El Dragón contra los Guerreros del Tet: la disputa por los recursos en el mar.

Las disputas territoriales marítimas disparan la tensión entre China y Vietnam
Hanoi anuncia que llevará a cabo unos ejercicios de tiro frente a sus costas, en respuesta a las acusaciones de Pekín de haber violado su soberanía


10 JUN 2011 - 14:09 CET



Las relaciones entre China y Vietnam atraviesan uno de los peores momentos en mucho tiempo, a causa de las disputas territoriales en el mar del sur de China. Hanoi ha asegurado hoy que el próximo lunes llevará a cabo unos ejercicios de tiro frente a sus costas, en una aparente respuesta a la exigencia realizada ayer por Pekín de que suspenda cualquier trabajo de exploración petrolífera en la zona. Las prácticas con fuego real, de una duración de nueve horas, tendrán lugar en un área frente a la provincia central de Quang Nam. Las autoridades han advertido a barcos y navíos que permanezcan alejados. Se trata de la primera vez que Vietnam emite tal alerta para la realización de unos ejercicios de tiro navales.
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El anuncio se produce después de que Pekín acusara a Hanoi de haber "violado gravemente" su soberanía y haber puesto en peligro la vida de sus pescadores durante un incidente registrado ayer por la mañana en aguas que reclaman los dos países, y le pidiera que ponga fin a "toda actividad invasiva". Según Vietnam, un pesquero chino, apoyado por dos patrulleras, dañó el cable de exploración de un barco de investigación sísmica de la compañía estatal Petrovietnam que se encontraba dentro de sus 200 millas náuticas de zona exclusiva económica garantizada por la legislación internacional.

Hanoi afirmó que el pesquero arremetió de forma intencionada con el cable y que se trata de la segunda vez en dos semanas que China entorpece las labores de un buque de exploración petrolera y gasística de forma "totalmente premeditada", y acusó a Pekín de estar incrementando las tensiones en la región. La versión china de lo ocurrido es muy distinta. Hong Lei, portavoz de Exteriores, replicó que Pekín tiene soberanía indisputable sobre las islas Nansha -conocidas en inglés como Spratly- y las aguas circundantes, donde se produjo el incidente. Según contó, varios pesqueros chinos fueron perseguidos por navíos militares vietnamitas el jueves por la mañana, y, en medio de la confusión, la red de uno de los barcos de pesca se enganchó con los cables del buque de exploración, que, según dijo, estaba operando en la zona ilegalmente.

China afirma que el barco vietnamita arrastró al pesquero durante más de una hora, hasta que los tripulantes de este se vieron obligados a cortar la red. "Esto puso gravemente en peligro la seguridad de los pescadores chinos", según Hong. "Al llevar a cabo estudios petroleros y gasísticos ilegales en los mares alrededor del banco Wan'an, en el archipiélago Spratly, y al expulsar a un pesquero chino, Vietnam ha violado gravemente la soberanía y los derechos marítimos de China".

Fricciones con Japón y Filipinas

Pekín y Hanoi no son los únicos que tienen reivindicaciones en estas aguas. Filipinas, Malasia, Brunei y Taiwan también reclaman partes del territorio, aunque el área reivindicada por Pekín, que incluye las Spratly y las Paracel, es la mayor: un total de 1,7 millones de kilómetros cuadrados, una superficie más de tres veces superior a la de España. Ambos archipiélagos incluyen importantes rutas navegación, y se cree que albergan yacimientos de gas y petróleo. Pekín rechazó ayer las acusaciones de Filipinas de que barcos de la armada china han entrado en aguas alrededor de las Spratly que Manila asegura que le pertenecen en seis ocasiones desde el pasado febrero, y que al menos en una de ellas realizaron disparos.

Las disputas territoriales en el mar del Sur de China y el mar de China oriental - donde Pekín y Tokio están enfrentados por las islas Senkaku (llamadas Diaoyu por China)- han puesto sobre el tapete el nerviosismo existente en la región sobre el creciente poderío militar chino y la modernización de su armada. Pekín ha reconocido esta semana que está construyendo su primer portaviones sobre la base de un buque adquirido a Ucrania en 1998, que no había sido finalizado debido a la desintegración de la Unión Soviética en 1991. China tiene previsto realizar unas maniobras navales en el océano Pacífico occidental a finales de mes.

Aunque es muy poco probable que la tensión en el mar del sur de China degenere en un enfrentamiento armado, el contencioso podría obligar a mediar a Estados Unidos, que teme que las disputas dificulten el acceso a importantes corredores navieros. La Secretaria de Estado estadounidense, Hillary Clinton, dijo el año pasado que la resolución pacífica de las diferencias en la zona es una cuestión de interés nacional para Washington. Estados Unidos, que considera algunas de las zonas reclamadas por China aguas internacionales, pidió una solución regional colectiva; algo que no gustó a Pekín, que prefiere lidiar cada disputa de forma independiente con los países afectados y ve con recelo la implicación de Estados Unidos.

Asia-Pacific
Sea dispute dominates Southeast Asian summit
Ten-member bloc's annual meeting in Myanmar comes after China relocated oil rig into territory claimed by Vietnam.
Last updated: 11 May 2014 07:20


There were protests after Beijing controversially relocated an oil rig into territory also claimed by Vietnam [EPA] Sí, ya sé que parecen un grupo de ñoras verduleras, pero estamos hablando de Vietnam, asi que...

Concerns over China's aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea are at the centre of the first Southeast regional summit hosted by Myanmar, which is hoping to demonstrate the progress it has made since emerging from a half-century of brutal military rule.

A standoff between Chinese and Vietnamese ships near the Paracel Islands, as Beijing controversially relocated a deep-water oil rig into territory also claimed by Hanoi, had already heightened tensions this week as the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit convened on Sunday.

The South China Sea is one of the world's most important shipping lanes, rich in fish and believed to contain significant oil and gas reserves.

However, some ASEAN members are wary of upsetting their political and economic relationship with their giant neighbour and regional powerhouse.

A draft of the closing statement to be read by host Myanmar, obtained by the AP news agency, made no direct mention of China.

International arbitration

Let us uphold and follow the rule of law in resolving territorial disputes in order to give due recognition and respect to the rights of all nations.

Benigno Aquino, Philippine president

While little was expected beyond a joint statement made by foreign ministers on Saturday, who expressed concern and called for self-restraint, Philippine President Benigno Aquino had made it clear before the leaders sat down on Sunday that he wanted firmer action.

Aquino said he would raise his country's own territorial dispute with Beijing, while calling for support to resolve its conflict through international arbitration.

"Let us uphold and follow the rule of law in resolving territorial disputes in order to give due recognition and respect to the rights of all nations," Aquino said in a statement.

"We cannot rely just on dialogues between only two nations to settle issues that affect others in the region."

China's foreign minister spokeswoman Hu Chunying responded to the criticism late on Saturday by saying that the South China Sea dispute is not a problem between China and its ASEAN neighbours.

"The Chinese side is always opposed to certain countries' attempts to use the South Sea issue to harm the overall friendship and cooperation between China and the ASEAN," the Reuters news agency quoted her as saying.

Tit-for-tat response

Observers have said Beijing's decision to relocate the deep-water oil rig could have been a tit-for-tat response to a recent visit to the region by US President Barack Obama, who reaffirmed support for Asian allies the Philippines and Japan, which is locked in its own maritime territorial dispute with China.

