Conflicto: Corea Del Norte en estado de guerra con Corea del Sur

Panamá imputa cargos a tripulación de barco norcoreano


AP Julio 17, 2013 8:35 pm

Las acusaciones son por el delito de atentar contra la seguridad del país por transportar material bélico sin declarar


PANAMÁ. El gobierno panameño formuló cargos criminales a la tripulación del barco norcoreano retenido en un puerto del Caribe con una carga de componentes de misiles y otras armas cubanas ocultas debajo de miles de sacos de azúcar.



El fiscal primero de drogas del Ministerio Público, Javier Carballo, dijo a la prensa que las acusaciones son por el delito de atentar contra la seguridad colectiva del país, al transportar el material bélico sin declarar y de forma “ilegal”. Sus declaraciones se dieron mientras los agentes de seguridad del país seguían despejando los miles de sacos de azúcar de una de las bodegas de la embarcación, retenida en el puerto internacional de Manzanillo, en la caribeña provincia de Colón.



“Según la declaración de embarque, este barco solo llevaba 220 mil quintales de azúcar. Nunca declaró maquinaria bélica y obviamente esto de por sí ya constituye una violación a las normas y un grave peligro para el tránsito por el Canal de Panamá, amén de ello que el destino del barco es Norcorea, que (crea) una posible violación de las resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas a la prohibición de este país de transportar u obtener armamento bélico”.



La medida judicial significa que la tripulación deberá seguir detenida en Panamá mientras se desarrollan los trabajos para desembarcar los miles de sacos de azúcar y encontrar todo el material bélico en el buque y se da curso a las investigaciones correspondientes. A su vez, la acción de la fiscalía tiene lugar varias horas después de que el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Corea del Norte dijo que Panamá debe liberar a la tripulación que fue arrestada cuando detuvieron al buque de carga porque no llevaba a bordo drogas o un cargamento ilegal.



“Las autoridades panameñas atacaron, de manera apresurada, y detuvieron al capitán y a la tripulación de la nave con el pretexto de que estaban llevando a cabo una ‘investigación sobre drogas’, y (luego) hicieron una requisa del buque pero no descubrieron ningún tipo de droga”, dijo un portavoz del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores que no fue identificado por la estatal agencia de noticias Central Coreana.



El gobierno de Corea del Norte señaló que “el cargamento no son más que viejas armas, que (Corea del Norte) envía de vuelta a Cuba tras reacondicionarlas, de acuerdo con un contrato legítimo”, y agregó que “las autoridades panameñas deben actuar para que los tripulantes del buque detenido y su tripulación sean liberados sin demora”.



Suspenden visas a funcionarios


El gobierno también anunció la noche del miércoles que un visado otorgado por la embajada de Panamá en La Habana a dos funcionarios norcoreanos basados en la isla caribeña para que viajaran a inspeccionar el barco y brindaran su versión de los hechos, no es válido porque se hizo sin las consultas del Ministerio Público, que lleva el caso. “Solo el Ministerio Público puede autorizar que ciudadanos de la República Popular de Corea realicen inspecciones al barco retenido; razón por la cual el documento solicitado en nuestra embajada con ese fin no es uno válido”, dijo la Presidencia en un comunicado.



Más temprano, el ministro de Seguridad Pública de Panamá, José Raúl Mulino, dijo que Cuba debió informar del viejo material de guerra que embarcó en un buque norcoreano que pretendía cruzar el canal interoceánico y por el cual la tripulación encaraba posibles cargos criminales.



Después de que el presidente Ricardo Martinelli anunciara la noche del lunes por su cuenta de Twitter la retención del barco y el descubrimiento de material bélico, el gobierno cubano informó un día después que el buque había zarpado de un muelle de la isla con 10 mil toneladas del cristal moreno y 240 toneladas de “armamento defensivo obsoleto” para ser reparado y luego devuelto al país.



La isla caribeña expuso sus argumentos de defensa nacional y su “firme e irrevocable” compromiso con la paz, el desarme, incluso nuclear, y el derecho internacional.



“Cuba tiene el derecho de plantear, por supuesto, su posición y nosotros en eso no tenemos nada que opinar”, dijo Mulino, en una entrevista telefónica. Pero, “ciertamente, una carga por obsoleta que sea o por dañada que esté no se puede transportar internacionalmente a escondidas y mucho menos tratándose del tipo de carga que es”.



“Para transitar por cualquier mar del mundo, la carga que usted transporta, así sea desechos, tiene que declararse y no es ilegal y contrabando”, añadió. “Ese comunicado de Cuba lo que revela es que este no era un tránsito inocente”.



Ven otros delitos


Además, el ministro mencionó el hecho de que el barco norcoreano, identificado como “Chong Chon Gang” y fabricado a fines de la década de 1970, ha estado involucrado en otros hechos delictivos.



“Es decir, no es cualquier barco el que estamos viendo en la escena. Tampoco es un barco público, oficial, militar del gobierno norcoreano. Es un barco mercante que pretendía pasar por el Canal de Panamá con un conocimiento de embarque que no reflejaba todo lo que llevaba dentro, independientemente de que el mismo pueda violar o no normas o resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas”.



Uno de los dos contenedores que estaban escondidos por miles de sacos de azúcar y que llevaban dentro parte del material de guerra cubano fue sacado del buque el miércoles y colocado en un patio del puerto internacional de Manzanillo, en la provincia caribeña de Colón, donde está retenida la embarcación de bandera norcoreana, indicó Mulino. Agregó que cuatro furgones más fueron encontrados en esa misma bodega, aunque no especificó lo que contenían.



“Este barco fue cargado para que no pudiera ser descargado”, señaló. “El esfuerzo es enorme”.



La tripulación de 35 marinos norcoreanos sigue bajo custodia de las autoridades de seguridad en una antigua base militar de Estados Unidos en Colón y por órdenes de una fiscalía de drogas.



Mulino señaló que esperan la llegada de expertos de Estados Unidos, Reino Unido y del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas para la tarea de inspección técnica del armamento, y que está por determinarse “si el Consejo de Seguridad toma competencia en el caso”.



La retención del barco tiene lugar en momentos en que Corea del Norte enfrenta una prohibición de la ONU para importar y exportar armas pesadas y misiles tras sus recurrentes pruebas nucleares. Martinelli dijo el lunes que creía que el transporte del material bélico sin declarar era una violación internacional y que Panamá acataba las resoluciones de la ONU.



Un intercambio de información de inteligencia en el que habría participado Estados Unidos alertó hace una semana del tránsito del buque norcoreano y sobre las sospechas de que probablemente llevaba drogas, explicó Mulino.



Una vez que ingresó a aguas del Caribe panameño, los agentes del Servicio Nacional Aeronaval y antidrogas de este país intentaron abordar el buque para inspeccionarlo, pero se toparon con la resistencia de la tripulación.



“Creo que quedamos claro y entendemos perfectamente ahora por qué fue la actitud hostil y violenta de la tripulación y de su capitán”, explicó Mulino.



El fiscal de drogas Javier Carballo aseguró que después de que se logró abrir con acetileno el primer contenedor el lunes, el capitán del barco intentó suicidarse cortándose el cuello con una pequeña navaja dentro del baño. El capitán fue llevado a un hospital de la provincia de Colón en donde permaneció hospitalizado hasta el martes por la tarde.



Mulino aseguró que el vicecanciller cubano arribó el sábado a Panamá y le solicitó al presidente Martinelli la liberación del buque, en el único contacto que han tenido ambos gobiernos sobre el caso.

ANTE UN POSIBLE ATAQUE NUCLEAR
Corea del Sur y EEUU completan un plan militar conjunto contra Corea del Norte

SEÚL, 8 Sep. (EUROPA PRESS) -

Corea del Sur y Estados Unidos han completado el borrador de un plan militar conjunto ante un eventual ataque nuclear por parte de Corea del Norte, según ha desvelado una fuente gubernamental a la agencia estatal de noticias surcoreana, Yonhap.

Ambos países han preparado un plan de contención a lo largo de estos últimos diez meses y que será refrendado por los jefes de los Departamentos de Defensa de Estados Unidos y de Corea del Sur el próximo 2 de octubre, de acuerdo con estas mismas fuentes.

"El plan de disuasión puede ser considerado el equivalente a un plan operacional", ha aclarado otra fuente bajo la condición de anonimato citada por Yonhap.

"La elaboración de un documento oficial que detalla el paraguas nuclear de Estados Unidos refleja su firme compromiso contra la amenaza de las armas nucleares de Corea del Norte", ensalza dicha fuente.

Este plan conjuga medidas políticas, diplomáticas y militares para afrontar una coyuntura de posibles provocaciones nucleares norcoreanas, dado el considerable progreso cosechado por Pyongyang en su programa nuclear en los últimos tres años, en base a un informe del Ministerio de Defensa surcoreano.

Una tercera prueba balística del régimen de Kim Jong Un disparó las tensiones en la península de Corea a comienzos de año. Pyongyang declaró oficialmente el "estado de guerra" contra Seúl a raíz de unas maniobras militares conjuntas entre Corea del Sur y Estados Unidos.

