Atentados en Francia dejan más de 150 muertos
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Atentados en Francia dejan más de 150 muertos
Estado de emergencia en Francia tras ataques que causan más de 120 muertos en París
Redacción
BBC Mundo
14 noviembre 2015
El presidente de Francia, François Hollande, declaró estado de emergencia, luego que al menos 120 personas murieron y varios quedaron heridas en una serie de ataques ocurridos este viernes en París.
El mandatario también anunció que la circulación quedará prohibida dentro de la Isla de Francia, el corazón de la capital francesa, y restableció el control de las fronteras.
"Es un horror, hemos tomado una decisión, movilizar toda la fuerza posible para la neutralización de terroristas", dijo Hollande en una conferencia de prensa en el que su tensión era evidente.
La situación en París es crítica. 1.500 militares fueron movilizados y desplegados en las calles para apoyar a la policía.
Es un horror, hemos tomado una decisión, movilizar toda la fuerza posible para la neutralización de terroristas".
François Hollande, presidente de Francia.
La Prefectura de la ciudad llamó a la población a permanecer en sus casas y ordenó la suspensión de todas las manifestaciones en las vías públicas hasta nuevo aviso.
"Frente al terror, Francia será fuerte", indicó el presidente, quien suspendió el viaje que tenía programado a Turquía para participar este fin de semana en la cumbre del G20.
El ministerio de Interior de Francia creó una página web para recopilar testimonios y reportar a personas desaparecidas: www.securite.interieur.gouv.fr
Seis incidentes
La Policía ha confirmado al menos 18 muertos.
Hubo tiroteos en al menos seis distintos lugares en el noreste de la capital francesa y explosiones en el Estadio de Francia con capacidad para 80.000 espectadores.
Todavía no se ha confirmado si los incidentes están vinculados ni está claro quienes son los autores, pero el fiscal de París, François Molins, confirmó que cinco han sido abatidos.
Ataques en París
Algunos de los sitios
1
Le Bataclan, sala de conciertos: ataque con armas de fuego y toma de rehenes.
2
Estadio de Francia, San Denís, norte de París: reportan atentado suicida en los alrededores del partido Francia–Alemania.
3 Le Carillon y Le Petit Cambodge, calle Alibert, 18 y 20, Distrito 10: ataque armado.
4 La Belle Equipe, calle de Charonne, 92, Distrito 11: ataque armado.
El ataque más grande ocurrió en el teatro Le Bataclan, donde actuaba la banda de heavy metal californiana Eagles of Death Metal.
Testigos afirman que hombres armado abrieron fuego contra la audiencia antes de tomar un gran número de rehenes.
La policía irrumpió en el local y muchos de los retenidos -más de 100- murieron.
El presidente Hollande visitó el lugar acompañado del primer ministro, Manuel Valls, el ministro del Interior
Bernard Cazeneuve,y la ministra de Justicia, Christiane Taubira.
Al llegar a Le Bataclan afirmó que "hay muchos heridos, heridos graves, en estado de shock y conmocionados por lo que vieron".
Estamos a su lado y compartimos su dolor".
Anne Hidalgo, alcaldesa de París.
"Vamos a seguir con la lucha, será implacable contra los terroristas", dijo el mandatario.
La alcaldesa de París, Anne Hidalgo, visiblemente afectada, agradeció la labor de las fuerzas de seguridad del Estado y se solidarizó con las familias de las víctimas.
"Estamos a su lado y compartimos su dolor", indicó Hidalgo.
"París está aquí, de pie", agregó.
Sin máscaras
Imágenes del canal francés BFM TV han mostrado varios buses vacíos llegando a la zona donde para recoger a personas que no se encuentran heridas.
Se puede ver gente que salieron del lugar cubiertas con mantas térmicas metalizadas.
Un hombre que estaba adentro del local, que afirmó tener rotos "algunos dedos", asegura que los hombres que se tomaron el lugar no usaban máscaras.
Le Bataclan se encuentra en el distrito 11, cerca de la sede de la revista satírica Charlie Hebdó, que sufrió un ataque en enero en el que murieron 12 personas, entre ellas el director de la publicación.
Julian Pearce, que estaba dentro de la sala, contó a la cadena CNN, que logró escapar unos 15 minutos después de que empezara el tiroteo.
Según su testimonio, los atacantes vestían de negro y dispararon directamente a las personas", agregó.
Eagles of Death Metal publicó este mensaje en su página de Facebook.
"Todavía estamos tratando de saber sobre la seguridad y el paradero de toda nuestra banda y equipo. Nuestros pensamientos están con todas las personas involucradas en esta trágica situación".
