Primer Ministro Indio le declara cero tolerancia a la Izquierda Maoísta

Gangrenous spread of Terror
By Lt Gen Prakash Katoch
Issue Net Edition | Date : 11 Jun , 2014


Prime Minister Narendra Modi has given a call of “zero tolerance” to Maoists aka Left Wing Extremism (LWE). The NSA too, through his recent article ‘Maoists War Against India: Time for United & Strong Response’ has talked of actions as the title of his article suggests. Quick to split hairs for raising TRPs, the media has come out criticizing the ‘zero tolerance’ comment of the Prime Minister including by citing a former R&AW officer that when Maoists in Nepal could be talked to, why not the Maoists in India? Common sense would suggest that it is not that the government plans to gun down the some 18000 plus Maoists guerilla force (mentioned by the NSA in his article) especially when India does not use heavy weapons and aerial bombings as Pakistan is undertaking in Baluchistan and SWAT.

The Prime Minister and NSA have apparently conveyed that anyone picking up a weapon against the Union simply cannot be tolerated.

The Prime Minister and NSA have apparently conveyed that anyone picking up a weapon against the Union simply cannot be tolerated. Our strategy would obviously follow synergised operations not only at the physical level but concurrent to focused initiatives in the socio-political, economic and moral planes. The synergized physical actions would be against the hardcore elements. Already the media has reported that additional 10,000 troops and helicopter support are being made available to Chhattisgarh for operations in Bastar area and the Home Minister has given a missive to the IB to infiltrate the Maoists.

Actions at the socio-political, economic and moral planes should egg the ‘greys’ to lay down arms and join the mainstream, leaving the option open to the ‘blacks’ to follow suit when the heat reaches boiling point unless they are hell bent on being ‘being eliminated’. Of course the rule of law must be re-established in all this and the population, which is the ‘centre of gravity’ provided due protection from the insurgents.

It would be prudent for the critics to read the Maoist document titled “Strategy and Tactics for the Indian Revolution” scripted as late as 2004 that says, “The central task of the Indian Revolution is the seizure of political power. To accomplish this, the Indian people will have to be organized in the People’s Army and will have to wipe out the armed forces of the counter revolutionary Indian State and establish in its place their own state”. It further goes on to say, “As a considerable part of the enemy’s armed forces will inevitably be engaged against the growing tide of struggle by various nationalities, it will be difficult for the Indian ruling classes to mobilize all their armed forces against our revolutionary war”.

On balance the pressure on the Maoists needs to be built to that extent that the offer for talks comes from them and not vice versa, while understanding that building pressure does not imply physical action but also decreasing their public support base.

Terrorist organizations banned by India as of 27 January 2014 are 34, of which CPI (Maoist) with all its formations and front organizations, are just one entity.

To say that LWE or the Maoist insurgency was ‘mishandled’ over the past decade would not be out of place. Treating the issue lightly and underestimating their military potential was great folly knowing that the ideologies for the Maoists in both Nepal and India were scripted in Beijing. It is not without reason that CPI (M) cadres were openly visiting China. Yet the government continued its policy of drift despite the former Prime Minister periodically describing it as the biggest internal security threat to India.

To avoid accountability, the government was content with dishing out Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) units and periodic intelligence to affected States, intelligence more often than not being of routine nature. All this was done by taking refuge behind the self-generated ambiguity whether LWE was a ‘Law and Order’ problem under purview of the State or should be handled by the Centre, conveniently leaving the response to individual States. Through his abovementioned article, the NSA has clarified that Article 355 of the Constitution unequivocally affirms that the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance’ places LWE under purview of the Centre, since LWE has transcended the limits of public order and threatens the internal security of the country.

The government has also indicated that the NCTC project is likely to come through. The NCTC should have come through a decade back but remained in limbo because of genuine fears by the States that it may be misused by the then government. With resolve of the new government, we should be looking forward to see the NCTC operationalized early, duly linked to SCTCs (state Counter Terrorism Centres), the Security Sector and other required agencies through the NATGRID. The UHQs (Unified HQ) at States level too would be linked up with the MHA (and a central operations room) and down to District level and even beyond, as deemed necessary.

…PFI that was initiated in Kerala, courtesy the LeT and Al Qaeda, has armed itself against India, has been running terrorist training camps, their cadres killed in J&K trying to exfiltrate to PoJK and have moved into urban areas for support much like Maoists developing support in JNU and DU.

At the same time, while a focused approach to counter LWE is welcome, the time has come to look beyond. Though a major threat, LWE is just one dimension of the internal security threat we are faced with. Terrorist organizations banned by India as of 27 January 2014 are 34, of which CPI (Maoist) with all its formations and front organizations, are just one entity. In addition there are two organizations that have been banned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act at some point. But the story hardly ends there.

There are yet other organizations that should have been banned long back, for example, the Kerala headquartered Popular Front of India (PFI) that was initiated in Kerala courtesy the LeT and Al Qaeda, has armed itself against India, has been running terrorist training camps, their cadres killed in J&K trying to exfiltrate to PoJK and have moved into urban areas for support much like Maoists developing support in JNU and DU. The danger to South India must be viewed not only by the PFI and IM in conjunction Al Qaeda and LeT but also in conjunction radicalization of Maldives with LeT and Al Qaeda having invested that country. Intelligence agencies have already been warning of possibility of terrorist attacks in South India through launch pads along northern coast of Sri Lanka. To this end, a review of all terrorist organizations operating in the country is warranted.

More significantly, it is the linkages that the terrorist organizations have established, for example the LWE link with the LeT, Nepalese Maoists and Peoples Liberation Army of Manipur (PLAM) are established facts. Maoists have been undertaking joint training with PLAM and that this is being engineered by Beijing, much that we may not want to officially talk about it with likely boost to Sino-Indian economic cooperation. Asymmetric wars are reality of geopolitics and it would be a great folly to mix them with economic cooperation.