El repunte de las tensiones se aminoró al tiempo que Seúl y Pyongyang han reactivado el único proyecto económico conjunto, el complejo industrial de Kaesong, cerrado durante la escalada de las represalias entre las dos Coreas.

Fuente: http://www.europapress.es/internacional/noticia-corea-sur-eeuu-completan-plan-militar-conjunto-contra-corea-norte-20130908082853.html

Pyongyang amenaza con ataques preventivos contra Seúl y EE.UU.
Publicado: 7 oct 2013 | 8:19 GMT Última actualización: 7 oct 2013 | 8:19 GMT

Corea del Norte ha advertido este lunes que podría responder con ataques preventivos a las provocaciones militares por parte de Corea del Sur y EE.UU. contra su arsenal nuclear.

"En caso de cualquier amenaza mínima por parte de nuestros adversarios, nuestro país realizará una serie de ataques preventivos decisivos", se dice en el comunicado del Comité norcoreano de Unificación Pacífica de la Patria (CPRK), citado por la agencia de noticias surcoreana Yonhap.

El comunicado condena el acuerdo sobre la contención de la amenaza nuclear norcoreana que en las primeras fechas de octubre firmaron EE.UU. y Corea del Sur. El documento estipula las medidas que tomarían los aliados en caso de tener señales de que Pyongyang pueda utilizar su arsenal nuclear. Las medidas incluyen ataques preventivos en los componentes nucleares norcoreanos. Según el documento, Washington se compromete a apoyar a Seúl con una gama de capacidades militares, incluyendo el paraguas nuclear, un ataque convencional y la defensa antimisiles.

Este acuerdo "tiene como objetivo arruinar el diálogo pacífico en la península coreana y podría escalar las tensiones y llevar a un conflicto nuclear", según el comunicado del órgano norcoreano responsable de las negociaciones entre las dos Coreas.

El comunicado destacó que las negociaciones sobre la desnuclearización mientras Washington hace planes para atacar Pyongyang "demuestra la hipocresía" de EE.UU., y calificó de ridículas los llamamientos de la presidenta surcoreana, Park Geun-hye, a la desnuclearización de Corea del Norte, según Yonhap.

Fuente: http://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/view/107757-corea-norte-amenazar-ataques-eeuu

Actualizado: 08/10/2013 | Por europapress.es
Corea del Norte avisa a EEUU de un "desastre" si despliega un submarino nuclear
Corea del Norte ha amenazado a Estados Unidos con un "horrible desastre", si finalmente despliega un submarino nuclear frente a las costas de la península coreana, en el marco de las maniobras militares previstas con Corea del Sur.

SEÚL, 8 (EUROPA PRESS)

El Estado Mayor de las Fuerzas Armadas de Corea del Norte ha emitido un comunicado informando de que "todas las unidades militares han sido puestas en estado de alerta para que estén preparadas para lanzar las operaciones que sean necesarias en cualquier momento".

"Estados Unidos será el único responsable del horrible desastre que resulte del ataque nuclear contra sus fuerzas imperialistas", ha dicho el Alto Mando norcoreano, en declaraciones recogidas por la agencia de noticias oficial del régimen comunista, KCNA.

Además, ha considerado que el eventual despliegue del submarino nuclear "demuestra que las declaraciones de altos cargos estadounidenses, como su secretario de Estado, John Kerry, de que no tienen la intención de atacar Corea del Norte, son puras mentiras".

El Ministerio de Defensa de Corea del Sur ha informado de que las maniobras navales tendrán lugar entre el martes y el jueves al sur de la península coreana. Se espera que intervengan distintas embarcaciones, incluido el submarino nuclear George Washington.

Es habitual que Seúl y Washington lleven a cabo ejercicios militares conjuntos para fortalecer su cooperación en materia defensiva ante las continuas amenazas norcoreanas. Anualmente, también intervienen fuerzas japonesas.

Asimismo, es habitual que, antes y después de que se lleven a cabo estas prácticas militares conjuntas, el régimen comunista amenace a Estados Unidos y a sus vecinos regionales con graves consecuencias, aunque nunca pasa a la acción.

Fuente: http://noticias.es.msn.com/mundo/corea-del-norte-avisa-a-eeuu-de-un-desastre-si-despliega-un-submarino-nuclear-1

Por Uno Noticias, http://www.unotv.com/, Última actualización: 08/10/2013
Corea del Sur reactiva reactor nuclear de Yongbyon
El complejo tiene capacidad para fabricar armas atómicas.

Corea del Sur confirmó este martes que el complejo nuclear norcoreano de Yongbyon, que tiene capacidad para fabricar armas atómicas, ha sido reactivado y sus actividades se han reanudado por completo, tras su suspensión en 2007.

El Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (NIS) de Corea del Sur presentó este martes al Parlamento un reporte en el que confirmó la completa reanudación de las actividades del reactor de plutonio, según un reporte de la agencia estatal de noticias surcoreana Yonhap.

La agencia de espionaje de Corea del Sur informó a legisladores que el reactor de cinco megavatios moderado por grafito reinició sus operaciones en agosto, tal y como había anunciado Corea del Norte, afirmó el legislador Cho Won-jin, presente en la sesión de este martes.

El régimen de Corea del Norte advirtió en abril pasado que reanudaría las operaciones del reactor de Yongbyon para fortalecer su potencial nuclear, ante el aumento de las tensiones en la Península Coreana, y la realización de su tercer ensayo nuclear en febrero pasado.

El mes pasado, expertos del Instituto de Estudios Avanzados US-Korea de la Universidad Johns Hopkins revelaron imágenes de satélites tomadas el 31 de agosto pasado, en las que se ve vapor blanco que sale de un edificio del reactor de Yongbyon, lo que supondría su reapertura.

Pese a las fotografías, tanto el gobierno de Corea del Sur como la Agencia Internacional de Energía Atómica (AIEA) se declararon incapaces de comprobar los informes de la posible reapertura del complejo nuclear norcoreano, hasta este martes.

Según la agencia de espionaje surcoreana, Corea del Norte podría haber realizado pruebas, antes de poner en funcionamiento el reactor nuclear, cerrado desde 2007, bajo un acuerdo internacional sobre el desarme en la Península de Corea, que está estancado.

Fuente: http://noticias.prodigy.msn.com/internacional/corea-del-sur-reactiva-reactor-nuclear-de-yongbyon

Por Uno Noticias, http://www.unotv.com/, Última actualización: 11/10/2013
Corea del Norte amenaza con hundir portaaviones de EU
Se produce un día después de que EU lanzara unas maniobras navales junto a Corea del Sur y Japón.

Esta última amenaza del régimen norcoreano se produce un día después de que Estados Unidos lanzara unas maniobras navales de dos días junto a Corea del Sur y Japón frente a la costa meridional de la península coreana.

En los ejercicios navales participan el portaaviones de propulsión nuclear estadounidense George Washington, navíos lanzamisiles, helicópteros antisubmarinos y aviones de detección.

"Las maniobras de guerra muestran que la alianza tripartita militar Estados Unidos-Japón-Corea del Sur evolucionó hacia una alianza de guerra nuclear y actualmente está operativa", añadió.

Corea del Norte ha condenado en varias ocasiones las maniobras militares conjuntas al sur de su frontera y ha amenazado con contraataques que no se materializaron.

Pyongyang: "La alianza militar entre EE.UU. y Japón amenaza la paz mundial"
Publicado: 16 oct 2013 | 13:46 GMT Última actualización: 16 oct 2013 | 13:46 GMT

Las autoridades de Corea del Norte creen que el fortalecimiento de la alianza militar entre Japón y EE.UU. representa una amenaza a la seguridad mundial, según informó la agencia surcoreana de noticias Yonhap.

El periódico norcoreano 'Rodong Sinmun', citado por Yonhap, indicó que la alianza militar bilateral fue creada para invadir otros países y destruir la paz en la región.

El diario hizo referencia a la reciente visita del secretario de Estado de EE.UU., John Kerry, a Tokio y a la reunión de los ministros de Exteriores y de Defensa de los dos países celebrada el pasado 3 de octubre.

Kerry apoyó el derecho de Tokio a "la autodefensa colectiva" y otras iniciativas que puedan mejorar la capacidad militar del país asiático. Como resultado de las negociaciones, las partes acordaron firmar un nuevo acuerdo militar hasta finales de 2014 .

'Rodong Sinmun' agregó que con sus acciones Japón está tratando de revivir la idea de la Esfera de Coprosperidad de la Gran Asia Oriental, que se convirtió en el fundamento de la ideología japonesa durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial.

Según el periódico norcoreano, el objetivo de Washington y Tokio es invadir conjuntamente territorios asiáticos. Su cooperación "puede ser vista como un intento de comenzar una nueva guerra agresiva en la península y de establecer el control militar sobre toda Asia", subrayó el diario.