La Marsellesa
En el estadio se jugaba un partido amistoso de fútbol entre Francia y Alemania y asistían como espectadores el presidente François Hollande y el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Alemania, Frank-Walter Steinmeier.
Los comentaristas deportivos que estaban transmitiendo el partido reportaron el estruendo.
Mientras la policía evacuaba, los jugadores de la selección francesa se refugiaron en un corredor afuera de los vestuarios, con cara de "desconcertados".
Muchos hinchas salieron cantando el himno nacional, la Marsellesa.
Sin confirmación
Otro de los ataques fue en el restautante camboyano Petit Cambodge, en el distrito 10, una zona de moda cerca a la Gare du Nord.
Uno de los tiroteos tuvo lugar en un café en el noreste de París.
Según informó el camarógrafo de la BBC Charlie Pitt, que se encontraba en el lugar, un hombre abrió fuego.
Reportes indican que al menos 10 personas murieron en ese incidente.
Reacciones
Líderes del mundo han estado manifestando su solidaridad con Francia. Estos son algunos de los mensajes:
"Estoy en estado de shock por lo eventos de París esta noche. Nuestros pensamientos y oraciones están con la gente de Francia. Haremos lo que podamos para ayudar". David Cameron, primer ministro de Reino Unido, David Cameron.
"Estados Unidos está con Francia, esto no es un ataque contra París y Francia, es un ataque contra la humanidad". Barack Obama, presidente de Estados Unidos.
"Expreso nuestro repudio total ante el horror desatado en París". Evo Morales, presidente de Bolivia.
"Nuestra solidaridad con el pueblo francés y el presidente Hollande". Juan Manuel Santos, presidente de Colombia.
"El gobierno del Perú extiende su solidaridad al pueblo francés y a su Pdte@fhollandey rechaza enérgicamente la violencia desatada en París". Ollanta Humala, presidente de Perú.
"México condena enérgicamente los ataques ocurridos este día en París. Expresamos nuestra solidaridad con el pueblo de Francia, y nuestras sentidas condolencias a los familiares de quienes perdieron la vida". Enrique Peña Nieto.
"Consternada por la barbarie terrorista, expreso mi repudio a la violencia y manifiesto mi solidaridad al pueblo y al gobierno francés". Dilma Rouseff, presidenta de Brasil.
"Como un país que conoce muy bien las consecuencias del terrorismo, entendemos perfectamente lo que ahora atraviesa Francia". Recep Tayyip Erdogan, presidente de Turquía.
"Una vez más el horror y la tragedia global del terrorismo. Nuestra solidaridad con el Pueblo y el Gobierno de Francia". Cristina Fernández, presidenta de Argentina.
Fuente: http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/11/151113_paris_ataque_ep
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Re: Atentados en Francia dejan más de 150 muertos
NETWORK GRAPH OF ISIS'S CLAIMED ATTACK IN PARIS
Nov 15, 2015 - Harleen Gambhir
By Emily Estelle and Harleen Gambhir with Kaitlynn Menoche
This update is co-authored with AEI's Critical Threats Project.
ISIS’s claimed attacks in Paris on November 13 mark the organization’s most sophisticated assault in the West to date. This interactive graphic depicts the individuals, events and locations directly linked to the Paris attacks. Eight attackers in three coordinated teams attacked six locations in Paris including the Stade de France sports stadium and the Bataclan art center with AK-47s, grenades, and SVESTs. The assailants aimed to maximize civilian casualties, taking concert attendees hostage and attempting to launch a suicide attack in a soccer stadium. The total casualties inflicted by ISIS as of November 15 are 129 dead and 352 wounded, the second most deadly terrorist attack in the West since 9/11.
The eight attackers depicted in ISW and CTP’s graphic likely enjoyed the support of a broader logistics and planning network active in multiple countries. Initial reports suggest that the attackers included French nationals living in France and Belgium as well as Syrian passport holders, one having entered Europe through a Syrian refugee camp on the Greek island of Leros. ISW and CTP will publish updates to this graph as the broader extent of ISIS’s terrorist network in Europe becomes known.
The Paris attacks do not represent a shift in ISIS’s strategy. Rather, they represent a major success in ISIS’s announced plans to encourage, resource, and direct terror attacks in the West. ISIS seeks to punish Western and regional adversaries acting against it in Iraq and Syria. ISIS also aims polarize communities in the U.S. and Europe by inspiring fear and suspicion. Terrorist attacks may sharpen social cleavages in Europe and increase the strain upon refugees in a way that supports ISIS’s aim. ISIS-linked operatives have attempted attacks in numerous European countries, including France, since January 2015. ISIS will likely continue using its foreign fighter networks to plot attacks in Europe and the wider world.
