El Ejército da un golpe de Estado en Tailandia tras seis meses de crisis

- El jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas explica que quiere restablecer el orden tras seis meses de crisis

- Los militares tailandeses han dado 18 golpes de Estado, 11 de ellos con éxito

22/05/2014.- El Ejército de Tailandia declaró este jueves un golpe de Estado, dos días después de proclamar el estado de excepción en medio de una crisis política que ha costado el cargo a la primera ministra Yingluck Shinawatra y tras seis meses de protestas antigubernamentales. Los participantes en las protestas han recibido la orden de dispersarse, las reuniones de más de cinco personas han quedado prohibidas, la Constitución suspendida y se ha impuesto un toque de queda desde las diez de la noche a las cinco de la mañana. Los integrantes del Gobierno en funciones han recibido orden de presentarse en un cuartel militar antes de que acabe el día.

“Para que la situación vuelva rápidamente a la normalidad y para que la sociedad recupere la paz de nuevo, el Ejército tiene que asumir los poderes”, declaró el jefe del Ejército tailandés, Prayuth Chan-Ocha, en una comparecencia en directo ante las cámaras de televisión. El anuncio del jefe militar se produjo tras un encuentro a siete bandas para intentar buscar una salida a la parálisis política. “Como no podemos encontrar un modo de pacificar el país y nadie da marcha atrás, les anuncio que tomo el poder”, les anunció a los reunidos, según un miembro de la Comisión Electoral presente y citado por Reuters. “Quédense sentados y quietos”, añadió el general.

Entre los participantes a las reuniones se encontraban representantes del actual Gobierno interino, de los diversos partidos, el líder del movimiento de oposición popular que ha protagonizado las protestas antigubernamentales, Suthep Thaugsuban, y del Senado y la Comisión Electoral. Pero, según informa el diario The Nation en su página web, Prayuth dio por fracasada la reunión y los soldados llevaron a los participantes al cuartel del Primer Regimiento de Infantería.

 Dos días antes, el jefe militar había proclamado el estado de excepción y la censura de los medios de comunicación con el argumento de que era necesario para restablecer el orden, pero había negado que se tratara de un golpe.

Tras el anuncio de Prayuth, el Ejército ha proclamado el toque de queda entre las diez de la noche y las cinco de la mañana hora local, mientras que han quedado prohibidas las reuniones “por motivos políticos” de más de cinco personas, so pena de un mínimo de un año de prisión. Las cadenas de radio y televisión han recibido la orden de suspender sus programaciones y sólo se emiten los comunicados militares.

En el trasfondo de la crisis está el enfrentamiento entre los partidarios del rey Bhumibol Adulyadej y el ex primer ministro Thaksin Shinawatra, un antiguo magnate de las telecomunicaciones tailandesas y muy popular entre las clases más desfavorecidas. Depuesto por el Ejército en 2006 bajo acusaciones de corrupción y falta de respeto al rey, huyó del país en 2008 para evitar ir a la cárcel por corrupción.

Desde entonces, no ha dejado de ejercer una poderosa influencia en la política tailandesa, en especial a través del Gobierno de su hermana Yingluck Shinawatra, a la que el Tribunal Supremo depuso el 7 de mayo por abuso de poder, pero cuyo Gobierno continúa al frente del país. El actual primer ministro, Niwatthamrong Boonsongphaisan, era su “número dos” y responsable de Comercio.

Los manifestantes acusan a Thaksin y a su hermana de corrupción y abuso de poder y reclaman que se nombre a un primer ministro interino neutral hasta la celebración de elecciones, que el actual jefe de Gobierno ha ofrecido aplazar hasta el 3 de agosto. Los “camisas rojas”, el movimiento popular leal al exmagnate y concentrado en las afueras de Bangkok, amenazaba por su parte con violencia si se cesaba al Ejecutivo actual.

Un total de 28 personas han muerto y centenares han resultado heridas en las manifestaciones en Bangkok que desde noviembre reclamaban reformas y el cambio de Gobierno. Yingluck disolvió la cámara Baja del Parlamento en diciembre, y Tailandia celebró elecciones en febrero, pero los comicios fueron anulados por el Tribunal Constitucional debido a incidentes de protesta en numerosas circunscripciones.

