El Oso Ruso vuelve a alzar la zarpa: La confrontación entre éste y el Aguila calva no ha terminado

No estamos ante una nueva guerra, porque la Guerra Fría nunca terminó

'Rusia empezó a no hacer tanto caso de los consejos de Occidente. Y eso no gusta'
'Putin tiene una experiencia enorme, ¿cómo puede permitirse que se jubile?'
'El caso Litvinenko fue la tentativa de desacreditar a Rusia'

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Actualizado sábado 15/12/2007 12:09 (CET)

DANIEL UTRILLA

MOSCÚ.- Delgado y con flequillo monacal, Andrei Lugovoi es, para la policía británica, el responsable del asesinato con polonio radiactivo del ex agente ruso Alexander Litvinenko. Para los rusos, es casi un héroe nacional desde se le señaló como sospechoso. A continuación, un resumen de sus declaraciones en la entrevista que ha concedido a EL MUNDO, la primera en un diario español.

No ha empezado ninguna nueva Guerra Fría porque la Guerra Fría nunca terminó (...) Cuando se descompuso la URSS, Rusia logró gracias a Dios mantenerse en pie, en 2000 llegó otra gente al poder y con el aumento del precio del gas y del petróleo, Rusia es ahora quizá el Estado más rico. Por eso Rusia empezó a no hacer tanto caso de los consejos de Occidente. Y eso no gusta. El caso Litvinenko fue la tentativa de desacreditar a Rusia.

No me preocupa en absoluto la inmunidad de diputado. El que viva tranquila y dignamente me lo permite la Constitución de Rusia (...) Como diputado, mi prioridad será devolver a los oficiales rusos el prestigio de élite perdido en los últimos 15 años.

"Rusia tiene solamente dos aliados: su Ejército... y su flota"

Litvinenko, por su carácter, siempre trataba de participar en provocaciones y de meterse donde "ni el perro mete el rabo". Odiaba tanto al Estado ruso, Putin incluido, que estaba listo para cometer cualquier acción. El polonio es muy engañoso, yo leí mucho sobre él. Si aquí hubiera polonio [señala la mesa], y se cubriera con un papel muy fino, o celofán, ya no habría ninguna radiación. Pero si se quitase el papel, podría empezar a evaporarse (...) Litvinenko pudo descuidarse y entrar en contacto con él.

Yo fui víctima de un ataque terrorista radiactivo en el territorio de Gran Bretaña. Pienso que se preparaba una provocación, pero algo no pasó según las reglas con las que jugaba Litvinenko. No sé el qué (...) Litvinenko me decía que estuvo muchas veces en España y que a algún mafioso lo encarcelaron gracias a sus actividades.

Rusia tiene solamente dos aliados: su Ejército y su flota (...) Putin tiene una experiencia enorme de ocho años al frente del Estado. ¿Cómo puede permitirse que se jubile?

Estados Unidos - Rusia: La guerra nunca terminó

Publicado: 28 jun 2013 | 11:49 GMT


Perspectiva Equilibrium

por elDr. Alberto Hutschenreuter



El arribo a Rusia del exanalista de la CIA Edward Snowden sumó otra nueva instancia de discordia entre Estados Unidos y Rusia, puesto que las autoridades de este último país han informado que Snowden, acusado por Estados Unidos de revelar datos oficiales sensibles, no sería deportado a su país de origen mientras permaneciera en Rusia. El hecho, que sigue a la reciente expulsión de Rusia del funcionario estadounidense Ryan Fugle, acusado de realizar actos de espionaje, precipitó un torrente de notas y análisis de expertos y diletantes sobre la erosión de las relaciones ruso-estadounidenses y el "regreso a una nueva confrontación".



Una mirada menos centrada en los eventos y más atenta a los procesos en las relaciones entre los dos países nos proporcionaría un contexto de continuidad que obedece a una lógica de poder que signó las relaciones entre estos dos singulares actores desde la desaparición de la Unión Soviética, en 1991.

Entonces, el (último) Gorbachov y el presidente ruso, Borís Yeltsin, creyeron haberse unido al bando vencedor de la Guerra Fría: según ellos, sobre todo Yeltsin y su joven canciller, Andréi Kozyrev, Estados Unidos "y Rusia" habían ganado la confrontación porque ambos habían derrotado al comunismo, que había sido una elección muy dañina para los rusos (de allí que la experta francesa Héléne Carrere D’Encausse aludiera a la "Rusia victoriosa").

Pero desde la visión estadounidense, no solamente hubo un único ganador, sino que el fin de la Unión Soviética no implicó dejar de considerar a su "Estado continuador", la Federación de Rusia, como un eventual desafío a su singular estado de supremacía.

Ello explica que Estados Unidos, bajo la pátina de una política de cooperación, confianza e incluso de "asociación estratégica" con Rusia, haya impulsado iniciativas relacionadas con maximizar su poder e impedir la recuperación del de Rusia, por caso, alentando la adopción sin cortapisas de la economía de mercado (en un país carente de tradición en la materia); ampliando la OTAN al este de Europa (sin respetar pactos implícitos que comprometían a Occidente a no hacerlo y sobre los que se habría establecido el fin del conflicto); logrando acuerdos en materia de armas estratégicas y convencionales que desfavorecían a Rusia, etc.

Hasta mediados de los años noventa Rusia no solamente creyó que la cooperación era efectiva, sino que, por vez primera en su historia, desestimó la defensa y promoción de sus intereses nacionales en pos de un orden interestatal basado en la defensa de "valores universales". Pero pronto fue comprendiendo la advertencia de Bismarck, respecto a que "una política exterior sentimental jamás reconoce reciprocidad".

Durante la segunda mitad de aquella década, Rusia asumió una conducta externa proactiva; sin embargo, su profundo grado de debilidad interna solamente le permitió un ejercicio retórico frente a políticas de maximización de poder por parte de Estados Unidos, por caso, en Kosovo, cuando la OTAN intervino sin autorización de la ONU; en países del "extranjero cercano" de Rusia, alentando fuerzas políticas refractarias a Moscú y deseosas de cobertura estratégica occidental; dando impulso a una nueva ampliación de la OTAN , etc.

Durante la década pasada, la percepción de Rusia respecto de las verdaderas intenciones de Estados Unidos para con ella se despejaron, al punto que en ocasión de la celebración del 60 aniversario del fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial el presidente Putin, sin ambages, sentenció que "La desaparición de la Unión Soviética había sido una catástrofe geopolítica, puesto que no solamente se había perdido la Guerra Fría, sino que Rusia, su heredera, podía perder lo que se había ganado en la Gran Guerra Patria" (es decir, poder, reconocimiento y capacidad de deferencia). Sin duda fue la expresión más contundente y sintetizadora en relación con aquella percepción nacional.

Más recientemente, la política externa rusa se tornó más activa, alcanzando en Georgia y en Siria su mayor afirmación ante las políticas de poder estadounidenses.


En breve, la Guerra Fría nunca terminó. Nunca existió un tratado que pusiera fin a la misma. Por ello, el experto Serguéi Karagánov ha dicho: "La confrontación permanece inacabada. Pese a que el enfrentamiento militar e ideológico de aquellos tiempos ha quedado muy atrás, se lo está sustituyendo por un nuevo punto muerto: entre Rusia, por un lado, y, por otro, Estados Unidos y algunos 'nuevos europeos'. Europa, Rusia y Estados Unidos deben poner fin a la 'guerra inacabada'. Después, tal vez en 2019, año en que se cumplirá el centésimo aniversario del Tratado de Versalles, podremos despedirnos del siglo XX".



Por Dr. Alberto Hutschenreuter
Ciudad de Buenos Aires
Argentina
www.equilibriumglobal.com

La guerra fría nunca terminó

El Mundo 4 Mar 2014 - 9:30 pm

Visión global


Lo que parecía una crisis política interna, difícil para Ucrania pero manejable en términos de sus repercusiones internacionales, se ha convertido en un pulso entre Rusia, Estados Unidos y Europa que recuerda el modus vivendi de la guerra fría, en el que la expansión de cualquiera de las partes se disuadía mediante la amenaza de retaliaciones militares de “baja intensidad” o incluso de tipo nuclear.

Por: Arlene B. Tickner



El actual impasse diplomático hace pensar que la disolución de la Unión Soviética y el fin de la guerra fría nunca dieron muerte a las doctrinas de política exterior que acompañaban a ésta, en especial la contención. Al contrario, podría afirmarse que desde comienzos de los noventa, Estados Unidos, de la mano de Europa occidental, ha buscado expandir su zona de influencia militar, política y económica hasta los límites fronterizos de Rusia (si no también dentro de estos) con el objeto de contener la expansión y la influencia de ese país. Así, Washington ha actuado en términos geoestratégicos como si la guerra fría nunca hubiera terminado.

Una columna reciente del académico y funcionario público, Joseph Nye en el New York Times, sobre la política de Obama en Asia, permite entender por qué la contención no funciona como estrategia frente a Rusia. Además de ser diseñada para otra época histórica en la que el intercambio económico y el contacto social eran limitados, parte de la consideración del “otro” como enemigo o amenaza, lo cual inculca en este conductas de adversario. En reflejo de esto, varias encuestas recientes de Gallup, Levada Center y VTsIOM muestran que las percepciones mutuas entre los habitantes de Rusia y Estados Unidos han empeorado ostensiblemente. Por primera vez en 15 años la mayoría de los estadounidenses consideran a Rusia como un enemigo en lugar de un aliado, teniendo altos niveles de desfavorabilidad tanto el país como Vladimir Putin. Mientras tanto, la mitad de la población rusa ve a Estados Unidos en términos negativos y considera posible una nueva “guerra fría”. A su vez, apoya masivamente la defensa de Rusia frente a intromisiones externas (occidentales liberales), así como la recuperación de su estatus como “gran potencia”.

