Los Talibanes se preparan para tomar Pakistán.

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In the near future, Taliban and Taliban like groups will impose Afghanistan type Taliban regime on Pakistan.

The civil war raging inside Pakistan in search of elusive ‘purity’ of philosophy is shrinking rapidly the space held by civil society. After expelling other religious minorities from Pakistan, the Islamic fundamentalists are determined to eliminate Ahamadias, cause heavy destruction of Shias and now the Ismailis. Anybody who does not confirm to extreme Wahhabi Sunni philosophy will be eliminated from the political canvas.

The elected civil government is in no position to take on the Jihad factory. Pakistan Army too is losing the war against the jihad factory. In fact, the Pakistan Army is so heavily infiltrated by Islamic fundamentalists that it stands fairly neutralized inside. In the coming years, it will be unable to dominate and maintain Pakistan’s territorial integrity, unless it joins hands with Taliban as a Talibanized Army.

Two trends are discernable inside Pakistan — first, as the Western Forces withdraw from Afghanistan, Taliban style militias will hold sway causing destruction of the elected government and the democratic institutions. Second, to maintain unity and focus within the different jihadi groups, attacks on India will be enhanced and enlarged.

The Jihad factory considers India as the next prize to be won to impose regressive laws like Sharia and Taliban style government. The dangerous divisive vote-bank politics within India in the last 10 years have created adequate groups of ‘sleeper cells’ and sufficient pockets of influence which are highly Talibanized in their thinking. The ‘soft target’ India appears to be ripe to become the largest sanctuary of the jihad factory in Asia in times to come.

Some of the politicians and the policy makers in India are unable to look beyond and visualize the dangers lurking in the vicinity of India. Many in India out of their so-called ‘liberal’ philosophy maintain that Pakistan or Afghanistan for that matter has a right to live and practice their beliefs, which includes imposition of extreme philosophies. While one respects the rights of the people to run their house with their beliefs even if they are regressive and out of sync with 21st century, the same ‘liberals’ forget that the Islamic fundamentalists are an expanding force based on ‘spoke and hub’ principle. They will export their philosophy ruthlessly to undermine India’s multicultural space and values. The jihad factory will expand, will export terrorism and is occupying sufficient destructive space inside India. India must gear up to grapple with the subversion that is creeping in.

At the initial stage, the Taliban game plan is based on the following:-

First, eliminate all opposition consisting of minorities or different sects of Islam.

Second, with withdrawal of the Western Forces, capture large territories to re-impose old Taliban regime inside Afghanistan. Imagine the havoc Taliban like regime from running from Afghanistan to Pakistan can cause in the neighbourhood.

Third, pretend talks and negotiations with the elected government in Islamabad, while at the same time undermine the democratic institutions, and the Pakistan Army. The Pakistan Army had to raise a special protection force of 25,000 personnel to guard its nuclear arsenal, lest they fall into the hands of Taliban.

In the subsequent phase, the Taliban strategy will be the following:-

Ensure takeover of entire Afghanistan and Pakistan.

To maintain unity between differing groups and to avoid inter-gang rivalry, task adequate groups to create mayhem inside India to unhook Kashmir, thereby providing external focus to the jihadis. The aim will be to begin the unraveling of India, and maintain unity between different groups of the jihad factory at the same time. The activation of Masood Azhar group is in this direction.

Similarly export Taliban like forces into resource rich Central Asia and put Russia under pressure.

The Nawaz Shariff government is likely to sink unless it joins hands and accepts harsh conditions being imposed by Taliban in Pakistan. In times to come, he will need assistance not only from the international community but as well from India. New Delhi is in deep slumber oblivious of the factor that to safeguard its own interests, it will have gear up to actively assist Pakistan in the near future.