Los militares tailandeses, considerados próximos a los manifestantes contra el Gobierno, no son ajenos a la intervención en la política de su país. Desde el fin de la monarquía absolutista en 1932 han dado 18 golpes de Estado, 11 de ellos con éxito.

La comunidad internacional ha reaccionado con preocupación al golpe. El presidente francés, François Hollande, lo ha condenado y gobiernos como el australiano, el japonés o el británico han expresado su alarma. El Pentágono ha indicado que revisará su colaboración con las Fuerzas Armadas tailandesas.

El golpe de Estado en Tailandia

No es la primera vez que el Ejército tailandés interviene para intentar aliviar la inestabilidad en el estratégico país del sureste asiático

Jueves, 22 de mayo de 2014 a las 13:01.- El Ejército tailandés declaró este jueves que tomó el control del país por medio de un golpe de Estado.

Dos días antes, las fuerzas armadas implementaron la ley marcial y señalaron que el objetivo era aliviar las tensiones.

¿Cuál es el motor de la situación en Tailandia? ¿Qué podría ocurrir? ¿Por qué es necesario estar atentos?

Esta es una guía para entender la crisis que se desarrolla rápidamente en el país.

¿Cuál es el acontecimiento más reciente?

El jefe de las fuerzas armadas de Tailandia emitió un comunicado nacional el jueves en el que anunció que las fuerzas armadas habían tomado el control del país porque las facciones rivales no habían podido llegar a un acuerdo para gobernar.

Las fuerzas armadas implementaron la ley marcial el martes sin consultar al primer ministro interino del país, quien ocupaba el cargo temporalmente en sustitución de la ex primera ministra Yingluck Shinawatra (que también era temporal), a quien destituyó el Tribunal Constitucional de Tailandia. Un asistente del primer ministro interino, Niwatthamrong Boonsongpaisan, señaló que la medida que las fuerzas armadas tomaron el martes era "medio golpe de Estado".

El equipo de Niwatthamrong no ha reaccionado hasta el momento.

El país sigue bajo la ley marcial, que entre otras cosas contempla restricciones a los lugares en los que los manifestantes pueden reunirse; a lo que pueden transmitir las televisoras y radiodifusoras, y a las publicaciones en los medios sociales, según el diario Bangkok Post.

¿Cómo se llegó a esto?

La política de Tailandia ha sido un caos desde hace años debido en parte a un cisma entre los populistas (muchos de ellos provienen de zonas rurales y son pobres) y la clase media y la élite mayormente urbana de Bangkok que favorecen al sistema monárquico del país.

La inestabilidad actual tiene sus raíces en el derrocamiento del multimillonario primer ministro Thaksin Shinawatra, quien construyó una sólida base política con medidas populistas que atrajeron a los aldeanos de las zonas rurales del norte de Tailandia.

La destitución de Thaksin provocó un amplio movimiento de oposición que culminó con manifestaciones generalizadas en Bangkok en 2010. Las fuerzas armadas sofocaron violentamente las protestas, lo que dejó un saldo de unos 90 muertos.

Al año siguiente, la hermana de Thaksin, Yingluck Shinawatra, aprovechó el apoyo de la oposición para asumir el poder.

Yingluck propuso unas leyes en 2013 con las que se habría concedido amnistía para Thaksin y otras personas. La medida provocó una nueva oleada de protestas e indignación, esta vez de la élite y la clase media urbana de Bangkok a los que a veces llaman camisas amarillas y que buscan poner fin de una vez por todas al involucramiento de la familia de Thaksin en la política tailandesa.

El Tribunal Constitucional de Tailandia destituyó a Yingluck y a nueve miembros del gabinete en mayo y señaló que ella había violado la constitución tailandesa al reinstalar en su cargo a un alto funcionario de seguridad en 2011.

Los populistas, conocidos como camisas rojas, consideraron que su destitución había sido un golpe de Estado judicial y han protestado porque creen que muchas de las instituciones del país están en su contra.

Las cosas empeoraron la semana pasada, cuando tres camisas amarillas murieron y 23 resultaron heridos luego de que unos pistoleros abrieran fuego en un campamento de protesta. La violencia provocó que el comandante del Ejército emitiera la ominosa advertencia de que las tropas tendrían que intervenir si la situación no se calmaba.

¿Qué sigue?