El lenguaje utilizado en días recientes por Washington frente al despliegue militar ruso en Crimea suena a ultimátum. Dentro de la lógica señalada aquí, la respuesta de Putin, consistente en no sucumbir ante la presión externa y dividir a Europa con el chantaje de cortar su suministro de energía, es completamente “racional”. Pese a la advertencia estadounidense de que “habrá costos que pagar”, no existe amenaza militar creíble que pueda forzar a Rusia a soltar a Crimea, mientras que la de otros tipos de sanción económica y política es similarmente inocua.

La pregunta, entonces, es cómo persuadir a Rusia a hacer lo que quieren Estados Unidos y Europa, dada la inutilidad de la contención y a sabiendas de que la anexión de Crimea es una posibilidad real. Además de tratar a Putin como socio o incluso rival, y no como enemigo o loco, es importante comprender las preocupaciones (no del todo ilegítimas) rusas frente a la crisis en Ucrania. Desde la guerra en Georgia de 2008, Moscú no había enviado señal más fuerte de que la inestabilidad política y económica en sus fronteras son inadmisibles para su “interés nacional”. Obama debe intentar escuchar.

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Red Alert: Rocket Fire Could Signal New Offensive on Mariupol
Analysis
January 24, 2015 | 17:23 GMT Print Text Size
A car burns amid debris after rockets shelled the city of Mariupol, Ukraine, on Jan. 24. (Image from Reuters video)
Analysis

Reports of heavy rocket artillery firing on the eastern parts of the city of Mariupol, Ukraine, as well as a statement made by a separatist leader, indicate the potential preparation of an offensive on the city. While this would be a significant escalation and an indicator of Russian intent to push further into Ukraine, potentially forming a much-rumored land connection to the northern border of Crimea, there are also several indicators required for such an offensive that are currently still missing.
Raw footage: Mariupol, Ukraine - Jan. 24, 2015

The heavy rocket artillery firing has been widely reported, and the death toll has risen to 27. Mariupol has been shelled in the past, notably in early September, but as the cease-fire took effect, separatist forces generally conducted attacks only outside of the city. It is not clear whether this is simply an intensification of relatively static fighting along the front between Russian and pro-Russian forces on the one side, and Ukrainians, or the beginning of a Russian-led offensive to widen the pocket, or the opening move in a broader strategic offensive to link up with Crimea, 200 miles to the west of the pocket.

The widespread use of Grad Multiple Launch Rocket Systems indicates that this is a planned action with significant logistical support that involves extensive use of Russian troops, though Grad fire has been widely used throughout the conflict. There have been indications that Russian forces, including Russian Marines, have moved into the eastern Ukraine pocket controlled by pro-Russian forces, giving the Russians offensive options. Heavy artillery preparations frequently precede Russian attacks, particularly by concentrated MLRS attack. Given the amount of munitions needed to supply concentrated fire, the Russians tend not to use them casually. The presence of Grad missiles indicates the possibility of artillery preparation for a broader offensive.

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The attack comes days after the Russian forces secured the Donetsk Airport, important in defending the right flank of any offensive westward. It also comes days after Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe, came to Ukraine and publicly announced that a small number of U.S. Army trainers would be arriving in Ukraine. While any large-scale offensive would have been considered and planned for much longer, the decision of the United States to send Lt. Gen. Hodges could have affected the dynamic of internal Russian calculations.

In any event, we do not yet know Russia’s strategic intentions. This could simply be an attempt to signal the danger Russia could pose to their negotiating partners in the west. It could be an attempt to extend the pocket they hold modestly. It could, finally, be the opening of an offensive toward Crimea.

The Russian position in Crimea is untenable. Crimea is easily isolated should Ukranian forces strengthen or Western forces get involved. Russia holds Crimea only to the extent that the West chooses not to intervene, or to the extent that it extends a relatively wide and robustly defended land bridge from Russia to the Crimea. Crimea and the Sevastapol naval facilities are of strategic importance to Russia and the decision to hold these facilities but not extend their power makes diplomatic sense, though it is not militarily rational. Either Russia can build the geographical structure to support Crimea, or it becomes a permanent weak point in the Russian position. The Russians do not want a massive confrontation with the West at a time of economic dysfunction, yet at the same time, having made the decision to hold Crimea, they will not have a better moment for consolidation.

This is an ongoing conversation in Moscow. It is not clear that it is over. The artillery may simply be a minor probe or it could be the preface to an assault. We know that there has been a significant increase in Russian presence in the pocket, but it does not seem to us that the Russians are logistically ready for a major offensive yet.

Taking Mariupol is a first step to a broader offensive. It is also an end in itself, anchoring the southern flank in the city, though may not even be that. However, the MLRS barrages on Mariupol open the door to multiple avenues of exploitation and have clearly moved the fighting to a new level, not so much in intensity, but in raising serious questions of strategic intention.

Red Alert Update: At the Heart of the Mariupol Crisis
Analysis
JANUARY 25, 2015 | 17:39 GMT Print Text Size

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A Ukrainian soldier rides atop a vehicle near Donetsk on Jan. 23. (Oleksandr Stashevskiy/AFP/Getty Images)
Analysis
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As the situation on the ground quiets down in the wake of the Jan. 24 barrage by Russian-allied forces near the Ukrainian city of Mariupol, Stratfor is continuing the watch initiated by our Red Alert. We believe, at the very least, that Russia is keeping its option to mount an offensive open, and at most, is preparing to launch an offensive to secure its hold on the Crimean Peninsula.

The artillery barrage in Mariupol has died down, and according to the Ukrainian military's local commander, there have been no attacks today. Some diplomacy is spinning up, and mutual charges of responsibility are being exchanged. The pro-Russian faction is blaming the Ukrainian military for the attack, and the Ukrainians are charging that the Russian military initiated the barrage, not Ukrainian pro-Russian factions. The fog of war is being supplemented by deliberate disinformation on all sides. The issue is whether this was an isolated incident or part of an extended strategy. If it is, it is not a Ukrainian strategy. Following recent defeats, Ukraine is not in a position to go on the offensive in this region, despite a noticeable build up and mobilization of Ukrainian forces in recent weeks. The Russians, however, have been moving regular forces, including some first-rate units, into Donbas. More important than the charges and counter-charges is this fact: At this moment, the rebels are being strongly reinforced by Russian forces, and those forces have an operational advantage but a strategic problem.



Consider this from the standpoint of a Russian military planner. The operational advantage is that the separatists have more and better forces available for combat. The strategic problem is that this advantage is temporary. If the United States chooses to increase arms transfers and training, the operational gap will close in 6-12 months. The rebels' broader strategic problem is geographical. Russia holds Crimea, but it has little sustainable contact with its forces there. Both sea and air transport can be interdicted. The best access to the peninsula is by land, but the routes are heavily defended by mobile and strategic surface to air missiles and armor to the north. Opening the route up would not be easy, but it would dramatically increase Ukraine's cost of severing Russia's link to Crimea. Without this, blockading Crimea would be relatively easy for the United States, Ukraine and other allies once their capabilities are increased and more units are deployed.

There is a connection to Crimea over the Kerch Strait from Russia proper of course, now based on ferry traffic but with plans for a bridge. But if war were to come, such tenuous links can easily be closed by a capable enemy. They are useful in peacetime, but vulnerable in war and near-war situations.


Ukraine's Geographic Challenge

If Russia is serious about holding on to Crimea, it has a diplomatic route and a military route that it can use. The diplomatic route would be to gain international recognition of its hold on Crimea. That will be difficult to get, certainly if Russia is passive. The alternative is to create a military presence that might be attacked but would have significant ability to resist. The third option is to use the threat of an attack on Ukrainian positions to force a more favorable political settlement. If that fails, Russia still has the superior strategic position that it has now.

If the Russians are serious about holding Crimea, and if their calculation of how the correlation of forces will shift over coming months is the same as ours, then they now have a window of opportunity to redefine the strategic reality using their current operational superiority. Whether this results in a diplomatic settlement instead of further combat will be up to the West.

The counter-argument will be that, given Russia's economic problems, the diplomatic consequences of further offensive operations would increase the strain on Russia. From a political point of view, however, pure passivity in the face of sanctions that are not the critical factor in Russia's economic downturn will hurt the government's legitimacy at home while offering no real economic advantage. In addition, the Americans are not eager for a Ukrainian conflict while their forces are engaged in the Middle East. Therefore, while nothing is certain, a Russian strategist might well calculate that the risks of passivity are higher than those that come with an offensive. The military buildup in Donbas, the concentration of artillery, certain incursions by Russian aircraft that would be needed to keep Western aircraft at a distance from the battle zone, including aircraft with standoff anti-armor capabilities, indicate to us that the Russians are at least keeping this option open, and at most, are preparing to launch an offensive.

Good strategy involves creating options while withholding commitment to any particular course until the political and diplomatic possibilities are played out in the context of a build up. It would seem to us that this is what the Russians are doing, while signaling capability if not yet intent. However, the Americans sending the commander of the U.S. Army to Kiev on a very public visit is a signal that the window is closing. That forces Russia to make decisions sooner rather than later.

The Red Alert we issued yesterday was triggered by what appeared to be artillery preparation by the Russians at exactly the point when a move toward Crimea would be launched. That was alarming. We think it was meant by the Russians to be alarming, a warning of Russian operational superiority and strategic imperatives. Things have quieted down. The quiet ought not to be taken as the end of anything.

We call Red Alerts when action is underway. While the action has now halted, the underlying crisis is intensifying. There are exits from the path to an offensive, though it is not clear that either side is prepared to pay the toll needed for the exit.



