una conducta externa proactiva; sin embargo, su profundo grado de debilidad interna solamente le permitió un ejercicio retórico frente a políticas de maximización de poder por parte de Estados Unidos, por caso, en Kosovo, cuando la OTAN intervino sin autorización de la ONU; en países del "extranjero cercano" de Rusia, alentando fuerzas políticas refractarias a Moscú y deseosas de cobertura estratégica occidental; dando impulso a una nueva ampliación de la OTAN , etc.

Durante la década pasada, la percepción de Rusia respecto de las verdaderas intenciones de Estados Unidos para con ella se despejaron, al punto que en ocasión de la celebración del 60 aniversario del fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial el presidente Putin, sin ambages, sentenció que "La desaparición de la Unión Soviética había sido una catástrofe geopolítica, puesto que no solamente se había perdido la Guerra Fría, sino que Rusia, su heredera, podía perder lo que se había ganado en la Gran Guerra Patria" (es decir, poder, reconocimiento y capacidad de deferencia). Sin duda fue la expresión más contundente y sintetizadora en relación con aquella percepción nacional.

Más recientemente, la política externa rusa se tornó más activa, alcanzando en Georgia y en Siria su mayor afirmación ante las políticas de poder estadounidenses.


En breve, la Guerra Fría nunca terminó. Nunca existió un tratado que pusiera fin a la misma. Por ello, el experto Serguéi Karagánov ha dicho: "La confrontación permanece inacabada. Pese a que el enfrentamiento militar e ideológico de aquellos tiempos ha quedado muy atrás, se lo está sustituyendo por un nuevo punto muerto: entre Rusia, por un lado, y, por otro, Estados Unidos y algunos 'nuevos europeos'. Europa, Rusia y Estados Unidos deben poner fin a la 'guerra inacabada'. Después, tal vez en 2019, año en que se cumplirá el centésimo aniversario del Tratado de Versalles, podremos despedirnos del siglo XX".



Por Dr. Alberto Hutschenreuter
Ciudad de Buenos Aires
Argentina
www.equilibriumglobal.com

La guerra fría nunca terminó

El Mundo 4 Mar 2014 - 9:30 pm

Visión global


Lo que parecía una crisis política interna, difícil para Ucrania pero manejable en términos de sus repercusiones internacionales, se ha convertido en un pulso entre Rusia, Estados Unidos y Europa que recuerda el modus vivendi de la guerra fría, en el que la expansión de cualquiera de las partes se disuadía mediante la amenaza de retaliaciones militares de “baja intensidad” o incluso de tipo nuclear.

Por: Arlene B. Tickner



El actual impasse diplomático hace pensar que la disolución de la Unión Soviética y el fin de la guerra fría nunca dieron muerte a las doctrinas de política exterior que acompañaban a ésta, en especial la contención. Al contrario, podría afirmarse que desde comienzos de los noventa, Estados Unidos, de la mano de Europa occidental, ha buscado expandir su zona de influencia militar, política y económica hasta los límites fronterizos de Rusia (si no también dentro de estos) con el objeto de contener la expansión y la influencia de ese país. Así, Washington ha actuado en términos geoestratégicos como si la guerra fría nunca hubiera terminado.

Una columna reciente del académico y funcionario público, Joseph Nye en el New York Times, sobre la política de Obama en Asia, permite entender por qué la contención no funciona como estrategia frente a Rusia. Además de ser diseñada para otra época histórica en la que el intercambio económico y el contacto social eran limitados, parte de la consideración del “otro” como enemigo o amenaza, lo cual inculca en este conductas de adversario. En reflejo de esto, varias encuestas recientes de Gallup, Levada Center y VTsIOM muestran que las percepciones mutuas entre los habitantes de Rusia y Estados Unidos han empeorado ostensiblemente. Por primera vez en 15 años la mayoría de los estadounidenses consideran a Rusia como un enemigo en lugar de un aliado, teniendo altos niveles de desfavorabilidad tanto el país como Vladimir Putin. Mientras tanto, la mitad de la población rusa ve a Estados Unidos en términos negativos y considera posible una nueva “guerra fría”. A su vez, apoya masivamente la defensa de Rusia frente a intromisiones externas (occidentales liberales), así como la recuperación de su estatus como “gran potencia”.

El lenguaje utilizado en días recientes por Washington frente al despliegue militar ruso en Crimea suena a ultimátum. Dentro de la lógica señalada aquí, la respuesta de Putin, consistente en no sucumbir ante la presión externa y dividir a Europa con el chantaje de cortar su suministro de energía, es completamente “racional”. Pese a la advertencia estadounidense de que “habrá costos que pagar”, no existe amenaza militar creíble que pueda forzar a Rusia a soltar a Crimea, mientras que la de otros tipos de sanción económica y política es similarmente inocua.

La pregunta, entonces, es cómo persuadir a Rusia a hacer lo que quieren Estados Unidos y Europa, dada la inutilidad de la contención y a sabiendas de que la anexión de Crimea es una posibilidad real. Además de tratar a Putin como socio o incluso rival, y no como enemigo o loco, es importante comprender las preocupaciones (no del todo ilegítimas) rusas frente a la crisis en Ucrania. Desde la guerra en Georgia de 2008, Moscú no había enviado señal más fuerte de que la inestabilidad política y económica en sus fronteras son inadmisibles para su “interés nacional”. Obama debe intentar escuchar.

NATO triples fighter jets in Baltic countries
Boost to patrols is meant to send a message to Moscow about the ongoing unrest in Ukraine's east.
Last updated: 01 May 2014 11:03


NATO is responding to tensions in Ukraine by tripling the number of fighter jets patrolling the air over Baltic countries that border Russia.

The move came in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and continuing unrest in Ukraine's east, which Western and other nations blame on the Kremlin.

NATO and Baltic politicians said the military build-up was intended to show solidarity and to send a message to Russia.

Al Jazeera’s Nick Spicer reports from the main airbase that NATO is using in Siauliai, Lithuania.
Source:
Al Jazeera

US and Germany threaten new Russia sanctions
Leaders say measures could target Russia's military and financial sector if it interferes in upcoming polls in Ukraine.
Last updated: 03 May 2014 06:07

The US president Barack Obama and German chancellor Angela Merkel have warned Russia it will face new sanctions if it interferes in Ukraine's presidential elections set for May 25.

The leaders met at the White House on Friday with the crisis in Ukraine high on the agenda.

The threat of new sanctions came as Russia's ambassador to the United Nations warned Ukraine's crackdown on pro-Russia protesters was a "fatal error".

Al Jazeera's Patty Culhane reports.
Source:
Al Jazeera

Freed Ukraine observers arrive in Germany
German defence minister says "we are deeply relieved" after the five men, along with their assistants, regain freedom.
Last updated: 04 May 2014 06:24

European military observers who were held more than a week by pro-Russian separatists have arrived in Germany a day after they were released in the Ukrainian eastern town of Slovyansk.

The five observers from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) - along with five of their Ukrainian assistants - were freed on Saturday.

They were deployed following a pact struck between Russia, Ukraine, the European Union and the US in mid-April aimed to resolve the crisis, which began with Russia's annexation of Crimea.

"We are deeply relieved that the members of the kidnapped OSCE team have landed unharmed here in Germany, in Berlin," Ursula von der Leyen, Germany's defence minister, said in Berlin.

"I would like to express my deep gratitude and my respect for the infinitely good cooperation we saw."

Nicolai Wammen, Denmark's defence minister, said they would continue to support the OSCE mission.

"It is important that they can work and conduct their important business in Ukraine and that this event will not make that more difficult in the future," he said.

The mission's prospects became clouded a week after their deployment when they were detained by armed men in Slovyansk, the crucible of unrest in eastern Ukraine.

The pro-Russian separatists holding them alleged the observers were spying for NATO and carrying suspicious material; one from non-NATO member Sweden was released two days later, but the rest remained in custody until Saturday.

The separatists' leader in Slovyansk, Vyacheslav Ponomarev, was quoted by Interfax news agency as saying he ordered the release because of increasing insecurity in the city, according to the Associated Press news agency.

In recent days, at least four Ukrainian soldiers were killed on the city's outskirts - two of them when helicopters were shot down - and at least 10 civilians have been killed, according to Ponomarev.

Ponomarev later told the Associated Press news agency that the OSCE observers "are not being released - they are leaving us, as we promised them".

One of the released observers, German Col. Axel Schneider, told the Associated Press that the 12 detainees held up well. Those held included three other Germans and a soldier each from the Czech Republic, Denmark and Poland.

"They had a very good attitude and that gave them the strength to stand the situation," Schneider said of the observers. "According to the word of [Ponomarev], we have been treated as good as possible. This is a miserable situation, but we were under his protection."

Ponomaryov had initially told the the Interfax news agency he ordered the release because of increasing insecurity in the city as Kiev pressed ahead with a military campaign to reclaim rebel-held territory in the area.

War against separatists

Vasyl Krutov, the head of Ukraine's "anti-terrorist centre", said on Saturday that clashes in the east against pro-Russian rebels "were not just some kind of short-lived uprising, it is in fact a war".

Ukraine forces took control of areas around the town of Kramatorsk.

"We are not stopping," said the interior minister, Arsen Avakov.

Ukraine accuses Russia of backing pro-Russian groups in eastern Ukraine. Russia denies invovlement with the rebels.

Tensions have heightened sharply after at least 42 people were killed in clashes between government supporters and opponents in the worst violence since the toppling of pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich from the presidency in February.

The violence broke out on Friday afternoon in the Black Sea port of Odessa, when the two sides confronted each other, leaving three people dead, reportedly by gunfire.

The clashes prompted government opponents to seek refuge in a building that caught fire after protesters threw firebombs.
Source:
Al Jazeera and agencies

We should not forget that in 1914, the possibility that the assassination of an Archduke could produce a world war seemed almost inconceivable.
Graham Allison

May 7, 2014

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The rapid slide from lawlessness to violence that has claimed the lives of more than sixty people in the Ukrainian cities of Donetsk, Slovyansk, and Odessa in the past week sounds alarms that should be heard more clearly in Western capitals. The strategy Washington and the Europeans have chosen that focuses on the villainization of Putin (much as he deserves it), calls on him to withdraw support for the separatists, and threatens further sanctions if he does not is bound to fail. It will not stop the killing. It will not prevent the de facto dismemberment of Ukraine. It will not deter Putin from continuing whatever role he and Russia are playing in this process. And it fails to address the risk that what happens in Ukraine does not end in Ukraine.



Mark Twain observed that while history never repeats itself, it does sometimes rhyme. In the combination of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the collapse of authority that is destabilizing Ukraine, can we hear echoes from a century earlier when the murder of an Austrian Archduke sparked a great European war?



The thought that what we are now witnessing in Ukraine could trigger a cascade of actions and reactions that end in war will strike most readers as fanciful. Fortunately, it is. But we should not forget that in May 1914, the possibility that the assassination of an Archduke could produce a world war seemed almost inconceivable. History teaches that unlikely, even unimaginable events do happen.



If those making fateful choices in Washington, Berlin, and Moscow today were to pause to reflect on what was done—and not done—in 1914, they would recognize that the current crisis poses much greater danger than they now imagine. This would stir them to think well beyond their current conceptions of events and to stretch to much bolder, preventative initiatives than we have seen thus far.



The storyline of events 100 years ago is well known. Then, the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian imperial throne by Serbian terrorists led European elites (many of whom were cousins) to grieve. But for several weeks essentially nothing happened. Then, on July 23, Austria delivered an ultimatum to Serbia with ten demands. Serbia capitulated, agreeing to nine of the ten. But having secured a “blank check” of support from their German patron in the meantime, Austria rejected the Serbian reply, mobilized its forces, and declared war on Serbia. In response, the Russian Czar mobilized his forces. Kaiser Wilhelm then mobilized Germany’s military. Within a week, the major states of Europe had declared war against each other.



Could this sequence of events have been prevented? In the century since, historians have identified a number of opportunities. Most have focused on failures to recognize trend lines that were heightening risks that a spark would ignite a larger fire. But even after the assassination, it was still possible that statesmen could have acted to prevent what happened. One major opportunity occurred in the last week before war, as Luigi Albertini, one of the most insightful historians of these events, has explained. On July 28, when the Kaiser saw the Serbian response to Austria, he recognized that his Austrian client was out of control and sought to reign him in. He wrote to his foreign minister that this is “capitulation of the most humiliating kind, and as a result, every cause for war has gone.” The German Chancellor, however, failed to communicate this message clearly enough to stop the Austrians in their tracks. Two days later, when the Chancellor finally realized that events were driving to a war Germany did not want, he sought an off-ramp. But by then Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, had concluded that the risks of Germany’s not mobilizing were too great to bear. When he discovered that the Chancellor was chairing a meeting on July 30 to authorize a proposal to defuse the crisis, he crashed the meeting and stunned the Chancellor with the news that he had already obtained the Kaiser’s approval for German mobilization to begin.



The framework for an agreement short of war that the Kaiser outlined on July 28, and the Chancellor embraced on July 30, was basically the same concept the British Foreign Minister Grey had been discussing several days earlier in London. Serbia would be required to destroy the Black Hand terrorist group that had assassinated the Archduke. To assure that it complied with this demand, Austrian troops would be allowed to occupy Belgrade until that was accomplished.

Had this plan been implemented, Austria’s reasonable demand that Serbia be seriously punished for killing its heir apparently could have been satisfied. Russian concerns that its Orthodox brethren in the Balkans could remain independent would have been addressed. Germany would have had no need, or pretext, to respond to mobilizations in Russia and France, since they would not have occurred. Britain could have continued to play the role it had managed to play so skillfully for a century as the offshore balancer preventing the emergence of any dominant power on the continent. In the history books, this would be discussed as the third in a succession of Balkan crises that posed risks statesmen resolved.



At this point in the Ukrainian tragedy, the danger of a violent outcome that will dismember Ukraine is rising rapidly. In last Thursday's phone call with Chancellor Merkel, Putin demanded that to defuse the crisis, the Ukrainian government withdraw its troops from southeastern regions. Defying that demand, Kiev sent its military to try to retake the rebel-controlled eastern Ukrainian city of Slovyansk.



The week ahead will see two decisive days of reckoning: May 9, when Russians commemorate the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany, and May 11, when pro-Russian separatists occupying government buildings in a dozen cities in eastern Ukraine will hold a referendum on independence. As Ukraine’s interim prime minister said pointedly last week, the government of Ukraine faces a dilemma in which it is damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t. In his words, “On the one hand, the majority of Ukrainians are pressing the acting president to bring these terrorists to justice. On the other hand, if you start this kind of very tough operation, you will definitely have civilian casualties. And this is the perfect excuse for Putin to say look, these ultranationalists kill Russian speaking people”, giving him a pretext to send troops.

While a Russian emissary succeeded in freeing seven OSCE hostages last week as President Obama and Chancellor Merkel threatened further sanctions, both actions were more symbolic than of substance. Deeper factors driving events are in the saddle and riding toward a violent splintering of Ukraine. Unless U.S. and European leaders act in the week ahead, before Ukrainians vote for a new President on May 25, they will, de facto, have been partitioned. And even if the United States and Europe respond by imposing biting sanctions on sectors of the Russian economy—a big “if”, given the interpenetration of the Russian and German economies—facts on the ground will be no more reversible than Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Some hard-headed realists have argued that even if Ukraine shrinks with the loss of several autonomous republics (as Georgia did in 2008 when Abkhazia and South Ossetia seceded), the impact on American interests would be limited. They also argue that since it is now clear that no one (other than Russia) is prepared to fight for Ukraine, what is happening is unfortunate but not that important. What this complacency overlooks are potential secondary effects. Two deserve attention.

First, on the current track, the combination of Putin’s actions and Western reactions will poison relations between Putin and Obama for the remainder of his two-and-a-half years in office. This is the critical period for what has been a promising prospect of a negotiated agreement that stops Iran verifiably (and interruptibly) short of a nuclear bomb. If an isolated Russian spoiler undermines the sanctions regime that has motivated Iranian interest in a negotiated solution, and Iran resumes or accelerates the nuclear program it was pursuing before the current pause, the United States and Israel will rapidly come to a crossroad. They will be forced to choose between seeing Iran acquire a nuclear bomb or bombing it to prevent that happening, igniting what is likely to become a wider war in the Middle East.

Second, think about the Baltics. Imagine a scenario in which we see a replay of Crimea or Donetsk in Latvia where one quarter of the population are ethnic Russians or Russian speakers. With or without Putin’s encouragement, several hundred of them occupy government buildings in Riga; Latvian police and security services evict them in an operation that turns violent and leaves as many corpses as last week’s fire in Odessa; the occupiers call on Putin to honor his pledge to “defend the rights of compatriots.” If the principles and precedent established by the Putin Doctrine lead to Russia’s little green men without insignia entering Latvia in what threatens to become another creeping annexation, who will fight for Latvia?

The brute fact that Latvia is a member of the NATO alliance is hard to ignore. The United States and other members have solemnly pledged themselves to regard “an attack upon one as an attack upon all.” But will German troops come to Latvia’s rescue? And if they did, would a majority of Germans support that action? Would the French, or British? Would Americans?

If we do, we will cross a bright redline Republican and Democratic presidents assiduously avoided over four decades of Cold War: American and Russian troops would be killing each other. Any such conflict would raise risks of escalation in which each nuclear superpower remains capable of erasing the other from the map. But if we don't, we will see a precipitous collapse of the credibility of U.S. security guarantees that have been the central pillar of the international security architecture the United States has constructed since World War II. Not only European allies, but Japan, South Korea, and others who have staked their survival on a U.S. security umbrella will look to their own defense.

In highlighting downside dangers in the current drift of events in Ukraine, my argument is not that these are the most likely outcomes. If Putin thinks first about Russian national interests, he will have sufficient reason to cooperate in preventing Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb. From the perspective of Russian national interests, acquiring additional territory in Eastern or Southern Ukraine and seeing the emergence of autonomous republics dependent on substantial financial support from Moscow is hardly a beneficial outcome for Russia. The overwhelming majority of Russians in the Baltics know that their lives are better as members of independent European states than they would be as provinces of Russia.

Nonetheless, especially in managing relations between great powers, and most especially, nuclear superpowers, American Cold War statesmen were vigilant in analyzing worst-case scenarios. Recognizing extreme risks (extremely unlikely, but extremely consequential), they observed what JFK, in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, called “primitive rules of prudence.” These accepted constraints and compromises in a competition in which the ultimate objective for each was to bury the other. Thus, Eisenhower refused to come to the rescue of Hungarian freedom fighters in 1956; LBJ to support the Prague uprising in 1968; and Reagan to deny overt support for Polish Solidarity and others as they loosened the Soviet grip on the Warsaw Pact.