Beijing claims sovereign rights to almost the whole of the South China Sea, but the area is also claimed in part by ASEAN members Brunei and Malaysia as well as Taiwan.

Beijing prefers to negotiate directly with its smaller, weaker neighbours on a bilateral basis, a policy that is rejected by its rivals.

Vietnam anger rises over South China Sea
China's oil rig deployment in disputed territory is stoking nationalistic fervour and deadly violence in Vietnam.
Roberto Tofani Last updated: 15 May 2014 07:36


A Vietnamese Coast Guard officer monitors Chinese ships in the South China Sea [Reuters]

The war of words between China and Vietnam over disputed islands in the South China Sea has gained steam and, while never dormant, the heated rhetoric has become notably more direct.

As the 14th ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) summit was in progress last weekend in Naypydaw, Myanmar's capital, thousands of Vietnamese in the capital Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh City took to the streets in anger after the China National Offshore Oil Corporation moved drilling rig HD-981 near the contested Paracel Islands.

Tensions further increased when Vietnamese naval ships, trying to prevent the Chinese from setting up the oil rig, collided with Chinese navy vessels. Beijing and Hanoi each accused the other of ramming their ships.

Occupied by China since 1974, sovereignty over the area surrounding the Paracel's has been challenged by China, Taiwan and Vietnam ever since.

Vietnamese anger has now erupted into deadly violence in the country's south. More than 20 people were killed on Wednesday after rioters stormed a foreign-owned steel factory in Ha Tinh province, with 16 of the dead said to be Chinese. About 100 other people were sent to hospital with injuries.

Thousands of Vietnamese set fire to foreign factories and rampaged through industrial zones in Binh Duong and Dong Nai provinces on Tuesday. News reports said hundreds of Chinese had fled the country.

We can read the Chinese [oil rig] move was also a response to Obama's pivot to Asia-Pacific.

- Hoang Viet, Ho Chi Minh City University

US 'pivot to Asia-Pacific'

Hoang Viet, a professor at Ho Chi Minh City University, noted the rig incident came days after an official visit to Asia by US President Barack Obama, who reiterated his commitment to allies in the region, including Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Malaysia.

"Hence, we can read the Chinese move was also a response to Obama's pivot to Asia-Pacific," Viet told Al Jazeera.

In Manila, President Benigno S Aquino III and Obama recently signed a 10-year pact that will give the US military greater access to the Philippines.

"The United States is not trying to reclaim old bases or build new bases… We'll work together to build the Philippines' defence capabilities and to work with other nations to promote regional stability, such as in the South China Sea," Obama said during the April visit.

Tensions among China and other nations surrounding the South China Sea have risen sharply recently.

The Philippine government seized a Chinese fishing boat and its 11 crew earlier this month on charges of catching endangered sea turtles in disputed South China Sea waters, prompting China to demand their release. China foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying urged the Philippine government to "stop taking further provocative actions".

The Philippines accused China on Wednesday of building an airstrip on a reef in the South China Sea in disputed territory. If proven true, it would be the first airstrip constructed by China on the contested Spratly Islands, and would violate the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, an informal code of conduct for the region.

Complex issues

Viet said when it comes to China-Vietnamese relations, there's more than meets the eye in the latest flare-up over the disputed territory. "There are also other factors that are raising tensions, and the issue is more complex that it appears," he said.

Over the past decade, both sides have repeatedly stated their intention to achieve a peaceful solution through negotiations, but at present there is little or no direct dialogue between the two governments.

Yet, the two communist countries are bound by significant economic ties, with bilateral trade expected to reach $60bn in 2015, growing from $50bn in 2013. Vietnam's trade deficit with China in 2013 stood at $23.7bn, an increase of 44.5 percent compared to the previous year, according to Vietnam's customs office.

"China and Vietnam need each other. The Vietnamese economy cannot exist without the Chinese one," Pietro Masina, a professor of international relations and economics at Napoli l'Orientale University in Italy, told Al Jazeera.

"There is a sort of paradox with a conflict on one hand - that I would say is regional and not only between China and Vietnam - and strong economic integration on the other hand."

Analysts have underlined the necessity for Hanoi and Beijing to negotiate over the contested areas in the South China Sea - one of the world's most important transit routes and fishing areas, which is also believed to be rich in fossil fuels. However, any potential cooperation can only reach fruition amid common ground found between Vietnam and China, as well as countries equally involved including Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan.

Vietnam insists on the necessity to work at multilateral level and within the ASEAN framework. However, China - which claims almost the entire South China Sea as its own - has made clear its ready to negotiate bilaterally only.

'Serious concerns'

During the recent ASEAN summit, the grouping's 10 foreign affairs ministers expressed "serious concerns" over the recent developments in the South China Sea.

China's foreign minister spokeswoman Hua responded to the criticism by saying the South China Sea dispute is not a problem between ASEAN and Beijing.

"China is opposed to certain countries' scheme of spoiling the atmosphere of friendly cooperation between China and ASEAN by making use of the issue of the South China Sea," Hua said. "China is ready to press ahead with the comprehensive and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea [DOC] together with ASEAN countries, so as to safeguard peace and stability of the region."

International security analyst Rommel Banlaoi told Al Jazeera it was unusual for ASEAN to speak out against China, even though it did not directly cite Beijing's oil rig deployment specifically.

"ASEAN is a diplomatic community of sovereign states with different levels of relationship with China," Banlaoi said. "ASEAN is cautious in using strong words in order not to antagonise China. But when ASEAN uses the words 'serious concerns', China knows that the problem is getting worse, and it is a signal to China to make up with its neighbours."

In the past we fought hard to regain independence for the people, and thus we cannot accept the escalation of Chinese actions.

- Nguyen Thi Huan, protester

Professor Masina, who has worked in both China and Vietnam, said Beijing's oil-rig deployment may backfire in its long-term efforts of securing the resource-rich region for itself.

"In some way, the Chinese aggressive behaviour in the contested area is a sign of weakness," Masina said. "A powerful country that wants to be a regional power is one which builds consensus around its policies. And if China is able to stand out by military force, politically it is weak. It is in the Chinese interests to find a negotiable solution to the issue."

Nationalism on the rise

While politicians attempt to find a way out of the impasse, nationalistic sentiment is rising both in China and Vietnam.

"When the enemy is at our doors, women also have to fight," said Nguyen Thi Huan, who battled the Americans during the Vietnam War. She arrived in Hanoi from Vinh Phuc province last Sunday to demonstrate against China.

"In the past we fought hard to regain independence for the people, and thus we cannot accept the escalation of Chinese actions," Huan told Al Jazeera.

Professor Viet said the rise of nationalistic fervour in both China and Vietnam over South China Sea possessions bodes ill for both countries.

"Tension at the moment is very high and both sides - who see each other as a provocative opponent - are trying to conquer public opinion… Nationalist sentiment is increasing and in international politics, it does not favour any of the parties," Viet said.
Source:
Al Jazeera

Dozens killed in Vietnam anti-China protests
At least 21 killed in latest incident of rioting over the Chinese construction of an oil rig in disputed waters.
Last updated: 15 May 2014 14:06


At least five Vietnamese people and 16 others described as Chinese have been killed in the latest incident of rioting, Reuters news agency has reported, as tension between Beijing and Vietnam escalates over the disputed territory in the South China Sea.