Read more: Red Alert Update: At the Heart of the Mariupol Crisis | Stratfor
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Military & Defense More: Ukraine Russia Putin Military
Russia wants to delay a plan that would create an aviation warning system over conflict zones
Reuters

Allison Martell and Allison Lampert, Reuters

Feb. 3, 2015, 8:15 PM
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Members of the Russian delegation listen to proceedings at the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) global safety meeting in Montreal, February 3, 2015. REUTERS/Christinne Muschi Thomson ReutersMembers of the Russian delegation listen to proceedings at the ICAO's global safety meeting in Montreal
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Russia clashed with Europe and the United States on Tuesday over the aviation industry's response to the downing of a Malaysia Airlines jetliner, calling for a delay in plans to establish a warning system on risks from conflict zones.

A senior Russian official told a gathering of the United Nations' aviation agency that plans for a centralized information-sharing system posed legal risks that could only be addressed by a full meeting of all 191 member states in 2016.

The UN's International Civil Aviation Organization has been under pressure to come up with a new system to protect aircraft from risks after Malaysia Airlines MH17, flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, was shot down over eastern Ukraine last July.

The incident occurred during fighting between Ukraine and pro-Russian separatist rebels. The United States says the plane was hit by a ground-to-air missile fired by Russian-backed rebels. Moscow says a Ukrainian military aircraft downed it.

"I think it would reflect on us very badly .... if we did not see these ideas through to delivery," Patricia Hayes, Britain's top aviation official, told an ICAO safety conference.

Speaking for the European Union, the Netherlands, which lost 196 citizens on MH17, said there was no need to delay setting up an information-sharing prototype.

ICAO's chairman said most members supported the scheme, but a final decision is not expected until later this year.

In a brief spat on the floor of the meeting, Ukraine demanded parts of a Russian paper on the subject be withdrawn.

Sparring over MH17 overshadowed efforts to show a united response to two Malaysian plane disasters that pushed aviation to the top of the international agenda, making 2014 a tragic centenary year for commercial flight.

Earlier on Tuesday, aviation leaders rallied behind a tight deadline to improve the tracking of passenger planes in a push to prevent a recurrence of the still unsolved disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370.

Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 MH370Flickr/Aero IcarusThis Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777-2H6ER (9M-MRO) went missing in March 2014.

Tracking

The rare UN gathering reflects pressure to show progress in time for the March anniversary of MH370. Regulators and airlines were criticized for responding too slowly to French tracking recommendations after the crash of an Air France jet in 2009.

ICAO urged airlines not to wait to install tracking systems that are already available.

"We know that there are technologies available today," Nancy Graham, director of ICAO's Air Navigation Bureau, said.

Britain, China and the United States backed ICAO proposals for further tracking guidelines that would apply from November 2016, an accelerated timetable in the often laborious process of aviation regulation.

Aircraft would have to send their position at least every 15 minutes, or more often in case of emergency, but it would be up to each state to decide how and when to implement this.

Malaysia said it was "unacceptable" that an aircraft or its recorders could be lost, decades after satellites were invented.

Airlines have been criticized for backing away from stop-gap proposals to fit existing tracking technology in all passenger jets within 12 months. The International Air Transport Association, which represents about 200 airlines, defended their record.

"Many airlines are tracking their aircraft today," IATA Director General Tony Tyler said.

However, he urged regulators to ensure that "hasty action" did not add complexity or "unintended impacts on safety."

(Editing by Amran Abocar and Christian Plumb)

The new Cold War is over Europe's energy future
Associated Press

Bradley Klapper and Matthew Lee, Associated Press

Feb. 3, 2015, 2:55 PM
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obama putinREUTERS/Kevin Lamarque Red light reflected from the carpet illuminates Russian President Vladimir Putin as he passes U.S. President Barack Obama at a group photo for the 70th anniversary of the D-Day landings in Benouville June 6, 2014.
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WASHINGTON (AP) — The United States and Russia are once more locked in what could be a generation-defining conflict, and Europe is yet again the core battleground. But this Cold War reprise isn't about military supremacy.

It's about heat and electricity for tens of millions of Europeans. The points on the map aren't troop deployments, tank battalions and missile silos but pipelines, ports and power plants.

As the Obama administration escalates economic sanctions on Russia and weighs military support to Ukraine, it also has revved up a less noticed but far broader campaign to wean Central and Eastern Europe off a deep reliance on Russian energy. Success, U.S. officials say, would mean finally "liberating" former Soviet states and satellites from decades of economic bullying by Moscow.

To that end, Washington is helping set up new natural gas pipelines and terminals in a region that depends on Russia for more than 70 percent of its energy needs. It is pushing American companies' bids for nuclear plants and fracking exploration in Europe.

Yet as the U.S. makes headway, the Kremlin is fighting back, warning neighboring governments about the consequences of looking westward for fuel. Russia is trying to outmaneuver the U.S. on nuclear bids, buy up pipeline infrastructure across Europe and control not only how its vast energy reserves move westward, but what European governments can do with those supplies afterward.

"It's a chess match," said Amos Hochstein, the State Department's special envoy for international energy affairs, as he pored over a map of Europe dotted with existing and proposed pipeline routes.

Although the U.S. has pressed its European partners for decades to find new oil, gas, coal and nuclear sources, the crisis in Ukraine has upped the ante. Russia's takeover of Crimea last year and continued support for rebels in a brutal civil war in Ukraine has changed Europe's mindset about relying so heavily on Russian energy.
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Last month, Secretary of State John Kerry visited Bulgaria to push for a new gas spur and to promote an American company's bid to build a new nuclear plant. Bulgaria relies on Russia for 85 percent of its gas and all of its nuclear power. The prices, among the highest for NATO countries, are a concern within the alliance, which prides itself on winning the Cold War.

"The battle was won," Kerry told staffers at the U.S. Embassy in Sofia. "And here we are today in 2015, and Russia is still trying to impose on people its will."

In November, Vice President Joe Biden visited Romania, another vulnerable country, and Turkey, Europe's bridge to resource-rich Central Asia, to press the case.

Victoria Nuland, America's top diplomat for Europe, and energy envoy Hochstein have spent much of the past few months working with Europe on a coordinated energy strategy. Their message: Failure now will only invite more Russian pressure.

While episodes of Russia shutting off the energy spigots to its neighbors have raised alarms, persistent infighting among European governments and energy companies has hampered diversification efforts across the continent.

Big countries, especially, have found it easier to make private deals with President Vladimir Putin's government. And that has done little for Europe's most vulnerable economies, whose infrastructure is designed only to take in supplies from Siberia.But, increasingly, there now is action in addition to diversity talk.

With U.S. support, Lithuania and soon Poland will be importing liquefied natural gas from Norway, Qatar and potentially the United States. New pipelines will enable Central and Eastern European countries to send fuel from west to east and north to south.

And in a couple of years, a southern corridor should be taking fuel from the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, and into Europe, bypassing Russia.

Those advances combined with other moving parts — a liquefied gas plant off the Croatian coast, a Bulgaria-Romania network connection, links into Serbia and Hungary, and greater energy integration as far afield as Spain and France — will mean Europeans can increasingly trade energy among themselves, pooling their fuel sources and weakening Russia's grip.
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Members of the armed forces of the separatist self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic drive a tank on the outskirts of Donetsk January 22, 2015.

Hochstein said the U.S. would like to see a 20 percent slice cut out of Russia's current share of the Eastern European gas market by 2020, considering that a major step forward.

While Western Europe provides the funding, the U.S. is giving technology and political support.

In a speech last week at the Brookings Institution, Nuland hailed Poland, Hungary and Slovakia for starting flows of gas in reverse to help Ukraine stave off an energy crisis. Moldova established a gas interconnector with Romania.

"In the area of energy security, we're not just talking the talk," Nuland said. The strategy aims "to create competition. ... It's about ensuring energy can't be used as a weapon."

Within the U.S., there is debate over whether America can be doing more.

The fracking revolution at home has propelled the United States past Russia as the world's top gas producer, yet U.S. exports to Eastern Europe are minimal. The region's lack of infrastructure, investment and transparency are partly responsible; another part is American unease with selling more liquefied natural gas overseas.

Still, officials say the U.S. gas boom is already affecting Russia's export power by lowering global prices and freeing sources of fuel that otherwise would have been gobbled up by the American market.

Last week, Gazprom announced a 60 percent dive in its latest quarterly profits.

Russia, however, isn't standing idly by.

As American officials have traveled around Europe, working with governments on new projects, Russian representatives have been quick to follow.

A September visit by Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller prompted Hungary to suspend reverse gas flows to Ukraine for more than three months. Elsewhere, Russia has responded to increased European pipeline activity by trying to buy up the pieces.

A year ago, Hungary announced an $11.3 billion deal with Russia to construct two new reactors at a Soviet-built nuclear plant; the deal involved almost no discussion and no international tender, shutting out Westinghouse, which had been interested in the deal.

Putin accepted defeat in December for a multibillion-dollar plan to build a pipeline under the Black Sea and into Europe after mounting EU opposition. But he vowed to increase supplies to Turkey across existing infrastructure and possibly build a new link that would take gas into Greece and beyond.

___

Associated Press writer Pablo Gorondi contributed to this report from Budapest.

Follow Bradley Klapper on Twitter at @bklapperAP, Matthew Lee at @APDiploWriter

Copyright (2015) Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.

Russia is looking to make an ally within its biggest enemy

Elena Holodny

Feb. 3, 2015, 4:46 PM
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Putin rifle gunRIA Novosti/APPutin, a former Soviet spy, knows the value of infiltrating the other side.