ISIS will continue to export lethal capabilities from Iraq and Syria to foreign operatives plotting against the West. ISIS-linked individuals likely built the SVESTs deployed in Paris while in Europe, after receiving training in Iraq and Syria. This transfer of military knowledge undermines anti-ISIS strategies intended to contain ISIS within Iraq and Syria. The organization’s global network is active, far-reaching, and expanding while ISIS sustains tactical losses within Iraq and Syria.
Click on the image below to go to an interactive version where you can choose each icon to learn details of the attacks and attackers, the connections between and among them, weapons used, map grid references, and more.
- See more at: http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/network-graph-isiss-claimed-attack-paris?utm_source=Network+Graph+of+ISIS%27s+Claimed+Attack+in+Paris&utm_campaign=Ukraine+Crisis+Update%3A+November+11%2C+2015&utm_medium=email#sthash.6jgSQOpQ.dpuf
http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/network-graph-isiss-claimed-attack-paris
chequen este link
http://www.jpoasanctions.org/Paris_attack_chart.html
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Re: Atentados en Francia dejan más de 150 muertos
WHAT TO DO AND TO DON’T IN RESPONSE TO THE PARIS ATTACKS
Nov 15, 2015 - Kimberly Kagan
By Dr. Kimberly Kagan and Dr. Frederick W. Kagan
This article is co-authored with AEI's Critical Threats Project.
The ISIS attacks in Paris mark a step-change in the threat that group poses to the West. The tactics employed came straight from the battlefields of the Middle East into the heart of Europe. The group hit multiple targets simultaneously without detection by French security services, which are among the best in the world, despite a series of arrests aimed at disrupting this operation. That capability demonstrates superior planning ability, resilience, and operational security. The successful use of multiple suicide vests shows that ISIS was able either to smuggle them all the way to Paris or, more worrisome, build them from materials available in Europe without detection.
Europe’s proximity to the Middle East and relatively open borders make it much more vulnerable to this sort of attack, but Americans should be very concerned that a group with these capabilities could also penetrate our homeland. We must draw the right conclusions from this incident in the context of regional and world crises if we are to maintain our security in the months and years to come. The following things to do and things not to do are the correct next steps for ensuring our security.
DO take the gloves off against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Adjust the rules of engagement to accept the risk of collateral damage (civilian casualties), hit every ISIS target on our lists, and do as much damage as possible from the air quickly. This should be our immediate response.
Restrictive rules of engagement have prevented U.S. aircraft from attacking many targets in Iraq and Syria known to be ISIS nodes. President Obama’s desire to avoid civilian casualties is laudable from both a moral and a practical standpoint. Wantonly killing civilians, as the Assad regime and the Russian bombing campaign is doing, will alienate the Sunni Arab community in which ISIS and al Qaeda exist and operate. But the president has gone too far in precluding all targets with any risk of civilian casualties. The U.S. military has long experience now in choosing targets carefully to minimize that risk while still accomplishing its missions, and it should be allowed to operate as it had been doing for the first six years of this presidency.
We cannot defeat ISIS or al Qaeda with airstrikes, but we can damage both groups much more significantly than we have so far. We can force them to go to ground, to stop maneuvering vehicles, and to stop massing forces. Doing so would degrade their abilities to conduct offensive operations significantly and would facilitate the formation of opposition groups that could ultimately recapture ground they now hold.
DO put the necessary U.S. forces on the ground in Iraq to help the Iraqis retake Ramadi and Fallujah rapidly and prepare them to retake Mosul within six months.
The Iraqi counter-offensive to retake Anbar and Ninewah Provinces has stalled for a number of reasons, including struggles between Iranian proxy militias and the Iraqi Security Forces over prioritization of effort and willingness to cooperate with the U.S. But American reluctance to engage fully in the campaign has been another important factor. If the U.S. made available to Baghdad the resources needed to retake Iraqi territory from ISIS rapidly and with limited losses, Prime Minister Haider al Abadi would likely leap at the chance.
The U.S. military footprint required is likely around 10,000 troops. Iraq does not at this point need American combat brigades leading the fight. It needs more U.S. Special Forces, tactical air controllers to direct precision strikes in direct support of Iraqis fighting on the ground, additional helicopter and artillery support, and a variety of other technical capabilities that only the U.S. can provide.