If the likely outcome on the current path is unacceptable, or poses unacceptable risks, are there alternatives that, however ugly, are nonetheless preferable to what is otherwise likely to happen? I believe the answer is yes. Imagine an agreement in which all of the territory of Ukraine (minus Crimea) remains a sovereign, independent nonbloc state. In military and economic relations, Ukraine would agree with all the parties that it would remain neutral for the next quarter-century. It would thus not become a member of NATO or the European Union, nor of equivalent Russian-led institutions. Internally, it would make a commitment to meet the highest EU standards for guaranteeing minority rights, including those of Russian speakers. And as an integral part of this package, all parties would also commit themselves to provide specific support for the new government of Ukraine as it attempts to build a viable state. For historical analogies, think Belgium in the nineteenth century, or Austria after World War II, or Finland.

Obviously, such an agreement could not be imposed on Ukraine. Its government will have to be a willing party to any resolution and convinced that it is preferable to its feasible alternatives. Realistic Ukrainians know, however, that Ukraine’s survival as an independent political entity will prove impossible without Russian forbearance. Indeed, for the foreseeable future, Ukraine’s economic viability will depend on Russian financial assistance (through below-market gas prices and delayed collection of outstanding debt for earlier deliveries), continuing exports of essential raw materials, and imports of Ukrainian products—all of which Russia can withhold at its own discretion.

Obviously, such an agreement would not be fair. But as JFK often observed, “life is unfair.” Ukraine is free to choose between claiming all the rights and privileges of a normal modern state and ending up with half its current territory, or meeting enough of a Russian bully’s demands to have a chance to survive with its current borders and, if it succeeds, to put Putin to shame.

An agreement requiring so much compromise by all parties will strike most readers as implausible—and is surely unlikely. Politically, the smart move for all the Western leaders is to focus their fire on Putin, unquestionably a most deserving target. But for those of us who still believe that Ukraine can have a future, this week’s decision by the IMF to release the first $3 billion of a $17 billion emergency rescue package to prevent the country from default and forestall economic collapse keeps hope alive. Despite the neo–Cold War divide with Russia on every other issue concerning Ukraine, the IMF was able to pull the package together quickly and win approval for it only because of cooperation from all the parties—including Putin’s Russia.

Graham Allison is director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Image: U.S. Air Force Flickr.

Nicolai N. Petro

May 8, 2014


ODESSA, Ukraine - If the West appears confused by Russian actions in Ukraine and unable to find an adequate response to the crisis, it is because from the outset, it has misread the situation, transforming an essentially domestic dispute into one that threatens the security architecture of Europe. While all sides have contributed to the current debacle, six widely held assumptions have played an inordinate role in shaping Western discourse about Ukraine. These will need to be corrected before any real progress can be made.

1. The Ukrainians are one people, united in their support of change: This is a familiar refrain among Western politicians, yet anyone familiar with Ukrainian history knows that its borders have changed many times in the past century. As a result, millions of people without any ethnic, cultural, or linguistic attachment to Ukraine wound up in its present borders. Since 1991, the most visible division has been between Western Ukrainians, many of whom seek a Ukraine culturally and politically distinct from Russia, and Eastern Ukrainians, who want to live in a Ukraine that is independent, but that also maintains close spiritual, cultural, and economic ties to Russia. The fact that Western governments have identified the national aspirations of Ukraine with those of the Western regions of the country puts them at odds with half the country. Even if the Western regions prevail over the Eastern regions in the current struggle, choosing sides in this way has generated anti-Western sentiment in the East that is likely to linger for years to come.

2. Supporting the Euromaidan’s ouster of president Yanukovych: At the height of the Euromaidan riots, Western governments warned president Yanukovych not to use force to disband the protests, even as they turned violent. Later, during a critical phase of negotiations with the opposition, officials from the United States were taped discussing which specific opposition leaders they wanted to replace him. To a Ukrainian public already sharply divided over the legitimacy of the public protests on the Maidan (three-quarters of the population in Ukraine’s eastern cities regarded the Euromaidan protests as illegal), this merely proved that the West was intervening to thwart the political preferences of half the country.

3. Failing to stand behind the February 21 agreement: The failure of France, Germany and Poland to stand behind the negotiated transition of power that they had called for, has been a blow to the legitimacy of Ukrainian state institutions from which it has had great difficulty recovering. The subsequent seizure of power by the opposition not only brought down the much reviled, though legitimately elected president, it also led to the collapse of the country’s largest political party which, for all its faults, embodied the political aspirations of roughly half the population. To this day, fewer than a third of the population in Russian-speaking Ukraine view the acting president and prime minister as legitimate, while in Donetsk and Lugansk, the hotbeds of armed resistance, this figure falls to less than 15 percent.

4. Ignoring the rise of the Radical Right: The Western media has slowly caught on to the fact that right-wing nationalist groups like Svoboda and the Right Sector played a decisive role in the radicalization of the Euromaidan, and in the dramatic seizure of power immediately after the February 21 accords. Officially, however, Western governments continue to insist that their role is marginal. Yet, even today, such groups wield inordinate influence within the parliament and on the streets of central Kiev, which they continue to occupy despite pleas by the acting president to leave. They intimidate politicians, judges, and journalists, indeed anyone who speaks out against the policies of the current government. Their intimidation of presidential candidates associated with the Party of Regions elicits almost no comment from Western governments. Many in the Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine see this as further confirmation of Western partisanship.

5. Labeling protesters in the East and South “pro-Russian” and “separatists.”: Both labels are misleading because attachment to Russia in these regions is cultural and linguistic, not political. Reports from the region, surveys, and statements by local and national politicians, make it abundantly clear that there are significant local grievances against the interim government in Kiev. Even firebrand Yulia Tymoshenko recently acknowledged as much on national television. The vast majority simply want their Russian heritage to be recognized as part of their Ukrainian identity. The easiest way to do this, they say, would be to acknowledge the reality of Ukraine’s bilingualism in the constitution. The interim government’s resistance to this idea only deepens their mistrust of Kiev.

As for the charge of separatism, it is worth noting that in every instance where separatism has become an issue, including Crimea, the original demand was for greater regional rights and autonomy within Ukraine. Only when Kiev responded by replacing local officials with ones loyal only to the new government, did the issue of secession arise. That is one reason why most people in the Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine (62 percent) blame the loss of Crimea on Kiev, rather than on Crimean separatists (24 percent), or on Russia (19 percent). The same approach is now being taken toward eastern and southern Ukraine, with the same disastrous results.

6. Blaming Russia for Ukraine’s problems: Despite the heated rhetoric coming from Western governments, Russia’s primary objective in Ukraine has actually been to reduce the level of domestic instability. The reasons are not hard to fathom. First, such instability is bad for business, which in the case of Ukraine, involves military, industrial and energy investments that are vital to Russia. Second, continued instability is bad for Russia because it increases the likelihood of Ukraine becoming a failed state, which Russia will feel obliged to support with massive humanitarian assistance. Third, such instability is bad because it increase tensions with the West, which has a tendency to blame Russia for everything that happens there.

Russia would very much like to see Ukraine as a stable economic and political partner, able to provide enough growth and jobs to its own citizens to reduce the annual flow of more than 3 million Ukrainian migrant workers into Russia, and thus contribute to the prosperity of the 11 million Russians who live along the border with Ukraine. Having already spent as much as 300 billion dollars over the past two decades to prevent the collapse of the Ukrainian economy, it hardly seems likely that Russia now seeks its economic demise. It most certainly does not want to spend the tens of billions of dollars it would take to absorb these regions, and raise their standard of living up to that of Russia.

What Ought To Be Done Instead

If Russia’s actions are not the root cause of Ukraine’s problem, then chastising it cannot possibly resolve the current crisis. In fact, it compounds the crisis in three ways: first, by distracting Western policy makers from the real divisions within Ukraine that need to be dealt with; second, by reinforcing the notion, popular among some in the interim government in Kiev, that Western backing means there is no need to negotiate with the discontented eastern regions; third, by antagonizing the external actor with the greatest stake in Ukraine’s well-being—Russia.

By interpreting current events in Ukraine through the prism of a new Cold War with Russia, the Obama administration has already achieved one of that conflict’s most unfortunate byproducts—the manipulation of external power by local actors seeking maximum advantages for themselves.

But Russia is not the USSR. In an odd historical twist, in the current crisis, it is defending the rights of local populations to be heard by their government, whereas the West is defending the removal of a legitimately elected president. Significantly, all this is taking place in an area of the world that retains strong sympathies for Russia.

An extensive survey of Russian-speaking areas in April 2014 shows that while 70 percent do not support secession, if a referendum were held today only 25 percent would want to join EU, whereas 47 percent would prefer to join the Russia-led Customs Union. Only 15 percent feel that Ukrainian relations with Russia should be the same as with any other county, whereas three-quarters say the two countries should have open borders, and 8 percent feel the two should be one country. Most worryingly for the prospects of the military campaign against the rebels being conducted in the East, while nearly three-quarters say they do not support the introduction of Russian troops, only 10 percent say they would take up arms to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

This is the minefield within which the United States and the EU are now trying to maneuver—deep in the historical heartland of the Russian empire, where popular sympathies for Russia are both vast and deep, and where the West has yet to define any clear strategic objectives.

Historians of the future will wonder greatly at the forbearance that Russia has shown in wielding its potentially vast influence (the ease with which Crimea was taken by Russia should be highly instructive), in contrast to the boldness verging on recklessness with which the United States and EU have sought to manipulate the political outcome in Kiev.

Recognizing the indigenous nature of Ukraine’s current problems, which often go back to promises left unfulfilled by past Ukrainian governments, is therefore a necessary first step toward dealing with them realistically. But it is only the first step. The next is to apply meaningful pressure on the interim government to do what it has thus far refused to do—establish a government of national unity.

Understandably, it is not easy for those who came to power on the wave of revolutionary enthusiasm, to admit that many of their countrymen regard what they did as illegitimate. Fortunately, however, most people in the East and South are still eager to reach an accommodation in the name of national unity. But they feel that such an accommodation should be based on concrete actions taken by Kiev that demonstrate that law and order is actually being restored, and that the interim government is not under the thumb of radical nationalists. Presently, the number one concern of people in the East and South is fear of “rampant banditry;” i.e., falling prey to the violence unleashed in Kiev in January and February, and the lawlessness they are witnessing there today.

A second critical step is making Russian Ukraine’s official second language. This one gesture would reassure the predominantly Russian-speaking regions of the country that their cultural legacy is indeed fully accepted in today’s Ukraine. Such a step has been promised by many presidential candidates since Ukraine’s independence, but has always been opposed by Ukrainian nationalists. That is why its advocates now demand that it be enshrined in the constitution.

A final step is political and economic decentralization, which some identify as federalism. The essential difference between regional autonomy and federalism is that the latter is a compact between regions and the central government stipulated in the constitution. Some types of federalism are very broad, while other types are very narrowly defined. If autonomy is not constitutionally established, its advocates say, any new group of legislators could rescind what was previously granted, as happened with Crimea in 1998.

The interim government, however, cannot accomplish these urgent tasks on its own. It is too strongly beholden to the radical nationalists and pro-revolutionary street forces that brought it to power. Let us not forget that the latter even approved the current government. Since any move toward a true government of national unity will have to be taken against the wishes of one of the interim government’s core constituencies, it will require political cover, and this can only be provided by its major supporters—the United States and the EU.

Recognizing the indigenous nature of Ukraine’s problems therefore leads directly to a radically different strategy toward Russia—one of cooperation rather than confrontation in the pursuit of a strong and independent Ukraine. Last, but certainly not least, it could put to rest once and for all the calls for a new Cold War.

Nicolai N. Petro, professor of politics at the University of Rhode Island, is currently a Fulbright Research Scholar in Ukraine. The views expressed do not reflect the views of the Fulbright Program or the U.S. Department of State.

Compromise With Russia, Compromise on Democracy?






By not accepting certain countries into the EU or NATO, the West would not be condemning their democratic aspirations to Russian predation.
Raymond Sontag

May 8, 2014
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What is playing out in Ukraine is the culmination of a decades-old argument between the West and Russia about post-Soviet Eastern Europe. The Washington-Brussels argument is that countries like Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have the right to join the EU and NATO and that their accession to these blocs promotes security, prosperity and democracy in Eastern Europe. Moscow’s argument is that these countries’ joining exclusive Western alliances would harm Russia’s own security and economic interests and is therefore unacceptable. While the West rejects Russia’s position as unfounded, insincere and imperialist, it is likely to concede to Moscow and halt further expansion. Western leaders have shown a willingness to accept these countries’ neutrality and little appetite for prolonged, serious conflict with Russia. President Barack Obama recently said that neither Ukraine or Georgia are on a path to NATO membership and expanding the EU further east is very unpopular in Western Europe.

But what will make accepting this neutrality hard for many in the West, and therefore drag the conflict out, is the fear that, in compromising with Russia, we are compromising on our commitment to democracy in post-communist Europe. This fear stems from two beliefs: first, that NATO and EU expansion are the best guarantees of democracy in that region; second, that in opposing this expansion, Russia is really opposed to democracy in its neighborhood. As John McCain put it, “Vladimir Putin does not want a democracy on his borders. That would be a very bad example, from his point of view, to be set for the Russian people.”

The good news is that, despite these fears, Russia has shown no particular concern with democratization in its near abroad. To be sure, Moscow has bullied its neighbors and, in so doing, often hurt governments that were seeking democratic reforms. But a review of Russia’s recent relations with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine—three countries that have seen significant improvements in democratic governance and that have found themselves in conflict with Moscow—shows no evidence that Putin intervenes to quash democracy. However, what Russia has consistently reacted badly to is these countries seeking NATO and EU membership.

We can conclude from this that, by not bringing countries into the EU or NATO, the West would not be condemning their democratic aspirations to Russian predation. We can further conclude that by pushing for expansion, we are only increasing the likelihood of Russia taking action against its neighbors, thereby undermining democratic reform. Seeing EU and NATO expansion as tools for promoting democracy may have made sense for that last round of East European entrants into these clubs. But as recent events have shown, this model cannot be replicated for the non-Baltic post-Soviet states, at least not now. Simply put, the West has shown itself far less willing and able to push this expansion than Russia has shown itself willing and able to block it. Therefore, it is time for the West to develop other approaches for promoting our values and interests in this part of the world.

Russia, its Neighbors and Democracy

Democratization is hard to measure, but researchers try. Groups such as Freedom House track indicators, like free elections and human-rights observance, and periodically assign countries democracy scores. This gives us at least a rough picture of how countries are (or aren’t) democratizing. Hans-Joachim Lauth at the University of Wurzburg produces a database that, once every two years, merges all the major democracy-rating studies into a Combined Democracy Index. This provides a basic measuring stick for changes in democratization in the former Soviet Union.

If Russia’s true aim in its near abroad is to suppress democracy, we would expect to see it punish countries when they democratize. At first glance, the misconception that Russia opposes democratization may make sense. Starting in 2002, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine saw significant improvements in their democracy index, followed by a period of tension with Russia. A closer look at this picture, though, shows no real correlation between a country democratizing and Russia taking action against it.


After Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, as President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko pushed democratic reforms and sought EU and NATO membership, its relations with Russia worsened. In 2005, Moscow began demanding higher payments from Ukraine for natural gas and periodically cutting off its gas supply during the coldest months. Then, after Viktor Yanukovych became president in 2010, Ukraine’s democracy index fell dramatically and relations with Russia improved. However, the rapprochement in relations had in fact begun in early 2009, as Ukraine reached its high point on the democracy index, when Putin and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko struck a deal ending the gas dispute. The current conflict, of course, started in 2012 when Russia began punishing Ukraine with economic sanctions as Yanukovich moved closer to an association agreement with the EU. That Ukraine’s democracy index had plummeted under Yanukovych counted for nothing, with Russia blocking its imports and disrupting gas deliveries.

Georgia’s experience mirrors Ukraine’s in some important ways. In 2003, mass protests over fraudulent elections sparked the Roses Revolution, which brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power. As Saakashvili pushed both democratic reforms and closer ties with NATO, Russia took punitive action. In early 2006 Moscow banned the import of Georgian wines, claiming they were contaminated. Over the next two years tensions built and in 2008 the two countries went to war over the disputed territory of South Ossetia. In 2010, though, as Georgia’s democracy index continued to improve, its relations with Russia also showed modest improvement. Following statements by Putin on the importance of good relations with Georgia, passenger flights between Moscow and Tbilisi resumed for the first time since 2008. In 2011, Georgia dropped its opposition to Russia’s World Trade Organization membership, finally allowing it to join that club after eighteen years of trying. Saakashvili’s party lost parliamentary elections in 2011 and presidential elections in 2012. While the new government is cautious in its approach to Moscow, Russian-Georgian relations have continued to improve as Tbilisi makes clear that it wants cooperation with both Russia and the West. This improvement has come as Georgia, according the democracy index, has never been more democratic. It reached its highest point on the index since it began in 1996 and, according to Freedom House, Georgian democracy only improved in 2013.

Moldova has seen a steady increase in its democracy index since 2002, and by 2012, it had the highest rating of all the non-Baltic former Soviet states. Over that same period, Moldova’s relationship with Russia was rocky. The two countries, though, have had periods of rapprochement and conflict between them has stemmed directly from Russia’s support for the separatist region of Transnistria and Moldova’s drive for closer EU and NATO ties.

In 2003, Russia thought it had struck a deal that would allow Moldova to reintegrate Transnistria, while keeping Russian troops in the disputed region until 2010. Under pressure from Western governments and protesters at home, though, Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin backed out of the deal. Russia continued to support Transnistria’s de facto independence, to which Moldova responded by blocking Russia’s WTO accession. Just as it did to Georgia, Moscow retaliated by banning the import of Moldovan wine and other products. But at the end of 2006, relations between the two countries began improving. Putin dropped the import ban and Moldova dropped its opposition to Russia’s WTO accession. In early 2008, Putin and Voronin again began discussing a resolution to Transnistria, and Russia signaled that it would back the breakaway region’s reintegration with Moldova if Moldova forswore NATO membership. No solution was reached, though, and in 2010, Moscow once again banned Moldova’s wines after its new government began seeking closer ties with the EU and enraged Russia by introducing a holiday mourning the country’s Soviet occupation. Now, as Moldova contemplates signing an association agreement with the EU, Russia has held military exercises in Transnistria, whose parliament recently voted to join the Russian Federation.

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have faced serious threats from Russia over the last decade, but as their experiences show, democratization itself does not provoke Russia. And, as Yanukovych discovered, rolling back democracy does not inoculate a country from Russian reprisal, should that country seek alliances with the West that Moscow opposes.

Disentangling Democracy from Geopolitics

Many in the West have, in the post–Cold War era, retained the Cold War tendency to conflate a country’s geopolitical orientation with its domestic political system; if a country is allied with the United States and Western Europe, the thinking goes, that is synonymous with it being democratic. The effect of this thinking post-1991 has been to conflate efforts to promote democracy with efforts to roll back Russia’s influence. As recent history shows, Russia may be aggressive toward its neighbors, but it is not really concerned about how democratic they are.