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/taliban-set-to-takeover-pakistan/

Pakistan’s Domestic Jihad
By Vikram Sood
Issue Net Edition | Date : 16 Jun , 2014


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Pakistan watchers would not find the current spate of terror in that country surprising because there has been a steady escalation in its lethality, its dramatic impact, geographical range and targets for some years. And that this has been mostly within Pakistan except for the attacks against Indian interests in Kabul and Mumbai in recent years. No one perhaps really noticed that Pakistani jihadis nurtured fondly for years, had gone into a catharsis of sorts soon after President Musharraf announced in September 2001 that he was reversing jihad. He was going to support the US in the war on terror in Afghanistan and, by implication, against some Pakistani jihadis. Musharraf had apparently been overawed by Washington’s “either you are with us or against us” message.

…Karachi has become a haven for the Taliban, sectarian militants, jihad financiers and Al Qaeda sleeper cells.

Unsurprisingly, for many more familiar with Pakistani behaviour and paranoia, it was known that this was going to be only selective reversal. The cooperation with the US was not meant to apply against the India-specific jihadis nurtured by Pakistan for years. Despite this selective approach to tackling jihadis, there were perhaps half a dozen attempts to assassinate Musaharraf by Islamic radicals between 2001 and 2003 — the most lethal being Christmas Day in 2003 when he had a miraculous escape. The attackers were professionals and they obviously had insider information about Musharraf’s movement that day.

The attack on the Karachi airport with instant media coverage, is perhaps the most high profile attack by Pakistani terrorists in recent years. Over time, Karachi has become a haven for the Taliban, sectarian militants, jihad financiers and Al Qaeda sleeper cells. With a high mix of criminal activity and a large Pukhtun population it is relatively easy for the Taliban to operate here. This would explain the ease with which there were two attacks on the airport on consecutive days.

There have been other, even more sinister and audacious attacks in Pakistan since the Lal Masjid episode in July 2007 in which 156 fundamentalist Islamists were killed in an operation by the elite SSG commandos. Attacks by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan terrorists on the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi in October 2009, the Pak naval base PNS Mehran in Karachi in May 2011 in apparent retaliation against the killing of Osama bin Laden earlier that month, the Kamra airbase in August 2012, and in December 2012 and the Bacha Khan airport in Peshawar were particularly audacious and exhibited a well thought out game-plan. Even the ISI Office in Lahore was attacked by the Taliban in May 2009 and later the ISI office in Sukkur was targeted. SSG commando training headquarters and the Sargodha air base had similarly been targets. These attacks were carried out by highly trained suicide squads armed with sophisticated weapons and aimed at inflicting maximum damage. Besides, high-profile strategic targets derive international publicity and send a message. Meanwhile the world, including Pakistanis, haven’t noticed the killing of 25 Shia pilgrims in Taftan, Balochistan, by Sunni terrorists, the day the airport was attacked.

The fact that internal terror took over Pakistan soon after the September 11 attacks in the US and Pakistani assurance to help, despite objections from many inside the Army, indicates that the mood in Pakistan had begun to change more than 10 years ago.

Let us also not forget the two attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009 and another recent one on the Indian consulate in Herat. In the midst of all this there have been innumerable terrorist attacks all over Pakistan. This was not the first and definitely not the last assault on Shias in Pakistan. A little known Sunni militant organisation called Jaish ul-Islam claimed to have carried out the suicide attack. The Pakistan establishment has often resorted to encouraging Islamist and sectarian forces to discredit and suppress nationalists by deeming them as anti-Islam. Like everything else this too has diminishing marginal returns.

There is considerable confusion about who carried out the Karachi attacks. The TTP was first to claim credit even though there were initial reports that some Uzbeks were involved in the attack. Usman Ghazi, the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, that has been based in FATA for years and sheltered by the Haqqani Network, has now claimed that their organisation carried out these attacks. We all know, success has many fathers.