Corea del Norte celebra una reunión excepcional de mandos militares.
Agencia EFE – mar, 22 oct 2013

Seúl, 22 oct (EFE).- Miles de oficiales e instructores del ejército norcoreano están celebrando desde la semana pasada en Pyongyang su primera junta en más de una década, en un gesto que se cree destinado a subrayar su lealtad al líder Kim Jong-un, informó hoy el Gobierno surcoreano.
"La reunión se inició con la llegada a Pyongyang de unos 10.000 jefes de compañía y un número idéntico de instructores políticos del Ejército Popular de Corea el pasado jueves", detalló un portavoz del Ministerio de Unificación a la agencia surcoreana Yonhap.
La última reunión de oficiales de este tipo tuvo lugar en 1999, mientras que la de instructores se celebró por separado un año después.
Al igual que sucedía en muchos países comunistas, Corea del Norte tiene asignados instructores políticos para todos los mandos de compañía y para personal con rango superior con el objetivo de supervisar el adoctrinamiento político de las tropas de primera línea.
"La reunión probablemente esté encaminada a reforzar la lealtad de los oficiales hacia el líder, mejorar la moral de las tropas e inculcar un mayor sentido de la disciplina a los soldados de a pie", estimó el portavoz de Unificación.
Los medios norcoreanos han mostrado imágenes de asistentes a esta junta visitando importantes monumentos de la capital norcoreana como Mangyondae, lugar donde nació Kim Il-sung (fundador del país y abuelo del actual líder), o el Cementerio de los Mártires de la Revolución.
Al mismo tiempo, el portavoz de Unificación aseguró que el Norte aún no se ha pronunciado sobre si permitirá o no a parlamentarios surcoreanos visitar el complejo industrial intercoreano de Kaesong, situado en territorio norcoreano, el próximo 30 de octubre.
Los parlamentarios enviaron a Pyongyang una solicitud la pasada semana ya que quieren visitar Kaesong para conocer el estado actual de sus operaciones.
El polígono estuvo parado varios meses este año después de que Pyongyang retirara a sus trabajadores como parte de su campaña de amenazas contra Washington y Seúl, en protesta por sus maniobras conjuntas y las sanciones de la ONU.
Antes del cierre temporal, en el complejo unos 53.000 operarios norcoreanos fabricaban relojes, textiles y otros productos para empresas surcoreanas, que aprovechaban la mano de obra barata, al tiempo que el régimen norcoreano obtenía fondos aplicando una quita al sueldo de los trabajadores.

Corea del Norte celebra una reunión excepcional de mandos militares.

ivan_077 escribió:

Corea del Norte celebra una reunión excepcional de mandos militares.

Traducción: se fueron te prostis y tratan de jsutificar el gasto. Si esos weyes son bien corruptísimos...

Ordena Norcorea a su Ejército estar listo para una guerra

El líder norcoreano, Kim Jong-un, dijo a sus militares que consideraran que "una guerra estalla sin previo aviso"

TOKIO, 25 de diciembre.- El líder norcoreano, Kim Jong-un, ordenó a sus militares estar preparados para el combate, "siempre teniendo en cuenta que una guerra estalla sin previo aviso", en medio de las fuertes tensiones en la península coreana.

Kim visitó una unidad del ejército cerca de la ciudad portuaria occidental de Nampo en la víspera de la Navidad, el día que Kim Jong-il, su difunto padre, fue nombrado comandante supremo del Ejército Popular.

El líder norcoreano fue acompañado por altos funcionarios y jefes militares, incluyendo Choe Ryong Hae, el jefe del Buró Político militar, y Ri Yong Gil, jefe militar de Corea del Norte, señaló el informe.

Choe se ha considerado el nuevo “número dos” del país comunista tras la reciente ejecución de Jang Song-thaek, tío del líder, en una purga inusualmente pública.

Seúl y Washington advirtieron de posibles actos de provocación por parte del Norte con armas nucleares a raíz de la ejecución de Jang Song-Thaek, un alto dirigente que era también el tío y mentor político de Kim.

Su inspección militar coincidió con la primera visita de la presidenta surcoreana, Park Geun-hye, a una unidad de primera línea desde que asumió el poder en febrero, de acuerdo con la agencia surcoreana de noticias Yonhap.

Park ordenó a los soldados que afronten "con firmeza y sin piedad" las provocaciones de Corea del Norte.

gak

China marca la 'línea roja' y afirma que no permitirá una guerra en la península coreana

Publicado: 8 mar 2014 | 17:21 GMT Última actualización: 8 mar 2014 | 17:22 GMT

China no permitirá que haya una guerra en la península coreana, afirmó este sábado el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del gigante asiático, Wang Yi, que mostró su deseo de que se retomen lo antes posible las conversaciones a seis bandas.

"La península coreana está justo al lado de China. Tenemos una 'línea roja', que es que no permitiremos la guerra o la inestabilidad allí", dijo el canciller durante una rueda de prensa celebrada en Pekín en el marco de la sesión anual de la Asamblea Nacional Popular, según cita la agencia Reuters.

Wang advirtió que la paz "verdadera y duradera" en la península solo será posible a través de la desnuclearización y urgió a todas la partes enfrentadas a "actuar con moderación" y "mostrar buena voluntad".

"Si se me permite usar algunas metáforas, creo que tenemos que subir la cuesta, quitar obstáculos y seguir el camino correcto", señaló el canciller.

Según el ministro, "la confrontación no puede traer nada más que tensión y la guerra solo puede causar un desastre".

Asimismo, hizo un llamamiento a la reanudación de las conversaciones entre Corea del Norte, Corea del Sur, EE.UU., Japón, Rusia y China, país anfitrión de esas charlas.

"En su calidad de país anfitrión, China desea una pronta reanudación de las conversaciones a seis bandas. Un diálogo es mejor que nada, y mejor temprano que tarde", concluyó Wang.

China es el socio diplomático y económico más importante de Corea del Norte. Sin embargo la paciencia de Pekín con Piongyang se ha puesto a prueba después de que el Ejército norcoreano llevara a cabo tres ensayos nucleares, así como otros ejercicios militares.

Pyongyang fires two missiles into sea as leaders of South Korea, Japan and the US discuss its arms programmes.
Last updated: 26 Mar 2014 02:15


North Korea has fired two mid-range ballistic missiles into the sea off its east coast and towards Japan, South Korea's military said as the leaders of South Korea, Japan and the United States discussed North Korea's arms programmes.

The missiles, which appeared to be Rodong class, were launched from an area north of Pyongyang and flew about 650km before dropping into the water, said an official at South Korea's office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who asked not to be named.

The North likely launched the missiles to drop short of its maximum range, which is believed to be more than 1,000km and enough to hit much of Japan, "mindful of neighbouring countries' reaction," the official said, without elaborating.

Wednesday's launch came on the day Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met South Korean President Park Geun-hye and US President Barack Obama, the Reuters news agency reported.

Obama, speaking after meeting both leaders on the sidelines of a nuclear security summit in The Hague, said the three countries had presented a united front against the threat posed by North Korea's arms programmes.

The launch followed a series of short-range missiles fired over the past two months, and was seen as an act of defiance towards the annual South Korean-US joint military drills that are currently under way.

'Talks unaffected'
The launches will not affect planned talks between Tokyo and Pyongyang this month over North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes, Jiji news agency quoted a Japanese Foreign Ministry official as saying on Wednesday.
Separately, Japanese media reported that Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida told a parliamentary committee that the Japanese government had protested against the missile launches through its embassy in Beijing.

The North's ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva So Se Pyongm said on Tuesday the country was conducting routine military exercises, when asked about the timing of the missiles coinciding with joint US-South Korea military drills.

Pyongyang routinely denounces annual US and South Korean joint military exercises as preparation for war.

The North was angered in February when a nuclear-capable US B-52 bomber made a sortie over South Korea, though the flight did not trigger the sharp escalation of military tension that was seen a year ago.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2014/03/defiant-north-korea-test-fires-more-rockets-20143261549693141.html

Security Council to meet on N Korea missiles
UN Security Council will discuss response to latest rocket test launches from Pyongyang, officials say.
Last updated: 27 Mar 2014 00:58



North Korea fired two medium-range Rodong ballistic missiles into the sea on Tuesday [Reuters]


The UN Security Council will hold closed-door consultations to discuss a possible condemnation of North Korea's latest ballistic missile launches, UN diplomats said.

The request for a special session on North Korea came from the United States, council diplomats told the Reuters news agency on condition of anonymity on Wednesday. The meeting of the 15-nation council was scheduled for 21:00GMT on Thursday.
In what appeared to be a show of defiance, North Korea fired two medium-range Rodong ballistic missiles into the sea at 2:35am Japan and Korea time (17:35 GMT Tuesday), both Tokyo and Seoul said.

North Korea's first firing in four years of mid-range Rodong missiles that can hit Japan followed a series of short-range rocket launches over the past two months.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's press office issued a statement condemning the latest missile launch.

"Such launches are contrary to building trust in the region. The Secretary-General urges the DPRK [North Korea] to cease its ballistic missile activities and focus, together with other countries concerned, on the dialogue and diplomacy necessary to maintain regional peace and security," the statement said.

Council diplomats said Washington was expected to propose a Security Council statement that would condemn the missile firings. It was not clear whether China, Pyongyang's protector on the council, would support such a condemnation, though it has been willing to back rebukes of Pyongyang in the past.