It looks like Russia is trying to make a military ally within its biggest enemy.

On Tuesday, Greece's defense minister and outspoken "Eurosceptic" Panos Kammenos announced that he was invited to Moscow to meet his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoygu in the near future.

What's interesting here is that Greece is one of the 28 members of NATO, while Russia perceives NATO as its biggest threat.

Still, Russia appears to be courting Greece's defense minister. On Tuesday, Kammenos met with both the US and Russian ambassadors to Greece.

"The discussion with the ambassador of Russia, Mr. Maslov, was also about the pending agreements between the Ministries of National Defence of Greece and Russia, the capabilities of a strategic cooperation, the organisation of the year of Greek-Russian friendship in 2016 which will take place in Greece and in Russia. I received an invitation by Russia’s Minister of Defence to visit Moscow within the next period of time," Kammenos wrote on Greece's Ministry of National Defense website.

Συναντήσεις του ΥΕΘΑ @PanosKammenos με τους Πρέσβεις των Η.Π.Α & της Ρωσίας στην Ελλάδα http://t.co/IMpJYxLsgq pic.twitter.com/EPsa02HETv
— Vasilis Siriopoulos (@V_Siriopoulos) February 3, 2015

The new Greek government has on occasion been openly critical of both the EU and NATO.

Kammenos, (a noted devout Orthodox Christian, who is anti-immigration, and has expressed anti-Semitic and homophobic remarks), is the leader of the right-wing junior coalition partner in the radical-leftist Alexis Tsipras' Greek government. He has also garnered some attention because of his anti-EU rhetoric.

"The junior party is openly Euroscpetic and withering of the way international creditors have turned Greece into an 'occupied zone, a debt colony.' Its leader, Panos Kammenos, who has declared that Europe is governed by 'German neo-Nazis,' assumes the help of the defense ministry," reported The Guardian.

Most of Kammenos' criticisms are aimed at (unsurprisingly) Germany, which is seen as the driving force behind the austerity push. He even once said that Germany treats its European partners as "concubines."

"He is not anti-European, he is anti-EU. There's a difference," the president of the French anti-EU group Debout la France, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, said.

syriza greece Defense Minister Panos KammenosREUTERS/Alkis Konstantinidis Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras (C), Deputy Prime Minister Yannis Dragasakis (2nd L), Defense Minister Panos Kammenos (L), Interior and Administrative Reconstruction Minister Nikos Voutsis, Minister of Productive Reconstruction, Environment and Energy Panagiotis Lafazanis (2R) and other members of the new government pose for a group picture after the first meeting of the new cabinet in the parliament building in Athens January 28, 2015.

And it's not just Kammenos. Syriza, the Tsipras-led, radical leftist party that won the election, has also expressed some anti-NATO sentiments.

"On Nato, Syriza describes its approach as a 'multi-dimensional, pro-peace foreign policy for Greece, with no involvement in wars or military plans.' It seeks 'the re-foundation of Europe away from artificial divisions and Cold War alliances such as Nato.' ... Last year on Syriza MP called for Greece to leave Nato altogether, though the comments were rapidly played down by senior officials," writes BBC.

"The new Greek government is cause for concern, especially because Tsipras has voiced his opposition to NATO membership in the past," Ian Bremmer told Business Insider last week. "And his early actions — these comments regarding sanctions, as well as his meeting with the Russian ambassador to Greece without hours of taking office — demonstrates that he is willing to engage differently with Moscow."

And Greece has already caused a bit of a stir when it appeared that it might block the extension of sanctions against Russia following the escalation of violence in Ukraine, although analysts believe that Greece was using this as a bargaining chip against the EU, since, ultimately, Greece is negotiating for a debt write-off.

In any case, the signals from the Tsipras government have been decidedly pro-Russia.

"Greece and Cyprus can become a bridge of peace and cooperation between the EU and Russia," the new prime minister Tsipras reportedly said on Wednesday.

For Russia, this is just the latest news of a budding military alliance. Over the year, Russia has been increasing its military cooperation with non-NATO members, including China, India, North Korea, and Iran.

Although Greece is still a NATO member, Russia might be looking to leverage the fact that Greece's new leadership has been critical of NATO and the EU on occasion.
http://www.businessinsider.com/russias-is-looking-to-make-an-ally-within-its-biggest-enemy-2015-2

This map shows why the Russia-NATO confrontation will continue even with a Ukraine ceasefire

Armin Rosen, Mike Nudelman and Amanda Macias

Feb. 12, 2015, 11:41 AM
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The war in eastern Ukraine is in a state of cease-fire after a deal reached in Minsk on February 12. But if the last ceasefire is any indication, this halt in hostilities won't spell the end of the most severe geopolitical crisis between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War.

The last attempt at a halt in fighting quickly fell apart, and the period of the cease-fire included a major battle over the Donestk airport and the shelling of the strategic city of Mariupol. In the economic and diplomatic realm, the US and EU are continuing to impose sanctions on Moscow, which has continued its aggressive policies in Ukraine despite the ruble's recent cratering in value.

Yet eastern Ukraine is just one hotspot along a larger, continent-wide fault line. The border between Russia and NATO-allied Europe is dotted with pockets of instability including several separatist regions that Moscow and its allies support. The fact that Russia and the NATO states possess all but around 550 of the world's estimated 17,100 nuclear weapons only raises the stakes.

This map depicts the larger confrontation between Russia and NATO and Europe's return to Cold War power dynamics.

[Tienes que estar registrado y conectado para ver esa imagen]

Russian warships are back in the English Channel

Tomas Hirst

Feb. 17, 2015, 6:59 AM

Neustrashimy Russian frigatePH2 George Sisting, US NavyRussian Neustrashimy-class frigate

A Royal Navy ship, the HMS Argyll, intercepted a Russian frigate travelling with a tanker in the English Channel on Wednesday.

The Neustrashimy class frigate Yaroslav Mudryy — "Yaroslav the Wise" — is part of Russia's Baltic fleet and is equipped with anti-ship missiles, the Kashtan anti-aircraft system and torpedoes. The HMS Argyll was dispatched to intercept the ships as part of a "NATO agreement whereby alliance nations co-operate to monitor activity", according to the Ministry of Defence.

The Russian ships are on the last leg of a Mediterranean deployment and are now heading to their permanent base in the Baltic. They are the second set of Russian ships to have traversed the Channel in the past few months after a squadron of the country's Northern Fleet passed through in November.

Russia has stepped up its military drills in recent months with a greater number of naval drills and NATO reports of incursions by Russian fighter jets and bombers. It comes as the country's economy continues to suffer under international sanctions imposed by the West over allegations that Russia has been providing troops and military equipment to pro-Moscow rebels in the east of Ukraine.

Germany Emerges
Geopolitical Weekly
February 10, 2015 | 09:00 GMT
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By George Friedman

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, accompanied by French President Francois Hollande, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Feb. 6. Then she met with U.S. President Barack Obama on Feb. 9. The primary subject was Ukraine, but the first issue discussed at the news conference following the meeting with Obama was Greece. Greece and Ukraine are not linked in the American mind. They are linked in the German mind, because both are indicators of Germany's new role in the world and of Germany's discomfort with it.

It is interesting to consider how far Germany has come in a rather short time. When Merkel took office in 2005, she became chancellor of a Germany that was at peace, in a European Union that was united. Germany had put its demands behind it, embedding itself in a Europe where it could be both prosperous and free of the geopolitical burdens that had led it into such dark places. If not the memory, then the fear of Germany had subsided in Europe. The Soviet Union was gone, and Russia was in the process of trying to recover from the worst consequences of that collapse. The primary issue in the European Union was what hurdles nations, clamoring to enter the union, would have to overcome in order to become members. Germany was in a rare position, given its history. It was in a place of comfort, safety and international collegiality.

The world that Merkel faces today is startlingly different. The European Union is in a deep crisis. Many blame Germany for that crisis, arguing that its aggressive export policies and demands for austerity were self-serving and planted the seeds of the crisis. It is charged with having used the euro to serve its interests and with shaping EU policy to protect its own corporations. The vision of a benign Germany has evaporated in much of Europe, fairly or unfairly. In many places, old images of Germany have re-emerged, if not in the center of many countries then certainly on the growing margins. In a real if limited way, Germany has become the country that other Europeans fear. Few countries are clamoring for membership in the European Union, and current members have little appetite for expanding the bloc's boundaries.

At the same time, the peace that Germany had craved is in jeopardy. Events in Ukraine have aroused Russian fears of the West, and Russia has annexed Crimea and supported an insurgency in eastern Ukraine. Russia's actions have sparked the United States' fears of the re-emergence of a Russian hegemon, and the United States is discussing arming the Ukrainians and pre-positioning weapons for American troops in the Baltics, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. The Russians are predicting dire consequences, and some U.S. senators are wanting to arm the Ukrainians.

If it is too much to say that Merkel's world is collapsing, it is not too much to say that her world and Germany's have been reshaped in ways that would have been inconceivable in 2005. The confluence of a financial crisis in Europe that has led to dramatic increases in nationalism — both in the way nations act and in the way citizens think — with the threat of war in Ukraine has transformed Germany's world. Germany's goal has been to avoid taking a leading political or military role in Europe. The current situation has made this impossible. The European financial crisis, now seven years old, has long ceased being primarily an economic problem and is now a political one. The Ukrainian crisis places Germany in the extraordinarily uncomfortable position of playing a leading role in keeping a political problem from turning into a military one.
The German Conundrum

It is important to understand the twin problems confronting Germany. On the one hand, Germany is trying to hold the European Union together. On the other, it wants to make certain that Germany will not bear the burden of maintaining that unity. In Ukraine, Germany was an early supporter of the demonstrations that gave rise to the current government. I don't think the Germans expected the Russian or U.S. responses, and they do not want to partake in any military reaction to Russia. At the same time, Germany does not want to back away from support for the government in Ukraine.

