S-300 para Irán

Iran says S-300 missile deal with Russia on track
19:55 | 15/ 04/ 2009



MOSCOW, April 15 (RIA Novosti) - There are no obstacles to the delivery of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile systems to Tehran, Iran's deputy foreign minister said on Wednesday.

"There are no problems with this S-300 contract," Mehdi Safari said at the end of his visit to Moscow.

He offered no specifics about the contract's implementation, but dismissed concerns voiced by a number of countries over possible S-300 deliveries to Iran.

"After all, these are purely defensive weapons, and any country has the right to buy them. I believe this could only worry those states that have plans to attack others," he said.

A Russian arms export official said last month Iran had not yet received any S-300 air defense systems.

Iranian media, citing senior security officials, have repeatedly reported that Russia has started delivering elements of the advanced version of the S-300 missile to Tehran under a 2007 contract.

The latest version of the S-300 family is the S-300PMU2 Favorit, which has a range of up to 195 kilometers (about 120 miles) and can intercept aircraft and ballistic missiles at altitudes from 10 meters to 27 kilometers.

It is considered one of the world's most effective all-altitude regional air defense systems, comparable in performance to the U.S. MIM-104 Patriot system.

Iran recently took delivery of 29 Russian-made Tor-M1 air defense missile systems under a $700-million contract signed in late 2005. Russia has also trained Iranian Tor-M1 specialists, including radar operators and crew commanders. The S-300 system is significantly superior to the Tor-M1.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090415/121146050.html

Sistema S-300

Es probablemente el mejor sistema anti-aéreo del mercado: una inversión fundamental de defensa.

Pues están bastante viejitos, me inclinaría mas por el S400 pero debo de reconocer que viejitos y todo aun son bastante buenos. Un sistema de defensa antiaerea movil. Imaginen una gran red de estos sistemas operando en el pais. Con licencia de construcción podriamos mejorar el sistema y adaptarlo a sistemas navales para proteccion de las plataformas.

Esa serie se ha actualizado mucho en sus últimas versiones: creo que con unas baterías de S-300 de última generación podríamos desarrollar mejoras como bien señala N370.

Primero hay que ver que puede hacer Israel en contra de esas baterias de misisles, yo creo que la verdad les va a ir muy pero muy mal. Despues podriamos considerarlos para algo importante...

Pues creo que les irritan mucho: andan presionando a Rusia para no venderles los S-300 de ùltima generaciòn, a persar de que la compra ya era un hecho (y eso que el sistema es totalmente defensivo en naturaleza):

Scenario for 2009 Israeli Strike on Iran

This week, Israeli President Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu both warned that if Hillary’s “diplomacy” failed to halt “Iran’s nuclear activities,” Israel would be left with “no option” but to attack and destroy them.

Never mind that on 15 November, 2007, IAEA Director-General reported for the umpteenth time he had “been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran” to a military purpose.

A few days after that 2007 IAEA report, Anthony Cordesman, widely acknowledged to be an expert on military affairs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, updated his war-game scenario entitled “Iran, Israel and Nuclear War; An Illustrative Scenario Analysis.” .pdf

Apparently, however, Cordesman, concluded that, because of the Likudnik paranoia, “the latest IAEA report on Iran again illustrates the risks of nuclear war in the Middle East.”

Nor did Cordesman take into account the just made-public National Intelligence Estimate entitled “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities” .pdf that judged “with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program” and assessed “with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program.”

Now, fast forward to 4 March, 2009, when Director-General ElBaradei once again reported he had “been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.”

A few days after that, Cordesman and someone named Abdullah Toukan, issued what appears to be a 2009 update, this time entitled “Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Development Facilities,” this time acknowledging and quoting from the November 2007 NIE on Iran’s nuclear programs. However, they focus on this judgment:

“We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.”

Why? Perhaps because then-President Bush had gone to Israel and reportedly told the Likudniks that he didn’t accept the judgments of his own National Intelligence Council, particularly those relating to the un-likelihood of Iran’s attempting to produce weapons-grade enriched-uranium

To his credit, in his 2009 update, Cordesman does note that;

“It is not known whether Iran has some secret facilities where it is conducting uranium enrichment and a nuclear weapons program. So far no concrete intelligence information points to this being likely.”