Of course there is no guarantee that Russia will not undermine the sovereignty of its neighbors even if NATO and the EU does not take them in. The Putin regime has shown, most notably in Crimea, that it can mask or quickly change its intentions. The evidence, though, strongly suggests that this expansion has been a major irritant for Moscow and removing it could pave the way for a far more productive relationship and greater security in Eastern Europe. In any case, the West has shown a distinct lack of willingness to expend the resources necessary to absorb and protect non-Baltic, post-Soviet states, making further NATO and EU expansion pointless in any case. Beyond this, as many have noted, Russia’s economic and military power is very limited, so the West could counter any actual threat to consolidated democracies in Europe should it arise.

Going forward, if the United States and Western Europe believe that promoting security and freedom in post-Soviet Eastern Europe are in their interests, they need to find the most effective and efficient policy for realizing this objective. This will likely mean accepting that Ukraine and others will not join exclusive alliances with the West or with Russia—such as the Eurasian Union—but rather, will maintain largely equal relations with both. The EU has taken a first step toward this by, for now at least, unilaterally dropping restrictions on imports from Ukraine, thus allowing Kiev to protect domestic industry and continue its existing pattern of trade with Russia. Such arrangements, which give Ukraine and others strong connections with the West without full membership in alliances that exclude Russia, will take time and a serious effort to develop. But the current approach of trying to push the EU and NATO further east will only lead to further conflict while not even being necessary to protect democracy in Eastern Europe.

Raymond Sontag is an adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for The National Interest.

Jacob Heilbrunn
Why Germany Admires Putin



Jacob Heilbrunn

May 6, 2014
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Is there a new Berlin-Moscow axis developing? A few weeks ago Gerhard Schroeder, the former German chancellor who serves on the board of Gazprom, was photographed giving Russian president Vladimir Putin a bear hug. Another former Social Democratic chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, declared in the weekly Die Zeit that the uproar over Putin’s expropriation of the Crimea was so much piffle. It was, he said, “entirely understandable.” And the German public itself has no appetite for confrontation over Ukraine.

All this is creating some consternation inside and outside Germany among foreign policy elites. In today’s New York Times, for example, Clemens Wergin, who is an editor at the conservative daily Die Welt in Berlin, reports that a love affair is developing between Germany and Russia. A few days earlier, John Vinocur, writing in the Wall Street Journal, came to similar conclusions: "we have a chancellor who—regardless of Germany's participation in new sanctions, or German officers being held captive by pro-Russian separatists—has spent much of her time since Russia's annexation of Crimea waiting on the phone to Moscow for positive signals from Mr. Putin."

The gist of their argument seems to be that Germany is reverting to type. Now that the cold war is over, it's looking east rather than west, much as it did during the 1920s, when it signed the Rapallo pact. Vinocur notes that the historian Heinrich August Winkler recently wrote an essay in Der Spiegel deploring Germany’s drift. He sees “new doubts about Germany’s calculability.” Wergin would seem to agree. He says, “We have come to think of Germany as a Western European country, but that is largely a product of the Cold War. Before then it occupied a precarious middle between east and west. Now Germany may well be drifting away form the West again.”

He has a point. The roots of this antipathy toward Washington are largely based in a left-wing, pacifist tradition in Germany that emerged full flower during the cold war. With the Vietnam War, America came to be seen as the bad guy in Germany. The student left revolted as much against America as against its parents. America was seen as the patron of nasty regimes such as the Shah’s Iran. It was, so the thinking went, conducting genocidal warfare in Vietnam, much as it had against the Indians. Then came peace movement of the 1980s, when the Reagan administration was seen as the real threat to peace in Europe. Germany, which aspired to become a new Switzerland, rebelled against the notion that it would become the battleground for a confrontation between the two superpowers. Schroeder, on the eve of the Iraq War, and himself a graduate of the peace school of the 1980s, was able to act upon those impulses by withholding German support for the war, thereby ensuring his reelection in the fall of 2002.

Today such sentiments have been given a boost, ironically enough, by President Obama’s policies. The candidate who was hailed near the Brandenburg Gate by rapturous German crowds and the president who was supposed to usher in a new era of global peace? Gone. He’s been replaced by the image of a Predator missile happy president who authorizes extensive spying on the German public, including its current chancellor. America’s name, by and large, is mud in Germany, at least when it comes to foreign policy.

Many of these sentiments are quite nicely summed up by the 87-year-old veteran peace activist Erhard Eppler, who was a cabinet minister under Willy Brandt. Writing in Der Spiegel, he pours scorn on the notion that Putin is the only one who has violated international law in Crimea: “What does international law say about the death drones that are also steered from German soil? Isn’t the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany and thus international law damaged? Who would ever come up with the idea to ban America because of the Iraq War—which Gerhard Schroeder spared us Germans from—from the community of civilized peoples?” Eppler also voiced understanding for Putin. In his view, Putin had little choice but to act. In Kiev what was presented as a temporary government was, in fact, “a rigidly anti-Russian team that had to be taught that it couldn’t immediately abolish Russian as an official language and immediately join NATO. A Russian president who simply looked on would have been hunted down sooner or later by Russian voters.”

Of course an emollient view of Putin rooted in German historical guilt for World War II only goes so far to explain Berlin's stance. Money plays a big role. German companies, from Siemens on down, are loath to give up their lucrative contracts with Moscow. They may be only too happy to see American companies refusing, at the behest of Obama, boycotting Putin's economic summit in St. Petersburg.

Finally, it can't be all that surprising that Germany, decades after reunification, would begin to define its interests differently from Washington's. This redefinition, you could even say, was inevitable. The suprising thing may be that it took as long as it did to occur.

Still, if Germany is drifting away from America--and it's easy to exaggerate the extent of the drift because fears about Germany have been voiced ad nauseam since the 1950s about the true depth of its commitment to the western alliance--then that drift has been taking place for awhile. But there's no denying that it's been compounded by maladroit American diplomacy and foreign policy since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Indeed, Germany isn't the only ally that appears to be at odds with Washington. Israel, too, appears to be cozying up to the Putin regime for a host of reasons. Soon enough, Germany, Israel, and Russia might find out that they have more in common with each other than America. It all brings to mind Lord Palmerston's adage about having neither permanent allies nor enemies.

Putin visita por primera vez Crimea desde su anexión a Rusia; conmemora el “Día de la Victoria” sobre los Nazis

Por: Redacción / Sinembargo - mayo 9 de 2014 - 10:22

Moscú, 9 may (EFE).- El presidente ruso, Vladímir Putin, llegó hoy a Sebastopol (mar Negro), puerto situado en la península de Crimea, para festejar el Día de la Victoria sobre la Alemania nazi en la Segunda Guerra Mundial.

Este es el primer viaje de Putin al territorio antaño ucraniano y que fue anexionado por Rusia el pasado 21 de marzo, acto condenado por Kiev y Occidente.

Putin presidirá la parada militar en la bahía de la ciudad, base de la Flota rusa del mar Negro, depositará un ramo de flores en el monumento a los héroes de la defensa de la ciudad y se reunirá con los veteranos de la guerra.

Sebastopol celebra hoy el Día de la Victoria, pero también el 70 aniversario desde la liberación de la ciudad de las tropas hitlerianas.

La primera visita del jefe del Kremlin a Crimea, que proclamó su deseo de ingresar en la Federación Rusa durante un referéndum separatista el pasado 16 de marzo, no fue anunciada oficialmente, aunque algunos medios habían informado sobre esa posibilidad.

No obstante, la canciller alemana, Angela Merkel, lamentó esta semana que el Gobierno ruso se propusiera organizar una parada militar en Crimea en medio de la tensión en la vecina Ucrania, escenario de una sublevación prorrusa en el este rusohablante.

Putin viajó a Crimea tras presidir el tradicional desfile militar en la Plaza Roja, por cuyo empedrado desfilaron miles de soldados y armamento pesado, como los misiles intercontinentales Tópol, el arma más temible del arsenal nuclear ruso.

Mientras, por motivos de seguridad, Kiev redujo hoy las celebraciones con ocasión del 69 aniversario del Día de la Victoria, lo que ha sido muy criticado por la prensa rusa, aunque el presidente interino, Alexandr Turchínov, felicitó a los veteranos en un mensaje oficial.

Merkel in the Middle
The German chancellor is caught between her country’s Amerika-Freunde and Putin-Versteher.

BY Paul Hockenos
MAY 16, 2014


BERLIN — In Germany these days, there are two camps when it comes to dealing with Vladimir Putin's Russia. They're referred to here as Amerika-Freunde (America-friends) and Putin-Versteher (Putin-sympathizers) and can apply to foreign-policy circles as well as the person on the street. In navigating the Ukraine crisis, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who is leading the international community's negotiations with Putin, is currently caught between them. In fact, the fault lines run right through her own cabinet of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats.

Merkel's task is to chart a middle ground -- or formulate a new vision, if she's up to it -- that will ultimately define not only German foreign policy but the country's function in 21st-century Europe. Is this Germany a steadfast member of the Western alliance, essentially the linchpin in a new, long-term standoff with Russia? Or is it a bridge between East and West, a more neutral negotiator in search of acceptable compromises with the Kremlin? Or is there another way for Germany to navigate between these poles?

Indeed, with the situation on the ground deteriorating from day to day, pressure is building on Merkel to act with resolution and impact. In desperation, she has yanked her country's top diplomat out of retirement to broker enough stability on the ground for Ukraine to hold nationwide elections on May 25. So far, however, she shows no signs of extricating Germany from anachronistic Cold War categories and, at long last, defining a post-reunification German foreign policy for the future.

Let's start with the America-friends, even though they're rapidly dwindling. In the Cold War decades, they were as plentiful as weisswürste at Oktoberfest, usually but not exclusively found in the conservative parties, like the Christian Democrats, and personified by chancellors such as Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl. Merkel and her defense minister, Ursula von der Leyen, are America-friends, even if the NSA spy scandal, the unceasing drone war, and Guantánamo, to name just a few Obama disappointments, have made this alliance considerably less attractive and its ranks thinner than ever before. (Indeed, impressive statesmen of any sort in Merkel's party are hard to find, at least compared with the better-stocked Social Democrats.)

The reflex of dyed-in-the-wool transatlanticists is to believe that, in terms of foreign policy, the United States is almost always right, whatever the issue, be it West Germany joining NATO in the 1950s, deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Northern Europe in the 1980s, or invading Iraq in 2003. America-friends in Germany aren't going to harbor Edward Snowden or even allow him to testify at Bundestag committee hearings as long as Washington objects. This much Merkel will do for her buddy Barack Obama.

The America-friends in Berlin insist that never again will Germany plot a Sonderweg, namely a separate path between East and West. Germany is in the Western camp to stay: a loyal member of NATO, the indispensable military alliance of choice, and of a European Union firmly anchored in the West -- and exclusively so.

In the Ukraine-Russia crisis, the remaining America-friends, like the Christian Democrats' Ruprecht Polenz and Friedrich Merz, more or less echo Washington, demanding tougher sanctions against Russia and sharper rhetoric against Kremlin policies, and gladly see a new raison d'être for NATO. The America-friends are viscerally distrustful of Putin's Kremlin and believe that force is the language it understands best. Putin should be dealt with the same way the West knocked out the Soviet Union: with tough talk, punishment when necessary, and overwhelming arsenals.

Although by nature an America-friend and deeply wary of ex-KGB officer Putin from the beginning, Merkel is understandably hesitant to throw caution to the wind and declare Russia the enemy. Rigorous sanctions would hurt German industry and imperil its shaky economic recovery; the United States, on the other hand, has little to lose. Moreover, it wasn't so long ago that Germany was the front line in the East-West conflict -- and Merkel was on the eastern side of the wall, living under a dictatorship. As someone who profited so immensely from the close of the East-West conflict, she is hard-pressed to redraw the lines of confrontation in a newly divided Europe.

On the other side are the so-called "Putin-sympathizers." Cooperation, not confrontation, with Russia is their mantra, incidentally the same one Obama adopted when he took office in 2009. It's important to note that the members of this camp (with some exceptions) aren't enamored with Putin himself, but rather underscore the necessity of reaching out to Russia and including it in Europe -- but not in the EU itself. Even though there are Putin-sympathizers across the party spectrum in Germany -- from the far left to the far right -- the most important are the Social Democrats, including former statesmen with considerable gravitas such as former chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Helmut Schmidt, as well as the late Willy Brandt's confidant, Egon Bahr.

Indeed, the heirs of Brandt call their approach to Eastern Europe and Russia the New Ostpolitik, after Brandt's visionary Cold War-era policies. The original Ostpolitik of Germany's Social Democrats broke the ice in the emotional, nuclear-charged East-West conflict, reaching out over the Iron Curtain to pursue détente with the Soviet Union and offering rewards -- foremost trade and diplomatic status -- in return for humanitarian concessions, more open borders, and arms control. The idea at its core was Wandel durch Annäherung ("change through rapprochement"), inducing change gradually through diplomacy and dialogue.

If you ask Social Democrats today, they'll tell you that it was the Cold War-era Ostpolitik that paved the way for Mikhail Gorbachev's ascent and set the stage for the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. (If you ask former Central European dissidents, however, they'll say that Ostpolitik caused the German Social Democrats to ignore them, opting instead to be chummy with the communist leadership.)

Germany's Social Democratic foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, is the man in Brandt's shoes today. By far the most influential Putin-sympathizer, though a comparatively moderate one compared with the likes of Schmidt and Schröder, he is Merkel's partner in Ukraine crisis management. Steinmeier began plotting a New Ostpolitik for Germany during the 1998-2005 Social Democrat-Green government, when he served as Schröder's chief of staff, by putting Germany-Russia relations on a new footing. These ties deepened from 2005 to 2009 when Steinmeier was foreign minister in the first grand coalition under Merkel and persisted behind the scenes even when the Social Democrats left office for a term. Although he's considerably more Putin-friendly than Merkel, she obviously trusts and relies heavily on Steinmeier, who has been racing around Europe without pause to halt Ukraine from falling apart.

The Putin-sympathizers insist that Germany has to understand where Russia is coming from and judge it by relative criteria, not those, say, of European Union members or presumptive candidates. In the spirit of Brandt's Ostpolitik, they argue that through intensive trade and diplomacy, Germany and its EU peers can turn Russia into an indispensable partner, which implicitly lends Europe leverage to sway Moscow. The more closely linked, the more clout Germany has. Sanctions and isolation are thus exactly the wrong way to deal with a contrary Kremlin. Even when Russia goes astray, such as by jailing gays, punk rockers, and opposition business tycoons, or by violating international borders, the Putin-sympathizers call for patience, condemning Moscow in soft tones, if at all. The priority is to keep Moscow in the game at all costs.

In relations with Russia, Germany has a special role. Through a 21st-century Ostpolitik, Germany can craft a new identity: Instead of the belligerent Deutschland of the past or the Western foot soldier of the Cold War era, a new, peaceful, conciliatory Berlin will broker peace on the continent. In contrast to the America-friends, the Putin-sympathizers don't see "Europe" as exclusively a club of liberal democracies rooted in the West. Like it or not, they reason, there are also authoritarian democracies like Russia in play. Germany simply has to deal with it. This is the essence of realpolitik, another term handed down from the postwar years.

In the German media as well as on the floor of the Bundestag, the Putin-sympathizers are quick to "explain" Putin, even if it can sound more like an apology. They point out again and again that Russia objected to the eastward encroachment of NATO and the EU every step of the way -- and was willfully ignored. The same goes for the missile systems deployed in Central Europe. They also concede that Moscow has legitimate special interests in Eastern Europe -- even a "sphere of influence." They condemn Russia's annexation of Crimea -- but are quite understanding about why Putin did it.

Since the New Ostpolitik began in the late 1990s, the Social Democrats have bent over backward to accommodate Putin. Although no longer an active politician, Schröder personifies this course, having struck up a friendship with Putin and serving as a paid lobbyist for Russian gas giant Gazprom since leaving office. Even many of his fellow Social Democrats cringed when in April he gave Putin a warm hug at the Russian president's birthday party in St. Petersburg, an image that made it into every newspaper in Germany. But many also confessed that Schröder's visit could be a legitimate means to get Putin to bend on Ukraine -- not pretty, but effective. Again, realpolitik. (Schröder did speak to Putin about the OSCE hostages, who were released shortly thereafter.)

The Schröder-Putin embrace, and Russia sympathy in general, galls no one more than the Central Europeans, who are among the staunchest critics of a new German Ostpolitik. (Indeed, they're first-row America-friends.) The Visegrad states and the Baltics are invested heavily in this debate, knowing full well that their interests will be sacrificed if Berlin and Moscow negotiate over their heads. This is exactly what happened in 2005, when Schröder, as chancellor, and Putin signed off on a new natural gas pipeline (Nord Stream) that directly linked Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea, skirting Poland and all of Central Europe. The message was clear: Regardless of what happens in Central Europe, Germany will get its gas. The Poles screamed foul at the top of their lungs, but to no avail. (When he left office, Schröder became the chairman of Nord Stream, a joint venture between Russia's Gazprom and two German companies.)

So, if the proof is in the pudding, then what has all this painstaking diplomacy (and groveling) brought Germany? It seems next to nothing. Putin looks intent on upending the European order and refuses to budge on even the smallest German requests from Merkel, like allowing observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) into Crimea or getting the eastern Ukrainians to call off their phony referendums. He lies to Merkel and Steinmeier over the phone in one conversation after another: about joining a contact group, about Russian special forces in Crimea, about stirring up trouble in eastern Ukraine. The list is long. Indeed, these days Germany doesn't appear to have any more clout in Moscow than France or Britain.

The Social Democrats are obviously crestfallen, but they intend to keep their course, arguing that there is no other way forward. In a recent interview, Brandt's former aide, Bahr, a top Social Democratic strategist, told a German daily: "I think Putin is a rational person. Chaos in Ukraine is not in his interests." Bahr's recommendation, just when everybody else is trying to lessen dependency on Russian hydrocarbons, is to build yet another gas pipeline from Russia to Germany in order to intensify ties further.

* * *

Merkel is hamstrung between two ostensibly irreconcilable paths that divide her own government: the Amerika-Freunde on the one side and the Putin-Versteher on the other. But neither track has born results. The sanctions already imposed and the threat of more to come, NATO troops in Poland and the Baltics, booting Russia out of the G-8 -- none of this seems to faze Putin in the least. Nor have the carrots -- Germany's close relations with Putin and immense trade and energy linkages -- moved him either. The pillar of the Social Democrats' foreign-policy vision, namely making Russia a "strategic partner," has obviously failed. Indeed, it didn't slow the radicalization of Putinism over the last decade one bit.