There is a common contradiction inherent in German strategy. The Germans do not want to come across as assertive or threatening, yet they are taking positions that are both. In the European crisis, it is Germany that is most rigid not only on the Greek question but also on the general question of Southern Europe and its catastrophic unemployment situation. In Ukraine, Berlin supports Kiev and thus opposes the Russians but does not want to draw any obvious conclusions. The European crisis and the Ukrainian crisis are mirror images. In Europe, Germany is playing a leading but aggressive role. In Ukraine, it is playing a leading but conciliatory role. What is most important is that in both cases, Germany has been forced — more by circumstance than by policy — to play leading roles. This is not comfortable for Germany and certainly not for the rest of Europe.
Germany's Role in Ukraine

The Germans did play a significant part in the fall of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's government. Germany had been instrumental in trying to negotiate an agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, but Yanukovich rejected it. The Germans supported anti-Yanukovich demonstrators and had very close ties to one of the demonstration leaders, current Kiev Mayor Vitali Klitschko, who received training in a program for rising leaders sponsored by the Christian Democratic Union — Merkel's party. The Germans condemned the Russian annexation of Crimea and Moscow's support for the Ukrainian secessionists in the east. Germany was not, perhaps, instrumental in these events, but it was a significant player.

As the Germans came to realize that this affair would not simply be political but would take on a military flavor, they began to back away from a major role. But disengagement was difficult. The Germans adopted a complex stance. They opposed the Russians but also did not want to provide direct military support to the Ukrainians. Instead, they participated in the sanctions against Russia while trying to play a conciliatory role. It was difficult for Merkel to play this deeply contradictory role, but given Germany's history the role was not unreasonable. Germany's status as a liberal democracy is central to its post-war self-conception. That is what it must be. Therefore, supporting the demonstrators in Kiev was an obligation. At the same time, Germany — particularly since the end of the Cold War — has been uneasy about playing a direct military role. It did that in Afghanistan but not Iraq. And participating in or supporting a military engagement in Ukraine resurrects memories of events involving Russia that Berlin does not want to confront.

Therefore, Germany adopted a contradictory policy. Although it supported a movement that was ultimately anti-Russian and supported sanctions against the Russians, more than any other power involved it does not want the political situation to evolve into a military one. It will not get involved in any military action in Ukraine, and the last thing Germany needs now is a war to its east. Having been involved in the beginnings of the crisis, and being unable to step away from it, Germany also wants to defuse it.
The Greek Issue

Germany repeated this complex approach with Greece for different reasons. The Germans are trying to find some sort of cover for the role they are playing with the Greeks. Germany exported more than 50 percent of its gross domestic product, and more than half of that went to the European free trade zone that was the heart of the EU project. Germany had developed production that far exceeded its domestic capacity for consumption. It had to have access to markets or face a severe economic crisis of its own.

But barriers are rising in Europe. The attacks in Paris raised demands for the resurrection of border guards and inspections. Alongside threats of militant Islamist attacks, the free flow of labor from country to country threatened to take jobs from natives and give them to outsiders. If borders became barriers to labor, and capital markets were already distorted by the ongoing crisis, then how long would it be before weaker economies used protectionist measures to keep out German goods?

The economic crisis had unleashed nationalism as each country tried to follow policies that would benefit it and in which many citizens — not in power, but powerful nonetheless — saw EU regulations as threats to their well-being. And behind these regulations and the pricing of the euro, they saw Germany's hand.

This was dangerous for Germany in many ways. Germany had struggled to shed its image as an aggressor; here it was re-emerging. Nationalism not only threatened to draw Germany back to its despised past, but it also threatened the free trade essential to Germany's well-being. Germany didn't want anyone to leave the free trade zone. The eurozone was less important, but once they left the currency bloc, the path to protectionism was short. Greece was of little consequence itself, but if it demonstrated that it would be better off defaulting than paying its debt, other countries could follow. And if they demonstrated that leaving the free trade zone was beneficial, then the entire structure might unravel.

Germany needed to make an example of Greece, and it tried very hard last week to be unbending, appearing to be a bit like the old Germany. The problem Germany had was that if the new Greek government wanted to survive, it couldn't capitulate. It had been elected to resist Germany. And whatever the unknowns, it was not clear that default, in whole or part, wasn't beneficial. And in the end, Greece could set its own rules. If the Greeks offered a fraction of repayment, would anyone refuse when the alternative was nothing?

Therefore, Germany was facing one of the other realities of its position — one that goes back to its unification in 1871. Although economically powerful, Germany was also extremely insecure. Its power rested on the ability and willingness of other countries to give Germany access to their markets. Without that access, German power could fall apart. With Greece, the Germans wanted to show the rest of Europe the consequences of default, but if Greece defaulted anyway, the only lesson might be that default works. Just as it had been in the past, Germany was simultaneously overbearing and insecure. In dealing with Greece, the Germans could not risk bringing down the European Union and could not be sure which thread, if pulled on, would unravel it.
Merkel's Case in Washington

It was with this on her mind that Merkel came to Washington. Facing an overwhelming crisis within the European Union, Germany could not afford a war in Ukraine. U.S. threats to arm the Ukrainians were exactly what she did not need. It wasn't just that Germany had a minimal army and couldn't participate or, in extremis, defend itself. It was also that in being tough with Greece, Germany could not go much further before being seen as the strongman of Europe, a role it could not bear.

Thus, she came to Washington looking to soften the American position. But the American position came from deep wells as well. Part of it had to do with human rights, which should not be dismissed as one source of decision-making in this and other administrations. But the deeper well was the fact that for a hundred years, since World War I, through World War II and the Cold War, the United States had a single rigid imperative: No European hegemon could be allowed to dominate the Continent, as a united Europe was the only thing that might threaten national security. Therefore, regardless of any debate on the issue, the U.S. concern about a Russian-dominated Ukraine triggered the primordial fear of a Russian try at hegemony.

It was ironic that Germany, which the United States blocked twice as a hegemon, tried to persuade the United States that increased military action in Ukraine would not solve the problem. The Americans knew that, but they also knew that if they backed off now, the Russians would read it as an opportunity to press forward. Germany, which had helped set in motion both this crisis and the European crisis, was now asking the United States to back off. The request was understandable, but simply backing off was not possible. She needed to deliver something from Putin, such as a pledge to withdraw support to Ukrainian secessionists. But Putin needed something, too: a promise for an autonomous province. By now Merkel could live with that, but the Americans would find it undesirable. An autonomous Ukrainian province would inevitably become a base for undermining the rest of the country.

This is the classic German problem told two ways. Both derive from disproportionate strength overlying genuine weakness. The Germans are trying to reshape Europe, but their threats are of decreasing value. The Germans tried to reshape Ukraine but got trapped in the Russian reaction. In both cases, the problem was that they did not have sufficient power, instead requiring the acquiescence of others. And that is difficult to get. This is the old German problem: The Germans are too strong to be ignored and too weak to impose their will. Historically, the Germans tried to increase their strength so they could impose their will. In this case, they have no intention of doing so. It will be interesting to see whether their will can hold when their strength is insufficient.

“Putin’s Soviet Ambitions”: The Return of the Cold War
By
Anant Mishra
Issue
Net Edition
| Date : 26 Mar , 2015

Ukraine is situated in the Eastern part of Europe bordering Belarus, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia and Slovakia. It is home to almost 44.3 million citizens (it grows to 45.4 million if we include Crimea). Territorially it is the largest country in Europe. After the fall of Soviet Union, Ukraine has maintained closer economic ties with Russia, and an estimated Ukrainian exports to Russia is 15.8million USD every year. It accounts for about 5% of the total Russia’s imports – the largest among the commonwealth of Independent nations and overall fourth largest. Ukraine is also a pipeline state which connects Russia’s gas supply to the west. One of the Russia’s five divisions in the Russian Navy, the Black Sea Fleet, is stationed at Svetsapol, Crimea.

The crisis began with the interference of Russia in the internal politics of Ukraine followed by the involvement of “green men” in assisting the separatists to claim independence…

Historically speaking, Ukraine is divided into two fronts, the Western and the Eastern fronts, which differs in ethnic compositions, political workings and identity. The Eastern part of the nation comprises Russian speaking majority, while the western part comprises of Polish, Moldovan and Hungarian speaking communities followed by other minorities, all under the Ukrainian identity. The division in two separate dominions has been a major factor in issues, such as strengthening Ukrainian as the national language, which has been discussed many times in the Ukrainian parliament and is the key factor dividing the nation into two. This divide has been actively noted after the coming of pro western government in the centre, which won an undisputed majority in the eastern part. This divide is the “deep root” of the current conflict.

On August 24th, 1991 Ukraine gained its independence. It was very close to Russia when Leonid Kuchma was in power. After the end of Kuchma’s term, Ukraine saw two candidates, vastly different from each other, instituting different policies and different methodologies, Viktor Yushchenko, widely known for his pro western attitude, and Victor Yanukovych, who was very keen in continuing relationship with Russia.

Yanukovych the pro Russian candidate took power in 2010 while pledging the people of Ukraine for stronger ties with Russia. He was leading in the second poll, which took place in the November 2014, the same time when protests in the nation began. Yanukovych leading the polls was questioned by local media sources followed by Ukrainians. This sparked protests in the country.