Antes del golpe, el general Prayuth Chan-ocha, comandante del Ejército, dijo que el siguiente paso sería "reunir a las facciones rivales para hablar en paz".

No quedó claro si la negociación sigue en pie o si las fuerzas armadas tienen otros planes.

Thinian Pongsudhirak, profesor de Ciencias Políticas de la Universidad Chulalongkorn en Bangkok, había dicho que las fuerzas armadas estaban en una posición precaria.

"Tienen que ser imparciales", dijo en ese entonces. "Si se cree que favorecen a una u otra parte, entonces podríamos tener más violencia y disturbios contra las fuerzas armadas", dijo.

¿Ha pasado algo parecido en Tailandia antes?

Tailandia ha vivido algunos golpes militares.

Si contamos el del jueves, las fuerzas armadas han intentado 19 golpes en 80 años y han tenido éxito en 12. El anterior al del jueves ocurrió en 2006, cuando las fuerzas armadas enviaron tanques a las calles antes de derrocar a Thaksin.

¿Por qué debería importarnos?

La inestabilidad política de Tailandia podría tener impacto más allá de sus fronteras.

"Conocida como La Detroit de Oriente, Tailandia ha crecido y se volvió un centro vital para la manufactura y ensamblaje de discos duros y automóviles de empresas japonesas y occidentales", señaló el Centro de Estudios Estratégicos e Internacionales en un análisis sobre la crisis política que se publicó en diciembre.

Los varios meses de protestas ya habían dañado la economía de Tailandia y ponían al país en riesgo de ser menos atractivo para los inversionistas y los gobiernos que pretendían lograr acuerdos con Tailandia, de acuerdo con los analistas.

"La reputación de ser perpetuamente inestable políticamente hablando lesionaría definitivamente la competitividad y el atractivo de Tailandia para la inversión extranjera futura", señalaron los analistas.

En un reporte que publicó recientemente el Servicio de Investigaciones del Congreso de Estados Unidos se señaló que "la confiabilidad de Bangkok como socio y su capacidad para ser líder regional son inciertas".

"Una Tailandia estable es importante estratégicamente para Estados Unidos ya que cuenta con estatus de aliada de Estados Unidos en los tratados y es el ancla del sureste asiático continental", se señaló en el reporte. "Los políticos estadounidenses ahora se enfrentan a cómo han de lidiar con una democracia que se desmorona y a cómo responderán a las profundas inquietudes que provoca el equilibrio entre civiles y militares en la sociedad tailandesa".

Esto suena conocido. ¿En qué se parece a lo que hemos visto en otros países?

Hemos escuchado sobre muchos golpes recientes en todo el mundo.

En Libia, algunos soldados han argumentado que no hay por qué preocuparse de que un general local renegado esté acumulando poderío militar. Sin embargo, el gobierno libio y el comando militar en Trípoli reaccionaron alarmados y señalaron que no ordenaron al general Khalifa Haftar que ejecutara los ataques letales de la semana pasada contra los militantes islamistas y que la operación —en la que participaron algunos soldados libios, según reconocieron— era equivalente a un golpe.

El presidente de Ucrania acusó que lo habían derrocado por medio de un golpe de Estado en febrero, mientras que los legisladores señalaron que habían obedecido a la voluntad del pueblo cuando el Parlamento votó por que lo destituyeran y se celebraran nuevas elecciones.

En Egipto derrocaron al presidente Mohamed Morsi por medio de un golpe de Estado el año pasado y nombraron a un presidente interino. Después surgió un debate respecto a si era correcto usar el término golpe para describir la destitución.

Paula Hancocks, Kocha Olarn, Hilary Whiteman, Kristie Lu Stout, Jomana Karadsheh y Ben Brumfield contribuyeron con este reportaje.

Yellow, red and a coup d'etat in Thailand
Thailand's military takeover has many asking: what happens next?
Last modified: 28 May 2014 13:49
Robert Kennedy



People have been protesting against military rule [Reuters]

The Thai military's hold over opponents - whether real or perceived - continues to tighten in the Land of Smiles, with government officials on both sides of the country's colour divide locked up amid heightened warnings that anyone who steps out of line will pay a price.

And people are listening to those warnings. "You can't wear red anymore, it's too dangerous. These soldiers are targeting anyone who does," Red Shirt supporter Nongnuch Karunyalert told me at a demonstration.