Deputy US State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf said on Tuesday, "We are closely coordinating with our allies and partners, including in the UN Security Council, to take the appropriate measures in response to this latest provocation and to address the threat to global security posed by the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes."

There is also a possibility, the diplomats said, of the Security Council's North Korea sanctions committee eventually expanding the current UN blacklist to include additional North Korean entities involved in Pyongyang's missile programme.

Expansion of the blacklist would take more time and was not expected to be decided on Thursday, the diplomats said.

According to diplomats, ballistic missile launches are banned under UN Security Council resolutions adopted in response to North Korea's 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests and subsequent rocket firings.

Those resolutions imposed a series of UN sanctions on Pyongyang that target the country's missile and nuclear programmes and attempt to punish North Korea's reclusive leadership through a ban on luxury goods.

Por Ap
dom, 30 mar 2014 23:18

Seúl. Corea del Sur respondió el lunes al fuego y disparó contra aguas norcoreanas después que varios proyectiles de la artillería de Pyongyang cayeron cerca del límite marítimo en disputa entre ambos rivales, informó un oficial militar surcoreano.

Ninguna de las dos partes disparó contra objetivos o instalaciones terrestres, dijo un oficial del Estado Mayor Conjunto de Corea del Sur. El oficial no ofreció más detalles y habló a condición de no ser identificado porque no está autorizado a hablar a la prensa.

El intercambio de fuego de artillería siguió a un anuncio poco común de Corea del Norte de que realizaría ejercicios militares, considerado una expresión de la frustración de Pyongyang por el poco avance en su reciente campaña por recibir asistencia de otros países.

En semanas reciente Corea del Norte ha subido de tono su retórica amenazadora y lanzado varios cohetes y misiles balísticos que se consideran actos de protesta contra los ejercicios militares que realizan anualmente Seúl y Washington. Pyongyang dice que esos ejercicios son preparativos para una invasión. Por su parte, los aliados dicen que los ejercicios son rutinarios y de naturaleza defensiva.

Pyongyang amenazó el domingo con realizar una cuarta prueba nuclear, aunque Seúl afirma que no hay señales de una detonación inminente.

Después del anuncio de Corea del Norte el domingo temprano de que realizaría ejercicios de artillería en siete zonas al norte del límite marítimo, Corea del Sur respondió que reaccionaría con fuerza.

Pyongyang dispara proyectiles de artillería y misiles al mar, pero es poco común que revele esos planes por adelantado. Wee Yong-sub, portavoz adjunto del Ministerio de Defensa de Corea del Sur, dijo que el mensaje de Pyongyang fue un intento "hostil" de subir de tono la tensión en la península.

La península de Corea permanece técnicamente en estado de guerra porque el conflicto de 1950-53 terminó con un armisticio y no un tratado de paz. Estados Unidos mantiene unos 28 mil 500 soldados en Corea de Sur para disuadir una potencial agresión de Corea del Norte.

Avión no tripulado sin identificar se estrella en una isla surcoreana: Ejército
martes 1 de abril de 2014 11:30 GYT

SEUL (Reuters) - Un avión no tripulado se estrelló en una isla de Corea del Sur cerca de una frontera marítima disputada con Corea del Norte, dijo el martes un funcionario del Ministerio de Defensa surcoreano, lo que provocó una investigación para determinar si la aeronave procedía de Pyongyang.

El avión no tripulado cayó en la isla de Baengnyeong cerca de las 1600 horas (0700 GMT) del lunes, cuando Corea del Norte disparó cientos de rondas de artillería en los mares cercanos a una línea marítima disputada. Eso provocó una muestra de fuerza similar de Corea del Sur.

El Ejército de Corea del Sur estaba intentando verificar la procedencia del avión no tripulado y cuál podría haber sido su propósito. También estaba investigando cualquier posible vínculo con las operaciones de espionaje de Corea del Norte, dijo el funcionario militar a Reuters.

El funcionario, que pidió no ser identificado, no dio más detalles.

Corea del Norte disparó más de 100 rondas de artillería a aguas surcoreanas el lunes como parte de unos ejercicios militares, provocando la respuesta del Sur. El ejercicio parecía ser más una nueva provocación de Pyongyang que el comienzo de un enfrentamiento militar.

La agencia de noticias Yonhap, citando a una fuente del Gobierno surcoreano no identificada, reportó que el avión no tripulado era de dos a tres metros de largo y tenía motor japonés y partes chinas, al igual que una cámara pequeña.

Imágenes del avión emitidas por el canal de noticias por cable YTN mostraron los restos de una aeronave pequeña con pintura y marcas similares a los aviones no tripulados usados por Corea del Norte en un desfile en Pyongyang el año pasado.

Esos aviones no tripulados eran aeronaves más grandes modificadas para impactar objetivos predeterminados, pero se cree que no son capaces de realizar ataques aéreos o vuelos de vigilancia de largo alcance.

Aviones pequeños, controlados por control remoto y disponibles comercialmente pueden ser modificados para transportar cámaras de video y otros equipos de vigilancia.

(Reporte de Ju-min Park. Reporte adicional de James Pearson.; Traducido por Raquel Castillo en la Redacción de Madrid; Editado por Lucila Sigal)

N Korea says US 'hell-bent' on regime change

Pyongyang's deputy UN ambassador also says government planning a "new form" of nuclear test but does not elaborate.\

Last updated: 05 Apr 2014 03:32


North Korea has accused the United States of being "hell-bent on regime change" and warned that any manoeuvers with that intention will be viewed as a "red line" that will result in countermeasures.

Pyongyang's deputy UN ambassador, Ri Tong Il, also repeated that his government "made it very clear we will carry out a new form of nuclear test" but refused to elaborate, saying only that "I recommend you to wait and see what it is."

His comments came at North Korea's second press conference at the United Nations in two weeks, a surprising rate for the reclusive Communist government.

Ri blamed the US for aggravating tensions on the Korean Peninsula by continuing "very dangerous" military drills with South Korea, by pursuing action in the UN Security Council against his country's recent ballistic missile launches and by going after Pyongyang's human rights performance.

Ri also accused the US of blocking a resumption of six-party talks on its nuclear program by settling preconditions and said Washington's primary goal is to maintain tensions and prevent the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

A US diplomat who was not authorised to comment publicly later told the Associated Press news agency: "We have long made clear - in close consultation with our allies - that we are open to improved relations with the DPRK if it is willing to take clear actions to live up to its international obligations and commitments."

North Korea walked away from the six-party nuclear disarmament talks in 2009 over disagreements on how to verify steps the North was meant to take to end its nuclear programs. The US and its allies are demanding that the North demonstrate its sincerity in ending a drive to acquire nuclear weapons.

Nuclear tests

Since pulling out of the six-party talks, the North has conducted two nuclear tests, at least two long-range rocket tests and most recently short-range rocket launches.

Using the initials of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the country's official name, Ri said, "The DPRK has been making strenuous, hard efforts, very generous, toward easing the tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but ignoring all this generous position of the DPRK and its proposals, the US went ahead with opening the joint military drills, [in a] very aggressive nature, and they're now expanding in a crazy manner the scale of this exercise."

He also rejected as "illegal" a Security Council statement last week that condemned North Korea's test-firing of two medium-range ballistic missiles as violations of council resolutions.

The deputy ambassador did not answer questions on detained American Kenneth Bae or on his country's drone program, which it has been promoting recently.

South Korean experts this week claimed that two small, camera-equipped drones had been flown across the border by the North, calling them crude and decidedly low-tech. Both drones crashed in South Korea.

North Korea
North Korea's Latest Military Operations

Apr 8, 2014

by Bruce W. Bennett

The North Korean regime is less stable than many experts believe. The recent artillery exercises conducted off North Korea's western coast are the latest evidence of this. While North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un perceives these exercises as a show of strength for both internal and external consumption, they actually demonstrate that his regime is weak and that he fears instability.

Kim has been purging many in the North Korean leadership and executing some. He has certainly been able to do so, but sooner or later one or more of his leaders will seek to avoid personal and family doom by targeting Kim with assassination or a coup. Kim is trying to avert such a prospect by demonstrating his support of the military and his military empowerment—with both heavily targeted at the internal political audience.

But Kim is also testing the outside world. Every missile/rocket launch violates several UN Security Council Resolutions, and yet the United States and the UN have not taken serious action against Kim. He is thus affecting external perceptions while also demonstrating to internal audiences that he can stand up to external foes because he is so powerful and his enemies fear him.

Kim also may have called for these exercises because his military needs the practice. When the North Korean military shelled Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, they should have fired 300-400 artillery shells and rockets, and yet only 60 hit the island and exploded. This is a truly horrendous performance for a target as large as that island and at a distance of less than 15 kilometers. So Kim needs opportunities to test his military systems and train his personnel.