The recent events stretch back to 2013 when, under intense pressure from Russia, the then Ukrainian president refused to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, which would have benefitted Russia with a free trade corridor. The agreement saw immense protests in Maidan Nesalezhhnosti (Independence Square) in Kiev which later on escalated to a full scale revolution. Russia condemned the protestors for their actions and described them as new Nazis while EU and the US government supported the Euromaidan protestors. This sparked the wave of civil unrest, massive demonstrations against the Yanukovych government. In February 2014, 77 protestors were shot dead in the Independence Square which led to the ousting of president, and later on he escaped to Russia, as the government – opposition agreement was on way.

According to NATO, Russia moved its troops to the separatist-occupied territories.The Russian Government however denied this action. This action increased tensions further and turned into an escalated form of Cold War.

Events were intensive in the March of 2014, when “Little Green Men”, soldiers of unknown origins (which were later assumed to be Russian), entered Crimea and helped the local separatist movements to take power, while conducting a political referendum in the region. This referendum resulted in Crimea being “illegally” annexed by Russian authorities. This was deemed illegitimate by the Ukrainian government followed by the US and the western powers, as it was a clear violation of Budapest agreement of 1994 that took place between US, UK and Russia, guaranteeing territorial integrity of Ukraine. This had to be stopped, so EU and the US imposed economic sanctions on Russia. The success of separatist movement in Crimea was a moment of inspiration for other separatists groups in Ukraine, especially those in Donetsk and Luhansk which were now motivated to draft their own agenda’s. This caused massive outbreak along the Russian border, and when, Petro Poroshenko, a businessman turned politician, won the presidential election of May 2014, who had massive support from the EU and the West, military actions grew intense in these breakaway regions. The issue intensified when a commercial Airliner MH 17 was shot down over the Donetsk region, killing all crew and 298 passengers on board. This drew enormous media attention followed by attention of the UN and the EU. More economic sanctions were imposed on Russia.

The issue of “allegedly Crimean accession” was discussed numerous times in the United Nations Security and General Assembly sessions. The resolution (A/RES/68/262) was passed in the General Assembly strictly advising member nations not to recognise any alternations. Amid heated arguments UNSC seemed to be controlled on the discussion as it only passed the resolution condemning the shooting of MH17 (S/RES/2166 (2014))18 in several press meetings as the resolution pertaining the situation in Crimea was vetoed by the Russian Federation.

Unclaimed and Undenied– The Struggle for Donetsk and Luhansk

The situation in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk began intensive in 2014, when protestors which were claimed by the media was pro western, occupied numerous buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv (although the situation was not as violent as the other two). Protestors largely inspired by the Crimean accession demanded independence from Ukraine and requested Russia’s succession. In May the separatists proclaimed themselves as the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’. These newly formed governments held referendum and declared independence. They also requested Russia’s support. No acknowledgment was sent by the Russian authorities nor it was discussed in the Russian parliament. Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, did, however, admit to provide assistance to the separatists.

It is also important to look at the fact that all the players in this game of dominance are equipped with nuclear arsenal…

In May 2014, the newly elected Ukrainian president, Pedro Poroshenko, established military operations in these regions, including the seizure of the airport in Donetsk, leading to heavy casualties on both sides. Throughout May and June, separatist groups expanded their territories, and occupied two strategic military bases in the Luhansk region and shot down several Ukrainian military planes.

The EU–Ukraine Agreement was signed on 27th June which angered a lot of pro Russian supporters while violating the previously adopted ceasefire. After heavy casualties on both sides, Ukraine authorities were able to recapture military and strategic installations in the region. Angered by their losses, the separatists retaliated by shooting down Ukrainian aircrafts. On July 17th, the separatists shot down the commercial airliner MH17, flying from Amsterdam to Kuala-Lumpur, with 298 people on board. The plane was shot down with a Soviet made anti aircraft weapon which made it difficult to identify the source. However a preliminary report suggested that the plane was shot down by mistake and no Russian involvement was found. This attracted international communities as international media began criticising Russia’s “Vodka policy”. Amid immense criticism from the global communities, EU and the US imposed more sanctions on Russia.

The United Nations Security Council meeting was convened on 24th October 2014, in the presence of Assistant Secretary General of Human rights Ivan Šimonović, who submitted his report on current civilian casualties. He informed the Council that the death toll during the conflict had risen to 3700 which was increasing than the previous estimated account of 2200 victims. By November 2014, the death toll had risen to 4400 people with over 9000 injured and million displaced. In his address to the UNSC session on October 14th, he advised the members “to work towards this urgent issue speedily before it consumes the whole nation” as the progress was too slow to handle an already escalated situation.


Current Situation – Geopolitical Instability

The current crisis is indeed the biggest political unrest in Europe since Yugoslavia. It is still unknown whether the crisis has to be termed with an international link, as Russia has not taken any responsibility for military intervention or political support of any sort, nor are the actions threatening other bordering nations. However Russia’s strategic importance towards Ukraine should not be undermined followed by the geopolitical importance of Ukraine has brought back the faded memories of Cold War.

Many experts suggested that Ukraine should follow the peaceful plan laid out by the Finnish and the Austrian model.

The crisis began with the interference of Russia in the internal politics of Ukraine followed by the involvement of “green men” in assisting the separatists to claim independence, in the first place. Their presence increased further with continued military operations in the two breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and multiple exercises by the Russian Army near the southern borders in the summer of 2014. NATO conducted military training in September in the Lviv Region in the Western part of Ukraine (Operation Rapid Trident) at the same time that peace talks took place in Minsk. Russia, allegedly, sent its soldiers to fight on the side of the separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as initiating five humanitarian aid convoys (as of the beginning of November 2014), which were initially regarded as an undercover invasion of Ukraine. Events escalated further in November 2014, when the Ukrainian government sent military troops to protect the occupied cities. According to NATO, Russia moved its troops to the separatist-occupied territories.The Russian Government however denied this action. This action increased tensions further and turned into an escalated form of Cold War.

Many experts agree to the fact that Russia’s ultimate goal of reuniting its dominance in the region as been achieved. Largely supported by the propaganda, Russia has confined its policies to recollect itself in establishing the old Soviet Union. On the contrary NATO has begun expanding towards the east, after covering the regions of Baltic and Poland, now bordering Russia. Russia has been deprived from invitation of G8 summits, which has also denied the discussion of the alleged accession of Crimea. If the incidents continue to escalate then heated conflict between the two sides is certain. The change of events occurred when several Russian warplanes were discovered hovering in the NATO airspace, from Baltic regions all the way to England. In addition to this, the Ukrainian President alleged that President Putin stated in a private telephone conversation that if he wanted to, “Russian troops could, in two days, be not only in Kiev but also in Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw, and Bucharest”. It is also important to look at the fact that all the players in this game of dominance are equipped with nuclear arsenal, although the international community is doing its best to resolve this already escalated situation, carefully enough to avoid a civil war.

Conclusion – Ending not so soon

All the four actors, the UN, the EU, Ukraine and Russia have stated on numerous occasions that “military solution” cannot resolve this conflict. However in this crisis, there are too many players in the game with almost everything to lose, hence de-escalation of Donetsk while withdrawal of Russian troops from the region has to be a part of solution.

India being the wisest democracy in Asia doesn’t support Russia’s accession of Crimea rather it believes that the actions taken by the President Putin was just as the president was acting under national interest.

The first step to a “peaceful solution” should be that the breakaway regions, Donetsk and Luhansk should be a part of Ukraine, a step to protect this sovereign nation’s integrity intact. They however should be granted with an autonomous status.. Many experts suggested that Ukraine should follow the peaceful plan laid out by the Finnish and the Austrian model.

The Boisto group, consisting of “American and Russian experts and former officials including an ex-director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service and a top Russia advisor to George W. Bush” met in Finland to discuss a step by step resolution for this issue. They designed a 24 step resolution. The resolution begins with neutralising the area by recalling both Ukrainian and Russian troops from the region, and establishing a UN peacekeeping mission. The governments of both the conflict nations have denied this.

International Stand

Russian Federation

Russia considers Ukraine to be one of its closest allies and a ‘brother nation’. Kiev was originally “Kiev Rus”, which had a significant image of multicultural state. In the past few years Russia has done everything it could to keep Ukraine close, economic deals while pressuring the Ukrainian government over gas deals, followed alleged poisoning of President Yushchenko in 2004. The Russians have also granted Yanukovych asylum. Russia recognises the government under Yanukovych no matter whether he is still in play or not, followed the self proclaimed governments of Donetsk and Luhansk. Russia allegedly annexed the Crimean peninsula under the guise of “protecting the Russian communities” (which constitutes approximately 60% of the total population of the region). Russia amid heavy criticism is still playing “the game of oppressions”. Under heavy economic sanctions Russia is still enjoying its relationship with Asian nations by signing USD 400 billion gas contract with China. Due to the economic sanctions placed on Russia, the falling price of oil, and a drop in the rouble against the US dollar, Russia has fallen into recession.

China like in all conflicts has a more neutral role as its interests are not affected by the conflict.

United States of America

The US has been supporting the Ukrainians since beginning. It has on numerous occasions condemned Russia on its old habits of accession over Crimea. It has imposed harsh sanctions over Russia, depriving the nations with basic trade. President Obama has sent a very clear message; more succession means more sanctions, ultimately destruction of this post World War II nation. He has ensured continued support to NATO forces followed by continued assistance to Ukrainian authorities against Russia’s “dark tactics”.

NATO

“NATO believes that a sovereign, independent and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security”. The cooperation, which was created in 1991, has strengthened in light of the current conflict, and NATO is determined to support Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Ukraine is a long-standing partner of NATO and is part of some of the Alliance’s programs. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO leaders agreed that Ukraine might become a NATO member in the future. During its summit in Wales on September 4th, Allied leaders issued a statement pledging to further support the Poroshenko government, strengthening its military capacities and insisting that Russian forces retreat from Ukraine.