Wednesday night's violence comes hours after mobs burned and looted a number of foreign-owned factories at industrial parks near the capital Hanoi. The protests by workers are against China's recent placement of an oil rig in the disputed Southeast Asian waters.

Vietnam has sent ships to confront the rig which are engaged in a tense standoff with Chinese vessels protecting it.
South China Sea dispute

At least 20,000 workers began rioting in Binh Duong province on Tuesday. Smaller groups of men attacked factories they believed were Chinese-run, but many were Taiwanese or South Korean, the provincial government said in a statement.

"Today we got as close as 12 km to the oil rig, and Chinese forces reacted with many ships and followed us closely. At one point, five Chinese ships surrounded one of ours to stop us from getting close to the oil rig that is operating illegally in our territories," Colonel Phan Duy Cuong of the Vietnamese Coast Guard said.

Vietnam reacted angrily after China towed a deep-sea oil rig on May 1 close to the Paracel Islands, which are controlled by China but claimed by Hanoi. It sent a flotilla of vessels to try to disrupt the oil rig. Some of the Vietnamese boats clashed with Chinese ships sent to protect the rig, raising fears of a possible conflict.

China has shown no signs of backing down, and accused Vietnam on Wednesday of "hyping'' the issue.

"I cannot confirm to you exactly what kind of construction China is conducting on the Chigua Reef (Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands). But I can tell you that in principle the Chigua Reef is Chinese territory and so it is totally normal for us to carry out construction there as it is part of our sovereign territory," said Hua Chunying, China's foreign ministry spokesperson.

The standoff underlines China's aggressive pursuit of its territorial claims despite complaints from smaller nations such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which also claim parts of the waters. The United States, a treaty ally of the Philippines, has called the latest Chinese action "provocative''.

China's Foreign Ministry and its embassy in Hanoi issued warnings to Chinese citizens and urged Vietnam's government to protect them. The embassy's website said it saw no end to attacks by what it called anti-China forces and urged Chinese to take safety precautions and avoid unnecessary travel.

Police said 440 people had been detained since Tuesday over the violence.
Source:
Al Jazeera and agencies

Chinese team in Vietnam after deadly clashes
An oil rig in the South China Sea has inflamed tensions between the two countries, with both claiming water is theirs.
Last updated: 16 May 2014 02:25

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Vietnamese protesters have targeted Chinese nationals and buildings [EPA]

China has dispatched a working group to Vietnam after at least 21 people were killed in rioting, the country's official news agency has said.

Xinhua reported on Thursday evening that the team, led by Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Jianchao, would deal with the aftermath of Wednesday's violence that saw people burning and looting foreign-owned factories in Vietnam. There has also been unrest in the capital, Hanoi.

China's foreign minister has said Vietnam "bears unshirkable responsibility" for violence directed towards Chinese companies and nationals.

Xinhua reported that Foreign Minister Wang Yi called Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Binh Minh on Thursday evening.

During the call, Pham was reported as saying that Vietnam authorities had apprehended more than 1,000 suspects and would "severely punish" the lawbreakers.

"The Vietnam authorities will also take measures to protect the safety of the lives and property of all Chinese nationals and organizations there," the news agency added.

Concerns over China's aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea dominated a regional summit hosted in Myanmar earlier this month.
Source:
Al Jazeera and agencies

China to discuss crisis with Vietnam


Vietnamese commerce minister to meet Chinese counterpart as anti-China protests spreads to Philippines.
Last updated: 16 May 2014 22:02


The Manila protest was against Beijing's incursions into South China Sea territories [AP]

Ministers from China and Vietnam are to discuss deadly anti-Chinese riots that have affected Beijing's business interests in the Southeast Asian nation, a Chinese official said.

The discussions between commerce ministers in China's Qingdao city come on Friday, as Filipino and Vietnamese residents staged a joint protest in the Philippine capital of Manila against Beijing's movements in disputed territories claimed by their countries.

Shen Danyang, a spokesman for the Chinese commerce ministry, demanded that Vietnam took steps to ensure the safety of Chinese people, businesses and property.

"There have already been deaths of Chinese citizens and more than 90 people were injured," Shen said

"It's expected that the number of casualties will rise further. This has resulted in businesses halting work and huge property losses. China strongly condemns this."

Anti-China protests

The riots erupted after China towed an oil rig into waters claimed by both states. Factories perceived to be Chinese-owned have been set on fire. Up to 21 people have been killed and a huge foreign steel project has been set ablaze.

On Friday, chanting "China get out", more than 100 Filipinos and Vietnamese picketed the Chinese consulate in Philippine capital, carrying banners, including one that urged Manila and Hanoi to "join hands" against Beijing.

Walden Bello, a Philippine congressman, said the protesters were denouncing Beijing's moves as provocative. "This protest is all about telling China, 'Please stop your aggressive moves in our territories. Please respect the rule of international law'," he said.

China claims virtually the entire South China Sea, a busy sea lane and fishing ground atop what is believed to be rich oil and gas reserves.

This week, the Philippines said China had reclaimed land on the Johnson South Reef in violation of a 2002 nonbinding agreement to not occupy uninhabited areas in the disputed waters.
Source:
AP

Human Rights
China evacuates 3,000 nationals from Vietnam
Evacuations follow deadly rioting in industrial parks in response to China's deployment of oil rig in contested waters.
Last updated: 18 May 2014 08:18

Thousands of protesters have rallied against China in front of the Chinese embassy in Hanoi [EPA]

China has evacuated more than 3,000 of its nationals from Vietnam after a wave of unrest in the Southeast Asian country following China's deployment of an oil rig in contested waters.

Sunday's announcement came after Vietnamese civil society groups called for fresh demonstrations against China following riots earlier in the week which left two Chinese workers dead and more than 100 injured.

The violence in industrial parks has heightened tensions between the neighbours over sovereignty in the South China Sea.

Vietnamese authorities followed up a warning they would "resolutely" prevent any further outbursts by breaking up small protests in two cities on Sunday.

Vietnam's communist rulers also flooded major cities with police to avert Sunday's planned anti-Chinese protests as they stuck to their pledge to thwart any repeat of last week's violence in three provinces in the south and centre.

Worker demonstrations spread to 22 of Vietnam's 63 provinces, according to the Vietnamese government, with angry mobs burning down foreign-owned factories.

Several arrests were made on Sunday in the capital Hanoi and commercial hub Ho Chi Minh City within minutes of groups trying to start protests, according to witnesses.

Police dragged away several demonstrators from a park in Ho Chi Minh City, the AP news agency said.

In Hanoi, authorities closed off streets and a park close to the Chinese embassy and pushed journalists and protesters away.

Police were posted outside well-known dissidents houses, preventing them from leaving, according to activists.

China sends ships

In a related development, China has sent the first of five ships to speed up the evacuation of its citizens.

The Chinese government is also arranging for a chartered plane and vessel to evacuate the staff of China 19th Metallurgical Corporation, a contractor of one of the plants badly hit by the recent violence, Xinhua, the state-run news agency, said.

"Recently, there was an explosion of violence in South Vietnam targeting foreign companies, provoking injuries and death of Chinese citizens and damaging companies' properties," China's Foreign Ministry said in a statement in Chinese on its website on Saturday.