Iranian-controlled militias and political figures will oppose any such U.S. deployment, probably by attacking the U.S. embassy and other American targets in Iraq. We must accept that likelihood and prepare for it by maintaining the forces and capabilities necessary to counter-attack against them within Iraq. The President must state clearly that he has already authorized the U.S. military to respond immediately and decisively in this scenario. The U.S. should seek to avoid open confrontation with the Iranians in Iraq, but we must not be deterred from defeating ISIS by the fear of what the Iranians might do to us. What they are doing against ISIS in Iraq is also failing, after all. It is, in fact, making things worse.
The U.S. must also act to support Prime Minister Abadi against his sectarian Shi’a political foes, particularly former Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki. It was the malign behavior of Maliki and his allies, after all, that generated support for ISIS in Iraq after the departure of U.S. forces. The U.S. should use all the diplomatic leverage at its disposal to strengthen Abadi as his coalition fractures and to help him plan and execute the reform agenda that is essential to Iraq’s future and to his own political survival.
DON’T over-rely on Kurdish forces for rapid, decisive operations beyond Kurdish ethnic boundaries.
Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria are among the most competent and determined foes of ISIS. They must surely be a part of any undertaking against ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra, as well as a central part of stable political resolutions in both countries. The U.S. is well-advised to help them defend their own lands against the jihadis and to integrate them as appropriate into the larger anti-ISIS effort.
But it is also important to understand that ethnic tensions between Kurds and Arabs have been high for decades and are rising. Iraq’s Kurds have a vision for an expanded Kurdistan that includes areas inhabited now by mixed populations of Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen—particularly the cities of Mosul, Sinjar, and Kirkuk. The presence of heavily-Kurdish Iraqi Security Forces in Mosul was one of the factors driving support for al Qaeda in Iraq into 2007, and the contest for control of Kirkuk has caused repeated outbreaks of violence.
Encouraging the Kurds to seize Arab territory will generate a backlash among local Arabs that can only benefit ISIS. The Kurds cannot clear and hold Mosul or its environs to the south and west on their own without the high risk of starting an ethnic war.
Kurdish forces fighting in Syria are heavily infiltrated by the PKK, which the U.S. Treasury has designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group. The PKK continues to conduct terrorist attacks in Turkey, and U.S. de facto support for the group in Syria seriously damages any prospect for a real partnership with our NATO ally. Syrian Kurdish forces also face problems similar to those described above in Iraq—any attempt by Kurdish forces to seize and hold Raqqa, for example, will ultimately generate Arab backlash and increase opportunistic support for ISIS or for al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra. The U.S. must act to exclude the PKK from participation in anti-ISIS efforts.
DON’T drop into a defensive crouch
Some candidates and political leaders are already demanding that the U.S. and Europe stop taking in Syrian refugees, close our borders, and focus on monitoring our Muslim populations. President Obama continues to discuss possible American responses in terms of the law enforcement paradigm he believes will be effective against these groups. These defensive measures will fail. We cannot close our borders so tightly that determined and skillful adversaries cannot penetrate them, nor can we monitor our own Muslim communities so carefully that no plots could escape our attention.
Attempts to rely on these defensive measures will also do the greatest harm to our own way of life and values as free peoples, moreover. Reliably detecting all such plots from among our own populations will turn our countries into police states. Closing our borders as completely as necessary to prevent any penetrations will disrupt the free flow of goods and people on which we rely and that marks one of our most important liberties. This defensive path is the quickest route to the erosion of everything we hold most dear.
DON’T line up with the Russians, Iranians, and Assad against the Sunni Arabs
The Russian-Iranian-Assad-Hezbollah military coalition is not fighting to defeat ISIS. It has conducted few major operations or airstrikes against ISIS targets. It is fighting, rather, to maintain the Assad regime, if not necessarily Assad himself, as the minoritarian dictator of as much of Syria as he can hold. Its military operations have focused on U.S.-backed opposition groups and Islamist groups not affiliated with ISIS because they pose the greatest threat to the regime. Its objectives are incongruent with ours.
Assad himself has been the principal driver of the radicalization of the Syrian conflict. His violent attacks against peaceful, secular protesters in 2011 began this war. His steady escalation through artillery, air, barrel bombing, and chemical weapons attacks against civilian populations has driven Syrians into the arms of ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra and created the massive refugee flows we now see. He cannot re-establish control of Syria except by the most brutal methods, and he almost certainly lacks the military power he would need even to try. Supporting him is supporting a continually expanding endless war.