The strategic aims of China and Pakistan at the sub-conventional level are threefold: one, create a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) combining all insurgent / terrorist outfits within India and increase their combat potential; two, suck in the Indian Military, particularly the Army into the Maoist insurgency; and three, reduce India to fighting its own people, degrading its external combat potential and keep India’s economy and regional / global aspirations in check. IM are the creation of Pakistan. Today, Paresh Barua and his ULFA cronies are lodged at Ruli in China. It was reported in media two years back that China had provided AK-47 manufacturing capability to Kachin rebels in Myanmar as well as Indian Maoists, and the Kachin-PLAM conduit was being used to supply arms to the Maoists.

…studies on the internet assess that of the 73 million illegal weapons in the world, 40 million are in India.

Now on 7th June 2014, media has reported three AK-47 rifles captured that were “Made in Bihar”. Then was the recent report of huge cache of arms including over 100 rocket launchers seized in Bangladesh along the northeastern border of Bangladesh with India, which in all probability were for terrorist groups in Assam and Tripura. In 2004, 10 trucks full of arms and ammunition intended for an Indian insurgent group were seized in the port city of Chittagong, the biggest-ever arms haul in Bangladesh’s history.

With illegal immigration from Bangladesh unofficially institutionalized over the past decade and truck loads of cattle being smuggled into Bangladesh from the Indian side, how many arms were smuggled into India cannot be guessed. But the illegal arsenal in India is certainly more than the 16000 weapons with only Maoists that the NSA has mentioned in his article. Significantly, studies on the internet assess that of the 73 million illegal weapons in the world, 40 million are in India. Two years back, there were reports of sophisticated arms and communication equipment wrapped in weatherproof bags having been recovered in Odisha buried in the ground, the pattern that was in J&K – weaponry for future use.

While cyber-terrorism is a reality, we don’t appear to be giving adequate importance to CBRN terrorism despite suffering a Cobalt 60 leak in Delhi, 15 Uranium sticks having gone missing form SAIL, recovery of a 1.5 kg Uranium IED in Assam in January 2013 and media revelation that during the VP Singh regime in India, the LeT had threatened a nuclear terror strike. That apart, the possibility of a terrorist biological, radiological or chemical strike is much more if we are to take lessons from the 1995 Tokyo Sarin Gas bombings, 2001 Anthrax attacks in the US and ongoing use of Sarin Gas in Syria by the radicals. The fact is that chances of such attacks being generated through terrorist organizations by both the ISI and China exist.

Recovery of the 1.5 kg Uranium IED matches China’s ‘fit the fight’ weaponry concept that leaves no signatures. Unmarked IR guided shoulder fired AD missiles could appear on the scene, as could hand held EMP weapons for covert injury and destruction of many type of targets including computer networks. Readers may find all this shocking in an atmosphere of dawn of a new economic cooperation era between India and China but despite decades of economic and defence cooperation with Myanmar, China has gone ahead and created her deadliest proxy in the USWA (United State Wa Army) headquartered in Shan State controlling the ‘golden triangle’, arming it with not only machine guns, rocket launchers, shoulder fired AD weapons and armoured vehicles but also helicopters fitted with missiles. Weren’t some Chinese nationals with fake India documents apprehended inside Indian territory on a mission to meet Naga insurgents? The Indian public may be unaware that other Naga tribes are wholly unhappy with GoI only talking to NSCN-IM and that latter is not happy with prospects of a solution like the Mizo Accord either. All these simmering fires are exploitable by our adversaries.

At the national level, we must create credible sub-conventional deterrence against proxy wars including by employing our Special Forces covertly on politico-military missions at the strategic level.

On balance, while we tackle LWE with a firm hand, it is vital to review the overall terrorist threat to India, terrorist organizations and their linkages both national and transnational and undertake a holistic national level appreciation as to what can be achieved through a rolling plan on yearly basis, laying down benchmarks. Obviously, modernization and integration of Security Sector would be a vital component. The CAPF units may need to be reorganized as part of modernization so as they do not have to look back. It may be sensible to give them leaders from their own Service, so essential in CI environment. The government will ruthlessly need to stamp out the politician-insurgent/terrorist nexus.

As for intelligence, in addition to the IB, part of the Special Police Units too must infiltrate the Maoists rather than executing only raids and fire-fighting. The cardinal rule of special operations is that such forces must generate their own intelligence as well. We must undertake capacity building against CBRN threats. Presently, the NDRF has little specialization with CAPF providing manpower on three year deputation basis. The internal security situation in the country is dynamic and volatile. We do not have the luxury of continue drifting and let external actors take away the initiative from our hands. External support in terms of weapons, equipment, finances and logistics must be ruthlessly eliminated.

At the national level, we must create credible sub-conventional deterrence against proxy wars including by employing our Special Forces covertly on politico-military missions at the strategic level. We must understand that idealism cannot be a stand-alone factor especially when costs of following an inward looking policy is much higher in the long-run and detrimental to our economic progress and national security. Therefore, the macro level changes we need are to remove the sub-conventional asymmetry through balanced mix of realism and idealism; evolving such a policy with a road map and an execution plan. The balanced mix is the crux because hard-headed realism without idealism will land us in the state Pakistan has landed itself today. Chanakya had said, “As soon as the fear approaches near, attack and destroy it.” No country has won by being on the defensive, which in military parlance should only be a temporary phase.
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About the Author
Lt Gen Prakash Katoch

Prakash Katoch is a former Lt Gen Special Forces, Indian Army