Recently, North Korean artillery reportedly fired 500 shells at the area of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) that divides North and South Korea, some 100 crossing the line. The South Korean artillery reportedly responded with 300 shells across the NLL, consistent with orders from ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Choi Yoon-Hee to take countermeasures three to five times stronger than an enemy attack. Kim may have hoped that South Korea would fire at the North Korean artillery, giving the North justification for a major escalation. While that did not happen, the North might still escalate, claiming that the South escalated by firing more artillery across the NLL than did the North.

One possible escalation would be a nuclear test. North Korea has announced that it may conduct a new form of nuclear weapon test, without being specific about what that meant. It could mean a bigger test, or an atmospheric test on a test stand, or a test on a ballistic missile.

Whatever form of chest thumping comes next from Kim, it is clear that his goal is to put forward the appearance of strength and power, when in reality he faces instability at home and scorn from the international community. Every artillery exercise, every rocket launch, every nuclear test is, ironically, further evidence of his insecurity and weakness.

Bruce Bennett is a senior defense analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School.

What is China's strategy for North Korea?
The key dilemma for Beijing is the question of retaining its historical commitment to N Korea to ensure its survival.
Last updated: 16 May 2014 11:23


Michael Raska is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

China has become more vocal in supporting sanctions on North Korea, writes Raska [AFP]

Since North Korea's third nuclear test on February 12, 2013, and subsequent escalating tensions and recent threats by Pyongyang to conduct a fourth nuclear test, Beijing has been more vocal in supporting sanctions and measures to deter North Korea from pursuing its WMD and ballistic missile programmes.

Moreover, recent reports indicate that China has been preparing for select contingencies, including the possibility of North Korean collapse. While Beijing has denied the reports, discussions with North Korean specialists in China point out that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) does indeed have mission templates to conduct three types of operations in North Korea.

But, the key dilemma for Beijing is the question of retaining its historical obligations and commitment to North Korea to ensure its survival.

In this context, China has been consistently ambiguous concerning the "principle for intervention" embedded in the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance that requires China to "render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal" in the event North Korea comes under "armed attack by any state".

The ambiguity is in China's position to make an authoritative interpretation in making the decision to intervene on behalf of North Korea.

China's strategic priority

China's key strategic priority is to prevent a major war on the Korean Peninsula, which also means preventing a North Korean implosion. Such collapse would undermine China's geostrategic interests by removing traditional strategic buffer provided by North Korea. This would mean that US forces would be deployed on the Korean Peninsula above the 38th parallel.
Inside Story - North Korea: Trumped up tyranny?

Beijing has therefore prevented North Korea's socio-economic implosion, while simultaneously exerting pressure on Pyongyang to return to the stalled Six Party Talks and resolving North Korea's nuclear issue through multilateral diplomatic means.

China's ambiguous stance, however, poses a challenge for the US and its allies in East Asia in trying to ascertain China's leverage over North Korea, while changing Beijing's commitment and involvement in defence of North Korea in potential crises.

Since the late 1990s, China has served as North Korea's chief food supplier and has accounted for nearly 90 percent of its energy imports. By providing critical economic lifeline to North Korea, China's diplomacy has been perceived as key enabler in defusing tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

China analysts, however, point out that Beijing does not control Pyongyang, and the extent of its influence over North Korea is overestimated. In this view, high-level meetings between Beijing and Pyongyang have stalled since December 2012. Moreover, the 2013 execution of Jang Song-thaek, Kim Jong-un's uncle and close adviser in charge of China's investment projects in North Korea, has further undermined Sino-North Korean relations.

Notwithstanding these concerns, ascertaining China's leverage and strategy toward the Korean Peninsula must be also viewed through the lens of its perceptions and responses to the policy of US strategic rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific.

Beijing has viewed Obama's pivot to Asia strategy as increasingly contentious and in "zero-sum" terms - as a comprehensive strategy by Washington to curtail China's rise and influence in the region. Beijing is concerned about US strengthening its military alliances in the region, and has periodically criticised US military deployments in East Asia, most recently in the 2013 China's Defence White Paper.

Potential conflicts

Consequently, in potential conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, China could use the PLA as a lever to mitigate the freedom of action of US forces in the region. Beijing could potentially disrupt, limit, prevent or intervene in US-ROK military responses in various conflict and unification scenarios in and around the Korean Peninsula.

China's ambiguous strategy coupled with its increasingly robust military power projection will therefore reshape security conceptions on the Korean Peninsula, and the extent of US-ROK strategic options and responses.

For the US and its ally South Korea, this means not only the need to maintain its traditional collective defence mechanism and robust force posture vis-a-vis North Korea, but at the same time, also addressing security issues that have a strong Chinese imprint.

While Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo and Washington share a common interest in ensuring stability and security on the Korean Peninsula, containing North Korea's nuclear programme, they do not discuss the modalities and country-specific responses to various contingencies and regional crisis scenarios to preserve the status quo.

In order to mitigate security uncertainties, it is imperative to enhance defence diplomacy and dialogue between Beijing, Washington and Seoul that would provide mechanism for defusing potential crises.

After all, the current interplay of strategic uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula cannot stipulate an indefinite status-quo. Whatever scenario, whether unification by force, by peaceful negotiation, by the collapse of North Korea or by nonlinear development such as foreign intervention, it may be characterised by an unexpected turn of events.

Michael Raska is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
Source:
Al Jazeera

Should America Reengage with North Korea?

The United States has favored a policy of what some observers have called “strategic patience.” There could be a better way.
Robert Einhorn

July 3, 2014
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This week, Chinese President Xi Jinping visits South Korean President Park Geun-Hye in Seoul, and next week, Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Treasury Jack Lew will meet with Chinese leaders in Beijing. These meetings provide an opportunity for the three countries to consider next steps on the vexing problem of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs—and in particular, to discuss whether and under what conditions to resume multilateral talks on the denuclearization of the DPRK.

The last round of Six Party Talks—involving North and South Korea, China, the United States, Japan, and Russia—was held in December 2008. Since then, the Obama administration has been reluctant (understandably so) to resume the six-party process, given the North’s provocative behavior and little evidence that a return to the process would produce meaningful results.

The administration has been determined to break the cycle in which the North Koreans engage in destabilizing activities, receive compensation in terms of economic and other benefits for suspending those activities, and then eventually renege on their commitments and resume those activities whenever it suits them. So instead of responding to provocative behavior by returning to the talks, the United States has favored what some observers have called “strategic patience”—resisting engagement and opting instead for stepping up economic and political pressure in the hope of altering Pyongyang’s strategic calculus and bringing the North’s leaders to the conclusion that the only sensible approach is to change course fundamentally.

But strategic patience has not produced better results than previous policies toward North Korea. Indeed, over the last five years—spanning the death of Kim Jong-il and the succession of his son, Kim Jong-un—the situation has steadily deteriorated.

North Korea has perpetrated murderous acts against the South, sinking an ROK naval vessel and shelling a South Korean island, killing both civilians and military personnel. With nuclear tests in 2009 and 2013 and test launches of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles (including in the guise of civilian space-launch vehicles), it has enhanced its capability to strike U.S. allies and eventually the U.S. homeland with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. It has publicly renounced the goal of denuclearization and stressed that its nuclear-weapons program is permanent. Contrary to UN Security Council resolutions, it has continued to peddle arms and perhaps sensitive technologies to other countries. With inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) no longer given access, the ability to monitor and understand DPRK intentions and capabilities has sharply degraded. The regime’s treatment of its own people remains abysmal. And while sanctions have increased and reinforced North Korea’s international isolation, China’s continued reluctance to use its leverage decisively against Pyongyang has enabled its leaders to evade tough choices.

U.S. policy toward North Korea is dead in the water. This is not a particular criticism of the Obama administration. U.S. policy toward the DPRK for the last quarter century has essentially failed.

Of course, some problems don’t have solutions, at least not at a price we are willing to pay. The North Korea nuclear issue may be one of them. Perhaps the best we can do is manage the problem—limit the damage as much as possible.

But this is a problem with enormous stakes for U.S. national security, for our allies, for the stability of Northeast Asia, and for the global nonproliferation regime. And it seems headed in a dangerous direction. Left to continue on that trajectory, things could get a lot worse. Simply managing the problem could become a very risky strategy. So, as frustrating as dealing with the North Koreans has been over the last two decades and as skeptical as we have every right to be about prospects for success, we should now give serious consideration to whether more active engagement with the North could serve U.S. interests.

For the last several months, China has energetically sought to build support for a resumption of the Six Party Talks. The North Koreans have asserted their readiness to return to the negotiating table without preconditions, presumably hoping to realize the economic and other benefits of engagement. But they have resisted reaffirming their previous commitments to suspend nuclear activities and pursue denuclearization, especially those contained in the September 2005 six-party joint statement. For their part, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have seen little point in resumption unless Pyongyang is willing not only to recommit to the goal of denuclearization, but also to lend credibility to that commitment by taking concrete steps to restrain its nuclear and missile programs.