The impasse has prompted Merkel and Steinmeier to reach out to one of Germany's most respected and able statesmen, Wolfgang Ischinger, to head up a round table that will bring together Ukraine's government, the opposition, and Russian-speaking regional representatives. The round table is part of an OSCE mission to Ukraine that is ramping up and will try to smooth the way to free elections on May 25. Coming out of retirement for the posting, the 68-year-old Ischinger is a career diplomat widely respected in both Moscow and Washington. Ischinger played a key role in negotiating reunification, which is how the Russians know him. And he helped U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke end the Balkan wars, as well as served as German ambassador to the United States from 2001 to 2006.

Ischinger might be just the person to aid Merkel and Steinmeier in the ongoing crisis management. In the short term, the Germans need to help Kiev hold legitimate, nationwide elections on May 25. Once elected representatives are in place, then hopefully Russia will join in talks.

But even if this eleventh-hour crisis management bears fruit, which seems increasingly unlikely, it doesn't answer the big questions about the nature of Berlin's relationship with Moscow or of Germany's role in Europe, issues that loom over Merkel and her coalition government. The current fiasco is, in part, a consequence of Berlin's not having a foreign policy in place. Merkel isn't one for sweeping, big-picture decisions. But these are the old German Questions, which no German leader can escape. As the Ukrai

Presencia de aviones de combate de la OTAN se triplica en países bálticos
Aviones de combate daneses aterrizaron en Estonia mientras que Polonia y el Reino Unido se hacen cargo de la vigilancia de los cielos en Lituania, triplicando la fortaleza de la misión de vigilancia aérea de la OTAN en la región báltica.


El general de la fuerza aérea del Reino Unido, Adrian Bradshaw, dijo a un periodista de la OTAN, Hemos triplicado la presencia aérea en la región y el propósito es demostrar el compromiso de la solidaridad de la OTAN y ser capaces de responder apropiadamente a alguna actividad inapropiada de otras partes.

Tres países bálticos y Polonia que comparten fronteras con Rusia han buscado una gran presencia de fuerzas de la OTAN tras el conflicto en Ucrania.

Esta semana, aviones de combate franceses también aterrizaron en Polonia y aviones canadienses fueron desplegados en Rumania. Es la fuerza aérea más grande asignada en la región desde que se inició la crisis en Ucrania.

Mientras que Estados Unidos ha tenido hasta ahora un papel decisivo en la prestación de apoyo naval en el Mar Negro con dos buques de guerra que patrullan junto a territorio naval ruso, ha sido la tarea de la OTAN defender los cielos en las regiones vecinas de Rusia.

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Fuente | aporrea.org

El poderío militar ruso no aguantaría un pulso contra la maquinaria estadounidense
¿Existe riesgo de una confrontación real sobre el terreno entre laFederación de Rusia y los Estados Unidos de América? En caso de un conflicto, ¿Cómo lo afrontaría cada uno de los países? en lo que a capacidad de armamento se refiere.


Jesús Argumosa Pila, General de División en la Reserva y Director Adjunto del Grupo Atenea, explica en primer lugar que el no se plantea como posible un escenario de conflicto a gran escala a raíz de la crisis en ucrania.

Jefe de la Escuela de Altos Estudios de la Defensa del CESEDEN, el General Argumosa explica a Teinteresa.es que el ejército ruso está en fase de actualización y modernización, en un proceso cuyo alcance todavía se desconoce.

Además, destaca cómo en el Desfile del Día de la Victoria celebrado este viernes en Moscú, han desfilado lanzaderas de los misiles intercontinentales Topol-M.

De esta manera, entiende, "Rusia quiere demostrar que todavía son fuertes, aunque también saben que en tecnología están bastante por detrás" de los estadounidenses, señala.

"El Topol-M que sí es un misil revolucionario, aunque posiblemente tenga problemas para la interceptación", destaca Argumosa, para quien su exhibición tampoco es algo que se salga de lo que se sabe que tiene los rusos en sus arsenales.

La Federación de Rusia destinó en 2013 a Defensa un presupuesto de 68.200 millones de dólares, poco que hacer frente a los 600.400 millones de dólares del presupuesto militar de Estados Unidos, según los datos del Instituto Internacional para Estudios Estratégicos (IISS).

"Desde el punto de vista militar no hay comparación" entre Estados Unidos y Rusia, a favor de los primeros, sentencia el general Argumosa. Este experto destaca un concepto, la proyección de fuerzas, en el que -a su juicio- "los americanos del norte ostentan el número uno".

Hablando en plata, en geoestrategia militar es mucho más potente la maquinaria de EEUU, ya que "Rusia no tiene capacidad, por ejemplo, de proyectar fuerzas a 4.000 kilómetros, o lo haría pero a pequeña escala. Sin embargo EEUU sí, porque están muy habituados", señala Argumosa.

En cuanto a la tecnología más puntera, sigue argumentado el General de División en la Reserva, los estadounidenses "están cerca de poner en servicio el nuevo avión F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, que está muy por encima de cualquier aeronave de combate al servicio de Rusia".

Balance Militar 2014

EEUU

RUSIA
Personal

1.492.000

845.000
Bombarderos nucleares

154

141
Submarinos nucleares

140

110
Carros de combate

2785

2750
Vehículos de combate

4459

7660
Piezas de Artillería

7429

5837
Lanzadores de misiles intercontinentales

450

356

"Desde ese punto de vista de la preparación, entrenamiento, tecnología, superioridad aérea, capacidad de intervención, si quieres efectividad, hay mucha lejanía. Otra cosa es que los rusos sean más sacrificados, y aguantan envites", resume Argumosa.

Deseando vivamente que nunca llegue el escenario, Argumosa reconoce que en el ámbito nuclear, "puede haber una equiparación en números de misiles, sumbarinos nucleares y bombarderos" entre ambas potencias.

"Aún así- señala este experto-, yo me pregunto cómo está el arsenal ruso. Hay muchos submarinos nucleares en Vladivostok, sin servicio por los problemas que tienen en su alimentación, por el riesgo de explosión del reactor nuclear".

Tras volver a dejar claro que no contempla el escenario de un gran conflicto, Argumosa sostiene que el Presidente de Rusia, Vladimir Putin, "conoce muy bien a Occidente, tras sus años en la Alemania Oriental".
Y añade que "el liderazgo que tiene Putin no lo tiene hoy Occidente, ni Obama, ni Europa. Occidente esté tomando posiciones reactivas, y Rusia proactivas. Como pasó en Crimea". El mejor arma rusa en estos momentos es el inquilino del Kremlin.

The US Is Conducting A Massive Nuclear Arms Drill Days After A Russian Nuclear Exercise

JEREMY BENDER

MAY 12, 2014, 4:49 PM


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The B-2 stealth bomber is taking part in Exercise Global Lightning 14.

U.S. Strategic Command will be conducting a massive "deter and detect" nuclear drill from May 12 to May 16, just four days after a similar Russian exercise.
The U.S. drill, known as Exercise Global Lightning 14, is set to include ten B-52s and six B-2 bombers in an attempt to demonstrate U.S. military flexibility and responsiveness.

The drill, which is meant to simulate a scenario in which the U.S. would have to protect itself and its allies in the event of a "strategic attack," is being touted as a chance to incorporate modern technology into U.S. drills.

Exercise Global Lighting 14 follows just days after Russia conducted its own nuclear weapons response drills, on May 8. The drills, which Russian president Vladimir Putin supervised, simulated retaliatory measures Russia would take if it were attacked by a nuclear weapon.

The Russian drill included the launch of an intercontinental Topol ballistic missile, and the test launch of two long-range ballistic missiles from submarines in its Pacific and Northern fleets.

U.S. Strategic Command has stressed that Exercise Global Lightning 14 has been planned for over a year and that it is in no way connected to real-world events.

However, tensions between Russia and NATO countries have been steadily rising as the situation in Ukraine continues to deteriorate. General Philip Breedlove, head of U.S. European Command, said NATO could consider permanently basing military personnel in Eastern Europe.

Russia responded with a warning that they could place nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave that borders Poland, if NATO forces were to be massed close to the Russian border.

“Russia is a nuclear power,” Lt. Gen. Yevgeny Buzhinsky, who formerly headed the department of international agreements in the Russian Defense Ministry, told RIA Novosti. “If NATO becomes more active, we will deploy a division of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad Region."

NATO has so far increased its air support to the Baltic States, but has stopped short of creating permanent military bases in the region.

Russia to cease space station cooperation
The country will not extend cooperation over the International Space Station due to recent US sanctions.
Last updated: 15 May 2014 17:20


Amid deteriorating relations over Ukraine, Moscow has told Washington that it will not extend cooperation over the International Space Station.

Instead, Russia plans to concentrate on its own space projects.

The move came after the US placed sanctions on high-tech equipment that could help Russia's military.

Al Jazeera's Nadim Baba reports from Moscow.

West warns Russia not to disrupt Kiev polls
US and European allies say Moscow will face further sanctions if it gets in the way of Ukraine election.
Last updated: 16 May 2014 02:42

Putin has warned gas shipments to Ukraine will be disrupted if payments were not made in advance [AP]

The United States and Europe have agreed to impose sanctions on Russia if it tries to disrupt this month's Ukrainian election, as Moscow stepped up pressure on its beleaguered neighbour by hinging future gas shipments on payments being made in advance.

US Secretary of State John Kerry, along with his German, French, British and Italian counterparts, on Thursday discussed possible sanctions, which would cover some of Russia's largest sectors including mining and gas.



A senior US official who attended the meeting told Reuters news agency that the next phase of sanctions against Russia would use "a scalpel rather than a hammer" to make its economy "bleed" through focusing on new investment in the sectors.

"All ministers, led by Secretary Kerry, underscored that a free, fair election across Ukraine, including the east, on May 25 is absolutely essential," a senior State Department official who spoke on condition of anonymity told reporters in London.

"There was broad unity in the room that if the elections are disrupted and Moscow's hand is behind that, that we need to move to sanctions," the official said. "There was no dissent on that subject."

The US and the EU have imposed several rounds of sanctions on individuals and some companies in an attempt to punish President Vladimir Putin for the annexation of Crimea and to halt any further interference in Ukraine.

Western leaders have accused Putin of destabilising Ukraine by stoking rebellion in the Russian-speaking eastern areas, a charge Putin has denied.

"We have been pretty clear in being able to pinpoint and expose ... when Moscow's hand has been behind past disruptions so I would guess that would be relatively clear should it happen," the US official said.

Russia, which has annexed the southern province of Crimea, fell short of endorsing independence for Donetsk and Luhansk or their absorption into Russia.

Russian foreign ministry spokesman, Alexander Lukashevich, said on Thursday: "I have not heard about any official request that has been received. Although, media has been talking about it very extensively."

Lukashevich said that the interim government in Kiev count not ignore the results and must enter talks with representatives of the regions.

Gas debt

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a letter issued by the Kremlin on Thursday, said that gas shipments to Ukraine, which also feed western Europe, would not be made available unless advance payments were made.

"Given the circumstances, the Russian company has issued an advance invoice for gas deliveries to Ukraine, which is completely in accordance with the contract, and after June 1 gas deliveries will be limited to the amount prepaid by the Ukrainian company," Putin said in the letter, AP news agency reported.

Besides handling a mutiny in the east, where pro-Russian separatists have seized administrative buildings, fought government troops and declared two regions independent following a Sunday referendum, Kiev's young government is also struggling with a multi-billion dollar gas debt to Moscow.

"The Russian Federation is still open to continue consultations and work together with European countries in order to normalise the situation," Putin said.

Ukraine has said it could start paying off the debt if Moscow restored the gas discounts cancelled following the ouster of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych.

"We believe Ukraine has already made many concessions in the gas area, it is now time for Russia to make concessions," Ukrainian Finance Minister Oleksandr Shlapak said.

"The gas price has remained astronomically high," Reuters reported him as saying.

Ukraine said it could pay around $4bn by the end of May but stood by a demand for a much lower rate for supplies, the news agency said.

Europe
UN warns of rights abuses in Ukraine's east
Russia accuses United Nations of double standards after report blames pro-Russian separatists for "alarming" situation.
Last updated: 16 May 2014 21:48


The United Nations has warned of an "alarming deterioration" of human rights in eastern Ukraine, blaming pro-Russian separatists, and prompting a swift denouncement from Moscow.

In a new report published on Friday, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay catalogued a number of "targeted killings, torture and beatings, abductions, intimidation and some cases of sexual harassment".

Pillay also voiced concern about "serious problems" of harassment and persecution of the Tatar community in Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in March amid international outrage.

Pillay also called on those with influence on the armed groups in the east "to do their utmost to rein in these men who seem bent on tearing the country apart".

Russia slammed the report, accusing the UN of double standards.

"The complete lack of objectivity, blatant discrepancies and double standards leave no doubts that (the report's) authors were performing a political put-up job aimed at clearing the name of the self-declared authorities in Kiev," said the Russian foreign ministry in a statement.

May elections

With the May 25 vote rapidly approaching, Kiev's interim leaders are battling to keep Ukraine from disintegrating.

Government forces are pressing on with a military offensive to extinguish a bloody rebellion in Ukraine's industrial belt where well-armed pro-Russians have already seized more than a dozen towns and cities in just a few weeks.

The US and the European Union have been pushing an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) peace plan to try to resolve the escalating crisis, while threatening further sanctions if Moscow or its "proxies" disrupt the election.

In another concern for Europe, Russian President Vladimir Putin has threatened to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine if it fails to pay a bill by early June.

Nearly 15 percent of all gas consumed in Europe is delivered from Russia via Ukraine, which is facing further economic gloom despite a $17bn International Monetary Fund aid package.

Ukraine has said it could pay around $4bn by the end of May but was demanding a lower rate for supplies, Reuters has reported.

Putin rejects 'new Cold War' claims
Russian leader says he does not expect a 'new Cold War' over Ukraine and says Russia is impossible to isolate.
Last updated: 24 May 2014 18:44
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Putin tells journalists 'new Cold War' label 'is a media weapon of war' [Reuters]

President Vladimir Putin has said he does not expect a new Cold War over the crisis in Ukraine and denied trying to revive the Soviet Union following Russia's annexation of Crimea.

In an interview with international news agencies on Saturday, Putin blamed the violence and political instability in Ukraine on the West and said he hoped Europe and the US were ready for compromise.

"I would not like to think this is the start of a new Cold war. It is in no one's interest and I think it will not happen," said Putin, sitting at a large table with journalists in a palace outside the former imperial capital, St Petersburg, the Reuters news agency reported.

He denied that plans to form a Russia-led trading bloc with two former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan and Belarus, meant he wanted to rebuild as much as he could of the Soviet empire that collapsed in 1991.

"They try to stick this label on us - a label that we are trying to restore an empire, the Soviet Union, make everyone subordinate.

This absolutely does not correspond to reality," he said. "It is a media weapon of war."

Responding to remarks attributed to Britain's Prince Charles, comparing his actions to those of Adolf Hitler, Putin said they were unacceptable and not worthy of royalty.

"I did not hear this expression. If it was said then of course this is unacceptable."

"I think he himself understands that. He is an educated man... This is unroyal behaviour," the AFP news agency reported.

East-West relations have reached their lowest level since the end of the Cold War following the overthrow of Ukraine's pro-Moscow president in February and Russia's annexation of Crimea in March.

Holding the briefing on the sidelines of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, the country's largest economic
event, Putin said that Russia took account of other countries' interests, and must also be treated equally.

Criticising European Union and US sanctions imposed on Russia over the Ukraine crisis, he said Russia would not be isolated internationally because of the crisis.

"I think that the idea of isolating such a country can only be temporary. It is impossible," he said.

Russia signed this week a 30-year deal to supply natural gas to China, worth $400 billion

Poroshenko poised to win Ukraine's elections
Chocolate magnate and 'political chameleon' Petro Poroshenko seems likely to win Ukraine's presidential elections.
Katherine Jacobsen Last updated: 23 May 2014 12:33

Recent polls show Petro Poroshenko far ahead of the other presidential contenders [AP]

Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Ukraine - Despite the temperamental May weather, a crowd of around 800 people had gathered around a makeshift stage in Kryvyi Rih, a small town in southeastern Ukraine, to see the man who is poised to be Ukraine's next president: Petro Poroshenko.

Red flags with the word, "Udar," (Punch), one of Ukraine's main political parties, snapped overhead in the breeze alongside Ukrainian and European Union flags. Women bustled through the crowd nudging leaflets into open palms. Teenagers dressed in red, tie-on aprons with the name "Petro Poroshenko" splashed across the front handed-out goody bags filled with brochures, a newspaper and a postcard with the candidate's picture.
More Ukraine election coverage

Profile: Petro Poroshenko

Ukraine's presidential race underway

Infographic: Ukraine's 2014 elections

On cue, a black Mercedes SUV rolled up to the edge of the crowd and Poroshenko, a tall, beefy man with salt-and-pepper hair and slightly baggy eyes, stepped out into the crowd, smiling and shaking hands on his way to the stage, trailed by his wife and a slew of bodyguards.

"He's the best of the worst," said Pavel Holiver, 50, a Kryvyi Rih resident, as Poroshenko made his way to the microphone on the stage. All of the other candidates are too stymied by scandal, lacking in bravado, or have strong ties to the now ousted President Viktor Yanukovich, said Holiver.

There is hope, as there has been for every past election in Ukraine, that the next president will actually change the country for the better. But for the past 22 years, "each president has made his successor seem not quite so bad," Holiver remarked wryly.

The latest polls show Poroshenko with a 45 to 53 percent approval rating, putting the candidate right around the 50 percent of popular votes he needs to win in the first round of elections. A second round of elections will be held in June if Poroshenko does not hit the 50 percent mark this Sunday, an event which could further agitate the country's already fragile political climate.

The candidate received a boost of support early on in the election when Vitaly Klitschko, the leader of Udar and a strong contender for the presidency, dropped out of the race and encouraged his voters to get behind Poroshenko.

Yulia Tumoshenko, who is known for her fiery, pro-European rhetoric and was imprisoned under Yanukovich, significantly trails Poroshenko with 9 percent support. Sergey Tigipko, who was once part of the pro-Russian Party of Regions is in third place with around 7 percent of the popular support, according to polls.

Political past

Described by some as a "political chameleon," Poroshenko, 48, began his political career in 1998 as a member of parliament and has held positions under the western-leaning President Yushchenko, as well as the pro-Russian governments of Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yanukovich.

Poroshenko has also managed to make it through the political tripwires of Ukrainian politics unscathed by any hugely damaging scandals.

He didn't hide from what was going on at all and he knows how to handle people.

- Laura Andreeva, voter

In 2001, Poroshenko worked as one of the founders of the Party of Regions before switching over to an opposition party the same year. During the Orange Revolution, Poroshenko played an active role in campaigning for the pro-European candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, and Poroshenko's television channel, Channel Five was vigilant in broadcasting information about the power transition.