It remains unclear exactly how many people have disappeared into the military detention system, or when they'll emerge. But nobody has been overlooked, including politicians, business figures, scholars, and journalists.

Small and sporadic protests have popped up, including a heated exchange of words, pushes, and shoves on Sunday as about 300 anti-coup demonstrators angrily denounced the seizure of power after months of political paralysis that effectively ground government functioning to a halt.

But since Monday, all has largely been quiet after the army issued stern warnings that those going against it would suffer the consquences. Make no mistake about it, Thailand's military is in full control of the country - and it appears to be in no hurry to surrender any of the power it seized last Thursday.

The military said it needed to takeover to create stability after warring politicians wearing yellow and red failed to hammer out a consensus and the threat of violence increased.

The struggle pits the old elite close to Thailand's revered monarchy against a relatively new one - the Shinawatra family from Chiang Mai in the north.

Yellow represents the monarchy and the way things used to be. The colour red is worn by those who adore Thaksin Shinawatra, the billionaire telecoms tycoon, and leaders linked to him. Thaksin barged his way into Thai politics by wooing the vast number of people of the north and northeast with promises of improving their lives through his Thai Rak Thai - "Thais Love Thais" - party.

He swept to victory in elections in 2001. He or those close to him have easily won every vote since, after implementing populist policies such as cheap healthcare, job creation initiatives and fuel and rice subsidies for the millions of voters.

But everything went awry after tensions with the long-running power structure grew. The new kid in town had ruffled the feathers of the old guard.

While out of the country in September 2006, the army staged a bloodless coup and Thaksin later fled to Dubai, where critics in yellow accuse him of calling the shots from his desert exile.

Yellow protests against the red government began in November 2013 and never stopped, with eight years of political tug-of-war culminating in last week's coup, the 12th coup d'etat in modern times. The military had seen enough.

Many are wondering what will happen next.

Can the military achieve its stated objectives of creating social harmony in a highly divided society through indefinite rule? Will democracy and the ballot box be tossed aside for some undefined "political reform" that's envisioned to solve all power-sharing problems?

It's anyone's guess what the answers are to these imperative questions. But one thing is certain at present - seeking these answers has become much more difficult - and dangerous - during the past few days.

Thailand's Reverse Revolution

Angry elites target democracy.
Doug Bandow

May 14, 2014
Tweet



Thailand continues its slow-motion political implosion. The prime minister has been ousted and a new election has been scheduled for July 20, but the latter will settle nothing unless traditional ruling elites are willing to accept a government run by their opponents. If not, the country risks a violent explosion.

Bangkok’s politics have long leaned authoritarian. Once ruled by an absolute monarchy, Thailand has periodically suffered under military rule. Democracy finally re-emerged two decades ago. Nevertheless, the 1997 constitution created institutions of establishment control, such as the Constitutional Court. The monarchy retains outsize (though indirect) influence, and is generally allied with top business and political leaders.

But in 2001, telecommunications executive Thaksin Shinawatra disrupted the system. Campaigning as a populist, he won the votes of Thailand’s neglected rural poor to become prime minister. Those accustomed to ruling were horrified.

Thaksin won again in 2005. Instead of figuring out how to better appeal to the popular majority, his opponents organized the so-called People’s Alliance for Democracy which launched protests to topple his government. The resulting confrontation gave the military an excuse to oust the traveling Thaksin in 2006. The military regime tried him in absentia for alleged corruption and rewrote the constitution before calling new elections.

However, Thaksin’s successor party won a plurality and dominated the resulting coalition.

Thaksin’s opponents, who predominated in Bangkok, launched a wave of demonstrations, blocked Bangkok streets, besieged parliament, surrounded government buildings, and even took over Bangkok’s international airport. The security agencies refused to defend the government and the opposition-controlled courts ousted parliamentarians, including one prime minister, on dubious grounds. Establishment interests then pressured coalition partners to flip to the so-called Democrat Party (DP), which had not won an election since 1992.

When United Front for Democracy (so-called “Red Shirt”) Thaksin supporters flooded into Bangkok to protest the de facto coup, DP Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva no longer supported the people’s right to protest. The military conveniently decided that order must be maintained. The government killed scores and injured thousands of demonstrators, and imprisoned numerous opposition leaders.

But Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, and her Pheu Thai party won an absolute majority in the 2011 election. So the PAD morphed into the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), led by former DP Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban, one of those responsible for the 2010 killings. He demanded elimination of the “Thaksin regime” and organized mobs, which worked full-time to drive Yingluck from office. Their tactics, designed to prevent the government from functioning, reflected a mindset reminiscent of Benito Mussolini and his infamous Black Shirts. Recently Suthep called on the military to “stand by the people” and stage a coup.

In response, Prime Minister Yingluck called new elections, which further angered the opposition. The DP complained that the February poll would be “unfair.” More honestly, opposition activists admitted that they would lose. DP parliamentarian Theptai Seanapong said, “We cannot beat them.” Suthep turned his mobs loose on Election Day, blocking many Thais from voting. His attacks left enough constituencies unfilled to prevent the new parliament from taking office.

In March, the Constitutional Court effectively backed Suthep by invalidating the entire election because its opponents had prevented Thais from voting. Yingluck remained caretaker prime minister with only limited power to govern. Now the Constitutional Court has ousted her over the attempted reassignment of a government official. Suthep and his allies hope to use this ruling to force the installation of a compliant, unelected prime minister.

But leaders of the Red Shirts promised to respond violently to any judicial coup. In March, a former military officer and top Red Shirt threatened to march on the capital with 200,000 armed “guards” if Yingluck was deposed.

In the past, the widely respected king was able to transcend party factions, but he is aged and largely disengaged, while other members of the court have backed Suthep. In contrast, the Crown Prince is thought to lean toward Thaksin.


The political battle is complex, deep-seated, emotional, and personal. Thaksin has been justifiably criticized, but his opponents generate more heat than light. For instance, his corruption conviction, in absentia by a compliant court under a military regime, proves little. One can criticize Thaksin’s populist approach, but political parties around the world commonly adopt a “tax and tax, spend and spend” election strategy. Columnist H.L. Mencken once said an election was an “advance auction sale of stolen goods.” For all the faults of Thaksin’s universal health care program, for instance, it hardly seemed “corrupt.” Perhaps his worst offense was attempting to bloodily suppress the drug trade.

Similarly, Yingluck’s expensive rice support program may be unwise—it has well-nigh bankrupted the government—but also is not corrupt in any classic sense. Anyway, wealthy urban elites who benefited from past Thai government policies have little credibility faulting the rural poor for favoring their interests when voting.

Suthep denounced Yingluck as a tool of her brother, but even if she acted as his agent—his involvement in policy making is real but its extent is unknown—that does not justify the opposition’s Black Shirt tactics. Many Thais supported her because they believed she represented his views.

Ultimately, Suthep and his supporters are most interested in gaining power for themselves. A woman from the south told the New York Times: “We are the middle class, we are educated and we know best.” Some Thaksin opponents suggest abandoning “one man, one vote”. Others forthrightly advocate authoritarian rule or even an absolutist monarchy. Suthep wants to rig the political system through “reform” implemented by an unelected “People’s Council.”

The frustration of Thaksin’s supporters is palpable. Several parliamentarians elected in February—whose selection then was voided by the court—visited Geneva where they spoke with Secretary General of the International Parliamentary Union Anders Johnsson, United Nations human rights officials, and NGO members. The Thai delegation found much sympathy over the obvious assault on democracy, but those outside the country have only limited ability to influence events.

So far, Thailand’s generals have demonstrated no interest in taking control again. Richard Werly of Le Temps observed that the military “tried before and realizes that it can take power but can’t resolve the underlying problems.” Moreover, generals cannot count on the loyalty of soldiers drawn from rural areas, as well as younger officers promoted under Thaksin and Yingluck.

The only real solution can come from the political process. For instance, a Thaksin family withdrawal from politics would help ease political tensions. However, that would be more likely if Thaksin did not fear, with good cause, being targeted by his enemies. Werly suggested that Thaksin may feel he “needs to be involved to protect his investment...otherwise they will come after his money.”

It is even more essential to exclude those who have been employing violence for their own political ends, most notably Suthep and Abhisit. Their role is far more malign. The latter, at least, recently raised the possibility of stepping back as part of his new reform proposal, though the latter also would rig the electoral process in the elite’s favor. Neither should be trusted with power in the future.