In its role as intermediary, China has strongly encouraged the North to recommit to denuclearization and adopt measures of nuclear and missile restraint. Beijing has grown increasingly aggravated by the provocative and erratic behavior of the Kim Jong-un regime, especially by the execution of Jang Song Taek (Kim’s uncle and China’s main conduit to the North Korean leadership) and by North Korea’s defiance of its pleas not to carry out nuclear and missile tests. China’s disenchantment with its erstwhile ally has reportedly led to an active internal debate about whether the North has become more of a liability than an asset, but it has not yet led to a decision to exert the kind of powerful pressures that Chinese leaders fear could undermine the Kim regime and destabilize the region.

Working closely with the United States—consistent with the Xi-Obama agreement at the 2013 Sunnylands summit to cooperate on North Korea—China pressed North Korea to take steps to demonstrate a genuine commitment to disarm. But the North adamantly refused to adopt constraints in advance of the resumption of the Six Party Talks, instead claiming that it could take steps once the multilateral process reconvened. Stymied by North Korea’s position, China has turned, in frustration, to the United States and South Korea and urged them to lower their requirements for getting the talks underway. The conditions for resuming Six Party Talks are expected to be discussed at the current high-level meetings in Seoul and Beijing.

The question of whether and under what conditions to resume Six Party Talks is a tough one for the Obama administration. There are understandable reasons for resisting engagement, or at least setting a very high bar for resumption. Given the disappointing track record of dealing with the DPRK over the last twenty years, the investment of time and energy may be hard to justify, especially when the likelihood of success is so uncertain. Moreover, the American public and opinion leaders have been content to keep the North Korea problem on the back burner in recent years. Gaining their support for elevating the priority assigned to the DPRK—particularly when so many other difficult issues are crowding the U.S. foreign-policy agenda—may be a challenge.

But there are also good reasons for reengagement. Even if prospects for complete denuclearization are remote, engagement could, at least in the near term, reduce the likelihood of dangerous North Korean provocations against the ROK and other U.S. interests. It could produce constraints on DPRK programs that would curb the momentum toward the capability to threaten the United States with nuclear-armed missiles and buy time for strengthening U.S. and allied defenses against such capabilities. Through direct contacts and renewed IAEA access, it could also give us better insights into the regime’s thinking and a better handle on its strategic programs.

Given the potential risks as well as the potential benefits, it would make sense—before deciding whether to resume Six Party Talks—to test whether North Korea is prepared to engage seriously, particularly whether it is willing to accept meaningful constraints on its nuclear and missile programs.

The most effective way to test Pyongyang is through bilateral U.S.-DPRK exploratory discussions. China has made genuine and persistent efforts to persuade North Korea’s leadership to take the steps necessary to get the multilateral talks underway. But notwithstanding Beijing’s impatience with its neighbor and its increased emphasis on the imperative of denuclearization, Chinese and U.S. interests on the North Korea problem, while converging, are not identical. The United States needs an unfiltered view of DPRK positions that it can only get through direct, face-to-face contacts. And only through such contacts can the U.S. administration ensure that its requirements are set forth as clearly and forcefully as necessary, without trimming or blurring those requirements for the sake of accommodation.

This is not to suggest that the administration should turn this into a bilateral U.S.-DPRK matter or relieve China of its major responsibility for helping engineer a solution. The North Korea problem belongs to the region and the international community generally, and progress must be made multilaterally and with China playing a leading role. It is just to suggest that the United States is in the best position to test North Korea, but Washington should do so in close consultation with, and with the support of, its partners in the six-party process.

Regarding what the United States should seek in any bilateral exploratory discussions, it is probably unrealistic to expect Pyongyang to agree to implement concrete constraints in advance of the formal commencement of Six Party Talks. Instead, in the course of such bilateral discussions, the United States should seek to nail down the specific steps the North Koreans would be willing to commit to in the first few days of the resumed talks—and the specific timeframes in which it would implement those steps. If the talks commenced and the North failed to follow through with the agreement reached in the exploratory discussions, there would be clear grounds for calling a halt to the process.

During the bilateral discussions, what steps should North Korea be urged to take? They should be similar to the measures Pyongyang accepted in the February 2013 “leap-day deal”—a U.S.-DPRK bilateral arrangement that fell apart when the North launched what it called a civilian space-launch vehicle, an action that U.S. negotiators warned their North Korean counterparts would be regarded as a violation of the arrangement. So North Korea should be required to suspend nuclear activities at its Yongbyon nuclear complex—including at its uranium-enrichment facility, its experimental light water reactor, and its five-megawatt plutonium-production reactor—and to permit the IAEA to return to Yongbyon to monitor the suspension. It should also adopt a moratorium on nuclear tests and on flight testing of long-range missiles.

This time around, the moratorium on long-range missile flights tests should explicitly prohibit all launches of rocket systems with a range and payload greater than agreed limits, regardless of whether the rocket systems are labeled as missiles or civilian space-launch vehicles. If it would facilitate North Korean acceptance of such a measure, North Korea could unilaterally assert a right to carry out rocket tests for peaceful purposes, as long as it clearly agreed to refrain from carrying out such tests under the moratorium.

A key question in seeking North Korean constraints is what to do about undeclared nuclear activities outside the Yongbyon complex. Ever since the North Koreans brought eminent U.S. scientist Sig Hecker to see their new uranium-enrichment facility at Yongbyon, it has been clear to any knowledgeable observer that the facility could not have been built by that time unless a variety of enrichment-related activities and facilities already existed outside Yongbyon. Indeed, it is widely assumed that there is currently an operating enrichment plant outside Yongbyon that is producing highly-enriched uranium for North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program.

While the suspension of all enrichment-related activities outside Yongbyon and the elimination of all enrichment-related facilities would be required at an early stage of denuclearization, it is exceedingly unlikely that Pyongyang would be willing in the initial days of a resumed six-party process to make those concessions. At the same time, it is inconceivable that the United States and some of its partners would agree to resume the multilateral process if North Korea persisted in denying and concealing the existence of a critical component of its nuclear-weapons program. Therefore, it is essential that, in any agreed “choreography” for the opening days of the Six Party Talks, the North Koreans acknowledge that they possess nuclear facilities outside Yongbyon, identify the numbers and kinds of facilities and their operating status, and commit to addressing those facilities in the negotiations within a reasonable period of time.

In all negotiations with the North Koreans over the last twenty years, they have insisted that any DPRK concessions be matched by reciprocal steps by the United States and the other six-party players. “Actions for actions, words for words,” they like to say. If we want the North, at the opening of a resumed six-party process, to announce the steps it is willing to take and the timeframe in which it is prepared to take them, we can expect Pyongyang to insist that the United States and its partners indicate, at the same time, what compensation they are prepared to provide.

For North Korea’s actions in the leap-day deal, nutritional assistance was the essential quid pro quo. Whether such assistance or some other step or steps would be required would be a subject for the bilateral exploratory discussions.

Another subject for those discussions would be the purpose of the resumed six-party process. While it would not be necessary to insist on North Korean implementation of agreed constraints before the commencement of the multilateral talks, it would be necessary to agree in advance on the purpose of the talks—and to make that purpose public. In particular, it would have to be agreed that the purpose, or goal, of the resumed talks is the denuclearization of North Korea—not, as Pyongyang has suggested, a discussion of limits on nuclear capabilities by states possessing nuclear weapons, including the DPRK. It must be clear that the United States and its partners in the process do not and will not accept the North as a nuclear-armed state and that the outcome of the process, however long it may take, is the complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea’s nuclear-weapons capability.

In recommitting to the goal of denuclearization, North Koreans may well be expected to assert unilaterally that their willingness ultimately to fulfill that goal will depend on the abandonment of what they call the U.S. “hostile policy” toward the DPRK regime—or some such qualification. They can say what they will, and the terms for moving forward toward denuclearization will have to be addressed in the negotiations. But from the outset, it must be clear that the process is about disarming North Korea.

Whether or not U.S.-DPRK exploratory discussions actually result in the formal return to Six Party Talks would depend on North Korea’s willingness to accept meaningful, initial constraints on its nuclear and missile programs. If the bilateral talks reveal that Pyongyang is not prepared to take reasonable steps at the outset of the multilateral process, the United States will at least have demonstrated its desire to find a diplomatic solution and the true source of the impasse will be apparent. In those circumstances, the United States would be in a stronger position to gain international support for tightening sanctions against North Korea—just as Iranian intransigence in the P5+1 talks in the 2009-2012 period facilitated efforts to toughen economic pressures against Tehran.

Indeed, in agreeing to hold exploratory discussions with the DPRK—a development the Chinese would presumably strongly support—the United States should seek an understanding with Beijing that, if Pyongyang does not agree to reasonable steps to get the multilateral talks underway, it would be time to work together to ratchet up pressures against the North. And in parallel with the U.S.-DPRK discussions, the Chinese should weigh in separately with DPRK leaders to encourage them to reach agreement with the Americans on the measures needed to resume the multilateral process.

Of course, even if North Korea commits to implementing meaningful constraints at the outset of resumed Six Party Talks—and follows through on that commitment—there is no guarantee that the process will eventually lead to the complete and verifiable elimination of Pyongyang’s nuclear-weapons program, which must remain our firm goal. Indeed, we would have every reason to be highly skeptical—whatever the North may say about recommitting to denuclearization—that it would genuinely intend to get rid of its nuclear weapons and every reason to suspect that any constraint would be tactical, designed to realize near-term benefits, and would be abandoned when judged to be no longer in North Korea’s interest.