"The Foreign Ministry advises Chinese nationals temporarily not to travel to Vietnam. [It also advises] Chinese citizens and structures in Vietnam to increase their risk-awareness, to strengthen their security prevention measures, and to avoid leaving [their premises]."

Separately, Hong Kong updated its travel advisory on Saturday, warning its residents to avoid "non-essential travel" to Vietnam.

Earlier on Saturday, Xinhua reported that Guo Shengkun, the security chief, had spoken to his Vietnamese counterpart and urged the authorities there to quell the violence.

Xinhua also said Gao Hucheng, China's commerce minister, had called on officials to "bring relevant issues under control".
Source:
Agencies

Vietnam's Chinese flee unrest to Cambodia
Anti-Chinese riots erupted after China provocatively placed an oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam.
Luc Forsyth Last updated: 18 May 2014 12:06

Cambodian authorities have welcomed Chinese fleeing mob violence in Vietnam [Luc Forsyth/Al Jazeera]

Bavet, Cambodia - Chen Qun squinted into the morning sunlight as she walked out of the customs and immigration office in Bavet, a small border town that serves as one of the main gateways for land travel between Cambodia and Vietnam.

"I have no friends in Sviey Rieng so I will stay in a hotel, maybe for four days," Chen, 25, told Al Jazeera. She is one of thousands of ethnic Chinese who have fled the recent violence in Vietnam since Wednesday.

Sparked by China's aggressive deployment of a $1bn oil rig roughly 110kms inside Vietnam's exclusive economic zone, mob violence has led to an estimated 21 killings after crowds began targeting and looting foreign-owned businesses and factories south of Hanoi last week.

According to a statement from the Vietnamese government, the rioters believed they were targeting Chinese-run facilities, but also mistakenly attacked several Taiwanese and South Korean businesses.

Starting at 4am on Wednesday, Cambodian customs officer Lieutenant Prak Vibol Chey, 51, observed unusually large numbers of people massing on the Vietnamese side of the border, most of whom turned out to be ethnic Chinese. "We didn't know what was happening. Some of them were walking and didn't have any transportation," recalled Chey.

I don't know if they were nervous in Vietnam, but once they arrived in Cambodia, they seemed very relaxed.

- Lieutenant Prak Vibol Chey

According to the Department of Immigration's computerised records, more than 700 Chinese passport holders crossed into Cambodia on tourist visas over the course of the day.

Though Chey noted that "anyone with the appropriate documents is welcome in Cambodia", the Chinese people who have crossed the border at Bavet are mostly skilled factory workers - a departure from the normal tourist demographic. "Normally they come with tour guides, but not this time," Chey said.

Many of the Chinese travellers appeared nervous as they waited for their passports to be stamped, shying away from photographers.

One man - who asked to remain anonymous out of fear of further harassment - became flustered when asked by Al Jazeera about the circumstances of his exit from Vietnam, saying only that his trip to Cambodia was not a vacation, and that the situation was "very bad".

But Chen painted a different picture of the events, stating the Vietnamese had always been "very kind to me, and helped me a lot". According to Chen, the majority of looters are young ruffians, while the general population has not shown any aggression towards Vietnam's Chinese.

Strained relations

At a press conference in Beijing on Thursday, Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying berated the government in Hanoi over the riots, stating they were "directly related to the Vietnamese government's indulgence and connivance towards domestic anti-China forces and criminals".
Anti-China riots turn deadly in Vietnam

The Vietnam People's Public Security Forces - the national police under the direct control of the Communist Party - have acted swiftly against the violence, arresting some 1,400 protesters since the turmoil began. While the stream of ethnic Chinese crossing into Cambodia has slowed considerably since Vietnamese police seemingly regained control of the situation, an anti-Chinese protest planned for Sunday could cause more to flee.

Relations between the two countries are now the worst they have been since 1979, when a short, bloody war led to the deaths of tens of thousands of people on both sides.

According to the Vietnamese foreign ministry, the placement of China's oil rig violates the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and is illegal under international law. The feuding neighbours have been engaged in small-scale naval skirmishes, deploying ship-to-ship water cannons and ramming each other hundreds of times since the conflict began earlier this month.

While Hanoi has openly condemned China's actions, the outbreak of violence against foreign-owned businesses risks a potential investment backlash in Vietnam - a country with an economy highly dependent on manufacturing for the international market. Li & Fung Limited, the world's largest supplier of toys and clothes for corporate giants such as Wal-Mart, closed most of its factories in Vietnam. At a shareholder meeting in Hong Kong earlier in the week, CEO Bruce Rockowitz said they were expecting at least a week's delay in production.

Eager to please

The border crossing at Bavet appeared to be operating as usual on Friday, yet more than 200 people holding Chinese passports had crossed before midday. Under orders from their superiors, Cambodian immigration officers were exceptionally polite to the arriving Chinese visitors, smiling broadly as they took digital fingerprints - an act likely aimed at currying favour with China, Cambodia's biggest investor.

While the US has threatened to cut foreign aid to Cambodia over a series of human rights abuse allegations, China's donations to Cambodia remain the largest sent by any nation. "Last time the US cut our aid, they were going to give us 100 old trucks. The Chinese saw this and gave us 257 trucks," Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen was quoted as saying in a speech during last year's election campaign.

China has invested more than $9bn in Cambodia since 1994, and plans for an $11bn iron mining and railway project were announced late last year - meaning the government of Cambodia would have a great deal to lose if relations with China were to deteriorate.

Foreign journalists were given special permission to photograph inside the customs office, and even allowed access to the Department of Immigration's computer records. This was almost certainly an attempt to win plaudits from Beijing by portraying itself as a safehaven for China's fleeing citizens.

"I don't know if they were nervous in Vietnam," said Lieutenant Chey of the Chinese crossing the border, "but once they arrived in Cambodia, they seemed very relaxed."
Source:
Al Jazeera

El jefe del Ejército chino asegura que no cederá «ni un milímetro» de su territorio

Un muerto y 90 heridos en los disturbios antichinos en el sur de Vietnam


16 de mayo de 2014. 00:07h Reuters/Ep. Washington.

El jefe del Estado Mayor del Ejército chino, el general Fang Fenghui, ha responsabilizado a Vietnam del conflicto en el mar de la China Meridional y ha advertido de que China no puede permitirse ceder "ni un milímetro" de su territorio.

Fang ha asegurado que la plataforma petrolera cuya presencia ha provocado las quejas de Vietnam, situada en aguas cuya soberanía reclaman ambos, seguirá en el lugar en el que está, ya que se encuentra en "aguas territoriales" chinas que protegerán. El jefe militar chino realizó estas declaraciones desde el Pentágono, en Washington, y en comparecencia conjunta con el jefe del Estado Mayor Conjunto estadounidense, el general Marin Dempsey.

Fang ha criticado los intentos de Vietnam de "dificultar" el trabajo de la plataforma petrolera enviando buques. "Creo que está muy claro (...) quién está desarrollando una actividad normal y quién la está dificultando", ha argumentado. "El territorio que hemos recibido de nuestros ancestros... no podemos permitirnos perder ni un milímetro", ha añadido.

Hasta 21 personas han muerto esta semana en disturbios registrados en Vietnam durante protestas contra la política china. La violencia se ha centrado en negocios y fábricas propiedad china.