At the beginning of the EuroMaidan protests, Poroshenko was the first oligarch to come out in support of the anti-government protesters and Channel Five, following suit, was one of the TV stations to offer coverage of the events early on.

Though he was not part of the troika that was regularly in negotiations with Yanukovich, Poroshenko was a regular presence on the stage. The billionaire gained fame for jumping on a tractor in front of angry protesters, yelling at them to calm down.

"I remember him on that tractor," said Laura Andreeva, 62, another Kryvyi Rih resident who had specially come by to hear Poroshenko speak. That's the moment when Andreeva said she first really took notice of the politician. "He didn't hide from what was going on at all and he knows how to handle people," Andreeva told Al Jazeera.

Business smarts

Throughout his campaign, Poroshenko, a consummate businessman whose net worth is $1.3bn, has made a point of emphasising his managerial skills by playing up the candy empire he created.

In the early 1990s, Poroshenko began working as a cacao importer and quickly made a fortune acquiring candy companies, turning them into a conglomerate, Roshen, by 1995. The company's name comes from Poroshenko's last name. Roshen now has over six factories across Ukraine, with one in Lithuania. The company's Russian factory was shut down in the summer 2012 due to health-standard reasons, though many saw the move as a politically motivated.

In addition to his chocolate empire, Poroshenko is also the owner of a more diversified portfolio of businesses that include bus manufacturing, shipyards, banking and media.

If elected president, Poroshenko promised to sell all of his businesses, except for "Channel Five". In Ukraine, the vast majority of major television networks are owned by oligarchs. For example, Ihor Kolomoisky owns 1 1 and Rinat Akhmetov owns the channel Ukrayina.

"There's no guarantee that Poroshenko's completely honest," after all, he's a billionaire and successful businessman is often synonymous with "corrupt" in Ukraine, said Andrey Eryomenko, 44, who was also watching Poroshenko speak in Kryvyi Rih.

But unlike many other businessmen who made it big during the post-Soviet privatisation of the 1990s, it seems like Poroshenko wasn't just making money in the shadows, Eryomenko told Al Jazeera. "We see the candy factories, we know they actually exist."

During his campaign speeches, the so-called “Chocolate King” has been sure to emphasise his business savvy and his workers' benefits: good healthcare, living wages and reasonable retirement packages, and promising what he can do for Ukraine what he did for his employees.

Getting the voters

However, the first and most pressing problem in this election is making sure that an election even takes place.
Ukraine's presidential race gets under way

While the Ukrainian parliament passed a law back in April that says the elections will be legitimate, even if voting does not take place in all of the regions, the more closed polling stations, the less legitimate the elections will look, said Iaroslav Kovalchuk, a senior analyst at the International Center for Policy Studies, an independent think-tank in Kiev.

Anywhere from 2 million to 5 million voters in the Donbass region, which includes Donetsk and Luhansk, will not have access to polling stations this Sunday because of political violence in the region. In the past six weeks, anti-government separatists have taken over cities and towns in Donbass, demanding greater independence from the Kiev government. The separatists claim that the new government, instituted in the wake of the EuroMaidan protests, is illegitimate and that the presidential election is unlawful.

Koyalchuk said the volatile situation in the east makes it all the more important to hold elections and begin restoring a sense of normalcy to the political process.

"There is no way to solve Ukraine's current political problems if there is no change in Parliament's line-up," Koyalchuk explained. And to change parliament, a new president, one elected by the people, rather than appointed by the parliament, needs to be chosen.

Follow Katherine Jacobsen on Twitter: @Kajtweets

Putin says Russia will respect Ukraine vote
Russian president says Moscow will respect outcome of Sunday's vote as defence official says forces will be pulled back.
Last updated: 24 May 2014 02:29
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Putin said Russia did not want to isolate itself from the rest of the world [Reuters]

Russian President Vladimir Putin has announced that Moscow will recognise the outcome of Ukraine's presidential vote this weekend.

Speaking at an investment forum in St Petersburg on Friday, Putin said Russia would "respect the choice of the Ukrainian people" and would work with the new leadership.

He said he was upbeat on the prospects for resolving the crisis in Ukraine and that doing so would help improve relations with the United States.

"I'm an optimist. I am not losing faith that the situation in Ukraine will at some point become normal and we will find the inner strength to normalise relations (with the United States)," the Reuters news agency reported.

He also said that Russia did not want to isolate itself from the rest of the world and that it wanted to work with the United States on many projects.

"We are not planning any self-isolation," Putin said. "We hope that common sense ... will prompt our European and US partners to work with Russia,"

Troops 'to withdraw'

Russia will also pull back all forces deployed to regions near its border with Ukraine "within a few days," a deputy defence minister said on Friday, a move that if carried out could assist to ease tensions.

Moscow has concentrated tens of thousands of troops across the border from eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russian separatists have declared two independent states.

The United States said a "very large and very capable" Russian force remained on Friday.

Kiev and its Western allies see the Russian troops as a potential invasion force should Moscow choose to back the rebels openly.

Meanwhile, in a live televised address from Kiev, acting Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov, who is not running in Sunday's presidential vote amid a surge of attacks by pro-Russian separatists in the country's east, emphasised the importance of choosing a new leader.

"Today, we are building a new European country the foundation of which was laid by millions of Ukrainians who proved that they are capable of defending their own choice and their country," Turchynov said, the AP news agency reported.

"We will never allow anyone to rob us of our freedom and independence, turn our Ukraine into a part of the post-Soviet empire."

Opinion
Is Russia reviving its empire?
Pundits are missing the point in their analyses of events in and around Ukraine. Things are simpler than they appear.
Last updated: 25 May 2014 05:27



Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia's National Assembly, a former foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan's Civilitas Foundation.

A pro-Russia activist wearing the Saint George ribbon along with a picture of Russian Tsar Nicholas II and a flag of the former Russian Empire takes part in a Victory Day rally in central Kiev [AFP]

A great many experts, observers and pundits are missing the point in their analyses of events in and around Ukraine by making two flawed assumptions. One, that the personal traits and characters of Russian President Vladimir Putin, or US President Barack Obama, or both, are the main causes of the momentous developments in and around Ukraine; and two, that Putin is executing a master plan.

The reality is something else. International relations are intricate. Decisions made by heads of states are guided by a complex web of domestic and international factors and circumstances. Of course, the person at the top and his or her worldview, leadership qualities and style are key factors in the final determination, but explaining transformative events on the basis of one man's behaviour and actions is overly simplistic and inevitably will miss the point.

What the pundits perceive to be Putin's "ambitions, arrogance and petulance", and Obama's "weakness, indifference and disengagement" are not manifestations of capricious behaviour. Rather, they are ideologically driven labels for behaviour based on convictions, beliefs and values developed through their personal experiences, domestic sentiments and their nation's past and recent history.

Putin is shrewd, smart and calculating. He may or may not be anti-Western, but he certainly is not sentimental towards the West. He doesn't like to be told to play by the rules that the West itself selectively ignores, circumvents and violates.

Russia's 'rightful place'

He believes Russia was on the brink of disintegration when he came to power, and he has restored Russia to its rightful place in the world. He believes that the West reneged on its promise to be considerate of Russia's security interests, and that the West is still intent on weakening Russia.

Obama is also shrewd, smart and calculating. He believes he restored America's image and reputation, which were hugely damaged as a consequence of two unfinished wars. He constantly hears that the American people are tired of foreign engagements and policing the world. Thus he prefers cooperation to confrontation, he would rather lead from behind than put boots on the ground and he definitely favours engagement to coercion.

Those who believe in the existence of a Russian master plan - that is, the revival of the empire, albeit a truncated one - have history on their side. Indeed, no other empire has been able to revive itself, except the Russians, and they have done so four times in history.

Those who believe in the existence of a Russian master plan - that is, the revival of the empire, albeit a truncated one - have history on their side. Indeed, no other empire has been able to revive itself, except the Russians, and they have done so four times in history.

Writing in the US Interest, Walter Russell Mead draws a parallel to the years when the Russian state collapsed and the Soviet Union was created.

"Lenin and Stalin were able to rebuild the tsarist empire," Mead writes, "first because they succeeded in creating a strong state in Russia, second because many of the breakaway states were divided and weak, and finally because a permissive international environment posed few effective barriers to the reassertion of Moscow’s power."

Mead believes those very conditions are present today.

I disagree for several reasons. One is that Putin is a realist and he understands Russia's capabilities and limitations. Two is that even if those conditions exist, they do not necessarily lead to the repetition of history. Three is that those conditions qualitatively and in relative terms differ from those at the turn of the previous century.

Russia in comparison to the US and the EU, is militarily, economically and domestically much weaker today than it was at the turn of the last century.

The constituent republics of the collapsed empire today have already experienced two decades of independence compared to what was only a two-year lag from the collapse of the Russian Empire to the formation of the Soviet Union. During these 23 years, most of the former Soviet republics have challenged Russia at one time or another on some issue. Even Armenia's grudging agreement to join the Customs Union should not be construed as a sign of willingness to be part of a future empire.

Finally, the international environment is hugely less permissive now. The Baltic states, Poland and the former East European bloc are members of NATO. Ukraine and Georgia have endured pain to maintain their position on the path to NATO and the EU.

The root of this conflict

And herein lies the root of this conflict. Russia's stake in Ukraine is its security. It's not Russian minorities, it's not trade and it's not energy.

Russia's security concerns cannot be ignored. Russia defines its security in terms of buffer zones around its periphery, particularly in the western and northwestern directions.

Since the collapse of the Berlin wall, NATO's and EU's borders have moved east. Ukraine's and Georgia's expressed willingness, with the West's acquiescence, to become members of both NATO and the EU, has the potential of bringing those organisations to Russia's borders, this time from the west and south. Not coincidentally, Russia's two encroachments towards those in its immediate vicinity were Georgia in August 2008 and Ukraine more recently.

Many US foreign policy veterans, including the venerable doyens George Kennan, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, all warned about the cost of ignoring Russia's bottom line. And Ukraine and Georgia are Russia's ultimate bottom line.

Putin cannot totally ignore the international sanctions but at the same time cannot appear weak in the eyes of the Russian people by giving in to Western "threats" and "intrusion" into what is perceived to be a traditionally Russian sphere of influence. Obama, on his part, cannot ignore the American people's reluctance to engage, but at the same time cannot appear weak and disinterested in the eyes of his NATO and other allies. This disconnect and series of misperceptions from all sides can endanger the balance of power in different parts of the world.

Though the sanctions are having some economic impact on Russia, tightening the screws further will not materially change Putin's decision-making. It is time that the major players look at things as they are, look beyond history and personalities and transcend the zero-sum-game-thinking of the past. Things are simpler, more transparent and evident than some would have us believe.

Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia's National Assembly, a former foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan's Civilitas Foundation.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

Many US foreign policy veterans, including the venerable doyens George Kennan, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, all warned about the cost of ignoring Russia's bottom line. And Ukraine and Georgia are Russia's ultimate bottom line.

"Rusia está preparando una respuesta al Rápido Ataque Global de EE.UU."

Publicado: 31 may 2014 | 15:40 GMT Última actualización: 31 may 2014 | 16:56 GMT


Rusia está trabajando para preparar una respuesta al programa del Pentágono Prompt Global Strike (Rápido Ataque Global, o PGS), afirmó el viceministro ruso de Defensa, Yuri Borísov.

"Se están llevando a cabo una serie de actividades de investigación y desarrollo en el contexto de las amenazas potenciales asociadas al inicio de los trabajos en el PGS con el uso de tecnologías hipersónicas por parte de EE.UU.", indicó Borísov en una entrevista concedida a una radio rusa.

Actualmente en Rusia está en marcha el desarrollo del misil hipersónico pesado Zircon. Se sabe poco sobre él, excepto que esta arma está diseñada para su instalación en submarinos multifuncionales y buques de superficie. Su velocidad y otras características aún no se han dado a conocer.

Según el viceministro de Defensa, el misil balístico intercontinental pesado será un arma única, capaz de superar cualquier sistema antimisiles de EE.UU. "El misil pesado es, de hecho, un arma única, de la que no dispone EE.UU.", destacó Borísov.

Borísov también señaló que hoy en día se están suministrando activamente misiles Yars y Bulavá. Los trabajos de creación del nuevo misil balístico intercontinental pesado también se están desarrollando en estricta conformidad con el plan establecido.

La iniciativa militar de EE.UU. Prompt Global Strike tiene como objetivo la creación de un sistema de armas ofensivas capaz de atacar cualquier parte del mundo en un margen de 30 minutos tras la toma de la decisión sobre el mismo. Se supone que el programa está destinado a la fabricación de misiles balísticos intercontinentales modificados, misiles de crucero hipersónicos y armas basadas en nuevos principios físicos.

Para conocer más sobre el programa PGS, lea este artículo. http://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/view/115280-rusia-ataque-global-inmediato-eeuu

NATO warns of Russian army boost near Ukraine
Secretary general says thousand more Russian troops have been deployed to the Ukrainian border.
Last updated: 19 Jun 2014 14:02

A Ukraine rebel leader said pro-Russia separatists significantly weaker than the Ukrainian army [EPA]

Russia has resumed a military build-up near Ukrainian border, the NATO secretary general has said, calling the deployments "a very regrettable step backward".

Anders Fogh Rasmussen said on Thursday that Moscow appeared bent on using its military to intimidate Ukraine further.

"I can confirm that we now see a new Russian military build-up - at least a few thousand more Russian troops deployed to the Ukrainian border, and we see troop manoeuvres in the neighbourhood of Ukraine," he said.

"If they're deployed to seal the border and stop the flow of weapons and fighters that would be a positive step. But that's not what we're seeing."

Rasmussen said "the international community would have to respond firmly if Russia were to intervene further".

Jack Lew, the US treasury secretary, said on Thursday that Russia must back the peace plan instead of destabilising the situation.

"We continue to urge Russia to work with Ukraine to reach a negotiated resolution to the current situation. But if Russia is unwilling to reverse course, the United States and the international community is prepared to impose additional cost," Lew said at a news conference in Berlin.

NATO estimated at one point there were up to 40,000 Russian forces deployed near the border with Ukraine, but reported last month that many of the soldiers and their equipment had been pulled back.

EU deal

Petro Poroshenko, Ukriane's president, said on Thursday he would sign the "association agreement" with the EU on June 27.

He added that his new foreign minister, Pavlo Klimkin, would be sent to Luxembourg next week to lay out a peace plan for the country's restive east to EU ministers.

Referring to plans to sign the EU agreement, Poroshenko said: "That for which we have waited for so long will take place next week."

Meanwhile, Denis Pushilin, the leader of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic, said on Thursday that the pro-Russian fighters were significantly weaker than the Ukrainian army.

Speaking in Moscow, Pushilin said pro-Russian fighters were losing most of their battles with Ukrainian troops.

Pushilin also said the troops had another major advantage over pro-Russia separatists - the support of the West.
Source:
Agencies

Yergin: Crude Exports Would be a Win-Win
A new study adds fuel to the political debate over ending the 40-year old ban on oil exports.

BY Keith Johnson
MAY 29, 2014


Allowing U.S. companies to export oil would require changing the law but would be a big win for consumers, oil producers, the government and the economy as a whole, according to an extensive study published Thursday by energy consultants IHS.

The study comes as the gusher of U.S. oil production has suddenly made the question of oil exports a hot topic in Washington. Top lawmakers, including big voices on the Senate energy panel, want to deep-six the the nearly 40-year-old ban on U.S. oil exports-one of the last vestiges of command-and-control energy rules put into place in the 1970s. The restrictions, which seem unsuited for the world's crude-oil production growth leader, are under review, Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz said earlier this month.

The U.S. oil boom unleashed by the hydraulic fracturing revolution-better known as fracking-has the country awash in sweet, light crude oil. Oil production has grown about 50 percent in the last five years and is now at the highest level since the late 1980s.

The problem is that the U.S. refining sector is geared to process an entirely different kind of oil, creating a mismatch. Given that the law essentially forbids exporting crude oil, U.S. oil trades at a discount on the global market. What's more, the self-imposed export ban means the United States is leaving billions of dollars on the table.

"We have this one last vestige of old energy policies that didn't matter for decades because everyone thought the U.S. was finished as an oil producer," said Daniel Yergin, vice chairman of IHS and the report's lead author. "But lo-and-behold, you have this great production revival, and now we have this big traffic jam, and it's creating a really big distortion," he said.

According to the 120-page study, supplying U.S. crude to the export market would push global oil prices down slightly, which would shave about 8 cents off a gallon of gasoline for U.S. consumers through 2030. (U.S. gasoline prices reflect global, not national, crude oil prices.)

It would also incentivize further oil production, the report found, because U.S. crude wouldn't be penalized with a price discount compared to its global peers. Average U.S. crude-oil production through 2030 would jump to 10.7 million barrels daily, compared with 9.5 million barrels a day if the export ban stayed in place, the study estimated. That boost would drive U.S. GDP higher--by as much as 0.7 percent in 2018--and add $1.3 trillion to federal coffers, thanks to higher tax receipts.

Companies such as Chevron, Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips and others in the industry that would benefit from lifting the export ban sponsored the report. IHS says that it is "solely responsible" for the analysis and study conclusions, which largely echo similar recent analyses.

One major industry sector is leery of lifting the ban: Refiners. Other petroleum products-gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and the like-may be exported; but not oil itself. Those exports are soaring, totaling more than 4 million barrels daily. Access to relatively cheap oil, and being able to export it as a product, benefits U.S. refiners.

One of the biggest, Valero, supports the export ban and is investing hundreds of millions of dollars to upgrade refineries to better handle the glut of U.S. oil, said spokesman Bill Day.

The ban dates back to the early 1970s, when Washington enacted a flurry of oil-price controls. It was further codified in the wake of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, which horrified U.S. consumers and policymakers with the specter of energy shortages. But most of the era's energy restrictions were lifted by the early 1980s, with the exception of the ban on oil exports.

Russia's incursion into Ukraine has elevated the export debate. U.S. lawmakers and many European politicians called for the United States to expedite the export of natural gas to Europe to help break Russia's energy stranglehold over the continent. But crude-oil exports, which don't require infrastructure upgrades, could materialize much faster and deal a blow to Russia much more quickly, Yergin said.

"If we see 500,000 barrels a day of U.S. crude exports to Europe, that would be taking market share away from West Africa and Russia. And this would be a message the United States could send tomorrow," he said.

Report
Russia's Quiet War Against European Fracking
Environmentalists trying to block shale gas exploration across Europe are unknowingly helping Putin maintain his energy leverage over the continent.

BY Keith Johnson
JUNE 20, 2014


Russia is trying to maintain its energy stranglehold over Europe by backing movements across the continent to demonize fracking, the head of NATO alleged. It is part of Russia's broader use of soft power and covert means to complement its more overt efforts to reassert influence in Europe and keep countries there from developing alternatives to an energy addiction worth $100 million a day to Moscow.