The uncertainties of such a path forward would hardly be ideal, to say the least. But they should be compared with the unsatisfactory and potentially deteriorating path on which we currently are. Monitored limits on DPRK capabilities at the outset of resumed multilateral talks could blunt the momentum of the North’s nuclear and missile programs, reduce the likelihood of dangerous provocations in the near term, and give us a better window into the behavior of Pyongyang’s mercurial and largely opaque leadership. These are not insignificant gains. And a resumed multilateral process would provide a diplomatic framework, which we could seek to structure in such a way as to give Pyongyang’s leaders continuing incentives to move step-by-step toward complete denuclearization.

Far from a sure thing, but more promising than maintaining the status quo.



Robert Einhorn, currently a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, was the Secretary of State’s Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control from 2009 to 2013.

Image: Flickr/Roman Harak/CC by-sa 2.0

North Korea, Beware of Seoul's Mighty Missiles

"Kill Chain": A welcomed enhancement to South Korea's military? You decide.
James Hardy

July 2, 2014


More missile news from the Korean peninsula, where North Korea's state media claimed on June 27 that the military had completed testing "cutting-edge ultra-precision tactical guided missiles," adding for good measure that the tests were overseen by leader Kim Jong-un.

Footage of the missile launch that appeared on the state-run Rodong Sinmun website on June 30 suggested they were either Nodong or Scud-derived Hwasong-6 ballistic missiles, which have been around for a number of years.

Beyond Scud derivatives, footage also recently appeared of what looks like a Russian 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 'Switchblade') antiship or surface-to-surface missile in North Korean service. The footage appeared in early June and if reliable could confirm 2008 reports of a sale to Pyongyang.

The possibility that new Russian-designed missiles are in North Korean service would add a twist to one of the most interesting developments in missile proliferation on the other side of the Demilitarized Zone: Moscow's unheralded role in helping the South Koreans develop their cruise and ballistic missiles.

These latter developments are having a major role in shaping Seoul's military doctrine--both by giving it an indigenously controlled first-strike capability to hit North Korea with little warning and by allowing it to opt out of U.S.-led ballistic missile defense programs.

As the International Crisis Group's Daniel Pinkston has outlined here, South Korea's Hyunmu-2 ballistic missile and Hyunmu-3 cruise missile, test footage of which was released in 2012, "look like clones of the Russian Iskander (SS-26) and the Iskander-K cruise missile. There is no conclusive proof that they are, but it would explain a lot about the ROK ballistic- and cruise-missile programs, which made rapid progress—including mass production and deployments with so few flight tests."

As Pinkston makes clear, the case for Russian involvement in the missiles' development goes beyond resemblance. However, given South Korea's refusal to discuss these programs, it is impossible to confirm.

The best estimate for the Hyunmu-2 ballistic missile's range is between 500 km and 800 km, depending on the size of the warhead. The Hyunmu-3 cruise missile, meanwhile, is believed to have a range of up to 1,500 km and an accuracy of within 3 meters.

These missiles are the pointy end of a spear that South Korean officials call "Kill Chain": an ambitious program that aims to knock out North Korea's ballistic missiles while they were still on the ground.

“Kill Chain” was elucidated in the 2012 White Paper, which stated that "the ROK military will decisively strike not only the origin of enemy provocation, but also the command and support forces behind the provocation.”

“To this end, the ROK military is not only reinforcing its precision surveillance, target acquisition, and precision strike capabilities in the Northwest Islands and the surrounding areas, but is also significantly strengthening its 'immediate retaliation forces', including air defense and anti-missile defense capabilities, as well as airborne and standby forces," the paper added.

The key driver for this is the transfer of military operational control (OPCON) from U.S. to South Korean command, which has been delayed a number of times but is currently supposed to occur in 2015. Along with “Kill Chain” Seoul is building the KAMD local missile-defense system based on second-hand Patriot missile batteries and locally built air-defense radars.

However, there are serious reservations about “Kill Chain”, one of which is whether it will actually work. Perhaps the most compelling argument against it was made by Yonsei University Professor Choi Jong-kun, who, in 2013, outlined for the Hankyoreh newspaper the core problems with the program.

The first is its ambitious scope: “Kill Chain” has to find evidence of an imminent threat anywhere in North Korea, assess it and pass a viable risk assessment to the top of South Korea's military command in minutes so it can order a pre-emptive strike. The system then has to scan North Korea for secondary sites that may also be preparing to launch ballistic missiles.

Even if South Korea invests heavily in its ISR capabilities, the sheer size of North Korea–and the fact that much of its military infrastructure is underground–suggests Seoul will be hard-pressed to supply the blanket surveillance it would need to function.

The second major issue critics have with "Kill Chain" is the preemptive doctrine on which it is based.

Proponents argue that it sends exactly the right kind of message to Pyongyang: that North Korea’s mobile ballistic-missile program is not the deterrent it thought it would be, and in an arms race, its much richer southern neighbor has time and resources on its side.
The counterargument, helpfully outlined by North Korean state newspaper Rodung Sinmun, is that it unnecessarily aggravates tensions on the peninsula. "If the puppets launch a preemptive strike, or even make a twitch, they will face our merciless revenge," the paper wrote in an October 2013 editorial.

For the United States, the South’s new missile capabilities and the accompanying doctrine appear to be less than welcome. For starters, “Kill Chain” complicates potential conflict scenarios and could see the United States pulled into a shooting war with the North by a trigger-happy South Korean military—something the United States has already had to deal with, according to former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. After the North’s November 2010 artillery attack on Yeonpyeong island, “South Korea’s original plans for retaliation were, we thought, disproportionately aggressive, involving both aircraft and artillery,” Gates wrote in his memoir. “We were worried the exchanges could escalate dangerously,” he added.

“Kill Chain” and KAMD also explain why South Korea feels that it can refuse to join a trilateral ballistic missile defense system with the United States and Japan, something that is a major policy objective for Washington and politically toxic for Seoul.

“If we consider various conditions such as the necessity, its adaptability to the peninsular environment and its cost, there is no appropriate logic for South Korea to join the U.S. missile defense,” Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin said in 2013, in comments that skirted the real issue – Tokyo’s involvement in any BMD program. Kim was in his current position when public opposition stopped Seoul from signing a military intelligence sharing agreement with Tokyo at the last minute in June 2012; since then, bilateral relations have plumbed new depths.



James Hardy is the Asia-Pacific Editor of IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of IHS.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Korean Cultural and Information Service (Jeon Han)/CC by-sa 2.0

Ofrece Norcorea diálogo a Seúl

Kim Jong-un estaría dipuesto a reunirse con la Presidenta surcoreana, Park Geun-Hye. Foto: AFP
Kim Jong-un estaría dipuesto a reunirse con la Presidenta surcoreana, Park Geun-Hye. Foto: AFP
Kim Jong-un estaría dipuesto a reunirse con la Presidenta surcoreana, Park Geun-Hye. Foto: AFP

AFP
Seúl, Corea del Sur (01 enero 2015).-
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El líder norcoreano, Kim Jong-un, se mostró dispuesto a mejorar las relaciones con Seúl, afirmando que está abierto a mantener conversaciones "al más alto nivel", en un momento de duras críticas a Pyongyang por parte de la comunidad internacional.

"Deberíamos escribir un nuevo capítulo en la historia de las relaciones Norte-Sur", propuso Kim durante el tradicional mensaje de Año Nuevo, transmitido en directo por la televisión estatal, según la agencia de noticias Yonhap.

"En función del humor y de las circunstancias que quedan por crearse, no tenemos motivos para no mantener discusiones al más alto nivel".

Según los medios de comunicación surcoreanos, se trata de un ofrecimiento de encuentro con la Presidenta de Corea del Sur, Park Geun-Hye, ocho años después de la última cumbre intercoreana, que data de 2007.

El entonces Mandatario surcoreano, Roh Moo-Hyun, ya fallecido, se entrevistó en Pyongyang con el máximo dirigente norcoreano, Kim Jong-Il, a quien su hijo Kim Jong-un sucedió tras su muerte, en 2011.

La declaración de este jueves llega pocos días después a la propuesta de Ryoo Kihl-Jae, Ministro de la Unificación surcoreano, de mantener conversaciones a alto nivel con Corea del Norte en este mes de enero.

"Estamos dispuestos a discutir todos los asuntos de interés recíproco", había declarado Ryoo durante una conferencia de prensa.

También dijo que estaba en disposición para encontrarse con representantes del poder norcoreano, ya fuera en Seúl o Pyongyang.

El anuncio de hoy ha sido interpretado en Seúl como un gesto de apertura y significativo.

"El Gobierno considera que es significativo, porque muestra una disposición al diálogo y a los intercambios intercoreanos", declaró Ryoo Kihl-Jae en rueda de prensa.

Por su parte, Estados Unidos manifestó su apoyo a "la mejora de las relaciones intercoreanas", en palabras de un portavoz del Departamento de Estado.