El general Fang ha asegurado por otra parte que el giro asiático anunciado por el presidente estadounidense, Barack Obama, está siendo aprovechado por algunos países de la región para generar conflictos en los mares cercanos a China y mencionó las disputas con aliados de Washington como Filipinas y Japón.

Dempsey, por su parte, no criticó explícitamente la política china, pero expresó su preocupación por el incremento de la tensión tanto durante el encuentro con Fango como durante la rueda de prensa. "Hemos hablado de lo provocativo que es el uso de activos militares para resolver disputas y de cómo genera más riesgos", ha explicado. "Hemos mantenido una rica conversación sobre cuál es exactamente el status quo y quién busca cambiarlo", ha añadido.

Decenas de buques de ambos países están en las inmediaciones de la plataforma petrolera y tanto China como Vietnam acusan al rival de provocar colisiones intencionadas entre estas embarcaciones.

China’s Achilles’ Heel in the South China Sea
Allen R. Carlson

May 16, 2014
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The recent anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam were catalyzed by China’s ongoing attempts to secure territory in the South China Sea that is claimed by both Beijing and Hanoi. Such protests represent a new chapter in the longstanding Sino-Vietnamese dispute over this maritime region. While the two countries have long been at loggerheads over the sovereign status of these ocean waters, this is the first time in recent memory that nationalist demonstrations have erupted over their status.

In light of this fact it is not surprising that media reports of the riots significance have been rather breathless, even hyperbolic. For example, some have suggested that they may create a pretext for Beijing to carry out a Russian-style annexation of the region. Others have noted that China may engage in a “forced war” to teach Vietnam, and the region, a lesson. As ominous as such observations appear, they are rather far-fetched, even misguided.

Paradoxically, the riots are more likely to lead to a de-escalation of the current Sino-Vietnamese conflict, rather than serve as an accelerant for even more confrontation.

Such a stabilizing effect stems from that fact that the riots are less indicative of Chinese strengths in Southeast Asia, and more reflective of the underlying weakness of China’s position there. While Beijing governs only the People's Republic of China, it is increasingly seen by many of its citizens as being responsible for safety and well being of overseas Chinese as well. China’s diaspora population is spread throughout Southeast Asia, including, obviously, Vietnam, yet the Chinese government is still ill equipped to provide such assistance to them.

When this overseas Chinese population is endangered, as seems to be the case in Vietnam today, China looks weak. This was evident in 1998 when anti-Chinese rioting in Indonesia erupted and Beijing could do little to stop it. Such ineffectuality led to intense criticism within China of the leadership’s handling of the situation. The memory of that critical chorus must be echoing within the minds of the Chinese leaders now when they look at what is happening in Vietnam.

Such a concern is all the more acute as this Achilles heel of the Chinese state has been amplified since 1998. Nationalist sentiments in segments of the Chinese public have hardened, and the advent of social media, such as weibo, has made the dissemination of such views all the easier. In such a caldron the attacks on Chinese nationals that have occurred within Vietnam are sure to elicit online Chinese demands for retribution. However, as was the case over a decade ago in Indonesia, Beijing has very few real policy options at its disposal. This is especially the case regarding military engagement with Vietnam as such an upping of the ante with Hanoi will only fuel even higher levels of anti-Chinese sentiment in the Southeast Asian nation, leading to more protests directed against overseas Chinese living there. Should such a situation develop it would create the need for even more reprisals from China, with the result being the construction of an unstable and widening spiral of conflict.

Such a scenario is possible, but not at all likely. China’s leaders are still risk averse, thus they are unlikely to take actions that could lead to unpredictable outcomes, but at the same time they are likely to be unwilling to allow what is widely viewed within their country as a Vietnamese provocation to simply go unnoted.

In light of such realities it should be expected that during the coming days China will loudly denounce the Vietnamese actions. However, over the longer term the riots will more likely lead to a cooling down of the conflict and a return to the uneasy status quo between the two Asian nations in which they continue to press their claims, but stop short of direct military engagement, in the South China Sea.

Allen R. Carlson is an Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University.

Image: Flickr/Creative Commons License.

China's Big Strategic Mistake in the South China Sea
Ha Anh Tuan

May 16, 2014
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China on May 1 moved its giant indigenous oil rig, Hai Yang Shi You (HYSY) 981, southward in the South China Sea (SCS). The new location, only 120 miles from Vietnam's shore, is well within Vietnam's continental shelf and its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). To support and protect this oil drilling structure, China dispatched over 80 vessels, a number that continues to rise. Foreign ships are warned to stay away from the rig for security and safety.

This move exhibits a new and dangerous escalation by China. Since 2007, Beijing has been increasingly assertive and aggressive in defending its territorial ambitions in the SCS. Chinese authorities attacked and captured foreign fishermen working traditional fishing zones in the area. Petroleum companies were pressured to withdraw from contracts with Southeast Asian claimants for fear of China's reprisal.

In 2009, Beijing officially stated its nine-dash line claim to over 80 percent of the SCS. This move was followed by the assertion in 2010 that the SCS was one of China's core interests. In 2012, China established Sansha City, the center of the local government of which was located in Woody Island, part of the Paracels and contested by Vietnam. A new garrison was formed and stationed on Woody Island. During this period, China's military capabilities have significantly improved, and it can now contest the U.S., both in the air and at sea, in the SCS.

China's newest escalation in the SCS represents a serious miscalculation by China's policy makers. They have made four strategic mistakes. First, the new development gives Vietnam no alternative but a bold and determined reaction. Article 56 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 (UNCLOS) established that a coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources in its EEZ. Therefore, no interpretation of the UNCLOS can explain China's intention to drill an oil well within Vietnam's EEZ.

Vietnam, like other countries, does not clearly explain its position regarding territorial disputes in the SCS. This strategic ambiguity gives states space to negotiate and maneuver. However, China's newest move has crossed the line drawn by Vietnam's top leaders. Hanoi, therefore, responded furiously. Vietnamese Vice Prime Minister cum Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Binh Minh called Chinese Councilor Yang Jiechi to protest China's move and asserted that Hanoi will "apply all necessary and suitable measures to defend its rights and legitimate interests" in the seas. Vietnamese marine police and fishery protection ships have been dispatched to stop deployment of the rig. China countered this move by sending over 80 vessels to protect its property. Collisions have occurred between ships of the two sides and more incidents are expected. This development has pushed Vietnam further from China and strengthened its security relations with other powers, such as the US. If Hanoi considers opening Cam Ranh Bay to a US naval presence, Washington would be remiss to turn down the opportunity. Indeed, Washington quickly commented on the incident. In a press statement May 8, State Department spokeswomen asserted that the sovereignty of the Paracel Islands is disputed and China's decision to introduce the oil rig, accompanied by numerous warships and authority vessels, in Vietnam's EEZ is provocative and raises tension.

Second, China's action violates the principles of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the SCS and deepens suspicions among regional countries about its true intention. In addition to Vietnam and the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia are increasingly concerned about China's behavior in the region. Indonesia, which once maintained strict neutrality toward territorial disputes in the SCS, has reversed its position, and is contesting China's claim in the SCS because it challenges Jakarta's rights in the Natuna waters. In fact, Chinese armed authority vessels have encountered Indonesian authority ships several times in the last few years in waters claimed by Jakarta.