There is also continued ambivalence in the ruling circles in Pakistan. Politicians state they prefer a dialogue to solve this, while the Army has been insisting that they would prefer to militarily tackle this without seriously pursuing the option. There are other long standing reasons for the differences between Pakistan’s civil and military establishments as the civilian leadership seeks to establish its dominance on Pakistan’s foreign and security policies. The Army is not prepared to give up this dominance. Meanwhile, the TTP is understood to have split with the Mehsud faction breaking away. It could be that the Deep State had organised this split to be better able to control the group as Pakistan readies itself for the departure of US and ISAF forces next year. Inevitably, such plans have a way of playing out differently and the TTP has hit back at the Pakistan state with this show of force in Karachi.

The fact that internal terror took over Pakistan soon after the September 11 attacks in the US and Pakistani assurance to help, despite objections from many inside the Army, indicates that the mood in Pakistan had begun to change more than 10 years ago. The rejection by the Pakistani extremists of this change in Pakistan policy was voiced by some within the ruling establishment and the revenge was visible in all the various bombings and killings. Pakistan’s surrogates were getting out of control. The gamble of playing good terrorist versus bad terrorist or good Taliban versus bad Taliban was unraveling.

…Pakistan’s military rulers will first try to blame India for all its troubles and then launch a diversionary jihadi attack to provoke a reaction from the Indians and bring the whole world into play.

The US may claim that the Al Qaeda had been reduced in its presence, but one is not sure how much its ability has been curbed. The Al Qaeda footprint is now visible in various West Asian countries, almost as if someone somewhere was running a franchise system. Extremists run their own print and online magazines and websites in fluent English and local languages, they have Twitter and Facebook accounts and they are not banned but YouTube has been banned in Pakistan for showing stuff that hurts the religious sentiments of these extremists.

This mindset is visible in the protests against the killing of Osama bin Laden, the reactions of the society to the murder of Punjab governor Salman Taseer where the lawyers cheered the assassin and the judge had to flee the country, the inability of the government to modify the blasphemy law and the continued murders of Ahmediyas and Shias. Sophisticated drawing rooms and farm houses in the Punjab nowadays discuss not application of Sharia rules, but only which Sharia rules are good and required.

Pakistan, for long the epicentre of terrorism, is also becoming the eastern flank of a widespread Sunni extremism visible in the Arab world. Clearly it is facing the effects of blowback — the unintended consequences of unacknowledged actions. It is up to Pakistan to deal with this, if at all they choose to.

It is possible that, unable to control the various jihadis in their country or control events in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military rulers will first try to blame India for all its troubles and then launch a diversionary jihadi attack to provoke a reaction from the Indians and bring the whole world into play. Only the weak will go around flailing their arms pretending to take retaliatory action. The strong will react too — but at a time, place and manner of their choosing. The idea is not shoot the messenger, but to hurt the person who sent the message.

Courtesy: www.asianage.com
Vikram Sood

Former Chief of R&AW.

Impact of Talibanisation
By Alok Bansal
Issue Courtesy: Aakrosh | Date : 10 Jul , 2014
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The most serious implication of this onward march of the Taliban has been the radicalisation of Pakistan’s armed forces. As the armed forces draw their manpower from the same society, its composition is bound to reflect the biases of the society. General Musharraf, after two assassination attempts, did try to cleanse the army of radical elements and succeeded in purging overtly religious generals. However, the junior officers and other ranks by and large reflect the prevailing views of the society. Most of them still believe that the war against Taliban is America’s war and have reservations about fighting them.

The growing Talibanisation is eroding the state structure, and the unravelling of Pakistan is a distinct possibility. For the first time since its creation, there is a threat to the cohesion of the Pakistan army…

Every single attack on a military installation has borne clear marks of collusion by elements from within. Many PAF and Pakistan army personnel, including six officers, were convicted of attempts on General Pervez Musharraf in December 2003, when he was the president. An army soldier, Abdul Islam Siddiqui, was hanged on 20 August 2005, after court martial for the same offence. In April 2012, one of the six convicts, an air force technician Adnan Rashid, who had been sentenced to death, was freed by the Taliban in a daring jail break in Bannu.1 As early as 2006, six middle-ranking officers were court-martialled for refusing to fight in FATA.2