Constitutional reform also might ease social conflict. Reducing the central government’s reach and devolving authority to provinces would reduce the winner-takes-all character of Thai politics, something proposed last year by a group of academics and local officials. Rural and urban populations might more easily live together if their futures were not subject to dictates from the other.

Moreover, the Thai people need to rethink the role of politics. A 2004 survey found that respondents leaned “toward majoritarian rather than strictly representative government.” At the same time, they were concerned about “the effect of diverse political views and the threat to harmony of the community posed by politically active groups.” Middle class voters seemed particularly willing to sacrifice democratic values for economic development. Yet social peace and economic growth are more likely to result from a representative, decentralized political system with only limited authority.

There is much to criticize about Thai politicians on all sides. However, it is putative authoritarians like Suthep who most risk plunging Thai society into violence. While there’s still time, the elites should pull their country back from the brink.

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author and editor of several books, including Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire (Xulon). Follow him on Twitter: @Doug_Bandow.

No end to woes of Thailand's rice farmers
Military regime's decision to revive policy of subsidies seen as unlikely to address root cause of the problem.
Last updated: 19 Jun 2014 08:33

The low price of rice in the global market has left many Thai farmers struggling to make ends meet.

The deposed civilian government had introduced subsidies for farmers, but the programme ended in February because of mismanagement.

The new military regime has revived the previous government's farm subsidies, but this decision fails to address the root cause of the problem.

Al Jazeera's Scott Heidler reports from Chiang Mai, Thailand.
Source:
Al Jazeera

Thailand Needs to Talk
The latest military coup in Thailand won't ensure real stability unless the country's new rulers address the deeper causes of political conflict.

BY Daniel Lansberg-Rodríguez , Tom Ginsburg
JUNE 6, 2014




The Kingdom of Thailand is a constitutional graveyard: In just over 80 years, it's gone through 18 failed constitutions in a carousel of military coups and corrupt civilian governments. And, in recent years, the civilians have likewise been fighting among themselves, pitting the so-called Red Shirt movement, strong in the North and rural areas, against the Yellow Shirts of Bangkok and the South, in an increasingly violent conflict that has destabilized the country. Now, as the smoke clears over mid-May's dramatic coup, Thailand's new military government has suspended the constitution once again. Though the military has been vague regarding specifics, they will put forth a temporary constitution, which will eventually to be followed by something more permanent: Lucky #19.

With the coup itself now behind us we can still hope that the military government may be able to break the vicious cycle once and for all. To make sure the next government sticks, however, the military will have to make a radical departure from tradition. It must resist the urge to implement a military mindset over the drafting of a new constitution. A top-down approach will be likely to poison the process -- and process is everything in constitution writing.

During the decades of constitutional upheaval, Thailand's civilian political parties remained relatively weak. This changed when billionaire populist Thaksin Shinawatra arrived on the scene about 15 years ago. Shinawatra and his allies played into the rural sense of exclusion from government, allowing them to win elections time and again -- six since 2001. But lacking a deep tradition of democracy, Thaksin's opponents, including the middle-class, urban Yellow Shirts, have been unwilling to accept the results. In fact, the Yellow Shirts' refusal to accept the 2013 election victory of Thaksin's sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, is precisely what sparked the conflict leading to last month's coup.

Thaksin's opponents, for their part, are highly influential among Thailand's strongest institutions -- the bureaucracy, the military, the Buddhist sangha, and, of course, the monarchy. These groups exist and function separately from any constitutional government, and tend to be distrustful of electoral democracy. The result has been a series of weak civilian governments, incapable of preserving themselves when the gulf between majoritarian sentiment and elite interest has become too wide.

Thai constitutions have historically been written rather hastily so as to recover a semblance of normalcy in the wake of a military coup or popular uprising. The 1997 constitution made an admirable attempt to break from that trend. The drafing process involved mass participation and created a new set of institutions aimed at ensuring that elected officials did not abuse their power, including a constitutional court and commissions to fight corruption and protect human rights. But by 2006, many within the Thai elite had come to see that system as ineffective, not least because Thaksin's electoral strength allowed him to wield great influence over these institutions. Following a coup in September 2006, Thaksin fled the country, and the military oversaw the drafting of the 2007 constitution, which watered down some of the perceived excesses of the previous version. They hoped it would serve as happy medium.