If China manages to drill oil in Vietnam's EEZ, on top of taking control of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012, it will go further southward and clashes would be expected with Malaysia and Indonesia. Given Indonesia's role in ASEAN, Jakarta's recent change in position toward China is a setback for Beijing. The more assertive it is in disputes in the SCS, the more its international prestige is damaged. The achievements of China's "charm offensive" toward Southeast Asia in the 1990s could be erased by a rising tide of anti-Chinese nationalism in Southeast Asia. Collectively, on May 10, ASEAN Foreign Ministers, during part of the 24th ASEAN Summit in Myanmar, issued a stand-alone joint statement on the tension in the SCS, expressing their serious concerns over the incident and reaffirming the importance of peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the SCS. This is the first time since 1995 ASEAN has issued a separate joint statement on a development in the SCS acknowledging threats to the regional peace, stability, and navigational safety in the SCS. This represents diplomatic backlash against China in Southeast Asia.

Third, China loses its pretext for military modernization. Beijing claims that its military modernization is defensive in nature, and it will not undermine regional security. During the period of rising tension in the SCS from 2007 to 2013, China often refrained from using naval forces. Instead, advanced paramilitary forces, such as China's Maritime Surveillance, were often deployed to serve its territorial ambitions. In the Scarborough Shoal stand-off between China and the Philippines in 2012, no PRC naval ship was sent to the site, and Chinese paramilitary forces and fishing vessels managed to push those from the Philippines out of the area. However, to protect China's giant oil rig in Vietnam's EEZ, Beijing has sent seven naval vessels to join 33 maritime surveillance ships and dozens of maritime police, transportation, and fishing ships. For the first time in the last few years, Chinese naval vessels have taken part in a direct dispute in the SCS. Other countries, therefore, have reasons to worry about the true intentions behind China's military modernization program.

Finally, China's move may destabilize regional security, creating a hurdle to Beijing's efforts to restructure its economy and sustain its growth. Beijing is facing severe domestic challenges, among them deterioration of the environment, an aging population, and separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang. In the last few years, terrorist attacks by separatist forces have occurred in major cities, threatening China's social stability. In addition, Chinese economic growth has shown signs of slowing. Chinese leaders need a stable international environment to concentrate resources on internal challenges. Its actions in the SCS, however, may destabilize regional security and undermine efforts to sustain growth.

China's movement of the HYSY 981 to drill inside Vietnam's EEZ is a strategic miscalculation. Beijing has, for the first time in the recent period of tension in the SCS, employed seven naval vessels to accompany this giant oil rig. It leaves Hanoi with no choice but to match the action with "all necessary measures" to protect its rights established in international law. Given China's recent history of assertiveness and aggressiveness in the SCS, other Southeast Asian littoral states are also alarmed by this move. Beijing's efforts to win Southeast Asian hearts and minds after the Cold War have been undermined, and its military modernization program is again being questioned.

In response to China's behavior, Southeast Asian countries are building asymmetrical capabilities to protect their sovereignty against Beijing. They also explicitly welcome the involvement of extra-regional powers, such as the US, Japan, and India, in the management of disputes in the SCS. In other words, China's aggressive behavior has facilitated and speeded up the US pivot toward East Asia, which Chinese top leaders do not want to see.

Being aggressive and causing regional instability doesn't help China realize its goals of economic growth and social development. The best way for China to rise to a status of a global power is to work out a new way to rise, one in which the core principle for its foreign relations is to cooperate for mutual benefit, respect legitimate rights of other countries, and settle disputes via peaceful negotiations. Running fast does not guarantee that it will arrive at its destination.

Ha Anh Tuan is a Ph.D. Candidate in Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia, and a Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leader. This article first appeared in CSIS: PACNET newsletter here.

Image: Wikicommons.

Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea: What Should Vietnam Do?
Le Hong Hiep

May 15, 2014
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Since 1 May, China has deployed the Haiyang Shiyou 981 floating oilrig off the central coast of Vietnam for an exploratory mission. Vietnam has been infuriated as the rig has been parked well within Vietnam’s lawful Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), just 120 nm from its maritime baseline. It has also caused widespread concerns across the region.

The incident is the latest development in what can be seen as a new wave of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea following its successful de facto seizure of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012. After a relatively calm year of 2013, this new wave started earlier this year with China’s siege of the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratlys. There are also reports that China has been actively preparing for the construction of an airstrip on the Johnson South Reef, which it occupied after a naval skirmish with Vietnam in 1988.

Deploying oilrigs in Vietnam’s EEZ isn’t a new tactic for China in its maritime disputes with Vietnam. In 1997, and in late 2004, China deployed the Kantan-3 floating oil platform to drill in Vietnam’s Block 113 off Thua Thien-Hue province. In both cases, China had to withdraw the platform after Vietnam issued diplomatic protests.

Nevertheless, the deployment of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 can still be seen as an escalation of Chinese assertiveness. Unlike the Kantan-3, the new rig is equipped with much more advanced technologies that make drilling more feasible in deep-water areas. Although it’s still unclear whether the rig has indeed undertaken drilling, the enhanced feasibility of the operation means that this time China is able to pose a more credible threat to Vietnam’s legitimate rights and interests.

Vietnamese authorities also report high levels of Chinese aggression at the scene. For example, China has dispatched up to 80 vessels from different forces, including seven naval warships, to the scene to protect the rig and to intimidate the Vietnamese vessels. Chinese vessels were reportedly using high-pressure water pumps to attack Vietnamese ships. Some also rammed Vietnamese vessels intentionally, causing major damage and endangering the lives of Vietnamese crew.

Against this backdrop, questions arise as to why China has targeted Vietnam rather than other claimant states in the South China Sea.

First, China might have considered Vietnam a more ‘convenient’ target than other ASEAN claimant states. Targeting Vietnam might not stir up as much concern and protest from other powers as targeting the Philippines, which has recently tightened its military cooperation with the US.

Second, the rig’s area of operation is close to the Paracels, which facilitates China’s protection of the rig. In that sense, it’s physically easier for China to coerce Vietnam than other claimants for simple reasons of geography.

Third, Vietnam is China’s biggest rival in the South China Sea so targeting it can provide Beijing with an opportunity to test Vietnam’s genuine capabilities and resolve. Vietnam has recently invested considerably in upgrading its navy as well as paramilitary forces, such as the Vietnam Coast Guard and the newly-established Vietnam Fisheries Resources Surveillance.

Fourth, Vietnam has recently made efforts to forge closer ties with the US so the deployment of the rig might serve as a timely reminder of the consequences of such actions.

Regardless of what China’s intentions might be, its deployment of the rig is undoubtedly a serious threat to Vietnam’s legitimate interests. Vietnam must therefore stand up to the Chinese challenge. Unfortunately, Vietnam seems to have only a limited range of options to deal with this.

It’s obvious that Vietnam isn’t willing to use force to evict the rig from its EEZ—it risks a major war with China, which is undesirable for Hanoi. Vietnam’s restraint in using force is therefore understandable, although it might raise doubts regarding Vietnam’s deterrence capabilities against China.

As a result, the most important thing Vietnam can do now is to name and shame China internationally and to enlist international diplomatic support in denouncing China’s actions. In addition to diplomatic protests, Vietnam will likely maintain the constant presence of its paramilitary vessels around the scene, at least as a form of protest against China’s actions, if not as a tactic to obstruct the deployment and operation of the rig.