On another occasion, an anti-aircraft gun was discovered on the flight path of General Musharraf’s plane when he was taking off from the Rawalpindi airbase on a pitch-dark night. In September 2006, most of the 40 men arrested for attacks on Musharraf were mid-ranking PAF officers. The conspiracy was uncovered when an air force officer used a cell phone to activate a rocket aimed at Musharraf’s residence in Rawalpindi. The rocket was recovered, and its activating mechanism, also a cell phone, revealed the officer’s telephone number.3 The PAF confirmed in 2009 that it had acted against at least 57 personnel following the December 2003 assassination attempt against Musharraf. Six of these men were sentenced to death; others were arrested or dismissed from service. Over 100 PAF men faced disciplinary action in the aftermath of the murder attempt. However, the possibility that some of the accomplices evaded arrest cannot be ruled out.4 There were numerous instances of sabotage in the PAF to prevent aircraft from being deployed against the militants.

In one of the most bizarre cases, 200 armed security personnel led by a colonel were taken captive along with their officers and equipment by 20 Taliban militants in South Waziristan.5 During subsequent attacks on Kohat Cantonment in 2008, there were reports that some tribal cadets of Army Cadet College had joined the militants. Former army personnel were also involved in the attack on the GHQ, which was carried out with the possible collusion of insiders. In 2010, two former army officers, along with two serving officers, including a colonel, were convicted by a court martial for planning an attack on the Shamsi airbase, which was being used by the Americans to fly their drones.

Pakistan has always tried to deny the existence of such elements within its security establishment.

Pakistan has always tried to deny the existence of such elements within its security establishment. Investigative journalist Syed Saleem Shehzad was believed to have been brutally silenced for publishing a story that highlighted the presence of al-Qaeda cells within the Pakistani navy. The attack on PNS Mehran was another case of collusion by serving personnel. Kamran Ahmed, a former naval commando, and his brother Zaman Ahmed were arrested for aiding the attackers. Another marine commando from Waziristan, who had been posted at PNS Mehran, was arrested in January 2011 for having links with al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

According to Saleem Shehzad, many ex-officers of the armed forces and numerous serving officers have been collaborating with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. A number of junior officers and other ranks still place faith above the country, and accordingly many former officers who were earlier involved with Afghan and Kashmiri ‘jihad’ have joined al-Qaeda. The book talks about Captain Khurram Ashiq from the elite Zarrar Company of Pakistan SSG who, along with his brother Major Haroon Ashiq, joined al-Qaeda after resigning from the army but continued to use his army connections to facilitate al-Qaeda aims. Haroon allegedly killed Major General Ameer Faisal Alavi in Islamabad and kidnapped Karachi filmmaker Satish Anand with assistance from another officer, Major Basit. He was subsequently arrested while attempting to kidnap an Ahmadi for ransom and is currently lodged in Adiala Jail in Rawalpindi.6

A few days before his murder, Saleem Shehzad had described the attack on PNS Mehran as ‘the violent beginning of an internal ideological struggle between Islamist elements in the Pakistani armed forces and their secular and liberal top brass.’7 He also warned about a nexus of serving and retired soldiers that could instigate mutiny against the top military brass.8 Most analysts believe that the Pakistani military is the glue that binds a fissiparous state like Pakistan, and one can well imagine the implications of an ideological war within this institution. Of late, the disciplined façade of the army has been showing cracks as many mid-level officers and soldiers have harboured latent sympathies for their opponents. This has resulted in large-scale surrenders by the personnel of the security forces. Many Pakhtoon soldiers were unwilling to take up arms against their kith and kin.9

…it is quite evident that Talibanisation will not stop at Pakistan’s frontiers and all its neighbours will have to face non-state actors based in Pakistan.