China

China like in all conflicts has a more neutral role as its interests are not affected by the conflict. It is the Russia’s “friends in arms” and is considered to be the “biggest winner” in the whole conflict. The crisis has resulted stronger economic ties with Russia, while giving the nation a strong player to stand with amid US–India relations in Asia. It believes in peaceful solutions.

India

India is the “oldest friend” of Russia as it is one of key allies of Russia in BRICS. In March 2014, the MEA (Minister of External Affairs) issued a statement with respect to escalations in Crimea, and stating Russia’s response as “legitimate”. However India being the wisest democracy in Asia doesn’t support Russia’s accession of Crimea rather it believes that the actions taken by the President Putin was just as the president was acting under national interest. President in its statement to press thanked idea for its “restraint and objectivity” towards the crisis. India has also congratulated the newly elected president Poroshenko for his victory in Ukraine. India shows a very balanced response to the conflict, looking at the growing Russia-China relationship in one end and while intense fighting and human rights violation in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk on the other. It seeks a balanced solution to the crisis. According to Ranjit Gupta, a former member of the Indian National Security Advisory Board, “India’s stance in relation to events in Ukraine has been somewhat ambiguous and decidedly nuanced, but admittedly tilted in favour of Russia”.

Sweden is making a bunch of war pacts amid ominous warnings from Russia

Jeremy Bender

Sep. 16, 2015, 5:22 PM 10,712 12
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Swedish Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist (L) and his Finnish counterpart Jussi Niinisto review the guard of honour at the Karlberg Palace in Stockholm, Sweden, June 5, 2015. Reuters ImagesSwedish Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist (L) and his Finnish counterpart Jussi Niinisto review the guard of honour at the Karlberg Palace in Stockholm, Sweden, June 5, 2015.
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With an official policy of neutrality dating back to the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Sweden has avoided the worst of the violence that has shaped Europe over the past 200 years.

But now, with the threat of an aggressive Russia across the Baltic, Stockholm has started pursuing military partnerships with gusto.

As Russian military ships and planes line the Baltic, Sweden has signed a military cooperation deal with NATO member Poland, the European newspaper The Local reports.

"Once a sea of peace, the Baltic has become a sea of danger," Polish Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak said in Warsaw on Monday alongside his Swedish counterpart, Peter Hultqvist.

In spite of Sweden's lack of NATO membership and its policy of neutrality, Stockholm has signed a number of military pledges with both NATO and non-NATO countries in an effort to increase its own safety. In April 2015, for example, Sweden and fellow Nordic nations of Iceland, Denmark, Norway, and Finland announced plans to expand defensive ties.

The pact represented the mounting fear Nordic nations feel over the role of an increasingly aggressive Russia.

"Russia's actions are the biggest challenge to the European security," the defense ministers from the Nordic nations said in a joint declaration. "Russia's propaganda and political maneuvering are contributing to sowing discord between nations, and inside organizations like NATO and the EU.

"There is increasing military and intelligence activity in the Baltics and in our northern areas," the declaration said. "The Russian military is challenging us along our borders and there have been several border infringements in the Baltics."

Sweden is also a member of the EU Nordic Battlegroup, alongside Finland, Norway, Ireland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

In response to concerns over Russian military aggression, Sweden has also participated in NATO-led military exercises in Spain and in the Baltic Sea. Additionally, Stockholm has considered raising its defense budget to prepare for the possibilities of war.

The Swedish public's attitude toward joining NATO has become increasingly positive since the start of the Ukraine crisis. A September poll showed that 41% of Swedes were in favor of joining NATO, compared to 39% against and 20% undecided. Those results come in spite of the Russian ambassador to Sweden's warning to Stockholm that it could face "consequences" if it decided to join the military alliance.

Turquía amenaza a Rusia con parar la cooperación nuclear y gasística
Erdogan advierte a Putin de que su incursión en Siria puede dañar al suministro de gas
La OTAN advierte de que está lista para desplegar tropas en Turquía
EFE Ankara 8 OCT 2015 - 12:14 CEST

El presidente de Turquía, el islamista Recep Tayyip Erdogan, amenazó este jueves a Rusia con dar marcha atrás a la cooperación entre ambos países en el ámbito nuclear y gasístico debido a las más recientes tensiones en el espacio aéreo turco.

La aviación rusa ha violado varias veces el espacio aéreo de Turquía durante su campaña militar a favor del presidente sirio, Bachar al Asad, que el Gobierno turco quiere ver derrocado.

En unas declaraciones a la prensa durante el vuelo hacia una visita en Japón, Erdogan dijo que Rusia debe considerar el impacto de sus acciones sobre las relaciones con Turquía, con la que tiene un volumen de comercio de unos 40.000 millones de dólares anuales (35.000 millones).

Concretamente, el presidente islamista destacó la construcción de la planta nuclear de Akkuyu, en la sureña provincia de Mersin.

"Si los rusos no construyen [la planta de] Mersin Akkuyu, entonces lo hará otro. Rusia debe tener sensibilidad sobre estos asuntos", señaló Erdogan, al destacar que Moscú ha invertido ya 3.000 millones de dólares en esa planta turca.

"Somos el principal consumidor de gas natural ruso. Perder a Turquía sería una seria pérdida para Rusia. De ser necesario, Turquía puede conseguir sus suministros de gas natural de lugares muy diferentes", aseguró el presidente turco.

La planta nuclear de Akkuyu es la primera que se construye en Turquía, tendrá cuatro reactores con una potencia total de 4.800 megavatios y está previsto que entre en funcionamiento entre 2020 y 2022.

Una segunda planta nuclear se construirá en la costa del mar Negro aunque con tecnología japonesa.

El pasado fin de semana, aviones militares rusos entraron dos veces en el espacio aéreo de Turquía, un aliado de la OTAN.

Desde entonces, las relaciones entre ambos países se han tensado, con tres citaciones del embajador ruso al Ministerio de Exteriores turco y advertencias de la OTAN contra Rusia.

La OTAN advierte de que está lista para desplegar tropas en Turquía
La Alianza responde a la intervención rusa en Siria y revisa la estrategia afgana
Rusia ataca en Siria con misiles desde las aguas del Mar Caspio
La OTAN estudia seguir en Afganistán tras 2016
BELÉN DOMÍNGUEZ CEBRIÁN Bruselas 8 OCT 2015 - 22:09 CEST

La OTAN mostró este jueves unidad frente a las “diferentes amenazas” que se ciernen en el este y el sur de Europa. El secretario general, Jens Stoltenberg, lanzó una dura advertencia a Rusia por haber violado el espacio aéreo turco en su trayecto a Siria, donde efectúa desde hace ocho días bombardeos contra los yihadistas en coordinación con el Ejército de Bachar el Asad. Los 28 socios avisan: “La OTAN ha elevado su capacidad y está preparada para defender a cualquier socio, incluida Turquía”. Stoltenberg anunció que estaría dispuesto a desplegar tropas en el país euroasiático “si fuera necesario”.

Los ministros de Defensa de la Alianza se reunieron este jueves en Bruselas para abordar la retirada de Afganistán, el conflicto en Siria, el refuerzo militar en la frontera sur y este de Europa y la relación con Georgia. Pero las reacciones a los ataques que Rusia efectúa desde hace ocho días en territorio sirio contra lo que el Kremlin identifica como posiciones de los yihadistas del Estado Islámico (EI) eclipsaron la cumbre. La escalada en Siria, afirmó el secretario de Defensa de Estados Unidos, Ashton Carter, “tendrá consecuencias para Rusia (…), que en los próximos días comenzará a sufrir bajas”.

Un día después de que Moscú, en una demostración de fuerza, disparase misiles contra Siria desde buques de guerra situados en el mar Caspio, Carter, que también acudió a Bruselas, aseguró que los proyectiles rusos estuvieron muy cerca de uno de sus drones. Cuatro de esos misiles de crucero impactaron en Irán —y no en Siria—, según explicaron dos altos cargos estadounidenses a la CNN.

La OTAN lleva días pidiendo a Rusia que se coordine con la coalición internacional antiyihadista en Siria —que lidera EE UU— para evitar “accidentes” entre aviones de ambas partes en el mismo espacio aéreo.

Pero la Alianza duda del objetivo real de la ofensiva rusa. “Mi preocupación es que los rusos no se dirigen principalmente contra el EI, sino contra otros grupos de la oposición. Además, están apoyando al régimen sirio (...) y no contribuye a restablecer la paz”, insistió Stoltenberg.

El secretario general apuntó que el considerable aumento de las tropas de Moscú en el terreno sirio los últimos días demuestra la incursión rusa

—sin permiso ni notificación— en el espacio aéreo de Turquía. Una clara violación del derecho internacional, según la Alianza, y una amenaza para un socio sensible geopolíticamente. En la misma línea se manifestó el titular de Defensa español, Pedro Morenés, quien subrayó la importancia de señalar a Rusia que la OTAN no sólo está unida y alerta, sino que también dispuesta a mostrar su fuerza frente a acciones que la Alianza ha calificado de “intolerables”.

Turquía se siente amenazada y en cierta forma pide a los socios una reacción que, por el momento, se queda en enseñar músculo militar. “Es importante que cualquier adversario de la OTAN [en referencia a Rusia] sepa que estamos dispuestos a desplegar tropas en cualquier momento”.

Mientras, la Alianza anunció este jueves que reforzará su presencia en el este de Europa con alrededor de un centenar de militares británicos en el Báltico y Polonia —noticia que el Kremlin calificó este jueves de “lamentable”— y con la apertura de dos cuarteles de entrenamiento en Hungría y Eslovaquia —que se suman a los seis en Estonia, Letonia, Lituania, Polonia, Rumanía y Bulgaria, inaugurados el pasado septiembre—; así como un fortalecimiento en la frontera sur como “efecto disuasorio” ante la amenaza rusa.