The most likely outcome is that there’ll be a standoff between the two countries over the rig until August 15, the date China announced it would withdraw the rig. Still, it’s unclear as to whether China will do so, and if so, whether it’ll move the rig back to its waters or simply to another location unacceptable to Vietnam.

Le Hong Hiep is a PhD candidate in Politics at the University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia. The following article was originally published by ASPI’s The Strategist here.

Sobering Thoughts: Remembering the Last South China Sea Struggle
Heather Marie Stur

May 29, 2014
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As tensions mounted in the South China Sea, a U.S. State Department telegram urged the government of Vietnam to avoid any deeper conflict with China over the Paracel Islands. There had already been casualties as a result of the dispute over which country had rightful control of the islands, and the Vietnamese government sought U.S. assistance. State Department officials contacted the U.S. ambassador to Vietnam and emphasized their interest in “cooling the situation.” They insisted that any statements to the media stress that the U.S. government took no position on the issue but held firmly to its belief that a confrontation with China over the islands was in no one’s best interests. The telegram is dated January 19, 1974.

Back then, the hostilities escalated into the Battle of the Paracel Islands, in which the Chinese navy defeated the navy of the Republic of Vietnam (a.k.a. South Vietnam) in a daylong fight. Although the U.S. had been South Vietnam’s main ally in its civil war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the north, by 1974, it had removed most of its military and financial assistance and was pursuing diplomatic relations with China. Thus, the U.S. Seventh Fleet denied the South Vietnamese navy’s call for assistance in the South China Sea as it struggled against Chinese warships. The islands and the waters around them have remained contested, with Vietnam and China each pointing to different maps to make their respective claims. Forty years after the Battle of the Paracels, the threat of war is once again brewing in the South China Sea.

Since China deployed an oilrig to the contested waters off Vietnam earlier this month, my friends, colleagues, and students here in Ho Chi Minh City have asked me what the U.S. is going to do about China. Given the history of fairly contentious relations between Vietnam and China, it is easy to understand why Vietnamese citizens are nervous, and even scared, about China’s potential for regional expansion. My Vietnamese friends, however, are not finding it as easy to comprehend why the U.S. has not come to their nation’s defense forcefully. One comment I have heard a number of times, always expressed with a sense of surprise, is that the U.S. is only concerned with its own interests. When I asked one friend why she found this astonishing given that all nations act according to their interests, she replied that Americans talk about defending freedom, yet they have not acted to stop China from encroaching upon Vietnam’s freedom of the seas.

A concern for strategic interests and a commitment to freedom are not mutually exclusive. By exercising restraint regarding the South China Sea, President Obama and U.S. policymakers are trying to avoid escalating the conflict, which could become a much more serious threat to freedom in Southeast Asia, and in the Pacific region in general, if current tensions explode into war. Concerned about China’s response, Vietnam is exploring closer relations with the U.S. cautiously. Vietnam limits the number of port visits U.S. navy ships can make to the country, so even if some U.S. military officials want to send ships to Vietnam’s aid, acting outside the constraints would violate the sovereignty Vietnam desperately hopes to protect. Forty years ago, a military confrontation between the U.S. and China would not have contributed to Asia-Pacific stability, and that holds true today. America’s measured response to South China Sea tensions illustrates an effort to maintain balance in its policy “rebalance” toward the Pacific.

Heather Marie Stur, Ph.D., is a 2013-14 Fulbright Scholar in Vietnam, where she is a visiting professor on the Faculty of International Relations at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City. She is an associate professor of history at the University of Southern Mississippi and a fellow in the Dale Center for the Study of War and Society. She is the author of Beyond Combat: Women and Gender in the Vietnam War Era (Cambridge 2011).

China and Vietnam meet over disputed waters
Talks in Vietnam are the first since a Chinese oil platform was sent to the disputed South China sea.
Last updated: 18 Jun 2014 17:34


China has sent its top diplomat to Vietnam, where anti-Chinese protesters have marched in the streets over the territorial dispute in the South China Sea.

The talks are the first since a Chinese oil platform arrived in the disputed waters.

Vietnam's deputy prime minister, Pham Binh Minh, said his country wanted to resolve a complicated situation and develop healthy and stable relations.

Al Jazeera's Adrian Brown reports from Beijing, China.

China ends drilling operation in disputed sea
Beijing says it will relocate rig having ended exploration in section of South China Sea disputed with Vietnam.
Last updated: 16 Jul 2014 03:39

When it announced the deployment of the rig, China said it would withdraw it on August 15 [Reuters]

China has ended drilling and exploration operations at an oil rig it deployed in a section of the South China Sea disputed with Vietnam and will relocate the unit, Chinese state media has said.

Beijing deployed the massive rig in early May, close to the Paracel Islands, triggering a furious reaction in Vietnam and the most serious increase in tensions in the waters in years.

Hanoi demanded Beijing withdraw the rig, and sent ships to the region to try and disrupt the operations. The Chinese move triggered protests in Vietnam and deadly anti-Chinese riots.

Beijing says it had done nothing wrong because the waters belonged to it.

News agency Xinhua said China National Petroleum announced the end of the operation on Tuesday, citing the beginning of the typhoon season, the AP news agency reported.

It said the rig would be relocated to operations close to China's Hainan Island.

The report said the company found oil and gas during the operation, but was assessing the data gathered before deciding its next move.

'Undermines peace and stability'

It has always been unclear whether the China deployed the rig for genuine commercial reasons or as part of strategy of staking out its territorial claims in the region.

When it announced the deployment, Beijing said it would withdraw it on August 15.

The deployment of the rig was seen as a highly provocative move by China, which claims nearly all of the South China Sea, bringing it into conflict with Vietnam, the Philippines and other nations.

Beijing's growing economic and military might is unnerving many countries in the region, as well as the United States, which is seeking closer ties with Southeast Asia to try to contain China.

The US criticised the rig placement "as part of a broader pattern of Chinese behaviour to advance its claims over disputed territory in a manner that undermines peace and stability in the region".

The Philippines Is Taking China To Court Over The South China Sea
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Gregory B. Poling, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Dec. 10, 2014, 3:42 PM
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Philippine Navy firing near south china seaNoel Celis//ReutersA Philippine Navy personnel mans a .50 caliber machine gun during the bilateral maritime exercise between the Philippine Navy and US Navy dubbed as Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) in the South China Sea near waters claimed by Beijing, on June 29, 2014.
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Beijing is fast approaching a Dec. 15 deadline to submit its defense in the arbitration case against its South China Sea claims brought by the Philippines.

That case, brought under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’s (UNCLOS) compulsory dispute mechanism, is summarized here.

The Chinese government has no intention of taking part in it or refuting the Philippines’ 4,000 pages of evidence and arguments. But it has made sure that the five judges hearing the case in the Permanent Court of Arbitration take China’s arguments against their jurisdiction into account.

To that end, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Dec. 7 released a position paper laying out China’s legal objections to the case.

Two days earlier the US State Department released a long-awaited analysis of the legality of Beijing’s South China Sea claims through its Limits in the Sea series.