"I have met allies who can report that Russia, as part of their sophisticated information and disinformation operations, engage actively with so-called non-government organizations -- environmental organizations working against shale gas -- obviously to maintain European dependence on imported Russian gas," NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen said after a Chatham House speech this week.

NATO officials said Rasmussen's remarks were meant to underscore NATO's growing unease with Europe's energy security situation. "Clearly, it is in the interest of all NATO allies to be able to have adequate energy supplies. We share a concern by some allies that Russia could try to obstruct possible projects on shale gas exploration in Europe in order to maintain Europe's reliance on Russian gas," a NATO official told Foreign Policy.

Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, has unleashed an energy boom in the United States. But the practice, which is designed to tap previously unreachable stores of natural gas by injecting a chemical cocktail at high pressure to break apart shale formations deep underground, also generates plenty of environmental opposition. Critics say fracking can poison underground stores of drinking water.

In Europe, that opposition is particularly fierce, both because environmental groups have more political power than in the United States and because higher population densities magnify the possible damaging effects of the drilling practice. Some countries have banned fracking outright; others, including France and Germany, have imposed onerous regulations that effectively make the practice illegal, though they are reconsidering fracking in light of the standoff with Russia over Ukraine.

Russian energy firms and officials, as well as Kremlin-controlled media, have lambasted fracking on environmental grounds for years. Top Gazprom officials and even Russian President Vladimir Putin have attacked the technology, which, if adopted, could ease Europe's dependence on Russian gas.

But one thing has for years puzzled energy experts: Well-organized and well-funded environmental opposition to fracking in Europe sprang up suddenly in countries such as Bulgaria and Ukraine, which had shown little prior concern for the environment but which are heavily dependent on Russia for energy supplies. Similar movements have also targeted Europe's plans to build pipelines that would offer an alternative to reliance on Moscow.

"It's very concrete; it relates to both opposition to shale and also trying to block any alternative pipelines with environmental challenges," said Brenda Shaffer, an energy expert at Georgetown University. "There is a lot of evidence here; countries like Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine being at the vanguard of the environmental movement is enough for it to be conspicuous," she said.

Bulgaria's anti-shale movement is particularly telling. The country initially embraced fracking as a way to develop its own energy resources and reduce reliance on Russia, even signing an exploration deal with Chevron in 2011. But then came an eruption of seemingly grassroots environmental protests and a televised blitz against fracking. In early 2012, the government reversed course and banned the practice.

Researchers who've worked on the ground in Central and Eastern Europe say there is plenty of anecdotal evidence, if no smoking guns, of Russian financial support for some environmental groups that have recently mobilized opposition to shale gas development.

In Ukraine, for example, anti-fracking movements became more organized and better funded just as the government worked to finalize shale gas deals with Western energy firms, officials there say. In Lithuania, "exactly the same thing is happening," said a government official, who described the mushrooming of anti-shale billboards and websites there as "an integrated, strategic communications campaign." As in Bulgaria, the well-funded groups organized screenings of Gasland to galvanize opposition to fracking.

"All of a sudden, in societies that never did grassroots organization very well, you saw all these NGOs well-funded, popping up, and causing well-organized protests," said Mihaela Carstei, an energy and environment analyst at the Atlantic Council.

To be sure, much of Europe's anti-fracking movement is motivated by genuine environmental concerns, just as in the United States; much of that opposition was catalyzed by the controversial 2010 anti-shale documentary Gasland. There are fears about fracking's effect on groundwater and the link between fracking and increased seismic activity. France, for instance, banned fracking before Bulgaria. And despite the Ukraine crisis and the rumblings of pro-fracking sentiment from some senior government officials, which could open the door to France rethinking the ban, fracking is still off the table there for now. Environmental groups such as Greenpeace scoff at the NATO chief's allegations, saying that they oppose fracking for sound environmental reasons. What's more, there's little love lost between Greenpeace and Russia, because Moscow detained dozens of the group's green activists last year.

"I wouldn't underestimate the role that Russia plays in shale gas in Europe, but I wouldn't overestimate it, either," said Andreas Goldthau, an energy expert at Harvard University's Belfer Center who has extensively researched shale gas policies in Europe. "Overall, particularly in Bulgaria and Romania, the causes of shale's problems are varied; it's not only the Russians coming in and trying to start protests."

Ultimately, Russia's efforts to derail Europe's alternative pipeline projects, more than its possible support for anti-fracking groups, represent a more immediate threat to Europe's efforts to diversify its energy supplies, Shaffer said.

"These rival projects are even more of a threat than fracking because shale gas will take a long time to develop, but these projects will soon bring gas to Europe; they are practical and concrete," she said.

Guerra nuclear y rol de Rusia en Ucrania

Publicado: 24 jun 2014 | 11:33 GMT


En todo el orbe, y especialmente las fuerzas progresistas, se hacen una pregunta que parece no haber sido respondida con claridad: ¿por qué Rusia, insultada, sancionada, violadas sus fronteras, calumniada, atacadas sus legaciones diplomáticas, asesinados sus periodistas, masacrados los rusos étnicos en Ucrania, es decir, agraviada en grado extremo por la Red House y la Unión Europea, no ha reaccionado proporcionalmente?¿Cómo es posible que un país soberano y su Gobierno acepten que un país extranjero continúe su injerencia, humillándolos al ordenarles la posición militar que deben tener sus tropas y manifieste que no las tolerará cercanas a las "fronteras propias" incluso, es decir, cercanas a los rusos originarios que habitan el este de Ucrania?(1)

Al respecto se pueden dar como mínimo cinco respuestas comprensivas, aclarando que poseen un carácter tentativo por lo complejo de la temática: una, que el Gobierno ruso no quiere arriesgarse por ningún pueblo que no sea el suyo; dos, que no posee el armamento militar o la defensa adecuada ante contrincantes fuertes; tres, que posee un alto temor ante la guerra mediática que alcanza a una parte importante del mundo; cuatro, que esta crisis la afectará de modo económico determinante y la mentalidad del capital es suprema; cinco, que sabe exactamente la inestabilidad mental de las élites transnacionales y su amenaza nuclear.

La primera respuesta, evadir su compromiso por otras naciones, no es tan evidente pues en los foros internacionales se ha sostenido una posición de defensa de los pueblos sirios, iraníes, palestinos y otros, iniciando una estrategia de relaciones justa en amplios campos de cooperación con las naciones que se encuentran más agredidas por la Casa Roja y la Tríada (Inglaterra-Francia-Alemania). El caso de Crimea demuestra que cuando hay que actuar se realiza la definición de forma precisa, concreta, definitiva, midiendo racionalmente las consecuencias presentes y futuras ante los reclamos de las grandes potencias y dejando cimentado su triunfo con celeridad. Se sabe de la detención de misiles teledirigidos contra objetivos militares sirios aplicando la tecnología rusa, lo que ha aclarado su posición ante cualquier intento de invasión, invalidando toda intervención que pretenda derrocar al mandatario elegido democráticamente.

En cuanto a la debilidad militar, la historia es muy clara: la experiencia de Rusia ha sido probada en diversos frentes y especialmente en la Segunda Guerra Mundial, donde la derrota de los nazis en Stalingrado determinó el fracaso de Hitler: no fue, como lo ha mostrado Hollywood, la armada o aviación euroatlántica la vencedora, puesto que llegaron cuando el triunfo estaba casi asegurado y, más bien, para impedir el ascenso imparable de las tropas soviéticas que "amenazaban" la Europa Occidental. La existencia de fuerzas entrenadas para combatir en tierra pertrechadas con tanques y armamento muy potente, defendidas desde el espacio aéreo y con la posibilidad de intervenir con una flota de amplio espectro, aplicando ingeniería de última generación, permitirían creer que posee una escuadra formidable. La duda es si sería suficiente, sin vincularse China u otros Estados, para enfrentar a la Alianza OTAN en una guerra convencional o de otro tipo.

Respecto al conflicto mediático, es claro que aún el poder lo poseen cadenas transnacionales que son dueñas de gran parte de las comunicaciones. Ello no implica que esa batalla se gane en esa dimensión pues la conciencia de los pueblos es fundamental cuando se hace presente para defender su soberanía o politizar la sociedad. En esta situación, independiente que la "opinión pública" pueda ser manipulada como ocurre en varios países de América Latina, por ejemplo, ello no implicaría el compromiso de los Gobiernos en una guerra que compete a una potencia que involucra a Europa como carne de cañón y que pronto se desanimaría si no ve amenaza real a sus fronteras.

Económicamente ha ocurrido un fenómeno extraordinario pues ha abierto un cosmos de opciones tanto con Asia, América y África, convirtiéndola en un líder indiscutido. Es más, las transnacionales quedan desligadas de mecanismos para engendrar primaveras violentas y apoderarse de los recursos nacionales ahora que se toma conciencia de la unidad a través del G77 y las propuestas para organizar un mercado con nuevas reglas de solidaridad, monedas diferentes al dólar, intercambio en justa proporción, la creación de bancos comunitarios y la organización de una nueva institucionalidad diferente a la ONU o reformada integralmente. Naturalmente, las sanciones disminuirán los ingresos base aunque permitirán en corto plazo recuperar la estabilidad infraestructural si se realiza un gestión inteligente desde lo financiero y productivo.

Los cuatro factores mencionados pueden adquirir mucha importancia dependiendo del prisma que se utilice para darle mayor o menor proporción a cada uno. Lo cierto es que todos serán debilitados en la medida que se retroceda en los principios fundamentales de la soberanía internacional.

Tal vez, si ninguno de los anteriores factores fuera suficiente, la única razón por la que no se responde proporcionalmente a las agresiones podría estar en que se conoce por fuentes confiables de la inestabilidad mental en las élites transnacionales y su amenaza nuclear en caso de apoyar decididamente a las repúblicas de Donetsk y Lugansk, con el objetivo de impedir el genocidio de rusos verdaderos, o sea, de su propia población.

Sería importante contextualizar esta situación con varias interrogantes: ¿cómo resolverá el régimen de Estados Unidos y las potencias europeas (Inglaterra y Alemania) la inmensa bancarrota que se les acerca a nivel económico y social?¿Será la guerra convencional, para continuar con la confrontación nuclear, las fases preestablecidas?¿No se habrán dado cuenta los propietarios de los complejos militares-financieros que la guerra en esa dimensión es un improbable para recuperar su dinastía y sostener el poder?¿Serán tan serviles los Gobiernos de países europeos, al igual que Francia, para aceptar una conflagración mundial ordenada por dichas élites?¿Existen problemas siquiátricos graves en quienes desean una escalada militar y, por ello, no pueden liderar al mundo?

Estas preguntas deben ser obligatorias para los dirigentes mundiales, especialmente para aquellos que con una racionalidad cuerda se dan cuenta que existe una tendencia suicida en la Unión Europea destinada a profundizar los conflictos con el fin de obligar a Rusia a intervenir en Ucrania, dando la razón esperada y llegada por fin, para acusar al oso ruso de injerencia en el extranjero.

Rusia ha soportado estoicamente todas las agresiones y trampas de parte de Estados Unidos, Alemania, Inglaterra, Francia, para apoderarse de Ucrania y obligar a Rusia a intervenir militarmente, las cuales suman cronológicamente una cifra exorbitante: falaces negociaciones de paz el 21 de febrero con Polonia incluido, mientras preparaban el golpe de Estado para el 22; acuerdos de Ginebra para un plan de paz en abril dejados unilateralmente sin efecto, sanciones permanentes en todo campo y aún bloqueo enorme; movilización de la OTAN cercando a Rusia; intervenciones de representantes de esas potencias burlándose del presidente ruso y sus planteamientos; acusaciones sin pruebas de intervención en Ucrania, genocidio de civiles, son una parte de ello.

Conocido el mapa de bases que posee Estados unidos y la OTAN en el mundo, el régimen de Obama, en un claro intento de retar al presidente Putin, ha enviado dos bombarderos nucleares a Reino Unido más tres B-52 Stratofortress, estacionados previamente en la base de la RAF en Fairford en Gloucesterhire, provistos de misiles subsónicos AG-86 y equipados con 80 cabezas nucleares. Si se sustenta en que el danés Rassmussen definió textualmente a Rusia como enemigo, la suspensión de los servicios de navegación aérea en Austria, Alemania, República Checa y Eslovaquia por los juegos de simulación de una guerra con Rusia, se percibe que las reacciones del mandatario han de ser interpretadas con esta clave.

Por el contrario, mientras el canciller Lavrov en la ONU y a nivel presidencial han insistido reiteradamente sobre la necesidad de detener la masacre del sureste, la intervención de la Red House y sus aliados es directa, sin vergüenza, desafiante, amparándose en un factor que se supone es la supremacía militar y (o) nuclear realmente.

Cabe intentar entender en este momento la posición rusa, posiblemente con el fin de no dar pie a una escalada nuclear que es la que los "locos del poder" en Estados Unidos desean para resolver la implosión económica que les deviene y se ven imposibilitados de ocultarla o simplemente "resolverla" al declarar una guerra directa. Es importante recordar que dentro de sus mentes torcidas es factible que los análisis que hacen sean los siguientes: la guerra es lejos de nuestras fronteras, no tocarán a los EE.UU. pues poseemos escudos nucleares, los tontos-imbéciles de Europa se sacrificarán por nosotros, incluido Israel, Inglaterra, Alemania y los becerros de Francia; se exterminarán entre europeos, rusos, chinos, japoneses, mientras nosotros estamos libres o enviamos obreros de clase baja e inmigrantes de América. Luego, cuando las fuerzas estén desgastadas, allí se intervendrá con toda potencia para continuar el modelo neoliberal dictatorial de expoliación mundial, dando la victoria a Occidente y, de nuevo, resolver "el mundo de la libertad" al gusto. Así, se destruirá la oposición y ansias de soberanía, democracia y libertad de Irán, China, Rusia, Venezuela, Bolivia, y todos los que deseen su liberación. No es descabellado pensarlo.

Tal como lo hemos sostenido desde hace un tiempo largo, y ahora confirmado por diversos análisis (2), desafortunadamente el presidente Obama se encuentra en una situación que lo ha puesto racionalmente en entredicho -denominado realidad paralela- lo que indica que su comportamiento es errático, por lo cual no ofrece ninguna seguridad en sus apreciaciones y, más bien, hay que entenderlas en su opuesto. No es anticientífico relacionar un cabello encanecido en menos de cuatro años, producto de tensiones inmensas, con una actuación sin equilibrio intelectual o lógico. Es aún más delicado si se considera lo que ocurre actualmente a través de criterios geopolíticos determinados humanológicamente por lo que se considera "escena de pánico", lo que puede conducir a decisiones propias de ambición desmedida.

Hay que reiterar que la incertidumbre que se presenta en la no reacción de Rusia, preocupa ya que la violencia hacia esta es tal que la Red House ha sentenciado que no aceptarán la intervención de las fuerzas militares rusas en el este de Ucrania, tal como lo manifestó el portavoz de la Casa Blanca, Josh Earnest.

Por tanto, es fundamental insistir en el perfil siquiátrico de los líderes transnacionales de las potencias puesto que de las órdenes emanadas en tanto superiores y acatadas por Obama, Merkel, Cameron, tiene gran significación pues existe un "alzhéimer histórico" demasiado profundo que les impide tener conciencia de que su lógica está desviada, tal como la locura lo expone. No darse cuenta que se apoya la usurpación de las Malvinas y se cuestiona a Crimea está por fuera de toda percepción normal; poseer un campo de concentración en Guantánamo y una Escuela de Las Américas donde se tortura (independientemente de su cambio de nombre), o se tienen presos políticos sin juicio justo y, a su vez, criticar la prisión de un delincuente que desea un golpe de Estado violento en Venezuela, indica que los límites están sobrepasados verdaderamente. Lo más grave es apoyar el terrorismo y negarlo como si fuera un peligro, lo que indica que se está ante personajes con problemáticas graves desde lo mental.

La respuesta a la no intervención de Rusia puede estar relacionada con la desconfianza en la actuación de personas que siquiátricamente no poseen escrúpulos para torturar, asesinar, quemar, matar niños o civiles indefensos, pues ya lo han hecho durante muchos siglos y en sus propias colonias, los que actúan con reacciones desproporcionadas. En esta dirección, si se establece corredores humanitarios en las fronteras del este ucraniano, como un resultado de la responsabilidad histórica de Rusia, y Occidente no los acepta, podría ocurrir una guerra limitada con armas convencionales; la derrota de Rusia conduciría obviamente a una respuesta nuclear o viceversa, conduciendo a un desenlace sin precedentes. La otra opción es que se acepte que Ucrania ya no es la misma y que los conflictos existentes se tendrán que ir resolviendo en una combinación de tensión y diálogo permanente, sometido a las posiciones ganadas.

La hipótesis es que el Gobierno de Vladimir Putin no se enfrenta a un enemigo peligroso solamente, sino que con serias interferencias de carácter mental e intelectual, lo que agrava la situación pues no se conoce su reacción normal. Mentalmente agresión, insultos, amenazas, son propios de personalidades paranoides; intelectualmente no se puede explicar de modo lógico las operaciones cerebrales, tal como ocurre con las frecuentes declaraciones del Departamento de Estado negando la realidad de su creación y apoyo al EIIL en Siria y el desarrollo del terrorismo en Irak.

¿Qué hacer?

Todas las naciones con Gobiernos soberanos que desean la paz mundial tienen que actuar decididamente y poner sobre el tapete el peligro nuclear existente puesto que los niveles de agresividad sobrepasan todo lo permitido: cortar el agua y la luz a una ciudad, destruir un pueblo, asesinar a civiles, calcinar a los opositores, usar sicarios para eliminar activistas, no puede ser permitido ni dejarse a declaraciones formales simplemente.

Hoy debe haber una campaña organizada por el G77 exponiendo esos planes, para establecer una política coordinada a nivel mundial que explicite y difunda los intentos de las potencias para resolver sus problemas económicos amenazando con la guerra nuclear. Analistas serios se interrogan si no será el momento que China y Rusia, en una unidad visible, realicen un manifiesto de defensa de la soberanía y supervivencia del mundo actual, complementado por la mayoría de naciones que desean un destino armónico para el orbe, avanzando sin temores en acciones que estimulen la soberanía y la descolonización, tal vez la única estrategia para detener los intentos de la destrucción humana por parte de organizaciones dictatoriales.

Más allá de las denuncias, protestas enérgicas, apertura de investigaciones, exigencias, calificación de unilateralidad, indicaciones de hipocresías, las que están ubicadas de modo cercano en el plano retórico pues no conducen a algo concreto que disuada efectivamente al adversario, se considera que Rusia debe otorgar, al igual que otras naciones, apoyo a las provincias del sudeste para ser libres, lo que implica una responsabilidad inmensa ante el mundo. Rusia tiene la oportunidad histórica en este nuevo siglo de establecer corredores humanitarios para defender a las repúblicas populares rusas de la masacre a la que son sometidas.