Respecto al conflicto en Siria, que desde hace más de cuatro años se ha cobrado más de 300.000 vidas, el máximo líder de la Alianza insistió en la “necesidad” de renovar un diálogo político. “No hay una solución militar a largo plazo”, descartó. Además, al igual que resaltó EE UU, Stoltenberg reiteró que apoyar al régimen de Bachar el Asad, que Rusia considera como el factor en la resolución del conflicto, no es la solución.

“Siria necesita una transición política”, dijo Carter, que dejó este jueves “la puerta abierta” a que las fuerzas de Moscú se unan a la coalición internacional. Algo que se augura muy difícil. Rusia es histórico aliado del Gobierno “legítimo” del presidente El Asad, según ha declarado el presidente Vladímir Putin.

Refuerzo en el sur, más presencia en el este
La OTAN ha anunciado también un refuerzo en la frontera sur de Europa aunque aún se desconocen los detalles. Fuentes diplomáticas aseguran que este jueves los ministros sugerirán la estrategia en el sur y que no será hasta 2016, en la cumbre bianual de la Alianza en Varsovia (Polonia), cuando se anuncien todos los detalles del plan en el sur. Lo que sí ha avanzado el secretario general en rueda de prensa es que se trata de una forma de disuasión a las amenazas externas que se puedan cernir sobre territorio bajo el amparo y protección de la OTAN. "Tendremos la capacidad para desplegar 40.000 efectivos en 48 horas", ha señalado en un claro guiño a la preocupación de Ankara por la constante violación de si espacio aéreo por fuerzas rusas. "La OTAN defenderá a las ciudadanos, la OTAN está en el terreno, la OTAN está preparada", ha dicho Stoltenberg que ha lanzado el mensaje al mundo: "No me refiero solo al este sino a todas las direcciones y a todas las formas de amenaza".

La seguridad en el este de Europa sigue siendo una de las mayores procupaciones de la Alianza que este jueves ha aplaudido el anuncio británico sobre el envío de tropas —hasta un centenar de militares— al mar Báltico. "Es una respuestas a las últimas acciones de Rusia", ha justificado Stoltenberg. Además, tras la inauguración de seis cuarteles de entrenamiento en países del este (Estonia, Letonia, Lituania, Polonia, Rumanía y Bulgaria) de principios de septiembre, Stoltenberg ha anunciado su ampliación a dos países más: Hungría y Eslovaquia.

La Alianza y el Kremlin se tientan
En Turquía Rusia y la OTAN miden sus fuerzas en un ejercicio más retórico que fáctico
JESÚS A. NÚÑEZ VILLAVERDE 9 OCT 2015 - 11:48 CEST





No es nada nuevo que Rusia y la OTAN midan sus fuerzas, en un ejercicio más retórico que fáctico, tratando de mostrar resolución en defensa de sus respectivos intereses y chequeando hasta dónde llega la voluntad del contrario para soportar el envite. Lo que Rusia pretende es recuperar un área de influencia propia, mostrar a sus vecinos que la OTAN no tiene agallas para pasar a los hechos y recuperar su estatus de potencia global. Por su parte, la OTAN se limita a no perder la cara, con precaución para no avivar la tensión más allá de lo estrictamente necesario.

Y en ese contexto hay que enmarcar la que actualmente se vive tras la violación del espacio aéreo turco por parte de aviones de combate rusos implicados en el apoyo al régimen sirio. Como un ejemplo más de un viejo juego que consiste en una gesticulación bravucona —pero midiendo milimétricamente cada paso para no provocar una escalada irreversible—, Moscú lleva tiempo sobrevolando las proximidades del espacio aéreo de distintos países OTAN, al tiempo que sus submarinos se adentran “accidentalmente” en aguas territoriales aliadas. Busca así mostrarse desafiante, con acciones de tan pequeña entidad que nunca justificarían una respuesta en fuerza, mientras calibra el estado de operatividad de las defensas adversarias. La Alianza, en consecuencia, suele responder discursivamente (al igual que ahora) con declaraciones más o menos firmes sobre su voluntad de defender a todo aliado amenazado, incrementando el número de ejercicios militares en el territorio afectado y reiterando su disponibilidad para emplear la fuerza si fuera necesario (incluso concretando su capacidad para desplegar hasta 40.000 efectivos en apenas 48 horas). Y ahí se queda todo.

MÁS INFORMACIÓN
La OTAN advierte de que está lista para desplegar tropas en Turquía
Rusia ataca en Siria con misiles desde las aguas del Mar Caspio
Una cosa es que el afectado (Turquía ahora) apele al artículo V del Tratado de la OTAN —defensa colectiva ante una agresión a uno de sus miembros— y otra muy distinta que eso suponga una respuesta militar automática contra el agresor. Aunque obviamente lo sucedido en cada invasión del espacio aéreo turco no puede considerarse un accidente, una respuesta militar directa contra Moscú sería una opción altamente improbable. Y esto es así porque la Alianza está lejos de mostrar la suficiente voluntad política para ir más allá de algún despliegue preventivo (como volver a activar alguna batería de misiles Patriot o desplazar algunos cazas aliados en suelo turco) o de preposicionar militar para hipotéticas acciones futuras. Y Moscú no puede desear abrir un nuevo frente, consciente de su inferioridad militar frente a Washington y cuando ya acumula una pesada carga, tanto en Ucrania como en Siria, contra cualquier enemigo de su aliado, sea Daesh o cualquier otro. Así, lo previsible es que ambas partes se ajusten al guion habitual.

Sígueme en @SusoNunez

Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde es codirector del Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria (IECAH).

Trump Slams NATO, Floats Russia Nuke Deal in European Interview
by Rainer Buergin
and Toluse Olorunnipa
January 15, 2017, 5:00 PM EST January 15, 2017, 7:02 PM EST

President-elect chastises Merkel on refugees, praises Brexit
Comments to Bild suggest policies to mirror campaign rhetoric

How Will Trump Impact U.S. Ties With China?

Donald Trump called NATO obsolete, predicted that other European Union members would follow the U.K. in leaving the bloc, and threatened BMW with import duties over a planned plant in Mexico, according to two European newspapers which conducted a joint interview with the president-elect.

Trump, in an hourlong discussion with Germany’s Bild and the Times of London published on Sunday, signaled a major shift in trans-Atlantic relations, including an interest in lifting U.S. sanctions on Russia as part of a nuclear weapons reduction deal.

Quoted in German by Bild from a conversation held in English, Trump predicted that Britain’s exit from the EU will be a success and portrayed the EU as an instrument of German domination designed with the purpose of beating the U.S. in international trade. For that reason, Trump said, he’s fairly indifferent to whether the EU stays together, according to Bild.

The Times quoted Trump as saying he was interested in making “good deals with Russia,” floating the idea of lifting sanctions that were imposed as the U.S. has sought to punish the Kremlin for its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and military support of the Syrian government.
‘Some Good Deals’

“They have sanctions on Russia -- let’s see if we can make some good deals with Russia,’’ Trump said, according to the Times. “For one thing, I think nuclear weapons should be way down and reduced very substantially, that’s part of it.’’

Trump’s reported comments leave little doubt that he’ll stick to campaign positions and may in some cases upend decades of U.S. foreign policy, putting him fundamentally at odds with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on issues from free trade and refugees to security and the EU’s role in the world.

Repeating a criticism of NATO he made during his campaign, Trump said that while trans-Atlantic military alliance is important, it “has problems.”

“It’s obsolete, first because it was designed many, many years ago,” Trump said in the Bild version of the interview. “Secondly, countries aren’t paying what they should” and NATO “didn’t deal with terrorism.” The Times quoted Trump saying that only five NATO members are paying their fair share.

While those comments expanded on doubts Trump expressed about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization during his campaign, he reserved some of his most dismissive remarks for the EU and Merkel, whose open-border refugee policy he called a “catastrophic mistake.”
Brexit Praise

In contrast, Trump praised Britons for voting in 2016 to leave the EU. People and countries want their own identity and don’t want outsiders coming in to “destroy it,” he said. The U.K. is smart to leave the bloc because the EU “is basically a vehicle for Germany,” the Times quoted Trump as saying.

“If you ask me, more countries will leave,” he said.

Trump told the Times that he plans to quickly pursue a trade deal with the U.K. after taking office and will meet with British Prime Minister Theresa May soon.

“We’re gonna work very hard to get it done quickly and done properly. Good for both sides,” he said. “We’ll have a meeting right after I get into the White House and it’ll be, I think we’re gonna get something done very quickly.”

While Trump blamed Brexit on an influx of refugees he said that Britain was forced to absorb, the U.K.’s number of asylum applications in 2015 was a fraction of the 890,000 refugees who arrived in Germany that year at the peak of Europe’s migrant crisis.
Build in U.S.

With Merkel facing an unprecedented challenge from the anti-immigration Alternative for Germany as she seeks a fourth term this fall, Trump was asked whether he’d like to see her re-elected. He said he couldn’t say, adding that while he respects Merkel, who’s been in office for 11 years, he doesn’t know her and she has hurt Germany by letting “all these illegals” into the country.

In line with his threats against other automakers, Trump said Bayerische Motoren Werke AG would face a 35 percent import duty for foreign-built BMW cars sold in the U.S. BMW should scrap plans to open a new plant in Mexico and build the factory in the U.S. instead, he was quoted as saying. BMW plans to start building 3 Series sedans at San Luis Potosí in 2019.

https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-15/trump-calls-nato-obsolete-and-dismisses-eu-in-german-interview+