The arrest and subsequent court martial of Brigadier Ali Khan of the Pakistani army, who was posted at the GHQ for links with pan-Islamic radical outfit Hizb-ut-Tehrir, once again highlighted the existence of radical Islamist elements within Pakistan’s armed forces. The prosecution alleged that he had planned a mutiny with the support of 400 armed men, including some generals and personnel of 111 Brigade, as well as an F-16 pilot who had agreed to bomb the GHQ during the corps commanders meeting.10 The fact that Brigadier Khan is a third-generation army officer, with a brother, a son and a son-in-law in the army, shows the gravity of the situation. Even before Brigadier Khan, two serving army officers were court-martialled for links with Hizb-ut-Tahrir.11

The growing Talibanisation is eroding the state structure, and the unravelling of Pakistan is a distinct possibility. For the first time since its creation, there is a threat to the cohesion of the Pakistan army, which is probably the most powerful institution in the country. According to Stephen Cohen, most states have an army but in Pakistan’s case, the army has a state. The erosion of the Pakistan army and the manner in which the state has been capitulating makes the Lebanonisation12 of Pakistan a distinct possibility and that might be catastrophic for all its neighbours.

Implications for the Region

The Taliban already enjoys complete domination over most parts of FATA and great influence over large areas in KP and northern Balochistan. Its influence in Punjab and urban Sindh is growing. There have been serious concerns about the nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of militants. It must also be understood that the Taliban today is quite different from what it was prior to 9/11. It is no longer insular and is closely linked to the global Islamic movements. Its aims and objectives are no longer confined within a geographically defined area.

Taliban today is quite different from what it was prior to 9/11. It is no longer insular and is closely linked to the global Islamic movements.

The onward march of the radical ideology as symbolised by the Taliban, if unchecked, would eventually lead to emergence of Pakistan as a citadel of radical Islam, with liberal elements either pushed out or silenced. Such a state would start exporting its ideology across the world. It is important to note that many Islamic militants from across the world – from the Philippines to Chechnya, including Indonesians, Maldivians, Bangladeshi, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Arabs and Uighurs – come to Pakistan for indoctrination. The possession of nuclear weapons by such a state could pose the most serious challenge to global peace.

The growing influence of the Taliban poses two-pronged challenges for Pakistan’s neighbours. Firstly, as the foot soldiers of the Taliban move out of their citadels, it would lead to net accretion in the ranks of the armed militants, challenging the state in Pakistan’s neighbourhood. Secondly, by giving the Taliban a free hand, Pakistan would end up creating a bastion of Islamic fundamentalism in this region, which will become the nerve centre for propagating Islamic radicalism in the entire neighbourhood. As it is, Afghan Taliban, Uzbek, Uighur, Tajik and Kashmiri militants have established fraternal ties with the TTP and many of their militant camps are now located in the region under their control. As the militants entrench themselves and propagate their extremist ideology, the volunteers willing to cross the Line of Control (LoC) or the international borders to blow themselves up are not going to be in short supply. So the increasing influence of militants in the region poses a direct threat to the security interests of Pakistan’s neighbours.13

By Alok Bansal
Issue Courtesy: Aakrosh | Date : 10 Jul , 2014

Today, al-Qaeda is in a position to influence the TTP and all other radical organisations in Pakistan. Even in the most populous Pakistani state of Punjab, where many of these organisations were created and nurtured by the security establishment, they have switched their loyalty from the Pakistan army to al-Qaeda.14 Al-Qaeda is in the region because it believes that it was the Prophet’s prophesy that ‘Khurasan’ (presentday Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia) will be the initial theatre of ‘end of time’ battles for the establishment of a global Islamic Emirate. It also talks of Ghazwa-e-Hind (battle for India) before Imam Mahadi reveals himself to command the Muslim forces to defeat the Western forces led by Dajjal (antichrist). The Taliban, under al-Qaeda’s influence, is set to fulfil this prophecy.15

Although the usage of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by non-state actors in the classical sense is unlikely, the use of low-tech radiation bombs by such outfits cannot be ruled out.