Frente a un poder tan inmenso de los Medios particulares, donde incentivan confrontaciones, deforman la realidad, movilizan los sentimientos populares, cabe ya la pregunta si los Gobiernos soberanos deben exigir o crear una legislación en cada país que sancione directamente a aquellos que no se ajusten a la verdad de los hechos y que contribuyen a la zozobra de la sociedad.

Los dirigentes gubernamentales que representan el sistema capitalista neoliberal arrojan una duda intelectual inmensa: no se han dado cuenta que sus mecanismos austericidas provocan la crisis de su mismo sistema(3), o sí lo saben y se encuentran en una encrucijada respecto a la decisión que deberían ética y humanamente tomar. Seguramente conocen que la paz es el mejor camino para la Humanidad… aunque se resisten a aceptar que el mundo pueda ser mejor y más confiable. Por ello, de las interrogantes y sus posibles respuestas se deducirá el presente de este mundo imperfecto y extraordinario que nos debería acoger por miles de años, por sobre la mentalidad absurda, vengativa y desquiciada de personas llenas de maldad en su interioridad ideológica.

Cuando Derek Chollet, Secretario adjunto del Departamento de Defensa de Estados Unidos, coordina en Kiev la represión militar y Polonia está dirigiendo las operaciones militares en Ucrania, la injerencia es evidente pese a sus acusaciones al Gobierno ruso. Ya ha sido comprobado que empresas privadas de seguridad o simplemente agencias reclutadoras de mercenarios, que seleccionan, entrenan y ponen en acción a sus "funcionarios" armados para la función que se les destine a través de negocios o contratos… especialmente de carácter terrorista, están actuando al servicio de Poroshenko. Por eso, no ha sorprendido a Estados Unidos, ni es negativo para sus intereses, el avance terrorista del EIIL, ya que se ha confirmado que sus líderes tuvieron entrenamiento de la OTAN y que el objetivo es la balcanización o separación territorial de Irak en tres Estados diferentes.

Ante esta grave situación que combina la guerra convencional con la nuclear, unido a la hipocresía y la falsedad de la negociación de la Red House y sus aliados, es preciso saber que sin guerras el mercado capitalista se destruye rápidamente, lo que presiona la creación de tantos focos de conflagración. Esta realidad incuestionable se combina con que un sector élite es consciente de la realidad y la necesidad de entrar a realizar reglas más justas de intercambio comercial, de relaciones políticas y de estabilidad internacional. Sin embargo, si la línea de los halcones, con sus garras desalmadas y sus fauces dispuestas a devorar la justicia necesaria a las naciones y los seres humanos se impone, la amenaza nuclear está muy cercana. Ojalá que la pobreza que asolará a Estados Unidos en tiempos próximos no sea un detonante de la hecatombe del planeta.

Finalmente una conclusión de principio: el texto anterior puede convertirse en una visión explicativa del rol trascendente que Rusia juega en este momento en el plano internacional, aunque no cubre las respuestas exactas que son del orden estratégico reservado de una nación. Lo esencial es que se logre aportar concretamente en la defensa de una región bombardeada y en peligro de exterminio total puesto que los niños, el germen de la sociedad, no son responsables de la existencia procaz de una mentalidad que considera a nuestro mundo como un objeto de expoliación y quienes tienen que ser desterrados del poder omnímodo para convertirlos en ciudadanos de pacificación. La amenaza nuclear existe y los senderos de resolución también.

Putin solicita al Senado anular el permiso para enviar tropas a Ucrania; inicia negociación

Por: Redacción / Sinembargo - junio 24 de 2014 - 7:24
De revista, Mundo, TIEMPO REAL, Último minuto - Sin comentarios


Moscú, 24 jun (EFE).- El presidente ruso, Vladímir Putin, propuso hoy al Consejo de la Federación (Senado) de Rusia anular el permiso para enviar tropas a Ucrania, otorgado al jefe del Kremlin el pasado 1 de marzo.

Putin envió una carta a la presidenta del Senado, Valentina Matvienko, antes de viajar hoy a Viena en visita oficial, informó el portavoz de la Presidencia rusa, Dmitri Peskov.

Según Peskov, la decisión fue adoptada para favorecer “la normalización de la situación en la regiones orientales de Ucrania” y también en vista del inicio de las negociaciones entre las partes en conflicto.

El Senado adelantó que se reunirá mañana mismo para estudiar la propuesta del presidente ruso.

La solicitud coincide con la tregua acordada a última hora de ayer entre las autoridades ucranianas y los rebeldes prorrusos, y también con la advertencia de la Unión Europea sobre nuevas sanciones, en esta ocasión económicas, si Moscú no contribuye al plan de paz para las regiones ucranianas de Donetsk y Lugansk.

La tregua, acordada hasta las 10 de la mañana del viernes, fue alcanzada en las primeras conversaciones entre representantes de Kiev y los líderes de la sublevación prorrusa desde que estallaron los enfrentamiento armados, hace casi dos meses.

El permiso para el envío de las tropas fue aprobado una semana después del derrocamiento del presidente ucraniano Víktor Yanukóvich y en vísperas de la anexión de la península de Crimea por Rusia. EFE

NATO allies agree to boost military budgets
Higher defence spending and new sanctions among steps being weighed to compel Russia to withdraw forces from Ukraine.
Last updated: 26 Jun 2014 02:18

Western powers are accusing Russia of supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine [EPA]

NATO allies are boosting their military spending in Europe and are preparing to impose greater sanctions against Russia unless it withdraws its forces from the Ukrainian border and stops the flow of weapons to separatists.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO secretary-general, said after a Brussels summit on Wednesday there would be "no business as usual with Russia" until it came back "in line with its international obligations".

He urged Russia to "take genuine and effective measures to stop destabilising Ukraine ... create conditions for the peace plan to be implemented ... end its support for armed separatist groups, and ... stop the flow of weapons and fighters across its borders".

The measures include the establishment of new trust funds to support defence-capacity building in critical areas such as logistics, command and control, and cyber-defence, and to help retired military personnel to adapt to civilian life, Rasmussen said.

John Kerry, US secretary of state, announced after the meeting that US President Barack Obama would ask the US Congress for another $1bn in defence spending for Europe.

Other NATO allies have so far not announced to what extent they will increase their military budgets.

Kerry's 'wake-up call'

Kerry urged Russia to stop destabilising Ukraine and described its recent moves there as a "wake-up call".

"After a free and fair election the Ukrainian people celebrated a peaceful transfer of power. [NATO] commends the Ukrainian government for reaching out to separatists and the Russian government and now it is critical for President [Vladimir] Putin to stop the flow of weapons over the border," Kerry said.

"Until Russia makes that commitment the US and Europe are compelled to prepare greater sanctions."

Philip Hammond, UK defence secretary, told Al Jazeera that Russia did not accept the international norms of behaviour and had shown it was prepared to intervene in the region where it felt it was in its own national interests.

"We in Europe in particular have to wake up to the fact that we have on our borders a powerful neighbour that does not accept the rules by which we live," Hammond said.

The upper house of the Russian parliament on Wednesday cancelled a resolution allowing the use of military force in Ukraine, at the demand of Putin.

Pavlo Klimkin, Ukraine's foreign minister, praised the Russian parliament's vote as a "positive step", but urged Russia to also go further to stem the flow of fighters and weapons across the border.

Klimkin added that Ukraine was doing its "utmost" to de-escalate the situation in the country's eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.

Earlier on Wednesday, Ukraine's president sought urgent talks with his Russian counterpart after rebels shot down an army helicopter despite a ceasefire.

Petro Poroshenko said he hoped German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande, the French president, would join him on a conference call to Putin on Wednesday.

On Tuesday, the deaths of nine servicemen in the helicopter near Slovyansk, and loss of two other soldiers in attacks by separatist gunmen, prompted Poroshenko to threaten to begin a powerful new military campaign in the industrial east.

Russia said on Wednesday it hoped Kiev and the international community would take heed of the "positive signals" it was sending over the Ukraine crisis.

"We are counting on the positive signals that the Russian president is now sending being heard across the world and, above all, in Ukraine," Grigory Karasin, Russia's deputy foreign minister, told Russian news agencies.

The AFP news agency on Wednesday reported new shelling in Slovyansk by Ukrainian forces, who have effectively surrounded the city of nearly 120,000.

Their push was met with extended rounds of anti-aircraft and heavy machine-gun fire, the agency reported.
Source:
Al Jazeera and agencies

Conquering Russia and the 'heartland'
What happens when US moralistic interventionism collides with Russian imperial inertia?
Last updated: 14 Jul 2014 08:37
Vartan Oskanian

Vartan Oskanian

Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia's National Assembly, a former foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan's Civilitas Foundation.
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The US never stopped containing Russia, just as Russia never ceased seeing itself as an imperial power, writes Oskanian [AP]

Those who value geopolitics understand why the then-almighty United States would have felt so threatened by the fall of a small, nearby island into the Soviet camp, that it tries to invade Cuba. Or why China and Japan, two of the three largest economies in the world, would quarrel over a few rocks (the Senkaku Islands) in the East China Sea.

Sir Halford Mackinder is one of the founding fathers of geopolitics. Mackinder labels the three contiguous continents, Asia, Europe and Africa as the "world Island" and the "heartland" as the rough center, occupied by Russia and Eastern Europe. His theory, conceived in 1904, goes as follows: Whoever rules east Europe commands the heartland; whoever rules the heartland commands the world island; whoever rules the world island controls the world.

Mackinder's ideas are believed to have appealed to a German geographer, Karl Haushofer, who became Adolf Hitler's favourite geopolitician, and is partly responsible for Hitler's obsession with Lebensraum to the east and his determination to conquer Russia and the heartland.

One might think that in this age of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, distinguishing between the heartland, the rimland and the world island is meaningless. But no, because those mutually destructive arsenals offset each other, and so conventional armaments, warfare and of course, geopolitical calculations, continue to remain the likely components of any military confrontation.

This is true in the recent confrontation between the West and Russia over Ukraine and a few other former Soviet republics.

EU borders move east

With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the Kremlin first lost eastern Europe as NATO's and EU's borders moved east. Then, the three Baltic States joined the EU and NATO. Just recently, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the European Union, setting the stage for deeper integration with Europe, including NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Not coincidentally, Russia's two encroachments towards those in its immediate vicinity were Georgia in August 2008 and Ukraine more recently.

The United States never stopped containing Russia, just as Russia never ceased seeing itself as an imperial power. Vladimir Putin's ascendency to power simply accentuated this reality.

The specificity of the post-Cold War period was that those very institutions that contributed to first the containment, and then the collapse of the Soviet Union - NATO, the EU, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organisation - were the ones that were modified and reinvented to accommodate and embrace the newly emerged states and outline the contours of a new world order.

Containment is an amazing word. It defined US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union during the entire Cold War period. It has generated debates, disagreements, and controversies among the foreign policy establishment. Volumes have been written explaining and analysing the essence and the meaning of that one word. Furthermore, it has been twisted and turned, redefined and reshaped with every new US administration from Truman to Ike, to Kennedy and Johnson, and from Nixon on, till the collapse of the Soviet Union during the transition from Reagan to Bush senior, to accommodate the changing circumstances of the Soviet-US confrontation.

As events in Ukraine transpire, and the tension between Russia and the United States grows, one may wonder about the root causes of this new confrontation. One should not look any further than what both Russia and the United States do best. The United States never stopped containing Russia, just as Russia never ceased seeing itself as an imperial power. Russian President Vladimir Putin's ascendancy to power simply accentuated this reality.

For Putin, gestures like including Russia in the G8, the G20, the World Trade Organization, and the NATO-plus-Russia format, could not make up for NATO's expansion to Russia's borders, the placement of anti-ballistic missile sites in Eastern Europe, or the dismemberment of Serbia. The overthrow of Libya's Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and ongoing efforts to undercut the Kremlin's ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, has only made matters worse.

Train wreck on global scene

Indeed, there are two foreign policy characteristics that come head to head, often causing a train wreck on the global scene. It's the interventionism, along with the moralism and missionary zeal from the US side, and the imperial inertia and the common and unequivocal expectation of submission to authority from the Russian side.

The US attitude arises from the nation's perception of itself as a unique and morally superior society. The US believes to have the appropriate democratic solution for every other society regardless of cultural and historical differences. It also seems to see US hegemony as the solution to the world's ills. Russia's attitude is anchored in its imperial past and a sense of betrayal and humiliation from what it perceives as unfair treatment of Russia since the end of the Cold War. Putin believes that the West reneged on its promise to be considerate of Russia's security interests, and that the West is still intent on weakening Russia.

The United States is blamed for being heavily involved through its soft power techniques to manipulate and shape the will of the people while advocating the independence, the sovereignty of states and respect of the will of those people to determine their future. Russia is reproached for pressuring and coercing states and populations into submission, while advocating no interference in other countries' domestic affairs.

This vicious cycle is hard to break. Both sides have their reasons, suspicions, doubts and convictions.

As I was finishing writing this piece, I was interrupted by a high-ranking official from Finland on a visit to Armenia. As a former colleague, he had asked for a meeting to hear my take about events in Armenia and the region. I asked him about Ukraine, since he had served there, too, as ambassador. He said Ukraine changed the thinking in Finland. Although we do not feel threatened by Russia's moves in Ukraine, nevertheless, they were a wake-up call for all, he said.

A recent poll showed that 60 percent of the Finnish people still don't want to see Finland as a member of NATO, but when asked whether they would agree if the government recommends NATO membership, 60 percent agreed.

The world - the West and Russia - have applauded Finland's nuanced geopolitical stance of the last several decades. Russia's recent moves are impacting that sophisticated decision-making on the one hand, while reinforcing the profound value of people's power and democratic decision-making, on the other. It would be ironic if that is the lesson that is to be culled from this most recent episode of tug-of-war between the two world-views. What a lesson to be learned.

Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia's National Assembly, a former foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan's Civilitas Foundation.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

Obama condemns Russia after airliner downed in Ukraine
Rescuers stand on the site of the crash of a Malaysian airliner carrying 298 people from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, near the town of Shaktarsk, in rebel-held east Ukraine on July 18, 2014. Getty Images: Dominique Faget, AFP
Rescuers stand on the site of the crash of a Malaysian airliner carrying 298 people from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, near the town of Shaktarsk, in rebel-held east Ukraine on July 18, 2014.
Reuters 22 hr ago By Anton Zverev of Reuters

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HRABOVE, Ukraine, July 18 (Reuters) - U.S. President Barack Obama demanded Russia stop supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine after the downing of a Malaysian airline by a surface-to-air missile he said was fired from rebel territory raised the prospect of more sanctions on Moscow.

At least one American was among the almost 300 killed, he said, a revelation that raises the stakes in a pivotal incident in deteriorating relations between Russia and the West.
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Photos: Malaysia Airlines passenger jet brought down in Ukraine

Related: Obama says one American was aboard downed plane in Ukraine

Related: Indiana University doctoral student among Malaysia Air dead

Calling it "an outrage of unspeakable proportions", Obama stopped short of directly blaming Russia for the incident but warned that he was prepared to tighten economic sanctions. He echoed international calls for a rapid and credible investigation and ruling out U.S. military intervention.

But, noting the global impact of the crash, with victims from 11 countries across four continents, he said the stakes were high for Europe, a clear call for it to follow the more robust sanctions on Russia already imposed by Washington.


Russia, whom Obama said was letting the rebels bring in weapons, has expressed anger at implications it was to blame, saying people should not prejudge the outcome of the inquiry.

There were no survivors from the Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, a Boeing 777. The United Nations said 80 of the 298 aboard were children. The deadliest attack on a commercial airliner, it scattered bodies over miles of rebel-held territory near the border with Russia.

Makeshift white flags marked where bodies lay in corn fields and among the debris. Others, stripped bare by the force of the crash, had been covered by polythene sheeting weighed down by stones, one marked with a flower in remembrance.

One pensioner told how a woman smashed though her roof: "There was a howling noise and everything started to rattle. Then objects started falling out of the sky," said Irina Tipunova, 65. "And then I heard a roar and she landed in the kitchen."

An American-Dutch dual national was confirmed aboard - more than half those who died were Dutch - and U.S. investigators prepared to head to Ukraine to assist in the investigation.

Staff from Europe's OSCE security body visited the site but complained that they did not have the full access they wanted.

Related: OSCE says it did not receive proper access to Ukraine crash site

The scale of the disaster could prove a turning point for international pressure to resolve the crisis in Ukraine, which has killed hundreds since pro-Western protests toppled the Moscow-backed president in Kiev in February and Russia annexed the Crimea peninsula a month later.

"This outrageous event underscores that it is time for peace and security to be restored in Ukraine," Obama said, adding that Russia had failed to use its influence to curb rebel violence.

While the West has imposed sanctions on Russia over Ukraine, the United States has been more aggressive than the European Union. Analysts say the response of Germany and other EU powers to the incident - possibly imposing more sanctions - could be crucial in deciding the next phase of the standoff with Moscow.

Some commentators even recalled Germany's sinking of the Atlantic liner Lusitania in 1915, which helped push the United States into World War One, but outrage in the West at Thursday's carnage is not seen as leading to military intervention.

The U.N. Security Council called for a "full, thorough and independent international investigation" into the downing of the plane and "appropriate accountability" for those responsible.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel said it was too early to decide on further sanctions before it was known exactly what had happened to the plane. Britain said the facts must be established by a UN-led investigation before additional sanctions were seriously considered.

Kiev and Moscow immediately blamed each other for the disaster, triggering a new phase in their propaganda war.
CRASH SITE

The plane crashed about 40 km (25 miles) from the border with Russia near the regional capital of Donetsk, an area that is a stronghold of rebels who have been fighting Ukrainian government forces and have brought down military aircraft.

Leaders of the rebels' self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic denied any involvement and said a Ukrainian air force jet had brought down the intercontinental flight.

Russia's Defence Ministry later pointed the finger at Ukrainian ground forces, saying it had picked up radar activity from a Ukrainian missile system south of Donetsk when the airliner was brought down, Russian media reported.

The Ukrainian security council said no missiles had been fired from its armouries. Officials also accused separatists of moving unused missiles into Russia after the incident.

The Ukrainian government released recordings it said were of Russian intelligence officers discussing the shooting down of a civilian airliner by rebels who may have mistaken it for a Ukrainian military plane.

After the downing of several Ukrainian military aircraft in the area in recent months, including two earlier this week, Kiev had accused Russian forces of playing a direct role.

Separatists were quoted in Russian media last month saying they had acquired a long-range SA-11 anti-aircraft system.

Latvia, a former Soviet state which like Ukraine has a large ethnic Russian minority, said Moscow bore "full responsibility" for providing the separatists with missiles. Baltic neighbour Lithuania spoke of "a brutal act of terror".