The timing of these two releases, both in relation to each other and to the next stage of the arbitration case, suggest that policymakers in Beijing and Washington recognize the value of occupying the legal high ground in the South China Sea and are eager to influence the arbitral tribunal even if they are not directly engaging in the case.
China's Position Paper

The core of the Chinese position paper lays out Beijing’s arguments for why the arbitral tribunal at The Hague lacks jurisdiction in the Philippines’ case. China contends that:

1. At its heart the case is not about interpreting UNCLOS, but about territorial sovereignty – who owns what features – over which UNCLOS has no jurisdiction.

This argument is not compelling, at least not in China’s formulation that to rule on any of the Philippines’ points, the court “would inevitably have to determine, directly or indirectly, the sovereignty over both the maritime features in question and other maritime features in the South China Sea.”

2. Even if the case were about UNCLOS, the Philippines had no right to bring it. China argues that the Philippines bound itself in both bilateral statements and especially in the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) to only resolve disputes through negotiation.

Whether or not any such binding obligation was made is highly suspect, but Manila could easily argue that Chinese violations have nullified the DOC regardless.

China also argues that the Philippines has not met the UNCLOS requirement to only pursue compulsory arbitration after failing to reach a bilateral accord.

Beijing insists that despite decades of discussions, “the two countries have never engaged in negotiations with regard to the subject-matter of the arbitration,” and even if they did, UNCLOS does not specify a time limit for such negotiations.

If accepted, this line of reasoning would preclude a country from ever using compulsory dispute resolution no matter how long another claimant stonewalls discussions.

South China Sea HelicopterWikimedia CommonsA Seahawk naval helicopter from an anti-submarine squadron flies into the South China Sea sunset after leaving the flight deck of landing ship USS Fort McHenry on May 25, 2005.

3. Even if Manila did have the right, China is exempted from compulsory arbitration. This is Beijing’s most compelling argument.

It rests on China’s 2006 declaration, as allowed by UNCLOS, that it is exempt from arbitration on certain topics including maritime delimitation.

The Philippines has done an admirable job of framing its case as being about China’s obligation to clarify the nine-dash line and about the status of features, not about delimiting disputed waters.

But Manila’s argument is not a slam dunk. Most worrying for the Philippines is that its lawyers felt compelled to include an argument about the status of Itu Aba, the largest of the Spratly Islands, in its March 30 submissions to the court.

Were the tribunal to rule Itu Aba (or any other feature) an island legally capable of generating a continental shelf, then it would likely undermine parts of the Philippine case, especially those pertaining to low-tide elevations.

But it is noteworthy that China’s position paper does not detail this point, leaving it to the arbitral judges to connect the dots.

4. Even if China were not exempt, the use of a special arbitral tribunal in cases in which a state has not selected one of the other options for arbitration permitted by UNCLOS violates international law.

This is essentially questioning an UNCLOS provision to which China agreed in 1996. It is the least compelling of China’s arguments, not least because it is hard to fathom that a court established under the provisions of UNCLOS would feel empowered to overturn the only sensible interpretation of one of those provisions.

It is telling that amid its arguments against the court’s jurisdiction, China also touches on the merits of the case (despite insisting in the introduction that it will not do so).

In particular, it makes an argument about the ability of a state to make a claim of sovereignty over a low-tide elevation, despite acknowledging that the International Court of Justice in 2012 ruled that such a claim is not permissible.

China also defends its actions at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal since 2012, which the Philippines describe as employing the threat of force.

Yet the position paper does not address either the status of those features the Philippines identifies as rocks rather than islands, nor does it defend the nine-dash line as a claim to maritime space in accord with UNCLOS – both indicative of the weakness of China’s legal position on those points.
The US's Study

The State Department’s Limits in the Sea studies have examined the maritime claims of dozens of nations, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The latest report does not touch on the validity of territorial claims over islands in the South China Sea, reiterating the US position of neutrality.

The study’s main finding is that “China has not clarified … the legal basis or nature of its claim.” The study points out that the nine-dash line lacks “geographical consistency and precision,” which it underscores by overlaying several Chinese maps showing significant variation in the placement of the dashes.

It offers some support for aspects of the Philippine case covering Chinese-occupied rocks and low-tide elevations. At its core, the analysis offers a refutation of the nine-dash line as a valid maritime claim, and thus aligns with the heart of the Philippines’ case.

The State Department presents three possible interpretations of the nine-dash line and analyzes their legality. Each of these interpretations are simultaneously supported and contradicted by various Chinese legislation and official pronouncements:

1. A claim to islands and the waters they would generate. The study finds that this could be a legally consistent definition of the nine-dash line but points out that it has major caveats.

For one, “states and international courts and tribunals typically accord very small islands far from a mainland coast … equal or less weight than opposing coastlines.”

This means that China could at best justify an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending to a median line between its claimed islands and its Southeast Asian neighbors’ coastlines.

2. A maritime boundary. The State Department points out that the nine-dash line extends too far beyond any coastline or island to be legally justifiable as the boundary of an EEZ, and certainly not territorial waters.

The study also charges that the claim’s lack of precision and unilateral declaration fail to meet the basic requirements of a legal maritime boundary.

3. A claim to historic title or rights. This is the most complicated of the legal justifications put forward by Chinese scholars regarding the nine-dash line. The State Department rightly points out that UNCLOS “limits the relevance of historic claims to bays and territorial sea delimitation” near a nation’s coast.

Nothing in the convention justifies a historical claim of sovereignty or extensive rights far from a coastline.

And contrary to some Chinese scholars’ assertions that customary law predating UNCLOS would allow such a claim, the State Department rightly insists that the convention takes precedence.

To prove the point, it cites the International Court of Justice’s ruling that the advent of EEZs “overrides the prior usage and rights of other States in that area” – a clear refutation of China’s claims to historic rights over fisheries and hydrocarbons.
The Next Steps

China will not submit anything on Dec. 15 in response to the tribunal’s deadline. This means the judges will take it upon themselves to consider the counterarguments that Beijing would have made. This is why the Chinese position paper’s release is so important.

A group of disputed islands, Uotsuri island (top), Minamikojima (bottom) and Kitakojima, known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China.REUTERS/KyodoA group of disputed islands, Uotsuri island (top), Minamikojima (bottom) and Kitakojima, collectively known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China.

It has been timed to ensure that the judges ask the right questions, from China’s perspective. Experts in China know that Beijing will lose on at least one point if the case goes the distance.

The nine-dash line in its current form does not meet any of the requirements of a legal maritime claim – a point the new US study underscores – and requires clarification.

That is why China, even while refusing to officially take part in the proceedings, has invested considerable energy in developing a legal case against jurisdiction.

Despite its bluster, Beijing does not want to flout an international tribunal’s ruling and incur the opportunity costs that come with being seen as an irresponsible player in the international system.

As a next step, the court will ask the Philippine legal team to respond to questions and possible objections regarding its March submission.

Those questions will likely cover many of the points raised in China’s position paper, among others, since the judges will not rule on such a high-profile and controversial case unless they feel it is airtight.

Once the Philippines responds – a task that will take several months – the judges will consider the questions of jurisdiction and merits in the case. They seem ready to consider both at once, which should speed up the proceedings.

There is no set timetable for a decision, and there might be more than one request to the Philippines for clarification of points. But by late 2015, and perhaps earlier, the court should make its decision – potentially the most impactful by any tribunal established under UNCLOS.