One of their revisions, for example, changed the architecture of Thailand's senate, the gatekeeper to high-level government promotions. Military-dominated constitutions tend to have appointed senates, while democratic ones use popular elections to fill those seats. In an attempt to compromise, the military-backed drafters of the 2007 constitution split the difference, establishing a system in which half the senators would be appointed and half elected. Such "compromises" were defined unilaterally, however, based upon the military's own notion of a "fair deal," without having undergone bipartisan dialogue beforehand.

And bipartisan dialogue is exactly Thailand needs to break the vicious cycle. The failure of the 2007 "compromise constitution," clearly illustrates the futility of any attempt to form a viable system merely by tweaking constitutional text. The polarized factions within the country must come together to create a constitution that will be widely seen as representing the whole country. That way, down the line, no party can say that the constitution was drafted according to an enemy's design.

Establishing a productive dialogue will not be an easy task. There are no institutions credible and neutral enough to mediate the deep class and regional divides that cause the country's current political crisis. King Bhumibol has been the supreme arbiter of political conflict for decades, but as his physical power wanes, so too does his ability to step in. The looming monarchical succession also adds a sense of urgency to the current crisis.

The military junta should call together all the major players, including leaders of both the Red and Yellow factions, for a genuine discussion about the principles and institutions that should guide the country going forward. Cases in which the military has successfully played the role of neutral arbiter anywhere are exceedingly rare. That said, the three-month "reconciliation" period recently announced by coup leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha represents good start. (In the photo above, a poster depicts the general as Big Brother from George Orwell's 1984.) But it is not yet clear exactly who will be invited to the table, or how the reconciliation will proceed. For a resolution to be viable in the long term it will require frank dialogue, leading to a bargain that is palatable to both factions. For the discussion to be successful, the negotiators will have to settle on two key issues: 1) how to ensure that both factions respect the democratic process in the future, and 2) how to come to terms as a nation with the political violence of the past few years.

The broad outlines of such a grand bargain are not inconceivable, even now, even if getting both sides to agree may be challenging. It should include a commitment on the part of the reactionary Yellow Shirt partisans to respect electoral results; a constitutional provision prohibiting political amnesties (although the military will almost certainly get a pass); a reconstituted set of accountability institutions; and a strong recommitment to the monarchy. Such a deal would leave Thaksin Shinawatra out of the country, but still allow room for democracy to be respected.

Given the geographic nature of the Red-Yellow divide, Thailand might also benefit from greater decentralization. This would reduce the stakes of controlling the national government, but could also encourage economic development within the poorer regions of the country, ameliorating some of the inequality that has to date fueled the conflict.

And yet, getting to a constitutional agreement will require patience and no small modicum of trust, and trust can be slow in coming. Outside pressures -- including U.S. insistence that the country return to constitutional norms so that bi-national relations can resume -- might incentivize the military to rush the process. Even under the best of circumstances, establishing rapport between foes can take time, and these are hardly the best of circumstances.

CHRISTOPHE ARCHAMBAULT/AFP/Getty Images

Thailand PM: Reform or repression?
The General who headed a military coup in May is appointed prime minister.
Inside Story Last updated: 21 Aug 2014 20:21
Email Article
Print Article
Share article
Send Feedback

Thailand's top general has been appointed prime minister, two months after overthrowing the elected government.

General Prayuth Chan-ocha was the only candidate. He was chosen by a legislature predominantly made up of military and police figures, in a vote lasting barely 15 minutes.

He said the May coup, and the imposition of martial law, were necessary to end years of political turbulance and violent protests.

Prayuth took over as head of the army in October 2010. He was seen then as a hardline royalist, and opposed to the Red Shirt movement that has largely backed the governments of Thaksin Shinawatra, and his sister Yingluck.

His first task now is to appoint a cabinet to oversee the establishment of a 250-member reform council. This council will be charged with writing a new constitution, to take effect in July next year. That's intended to pave the way for a general election in late 2015.

Critics though are concerned the military is seeking to strengthen its hold on the country.

So will the takeover signal an era or repression or new age of democratic reform?

http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2014/08/thailand-pm-reform-repression-2014821175842154182.html