DO take action to drive the Assad regime—not just Assad—from power
U.S. policy has become excessively focused on getting Bashar al Assad himself to step down, but more is needed to achieve peace. His departure is essential. He is the symbol of atrocity and violence in Syria, to be sure, but the majority Sunni Arab population of Syria will not accept the continued rule of Assad’s lieutenants either. They will not accept continued domination by a minoritarian ‘Alawite government, in fact, while any representative system in Syria would drive the ‘Alawites from power. The only political solution in Syria is an inclusive, multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian government, which will not be achieved by simply removing Assad himself. It will also not be achieved through the political opposition to Assad alone. The armed opposition must have a place at the peace talks and in the new political order.
DO get the Russians out of Syria
Vladimir Putin intervened in Syria to establish a Russian air and naval base on the Mediterranean and to solidify a regional alliance with Iran aimed at expelling the United States from the region. He has also used his base to press on NATO’s southern flank by violating Turkish airspace. To the extent that he has clear objectives in Syria, they are antithetical to ours—he is interested in solidifying the control of an ‘Alawite government friendly to Russia on the Syrian coast.
Putin will therefore likely use his military operations in Syria to deter the U.S. from attacking Assad and to interfere with any such American efforts. He will oppose the establishment of a no-fly zone and try to undermine it. The U.S. must work to drive Russia out of Syria even as we move against ISIS and Assad.
The U.S. should not pursue immediate military action against Russian forces in Syria and should seek to avoid direct conflict with the Russians. We should, however, refer back to the Cold War playbook for dancing with MiGs that we used for decades to raise the cost of Russian adventurism. We can take many actions to make it harder for Russian aircraft to operate over Syria while deterring any thought they might have about shooting at our airframes. A single American aircraft carrier, after all, has nearly three times as many combat aircraft as the Russians now have in Syria. If Putin chose to shoot, it would not be a fair fight. The U.S. should use that fact to lever him out of Syria’s skies.
Radical groups such as the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra are usng Russia’s intervention to stoke their false but resonant narrative that the U.S. is complicit with Russia and Assad in killing Syrian civilians. America’s failure to challenge the Russians and the Syrian regime stokes this false narrative.
DON’T imagine that they couldn’t do that in the U.S.
The French police and security forces are among the most competent and determined in the world. They have been on alert for precisely this kind of attack since the Charlie Hebdo murders and the attack on the kosher supermarket. They generally have fewer restrictions on their abilities to collect information within their own country than do their American counterparts. If ISIS can beat the French in Paris, they can beat us here.
France’s proximity to the Middle East and membership in the European Union certainly made it easier for ISIS fighters to enter and operate. But it took only eight fighters to kill more than 120 people and wound hundreds more. There is nothing U.S. law enforcement and border security could do to guarantee that a group that small could never enter our country or, once here, plan and conduct an attack like this. If the enemy is allowed to try as hard and as often as they like from safe havens abroad, they will eventually get through our defenses.
http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/what-do-and-don’t-response-paris-attacks
Nov 15, 2015 - Kimberly Kagan
By Dr. Kimberly Kagan and Dr. Frederick W. Kagan
This article is co-authored with AEI's Critical Threats Project.
The ISIS attacks in Paris mark a step-change in the threat that group poses to the West. The tactics employed came straight from the battlefields of the Middle East into the heart of Europe. The group hit multiple targets simultaneously without detection by French security services, which are among the best in the world, despite a series of arrests aimed at disrupting this operation. That capability demonstrates superior planning ability, resilience, and operational security. The successful use of multiple suicide vests shows that ISIS was able either to smuggle them all the way to Paris or, more worrisome, build them from materials available in Europe without detection.
Europe’s proximity to the Middle East and relatively open borders make it much more vulnerable to this sort of attack, but Americans should be very concerned that a group with these capabilities could also penetrate our homeland. We must draw the right conclusions from this incident in the context of regional and world crises if we are to maintain our security in the months and years to come. The following things to do and things not to do are the correct next steps for ensuring our security.
DO take the gloves off against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Adjust the rules of engagement to accept the risk of collateral damage (civilian casualties), hit every ISIS target on our lists, and do as much damage as possible from the air quickly. This should be our immediate response.
Restrictive rules of engagement have prevented U.S. aircraft from attacking many targets in Iraq and Syria known to be ISIS nodes. President Obama’s desire to avoid civilian casualties is laudable from both a moral and a practical standpoint. Wantonly killing civilians, as the Assad regime and the Russian bombing campaign is doing, will alienate the Sunni Arab community in which ISIS and al Qaeda exist and operate. But the president has gone too far in precluding all targets with any risk of civilian casualties. The U.S. military has long experience now in choosing targets carefully to minimize that risk while still accomplishing its missions, and it should be allowed to operate as it had been doing for the first six years of this presidency.