The OSCE said 30 observers and experts from the organisation, which has monitors in the region, had reached the site on Friday: "We have to work there quickly to see what's going on in terms of safety and security of the perimeter, the state of the bodies, the wreckage and also the black boxes," spokesman Michael Bociurkiw said near the crash scene.

The plane's two black boxes - voice and data recorders - were recovered, but it was unlikely they could determine it was a missile strike - let alone who launched it.

Further complicating any investigation, local people were seen removing pieces of wreckage as souvenirs. The condition of the metal can indicate if it has been struck by a missile.

Reuters journalists saw burning and charred wreckage bearing the red and blue Malaysia Airlines insignia and dozens of bodies in fields near the village of Hrabove, known in Russian as Grabovo.

Ukraine said on Friday that up to 181 bodies had been found. The airline said it was carrying 283 passengers and 15 crew.

Ukraine has closed air space over the east of the country as Malaysia Airlines defended its use of a route that some other carriers had been avoiding.

More than half of the dead passengers, 189 people, were Dutch. Twenty-nine were Malaysian, 27 Australian, 12 Indonesian, nine British, four German, four Belgian, three Filipino, one America, one Canadian, one New Zealand. Several were unidentified and some may have had dual citizenship. The 15 crew were Malaysian.

Related: All walks of life among Malaysia plane passengers

A number of those on board were travelling to an international AIDS conference in Melbourne, including Joep Lange, an influential Dutch expert.

"We lost somebody who wanted to make the world a better place," said his friend Marcel Duyvestijn.

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Relatives of passengers on board Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 arrive at Kuala Lumpur International Airport in Sepang, July 18, 2014.

"TRAGIC DAY, TRAGIC YEAR"

The loss of MH17 is the second devastating blow for Malaysia Airlines this year, following the mysterious disappearance of Flight MH370 in March, which vanished with 239 passengers and crew on board on its way from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing.

In Malaysia, there was a sense of disbelief that another airline disaster could strike so soon.

"This is a tragic day, in what has already been a tragic year, for Malaysia," Prime Minister Najib Razak said.

International air lanes had been open in the area, though only above 32,000 feet. The Malaysia plane was flying 1,000 feet higher, at the instruction of Ukrainian air traffic control, although the airline had asked to fly at 35,000 feet.

Relatives gathered at the airport in Kuala Lumpur and the Netherlands declared a day of national mourning, without apportioning blame.

TRADING BLAME

Ukraine accused pro-Moscow militants of firing a long-range, Soviet-era SA-11 ground-to-air missile. U.S. officials said that they saw this as possibly the most likely cause of the disaster.

Russian President Vladimir Putin blamed Kiev for renewing its offensive against rebels two weeks ago after a ceasefire failed to hold. The Kremlin leader called it a "tragedy" but did not say who he thought had brought the Boeing 777 down.

He also called for a "thorough and unbiased" investigation and for a ceasefire to allow for negotiations.

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Emergencies Ministry members work at the site of a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 plane crash in the settlement of Grabovo in the Donetsk region, July 17, 2014. The Malaysian airliner was shot down over eastern Ukraine by pro-Russian militants on Thursday, killing all 295 people aboard, a Ukrainian interior ministry official said.


Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, who had stepped up an offensive in the east this month, spoke to Obama and sought to rally world opinion behind his cause.

"The external aggression against Ukraine is not just our problem but a threat to European and global security," he said.

Russia, which Western powers accuse of trying to destabilise Ukraine to maintain influence over its old Soviet empire, has accused Kiev's leaders of mounting a fascist coup. It says it is holding troops in readiness to protect Russian-speakers in the east - the same rationale it used for taking over Crimea.

(Additional reporting by Natalya Zinets, Pavel Polityuk, Peter Graff and Elizabeth Piper in Kiev, Tim Heritage, Vladimir Soldatkin, Polina Devitt, Thomas Grove and Gabriela Baczynska in Moscow, Thomas Escritt in Amsterdam, Anuradha Raghu, Siva Govindasamy and Trinna Leong in Kuala Lumpur, Jane Wardell and Matt Siegel in Sydney and Phil Stewart, Warren Strobel, Jeff

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http://news.msn.com/world/obama-condemns-russia-after-airliner-downed-in-ukraine

Ukraine, rebels argue over wreckage, Germany says Putin has "last chance"
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People place flowers outside Schiphol airport in Amsterdam, July 18, 2014.
Reuters 1 hr ago By Anton Zverev of Reuters



HRABOVE/DONETSK Ukraine (Reuters) - Ukraine accused Russia and pro-Moscow rebels on Saturday of destroying evidence of "international crimes" as guerrillas and foreign observers faced off over access to the wreckage of the downed Malaysian airliner.

As Kiev raised the stakes by saying it had evidence that a Russian fired the missile widely assumed to have killed all 298 aboard on Thursday, a separatist leader blamed Ukraine for the delay and called on Moscow to help in recovering bodies starting to rot after two days in baking summer heat on the steppe.


Russia urged both sides to open access to foreign experts.

After President Barack Obama called the loss of flight MH17 a "wake-up call" to Europe to join the United States in threatening Moscow with heavier economic sanctions if it does not help end the conflict, German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke to Russian President Vladimir Putin, urging him to use his influence with the rebels to ensure an urgent ceasefire.

"Moscow may have a last chance now to show that it really is seriously interested in a solution," Merkel's foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier told Bild am Sonntag newspaper.

"Now is the moment for everyone to stop and think to themselves what might happen if we don't stop the escalation."

Germany, like other EU states heavily dependent on Russian energy and trade, has been less eager than Washington to damage its own economy by escalating a confrontation with Moscow that has revived memories of the Cold War. But with military action not seen as an option, Western powers have few other levers.

Fighting flared in eastern Ukraine overnight. The government said it was pressing its offensive near Donetsk and Luhansk.

Malaysia, whose national airline has been battered by its second major disaster this year, said it was "inhumane" to bar access to the site around the village of Hrabove, near Donetsk, but said Russia was doing its "level best" to help.

Observers from Europe's OSCE security agency visited part of the crash site near the village of Hrabove for a second day on Saturday and again found their access hampered by armed men from the forces of the self-declared People's Republic of Donetsk. An OSCE official said, however, they saw more than on Friday.

At one point, a Reuters correspondent heard a senior rebel tell the OSCE delegation they could not approach the wreckage and would simply be informed in due course of an investigation conducted by the separatists. However, fighters later let them visit an area where one of the Boeing 777's two engines lay.

EVIDENCE "DESTROYED"

"The terrorists, with the help of Russia, are trying to destroy evidence of international crimes," the Ukrainian government said in a statement. "The terrorists have taken 38 bodies to the morgue in Donetsk," it said, accusing people with "strong Russian accents" of threatening to conduct autopsies.

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A piece of a plane with the sign "Malaysia Airlines" lies in the grass as a group of Ukrainian coal miners search the site of a crashed Malaysian passenger plane near the village of Rozsypne, Ukraine, eastern Ukraine, July 18, 2014.AP Photo: Dmitry Lovetsky



Ukraine's prime minister said armed men barred government experts from collecting evidence and threatened to detain them.

In the regional capital Donetsk, the prime minister of the separatist authorities told a news conference that Kiev was holding up the arrival of international experts whose mission to probe the cause - and potentially blame - for the disaster was authorized on Friday by the United Nations Security Council.

And contrary to earlier statements by the rebels, Alexander Borodai said they had not found the black box flight recorders. He said rebels were avoiding disturbing the area where the plane crashed, spreading corpses over many miles.

"There's a grandmother. A body landed right in her bed. She says 'please take this body away'. But we cannot tamper with the site," Borodai said. "Bodies of innocent people are lying out in the heat. We reserve the right, if the delay continues ... to begin the process of taking away the bodies. We ask the Russian Federation to help us with this problem and send their experts."

Midday temperatures are around 30 Celsius (85 Fahrenheit).

At Hrabove, one armed man from the separatist forces told Reuters that bodies had already been taken away in trucks. Amid reports of looting, fighters and local people say they have been doing their best to collect evidence and preserve human remains.

As the stench of death began to pervade the area, a Reuters correspondent watched rescue workers carry bodies across the fields and gather remains in black sacks. One local resident said Ukrainian fighter jets had flown over the area earlier.

Ukraine has accused the rebels of trying to spirit away the black boxes and the missile-launcher across the Russian border.


On Saturday, counter intelligence chief Vitaly Naida said he had "compelling evidence" that not only had the SA-11 Buk radar-guided missile system Kiev says was used to hit the airliner been brought over the border from Russia, but the three-man crew was also comprised of Russian citizens. He said the unit had returned to Russia and demanded Moscow let Kiev question them.

U.S. officials describe as convincing audio recordings that the Ukrainian government has released purporting to be of Russian officers and rebels discussing shooting down the plane.

Moscow has repeatedly denied Kiev's accusations that it is supply manpower and hardware across the frontier to the rebels.

The Kremlin said Putin insisted to Merkel that the inquiry should be objective. Locked in a propaganda war with Ukraine, Russia has suggested Ukrainian forces may have brought down the plane, an allegation made more concretely by rebel leaders.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said on Saturday Moscow would retaliate against U.S. sanctions imposed last week before the loss of the airliner. It would bar entry to some Americans.

DETENTION THREAT

The Ukrainian security council in Kiev said staff of the emergencies ministry had found 186 bodies and had checked some 18 sq.km (7 square miles) of the scattered 25-sq.km crash site. But the workers were not free to conduct a normal investigation.

"The fighters have let the Emergencies Ministry workers in there but they are not allowing them to take anything from the area," security council spokesman Andriy Lysenko said. "The fighters are taking away all that has been found."

Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk issued a statement after he spoke to the foreign minister of The Netherlands - more than half those aboard the flight from Amsterdam were Dutch.

He said government experts sent to the site "were not given the opportunity to collect evidence".

"They gave them less than an hour there, and made them leave the site of the catastrophe threatening to take them hostage."

A team of Malaysian experts flew in to Kiev on Saturday and experts from Interpol are due there on Sunday to help with the identification of victims.

Malaysian Transport Minister Liow Tiong Lai said on Saturday he would fly to the Ukraine capital of Kiev to ensure an investigating team gets safe access to the site. Before setting off, he said it would be "inhumane" not to have access, but said Moscow was trying to help: "They are trying their level best to assist Malaysia to ensure we have a safe site," Liow said.

Defence Minister and former transport minister Hishammuddin Hussein said a priority was to ensure debris was not tampered with.

"We want to get to the bottom of this," he added, saying that Malaysia had been in touch with officials in Russia, Ukraine, the United States, Britain and China.


"We do not have a position until the facts have been verified, whether the plane was really brought down, how it was brought down, who brought it down," he said.

As tales of personal grief unfolded, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak revealed his own family was involved - his 83-year-old step-grandmother had been aboard the flight.

TURNING POINT?

The United Nations said 80 children were aboard. The deadliest attack on a commercial airliner, follows the disappearance of flight MH370 in March with 239 passengers.

The scale of the disaster could prove a turning point for international pressure to resolve the crisis in Ukraine, which has killed hundreds since pro-Western protests toppled the Moscow-backed president in Kiev in February and Russia annexed the Crimea peninsula a month later.

"This outrageous event underscores that it is time for peace and security to be restored in Ukraine," Obama said, adding that Russia had failed to use its influence to curb rebel violence.

Some commentators even recalled Germany's sinking of the Atlantic liner Lusitania in 1915, which helped push the United States into World War One, but outrage in the West at Thursday's carnage is not seen as leading to military intervention.

The U.N. Security Council called for a "full, thorough and independent international investigation" into the downing of the plane and "appropriate accountability" for those responsible.
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(Additional reporting by Pavel Polityuk and Elizabeth Piper in Kiev, Peter Graff in Donetsk and Siva Govindasamy and Al-Zaquan Amer Hamzah in Kuala Lumpur; Writing by Alastair Macdonald Editing by Jeremy Gaunt)

Why were commercial planes still flying over Ukraine?

A closed desk of Malaysian airlines is seen at Schiphol airport in Amsterdam, Thursday, July 17, 2014.
AFP 1 day ago By AFP

The downing of a Malaysia Airlines jet over rebel-held eastern Ukraine has raised questions over why the company persisted in flying in conflict-zone airspace that many other Asian carriers had abandoned months ago.

The downing of a Malaysia Airlines jet over rebel-held eastern Ukraine has raised questions over why the company persisted in flying in conflict-zone airspace that many other Asian carriers had abandoned months ago.

Related: Woman loses relatives in 2 Malaysia air disasters

Related: World leaders demand answers after jet downed

The air corridor over Ukraine has always been a crowded one for flights between Europe and Asia -- particularly Southeast Asia -- and re-routing around the airspace would mean an increase in flight time and fuel costs.

Nevertheless, a number of major Asian airlines, including South Korea's Korean Air and Asiana, Australia's Qantas and Taiwan's China Airlines, said Friday that they had started avoiding the area as much as four months ago, when Russian troops moved into Crimea.

"We stopped flying over Ukraine because of safety concerns," Asiana spokeswoman Lee Hyo-Min said.

Korean Air moved its flight paths 250 kilometres (160 miles) south of Ukraine from March 3 "due to the political unrest in the region", an official for the carrier told AFP.

A Qantas spokeswoman said its London to Dubai service used to fly over Ukraine, but the route was changed "several months ago", while Taiwan's China Airlines diverted its flights from April 3.

Hong Kong's Cathay Pacific and Pakistan International Airlines said their flight paths had changed "some time" ago.

Singapore Airlines said it had been using Ukrainian airspace but had "re-routed all our flights" to alternative corridors away from the region.

It was not immediately clear when the route change was put into effect.

- 'Safe' flight path? -

Asked why Malaysia Airlines had not taken similar precautions, Prime Minister Najib Razak said international air authorities had deemed the flight path secure.

"The International Air Transportation Association has stated that the airspace the aircraft was traversing was not subject to restrictions," he said.

According to the European flight safety body Eurocontrol, the doomed plane was flying at a level known as "330", or approximately 10,000 metres or 33,000 feet.

The route had been closed to level "320" but was cleared for those flying at the Malaysian plane's altitude.

European and US airlines re-routed their flights as Kiev said flight MH17 was shot down in a "terrorist" attack, and a US official said intelligence analysts "strongly believe" it was downed by a surface-to-air missile.

Analysts were divided on whether carriers like Malaysian Airlines had been negligent in opting to continue flying over Ukraine.

"I just find it astonishing. I am absolutely flabbergasted," said Geoff Dell, an air safety expert from the University of Central Queensland in Australia, told Sky News.

"If there's trouble spots on the globe, then you take a decision to avoid that area," Dell told Sky News.

"You don't put your primary assets -- your passengers, your crew, your airplane -- at risk unnecessarily," he added.

- Assessing risk -

But Gerry Soejatman, a consultant with the Jakarta-based Whitesky Aviation chartered flight provider, said every airline had its own level of risk assessment.

Flying above 30,000 feet is generally considered secure given the level of training and sophisticated weaponry required to shoot down a plane at that height, Soejatman said.

"Ten years ago you'd be an idiot to fly over Iraq below 15,000 feet, but over 30,000 feet was very safe, so it's about the level of risk.

"I think this will send a message to airlines to have a closer look at conflict zones when they choose to fly over them and gain a better understanding of what equipment is on the ground," he said.

Malaysian Airlines was not the only carrier that had persisted with the corridor over Ukraine.

Air India and Thai Airways said they had only decided to re-route their flights after the Malaysian crash.

Air China and China Eastern Airways had a total of 28 flights a week passing over eastern Ukraine, but China's Civil Aviation Administration said Friday it had ordered all carriers to circumvent the region.

Vietnam Airlines said it had suspended four long-haul flights to Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Malaysia Airlines incident.

The flights resumed Friday, but on re-drawn routes that "completely avoid" eastern Ukraine, the airline said.

© 2014 AFP

Putin says sanctions inflict 'serious damage' to US-Russia ties
Russia's President Vladimir Putin looks on during his meeting with India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the BRICS group leaders’ summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, July 16.


Russian President Vladimir Putin warned on Thursday that Washington's new biting sanctions against his country will boomerang and hit back at US national interests.

"Without any doubt in this case (sanctions) are driving Russian-US relations towards a dead-end, (and) are inflicting very serious damage on them," the state news agency ITAR TASS quoted Putin as saying while on a visit to Brasilia.

"And I am convinced that this will harm the national long-term interests of the American state, the American people," Putin told reporters.

The Russian strongman reacted sarcastically when a journalist said that Washington had slapped new sanctions against Russia and asked to comment.

"You don't say!" he was quoted as saying.

Russian stock markets fell around three percent at the open Thursday.

The MICEX bourse fell 2.52 percent on opening, while the dollar-denominated RTS exchange fell 3.44 percent, the ITAR-TASS news agency reported. The markets then rallied slightly.

Putin, who is on a six-day visit to Latin America, appeared to put on a brave face and indicated Moscow will take time to weigh the possible damage before responding.

"One has to look what these sanctions are, to sort this out thoroughly, without haste, calmly," he was quoted as saying by ITAR-TASS.

He accused the United States of behaving aggressively and pointed to crises in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan.

US officials, he said, are conducting "rather aggressive foreign policy and rather unprofessionally at that, in my opinion."

At the same time the Russian strongman expressed hope that common sense would prevail and the two countries would be able to settle all disputes diplomatically.

"It is a pity that our partners are going along this road. But we have not closed a door on a negotiating process, in order to exit this situation."

He said US energy companies would be among top victims of Washington's new punitive measures.

"They inflict damage on their largest energy companies and all for what?" the Russian president was quoted as saying by the RIA Novosti news agency.

The United States and Europe dramatically strengthened sanctions on Moscow over Ukraine, with Washington for the first time directly targeting Russia's banking, military and energy sectors.

The new blows against Russia deepened the most serious standoff between Moscow and the West since the end of the Cold War, as fighting between the Kiev government forces and pro-Russian separatists threatened to escalate into all-out civil war.

A deputy foreign minister, speaking earlier Thursday, called the new US sanctions outrageous and unacceptable.

"The US administration's new decision to enforce sanctions against a number of Russian legal entities and individuals under a far-fetched, false pretext cannot be called anything other than outrageous and fully unacceptable," deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov told the Interfax news agency.

He added that Russia would retaliate but did not provide details.

In a later statement, the Russian foreign ministry condemned what it called US "blackmail."

In its latest statement Moscow accused the United States of "a primitive attempt to take revenge for the fact that events in Ukraine are developing differently from Washington's scenario."

It said that US support for the Ukrainian leadership as it deploys heavy firepower against rebels in fact "is provoking bloodshed".

Russia said the United States was using a "sanctions bludgeon" and warned that the measures against its energy firms would not be effective.