With this sort of ideology, it is quite evident that Talibanisation will not stop at Pakistan’s frontiers and all its neighbours will have to face non-state actors based in Pakistan. Every single deal with the Taliban in Pakistan has seen their foot soldiers move to newer areas. Peace deals in Swat saw many of them moving to Kashmir and Afghanistan, sometimes even with the connivance of state actors.16 Besides India and Afghanistan, growing influence of the Taliban will give strength to Islamic militants fighting in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and even China. Its intolerance of Shias will soon bring it into conflict with the Iranian regime as well.

Pakistan’s security establishment has been obsessed with the idea of controlling Afghanistan. It realises that the only force on the Afghan political landscape that might be willing to do its bidding is the Taliban and hence has been supporting its inclusion in the Afghan government. At the same time, it wants to be the sole mediator between the Taliban and the West. Consequently, it will scuttle any approach made by the West or the Afghan government to reach out to the Taliban directly, as was done in the case of Mullah Biradar and Burhanuddin Rabbani.

The Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which looks after Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, is also manned and controlled by the Pakistan army and with the army getting Talibanised, the elements of the SPD getting influenced by its ideology cannot be ruled out. The TTP, through subverted elements in the SPD, could eventually gain access to Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile and may use it in pursuit of its nefarious agenda.

It must be appreciated that the concept of Taqiya in Islam allows an individual to disguise his ideological orientation till the opportune moment arrives. Although the usage of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by non-state actors in the classical sense is unlikely, the use of low-tech radiation bombs by such outfits cannot be ruled out. The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Western military components could be at the receiving end of such dirty bombs. As the Taliban and other radical groups are being indirectly controlled by al-Qaeda, which ideologically aims to defeat the West in Khurasan, it may be more than willing to do so.

Pak armed forces are showing signs of Talibanisation and consequent erosion of their cohesion. This could lead to ‘Lebanonisation’ of the state, which could pose a grave threat not only to the countries in the region but to the entire globe…

The Taliban, therefore, may not allow foreign troops to easily pull out from Afghanistan and could keep them embroiled there so as to attain victory in the ‘end of time’ battle. It must be clear that a Talibanised Pakistan will aim to engulf Afghanistan ideologically to attain al-Qaeda’s perceived objectives.

Conclusion

The state policies of the Pakistani establishment since 1947 have contributed to the radicalisation of the society and consequent Talibanisation. Accommodation with the Taliban for short-term tactical gains has allowed the Pakistani Taliban to spread its influence from South Waziristan to North Waziristan and from there to all the Pakhtoon-dominated areas. Its influence now is spreading beyond the Pakhtoon belt, to Punjab and urban Sindh. Many academics try to make a distinction between the TTP and the Afghan Taliban, but they fail to understand that though they are different organisations, they are ideologically unified. The TTP and other radical groups, like Haqqani Network, consider Mullah Omar as Ameer-ul- Momin.

The state has failed to take effective measures against Talibanisation, and the warped educational curriculum continues to inculcate a conservative mindset that is susceptible to jihadi ideology. Recent indicators show that Talibanisation is perpetuating effortlessly and a major correction in the established policies of the state coupled with sustained measures are required to check the Taliban onslaught. However, the state is still negotiating peace deals with the TTP. The last bastion of the Pakistani state, the armed forces are showing signs of Talibanisation and consequent erosion of their cohesion. This could lead to ‘Lebanonisation’ of the state, which could pose a grave threat not only to the countries in the region but to the entire globe, as Taliban today, despite its denials, has a global agenda.