We cannot defeat ISIS or al Qaeda with airstrikes, but we can damage both groups much more significantly than we have so far. We can force them to go to ground, to stop maneuvering vehicles, and to stop massing forces. Doing so would degrade their abilities to conduct offensive operations significantly and would facilitate the formation of opposition groups that could ultimately recapture ground they now hold.
DO put the necessary U.S. forces on the ground in Iraq to help the Iraqis retake Ramadi and Fallujah rapidly and prepare them to retake Mosul within six months.
The Iraqi counter-offensive to retake Anbar and Ninewah Provinces has stalled for a number of reasons, including struggles between Iranian proxy militias and the Iraqi Security Forces over prioritization of effort and willingness to cooperate with the U.S. But American reluctance to engage fully in the campaign has been another important factor. If the U.S. made available to Baghdad the resources needed to retake Iraqi territory from ISIS rapidly and with limited losses, Prime Minister Haider al Abadi would likely leap at the chance.
The U.S. military footprint required is likely around 10,000 troops. Iraq does not at this point need American combat brigades leading the fight. It needs more U.S. Special Forces, tactical air controllers to direct precision strikes in direct support of Iraqis fighting on the ground, additional helicopter and artillery support, and a variety of other technical capabilities that only the U.S. can provide.
Iranian-controlled militias and political figures will oppose any such U.S. deployment, probably by attacking the U.S. embassy and other American targets in Iraq. We must accept that likelihood and prepare for it by maintaining the forces and capabilities necessary to counter-attack against them within Iraq. The President must state clearly that he has already authorized the U.S. military to respond immediately and decisively in this scenario. The U.S. should seek to avoid open confrontation with the Iranians in Iraq, but we must not be deterred from defeating ISIS by the fear of what the Iranians might do to us. What they are doing against ISIS in Iraq is also failing, after all. It is, in fact, making things worse.
The U.S. must also act to support Prime Minister Abadi against his sectarian Shi’a political foes, particularly former Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki. It was the malign behavior of Maliki and his allies, after all, that generated support for ISIS in Iraq after the departure of U.S. forces. The U.S. should use all the diplomatic leverage at its disposal to strengthen Abadi as his coalition fractures and to help him plan and execute the reform agenda that is essential to Iraq’s future and to his own political survival.
DON’T over-rely on Kurdish forces for rapid, decisive operations beyond Kurdish ethnic boundaries.
Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria are among the most competent and determined foes of ISIS. They must surely be a part of any undertaking against ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra, as well as a central part of stable political resolutions in both countries. The U.S. is well-advised to help them defend their own lands against the jihadis and to integrate them as appropriate into the larger anti-ISIS effort.
But it is also important to understand that ethnic tensions between Kurds and Arabs have been high for decades and are rising. Iraq’s Kurds have a vision for an expanded Kurdistan that includes areas inhabited now by mixed populations of Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen—particularly the cities of Mosul, Sinjar, and Kirkuk. The presence of heavily-Kurdish Iraqi Security Forces in Mosul was one of the factors driving support for al Qaeda in Iraq into 2007, and the contest for control of Kirkuk has caused repeated outbreaks of violence.
Encouraging the Kurds to seize Arab territory will generate a backlash among local Arabs that can only benefit ISIS. The Kurds cannot clear and hold Mosul or its environs to the south and west on their own without the high risk of starting an ethnic war.
Kurdish forces fighting in Syria are heavily infiltrated by the PKK, which the U.S. Treasury has designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group. The PKK continues to conduct terrorist attacks in Turkey, and U.S. de facto support for the group in Syria seriously damages any prospect for a real partnership with our NATO ally. Syrian Kurdish forces also face problems similar to those described above in Iraq—any attempt by Kurdish forces to seize and hold Raqqa, for example, will ultimately generate Arab backlash and increase opportunistic support for ISIS or for al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra. The U.S. must act to exclude the PKK from participation in anti-ISIS efforts.
DON’T drop into a defensive crouch
Some candidates and political leaders are already demanding that the U.S. and Europe stop taking in Syrian refugees, close our borders, and focus on monitoring our Muslim populations. President Obama continues to discuss possible American responses in terms of the law enforcement paradigm he believes will be effective against these groups. These defensive measures will fail. We cannot close our borders so tightly that determined and skillful adversaries cannot penetrate them, nor can we monitor our own Muslim communities so carefully that no plots could escape our attention.
Attempts to rely on these defensive measures will also do the greatest harm to our own way of life and values as free peoples, moreover. Reliably detecting all such plots from among our own populations will turn our countries into police states. Closing our borders as completely as necessary to prevent any penetrations will disrupt the free flow of goods and people on which we rely and that marks one of our most important liberties. This defensive path is the quickest route to the erosion of everything we hold most dear.