Las Coreas se encuentran técnicamente en guerra tras el conflicto entre 1950 y 1953.

La última ronda de conversaciones formales a alto nivel tuvo lugar en febrero pasado, y logró que familias separadas por la guerra pudieran visitarse, un tema clave en la península asiática.

En octubre, las Coreas decidieron reanudar las conversaciones tras una visita, muy poco común e inesperada, de dos dirigentes del Norte a Seúl, pero nada ocurrió, tras un aumento de las tensiones militares en la frontera.

Corea del Norte se encuentra sometida a presiones sin precedentes por parte de la comunidad internacional por su balance negativo en materia de derechos humanos, a lo que se suma la acusación de Washington de piratería informática masiva.

En su discurso, Kim Jong-un también se dirigió a Estados Unidos invitándolo a un "cambio valiente" de su actitud hacia el régimen norcoreano, y criticó a Washington por su papel en la campaña internacional que denuncia la grave situación de los derechos humanos en el país asiático.

"Estados Unidos y sus discípulos se dedican a esta vil estafa de los derechos humanos porque sus artimañas para destruir nuestra fuerza de disuasión nuclear y atar nuestra república por la fuerza son irrealizables", declaró el líder de Corea del Norte.

El Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU consagró a finales de diciembre una sesión entera a este tema, tras una resolución de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas solicitándole presentar el asunto de los derechos humanos ante la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI).

Ofrece Norcorea pausar pruebas nucleares

El máximo líder de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (RPDC), Kim Jong Un inspecciona la recién construida Granja de Hongos de la Ciudad de Pyongyang. Foto: Xinhua
El máximo líder de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (RPDC), Kim Jong Un inspecciona la recién construida Granja de Hongos de la Ciudad de Pyongyang. Foto: Xinhua
El máximo líder de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (RPDC), Kim Jong Un inspecciona la recién construida Granja de Hongos de la Ciudad de Pyongyang. Foto: Xinhua

Reuters
Seúl, Corea del Sur (10 enero 2015).-
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Corea del Norte dijo estar dispuesto dispuesto a suspender sus pruebas nucleares si Estados Unidos accedía a cancelar los ejercicios militares que lleva a cabo anualmente junto a Corea del Sur, señalando que estas maniobras son la principal razón para las tensiones en la península.

La propuesta, que según la agencia de noticias norcoreana KCNA fue presentada a Washington el viernes a través de un "canal relevante", se produce en medio de la reiterativa demanda de Pyongyang para que se ponga fin a los ejercicios de defensa entre los aliados estadounidenses y surcoreanos.

"El mensaje propone (que) Estados Unidos contribuya a reducir las tensiones en la Península Coreana suspendiendo temporalmente los ejercicios militares conjuntos en Corea del Sur y sus alrededores este año", indicó KCNA en un reporte.

"(El mensaje) sostuvo que en ese caso la DPRK está dispuesta a tomar un paso en respuesta para suspender temporalmente las pruebas nucleares sobre las cuales Estados Unidos ha expresado preocupación", dijo KNCA, usando la sigla en inglés de la República Democrática del Pueblo de Corea.

La portavoz del Departamento de Estado estadounidense, Jen Psaki, aseveró que las pruebas nucleares y los ejercicios militares eran temas por separado.

"El comunicado de KNCA que vincula de forma inapropiada los ejercicios de rutina de Estados Unidos y Corea del Sur a la posibilidad de una prueba nuclear de Corea del Norte es una amenaza implícita", indicó Psaki a reporteros que viajaban con el Secretario de Estado, John Kerry, por Europa.

Estados Unidos y Corea del Sur han llevado a cabo los ejercicios militares conjuntos por alrededor de 40 años, agregó.

Corea del Norte ha realizado tres ensayos nucleares, el último de ellos en febrero del 2013, y afronta numerosas sanciones de Naciones Unidas por desafiar las advertencias internacionales respecto al lanzamiento de dispositivos atómicos para mejorar su arsenal, al que Pyongyang se refiere como su "espada sagrada".

Tokio, Seúl y Washington intentarán reactivar el diálogo nuclear con Pyongyang

lainformacion.com

miércoles, 14/01/15 - 08:03
[ ]

Representantes de Japón, Corea del Sur y Estados Unidos se reunirán a final de mes en Tokio para buscar el reinicio de las conversaciones que persiguen la desnuclearización del régimen norcoreano.
El encuentro se ha planteado en un momento en que la tensión entre EEUU y Corea del Norte se ha incrementado a raíz de las nuevas sanciones económicas de Washington a Pyongyang.


Corea del Norte ofrece suspender los ensayos nucleares a cambio del fin de las maniobras militares de EEUU

Representantes de Japón, Corea del Sur y Estados Unidos se reunirán a final de mes en Tokio para buscar el reinicio de las conversaciones a seis bandas que persiguen la desnuclearización del régimen norcoreano.

La reunión tendría lugar como pronto el próximo 28 de enero, según explicó este miércoles a la agencia Kyodo una fuente cercana a las negociaciones.

Por parte de Japón participará en la reunión Junichi Ihara, director de Asia Pacífico en la Cancillería, al tiempo que Seúl enviará a Hwang Joon Kook, representante especial para temas de seguridad y pacificación de la península coreana, según las fuentes consultadas.

Por parte de Washington acudirá Sung Kim, enviado de Estados Unidos a las negociaciones a seis bandas y exembajador en Seúl que ya confirmó en la víspera su asistencia al encuentro de Tokio en un comité del Congreso estadounidense.

Las discusiones a seis bandas en las que participan las dos Coreas, Estados Unidos, Japón, China y Rusia, permanecen estancadas desde 2008.

Pyongyang ha instado en repetidas ocasiones al reinicio de las mismas sin ningún tipo de condición previa, pero Tokio, Seúl y Washington se han negado a retomarlas hasta que el régimen norcoreano no lleve a cabo "pasos concretos" de cara a la desnuclearización.
Tensión entre EEUU y Corea del Norte tras el ciberataque a Sony

El encuentro trilateral de Tokio se ha planteado en un momento en que la tensión entre Estados Unidos y Corea del Norte se ha incrementado a raíz de las nuevas sanciones económicas impuestas por Washington a Pyongyang después de que el FBI acusara al país asiático de estar detrás de un ciberataque contra Sony Pictures.

Además, Corea del Norte, que ha negado estar detrás de ese ataque, ha amenazado con realizar una nueva prueba nuclear subterránea en protesta por a una resolución de la ONU que busca juzgar las violaciones de los derechos humanos del régimen en la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI).

Closing Kaesong: South Korea Withdraws from Joint Industrial Park
The decision comes in response to Pyongyang’s recent nuclear test and satellite launch.

Putz_Catherine
By Catherine Putz
February 11, 2016
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With North Korea bent on making 2016 interesting–testing a nuclear device on January 6 and launching a satellite over this past weekend–South Korea has pulled one of the few cards remaining in its hand and has decided to unilaterally withdraw from the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The South Korean Unification Ministry said in a statement that the complex would be shut down temporarily in response to recent North Korean provocations. The complex was cited by the Ministry as source of income for North Korea:

“Until now, about 616 billion Korean won (about $516 million) have flowed into North Korea via the KIC, with 132 billion won alone last year. It is crucial for South Korea to actively get involved in sanctions while the international community discusses tougher sanctions (on North Korea) for violating UN resolutions and pushing forward with a nuclear test and missile launch.”

An unnamed ministry official was more direct to Yonhap News Agency, linking the complex to North Korea’s nuclear program: “The operation of the complex should not be used for North Korea’s development of weapons of mass destruction at a time when the international community is pushing for tougher sanctions against the North.”

Kaesong opened in 2004 and stood as a symbol of inter-Korean cooperation. The collaborative industrial park sprung from the “Sunshine Policy” of the late 1990s. An estimated 54,000 North Koreans work at the complex for some 124 South Korean companies. Each day, hundreds of South Koreans would cross the border to manage production operations. For South Korea, Kaesong was a symbol of cooperation with their northern brothers and source of cheap labor. For North Korea, Kaesong has been its only major source of hard currency.

This is not Kaesong’s first closure, though it is the first time the South has precipitated the closure of the complex. In 2013, North Korea withdrew its workers from Kaesong after South Korea engaged in military drills with the United States. After five months, however, North Korea toned down its rhetoric (again) and reengaged in Kaesong–having perhaps recognized that the closing hurt Pyongyang more than it hurt Seoul. Previously, in 2009, then-South Korean President Lee Myung-bak aired the specter of closing Kaesong during a press conference while visiting the United States a month after North Korea’s second nuclear test. He said, “If the Kaesong industrial complex were to close, these 40,000 North Korean workers will lose their jobs.” But at the time, South Korea declined to actually withdraw from Kaesong.

According to Yonhap, South Korean officials are not discussing when (or if) operations at Kaesong will resume. An official said, “Whether the park can be reopened will entirely hinge on North Korea…The North should first dispel the international community’s concerns about its nuclear and missile developments, and provide a favorable atmosphere for our firms to normally operate factories.”
http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/closing-kaesong-south-korea-withdraws-from-joint-industrial-park/