So, Cordesman’s scenarios assume the Israelis will attack what he considers to be the three main target facilities, which if destroyed, would seriously delay Iran’s attempt to realize its inalienable rights to the enjoyment of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

• Natanz facility apparently covers some 670,000 sq ft in total, the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) complex was built some 8 meters-deep into the ground and protected by a concrete wall 2.5 meters thick, itself protected by another concrete wall. By mid-2004 the Natanz centrifuge facility was hardened with a roof of several meters of reinforced concrete and buried under a layer of earth some 75 feet deep.

• The Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) is an Industrial-Scale Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF). The U3O8 yellowcake is transported to ENTC to convert it to UF6 (Uranium Hexafluoride).

• The Arak Facility covers an area of approximately 55,000 sq ft and contains the uncompleted Heavy Water Reactor and a completed ‘heavy water' production facility and a set of cooling towers.

However, according to the DEBKAfile – an Israeli internet website that specializes in disseminating information and apparently quite a bit of intentional dis-information related to U.S., Israeli and Mid-East Security and Intelligence – the 2009 CSIS study lists an additional six targets that would need to be destroyed in order to “cripple” the Iranian nuclear program.

Lashkar A’bad, site of secret uranium enrichment plants in the north near the Turkish border.
Tehranb, for the central laboratory for developing atomic armaments as well as more uranium enrichment facilities.
Ardekan, at the southern tip of Iran, where more uranium enrichment facilities are located.
Saghand, Iran’s main uranium mining region.
Bushehr, on the Persian Gulf shore, Iran’s biggest nuclear reactor built by Russia.
Gachin, near the Strait of Hormuz, the site of more uranium mines and enrichment facilities.
But, except for its description of the nuclear reactor at Bushehr as being Russian-built, all the above is either DEBKAfile mis-information or dis-information.

Cordesman presents in mindboggling detail – specifying the number and types of Israeli aircraft (virtually all U.S.-supplied) required, the refueling-in-flight requirements (going and returning), the number and types of bombs required, the optimum altitudes to be flown at each phase of the route, etc. – three possible aircraft-accomplished scenarios, as well as one Israeli ballistic missile-accomplished scenario.

But the targets to be attacked do not include those additional targets alleged by DEBKAfile to be parts of Iran’s nuclear program.

Targets to be attacked do include Iran’s military installations; all ten of Iran’s military aircraft bases, Iran’s known ballistic missile sites and known air-defense surface-to-air missile sites.

Cordesman predicts that the Israelis will suffer a “very low attrition rate” in taking out all these Iranian military targets because Iran now lacks “modern weapons systems, integration and C4I Battle Management.”

However, if Russia delivers to the Iranians the S-300V (SA-12, Giant) Mobile SAM system – which the Iranians have already bought and paid for and for which Cordesman provides detailed specifications and resulting capabilities – then “the whole analytic model, beginning from C4I Early Warning to Response and Scramble times in the engagement of Israeli aircraft with the Iranians in possession of this integrated mobile air defense system, will have to be calculated.”

Cordesman estimates that once that Russian Mobile SAM system is operational the attrition for an Israeli Air Strike of 90 aircraft could then be “between 20 to 30 aircraft,” a loss he supposes Israel could hardly afford. Cordesman also provides an informed analysis of the dire probable environmental consequences of an Israeli attack on the Bushehr nuclear-power plant, once it becomes operational later this year.

So, what principal message did Cordesman send?

“Iran should be engaged directly by the U.S. with an agenda open to all areas of military and non-military issues that both are in agreement or disagreement.”

And what message did DEBKAfile and the Likudniks receive?

That if Hillary’s “diplomacy” fails – as it will – to “halt” Iran’s IAEA Safeguarded “nuclear activities” Israel will be left “with no option” but to attack and destroy them before the year is out!

http://original.antiwar.com/prather/scenario-for-2009-israeli-strike-on-iran/

Pues solo es cuestion de tiempo...

Suponiendo que fallen al menos el 30% de los misiles y si la bateria en total tiene 32 misiles, yo calculo que al menos serian detenidos y destruidos 60 blancos, entre misiles y aviones, por lo que veo que Israel la va a pasar muy pero muy mal si eintenta algo en contra de Iran, ademas de que han implementado medidas de combate de la infanteria en contra de la aviacion. Se me hace que se acabo la supremacia Israeli en el area.