DON’T line up with the Russians, Iranians, and Assad against the Sunni Arabs
The Russian-Iranian-Assad-Hezbollah military coalition is not fighting to defeat ISIS. It has conducted few major operations or airstrikes against ISIS targets. It is fighting, rather, to maintain the Assad regime, if not necessarily Assad himself, as the minoritarian dictator of as much of Syria as he can hold. Its military operations have focused on U.S.-backed opposition groups and Islamist groups not affiliated with ISIS because they pose the greatest threat to the regime. Its objectives are incongruent with ours.
Assad himself has been the principal driver of the radicalization of the Syrian conflict. His violent attacks against peaceful, secular protesters in 2011 began this war. His steady escalation through artillery, air, barrel bombing, and chemical weapons attacks against civilian populations has driven Syrians into the arms of ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra and created the massive refugee flows we now see. He cannot re-establish control of Syria except by the most brutal methods, and he almost certainly lacks the military power he would need even to try. Supporting him is supporting a continually expanding endless war.
DO take action to drive the Assad regime—not just Assad—from power
U.S. policy has become excessively focused on getting Bashar al Assad himself to step down, but more is needed to achieve peace. His departure is essential. He is the symbol of atrocity and violence in Syria, to be sure, but the majority Sunni Arab population of Syria will not accept the continued rule of Assad’s lieutenants either. They will not accept continued domination by a minoritarian ‘Alawite government, in fact, while any representative system in Syria would drive the ‘Alawites from power. The only political solution in Syria is an inclusive, multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian government, which will not be achieved by simply removing Assad himself. It will also not be achieved through the political opposition to Assad alone. The armed opposition must have a place at the peace talks and in the new political order.
DO get the Russians out of Syria
Vladimir Putin intervened in Syria to establish a Russian air and naval base on the Mediterranean and to solidify a regional alliance with Iran aimed at expelling the United States from the region. He has also used his base to press on NATO’s southern flank by violating Turkish airspace. To the extent that he has clear objectives in Syria, they are antithetical to ours—he is interested in solidifying the control of an ‘Alawite government friendly to Russia on the Syrian coast.
Putin will therefore likely use his military operations in Syria to deter the U.S. from attacking Assad and to interfere with any such American efforts. He will oppose the establishment of a no-fly zone and try to undermine it. The U.S. must work to drive Russia out of Syria even as we move against ISIS and Assad.
The U.S. should not pursue immediate military action against Russian forces in Syria and should seek to avoid direct conflict with the Russians. We should, however, refer back to the Cold War playbook for dancing with MiGs that we used for decades to raise the cost of Russian adventurism. We can take many actions to make it harder for Russian aircraft to operate over Syria while deterring any thought they might have about shooting at our airframes. A single American aircraft carrier, after all, has nearly three times as many combat aircraft as the Russians now have in Syria. If Putin chose to shoot, it would not be a fair fight. The U.S. should use that fact to lever him out of Syria’s skies.
Radical groups such as the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra are usng Russia’s intervention to stoke their false but resonant narrative that the U.S. is complicit with Russia and Assad in killing Syrian civilians. America’s failure to challenge the Russians and the Syrian regime stokes this false narrative.
DON’T imagine that they couldn’t do that in the U.S.
The French police and security forces are among the most competent and determined in the world. They have been on alert for precisely this kind of attack since the Charlie Hebdo murders and the attack on the kosher supermarket. They generally have fewer restrictions on their abilities to collect information within their own country than do their American counterparts. If ISIS can beat the French in Paris, they can beat us here.
France’s proximity to the Middle East and membership in the European Union certainly made it easier for ISIS fighters to enter and operate. But it took only eight fighters to kill more than 120 people and wound hundreds more. There is nothing U.S. law enforcement and border security could do to guarantee that a group that small could never enter our country or, once here, plan and conduct an attack like this. If the enemy is allowed to try as hard and as often as they like from safe havens abroad, they will eventually get through our defenses.
http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/what-do-and-don’t-response-paris-attacks
szasi- Inspector [Policia Federal]
- Cantidad de envíos : 213
Fecha de inscripción : 01/06/2015
Re: Atentados en Francia dejan más de 150 muertos
Detenidos dos presuntos implicados en Bélgica por los atentados de París
J.M.A.R
Jueves, 21 de enero del 2016 - 11:20
[ 0 ]
Dos personas fueron detenidas en Bruselas en allanamientos realizados el miércoles y jueves en el marco de la investigación de los atentados de París del 13 de noviembre.
Un belga y un marroquí de 30 y 35 años respectivamente, son los detenidos que tendrían una vinculación con los responsables de la masacre en Francia.
Bélgica se blinda ante posibles ataques yihadistas
TemasBélgica Bruselas París Armas Arresto Terrorismo Guerra Bélgica Armas Arresto Terrorismo
Entre el miércoles y el jueves, se llevó a cabo el arresto en Bruselas de dos personas sospechosas de participar en los atentados de París el 13 de noviembre.
Según anuncia la fiscalía las dos personas fueron detenidas por presuntos vínculos con diversas personas que aparecen en la investigación de los atentados.
En el comunicado que ha publicado la ficalía del caso se cuenta que "No se hallaron armas ni explosivos" en el lugar dónde se encontró a los detenidos.
El juez de instrucción decidirá durante el día si retiene cargos contra ellos, según indica la misma fuente.
Además se han mostrado otros datos como que los detenidos tienen nacionalidad belga y marroquí, de 30 y 36 años respectivamente.
La investigación en Bélgica por los atentados de París que dejaron 130 muertos y centenares de heridos permitió desmantelar una parte de la organización que ayudó a uno de los presuntos participantes, Salah Abdeslam, a regresar a Bruselas al día siguiente de la masacre, y a desaparecer. Permitió asimismo descubrir tres departamentos utilizados para preparar los ataques.
Desde la fatídica fecha, Bélgica se ha convertido en un punto candente en la búsqueda de los responsables del atentado.
Hasta la fecha diez personas fueron inculpadas en el país, y nueve permanecen en detención.
Pese a esto, cuatro personas están en busca y captura, entre los que están Salah Abdeslam y Mohamed Abrini.
http://noticias.lainformacion.com/policia-y-justicia/arresto/detenidos-dos-presuntos-implicados-en-belgica-por-los-atentados-de-paris_itbbLJ7HAjealU4uMU1vw1/?utm_source=LAINFO+-+Kit+buenos+días&utm_campaign=9b1e6bccfa-inf22012016&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_378063843d-9b1e6bccfa-181494177
J.M.A.R
Jueves, 21 de enero del 2016 - 11:20
[ 0 ]
Dos personas fueron detenidas en Bruselas en allanamientos realizados el miércoles y jueves en el marco de la investigación de los atentados de París del 13 de noviembre.
Un belga y un marroquí de 30 y 35 años respectivamente, son los detenidos que tendrían una vinculación con los responsables de la masacre en Francia.
Bélgica se blinda ante posibles ataques yihadistas
TemasBélgica Bruselas París Armas Arresto Terrorismo Guerra Bélgica Armas Arresto Terrorismo
Entre el miércoles y el jueves, se llevó a cabo el arresto en Bruselas de dos personas sospechosas de participar en los atentados de París el 13 de noviembre.
Según anuncia la fiscalía las dos personas fueron detenidas por presuntos vínculos con diversas personas que aparecen en la investigación de los atentados.
En el comunicado que ha publicado la ficalía del caso se cuenta que "No se hallaron armas ni explosivos" en el lugar dónde se encontró a los detenidos.
El juez de instrucción decidirá durante el día si retiene cargos contra ellos, según indica la misma fuente.
Además se han mostrado otros datos como que los detenidos tienen nacionalidad belga y marroquí, de 30 y 36 años respectivamente.
La investigación en Bélgica por los atentados de París que dejaron 130 muertos y centenares de heridos permitió desmantelar una parte de la organización que ayudó a uno de los presuntos participantes, Salah Abdeslam, a regresar a Bruselas al día siguiente de la masacre, y a desaparecer. Permitió asimismo descubrir tres departamentos utilizados para preparar los ataques.
Desde la fatídica fecha, Bélgica se ha convertido en un punto candente en la búsqueda de los responsables del atentado.
Hasta la fecha diez personas fueron inculpadas en el país, y nueve permanecen en detención.
Pese a esto, cuatro personas están en busca y captura, entre los que están Salah Abdeslam y Mohamed Abrini.
http://noticias.lainformacion.com/policia-y-justicia/arresto/detenidos-dos-presuntos-implicados-en-belgica-por-los-atentados-de-paris_itbbLJ7HAjealU4uMU1vw1/?utm_source=LAINFO+-+Kit+buenos+días&utm_campaign=9b1e6bccfa-inf22012016&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_378063843d-9b1e6bccfa-181494177
szasi- Inspector [Policia Federal]
- Cantidad de envíos : 213
Fecha de inscripción : 01/06/2015
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