Reference:

Rediff.com. ‘Pak Jailbreak: Terrorist Had Access to Mobile, Facebook.’ 16 April 2012. .
Zahid Hussain. ‘Deadly Dilemma.’ Newsline, November 2006. p. 23.
Shaheen Sehbai. ‘Rumour Mills Go Rolling with Arrest of Eight Militants.’ News, 15 October 2006.
News. ‘The Enemy Within? [editorial]. 26 June 2009. p. 6.
Dawn. ‘Tackling the militants’ [editorial]. 2 September 2007.
Syed Saleem Shahzad. Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11. London: Pluto Press, 2011. pp. 82–103.
Syed Saleem Shahzad. ‘Pakistan’s Military Under al-Qaeda Attack.’ Asia Times Online, 24 May 2011.
Syed Saleem Shahzad. ‘Trouble Ahead in Pakistan’s New US Phase.’ Asia Times Online, 18 May 2011.
Ayesha Siddiqa. ‘Dealing with Deals.’ Herald, August 2008. p. 16d.
Daily Times. ‘Brig Ali Planned Air Strike at GHQ: BBC.’ 2 March 2012.
Alok Bansal. ‘Radicalisation of Pakistani Armed Forces.’ CLAWS, 28 June 2011. .
‘Lebanonisation’ has come to refer to a process of national disintegration, where central authority erodes to a level that different power groups start acting independent of the central authority as far as their interactions with not only one another are concerned but also with entities outside the geographical frontiers of the state. It is distinct from ‘Balkanisation’ because the process of disintegration does not create clear-cut smaller states as in the latter case. In recent times, the term has been used extensively for Somalia and Iraq before its recent stabilisation.
Alok Bansal. ‘Implications of Peace Deals in Pakistan’s Wild West.’ IDSA. .
Khaled Ahmed in Foreword to Mujahid Hussain. Pakistani Taliban: Driving Extremism in Pakistan. New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, 2012. p. vii.
Op cit, n. 77, p. xvi.
Op cit, n. 61.

Pakistan will never dismantle its Jehad Machine
By Brigadier Arun Bajpai
Issue Net Edition | Date : 08 Dec , 2014

America’s decade old war on terror is finally drawing down in Afghanistan in next seven months. Even though Americans are going back on their own vocation in an orderly manner, most of the world sees this as an American defeat. To that extent Americans have lost face. However Pakistan who was the main player in promoting this conflict is not only flooded with aid but still continues to relentlessly use jehad as state policy harbouring many wanted criminals and terrorist with impunity. It will never dismantle its jehad machine come what may.

…terror strikes in major towns of India including 26/11 Mumbai attack have been Pakistan sponsored. Still our Prime minster Dr manmohan Singh is harbouring a dream of Pakistan having good relations with India and India is bending backwards to accommodate Pakistan.

On the eve of visit of Pakistani Prime minister Navaz Sharif to US in the third week of October, where he will be meeting American president Obama ,The US State department has moved a proposal to congress to restore the American Aid to Pakistan which had trickled down to pittance in recent months after ties between the two countries deterioted sharply in the after math of Raymond Davis episode, the Salala incident and elimination of Osama bin Laden in Pakistani garrison military town of Abbot bad. Under this proposal Pakistan will get 1.6 Billion dollar military and economic aid from the US.

The new narrative of US state department is that Pakistan under its new PM Navaz Sahrif has somehow changed its military dominated policy outlook which continues to use jehad as a tool to its state policy. This view of the state department has been challenged by many analysts of international repute. Pakistan’s own liberal commentators have questioned this new found wisdom of US state department. The ex Pakistan envoy to US, Hussein Haqqani made a recent statement that US totally misunderstands Pakistan when it is trying to buy Pakistan’s compliance with the American world view by doling out money. The truth of the matter is that till date Pakistan has taken from us 21 billion dollar aid but has continued to follow its use of terror as state as policy. America is in full knowledge of the fact that Pakistan is arming and training Haqqauni network and Afghan Taliban to operate against Americans in Afghanistan from the Pakistani territory, still it continues to provide money to Pakistan.

The story from New Delhi is similar. Anybody and everybody from India is fully aware of the fact that since 1988 Pakistan is hell bent in arming and training jehadis in its territory and then sending them to India. By new Delhi’s own statements currently Pakistani army and ISI are running 27 jehadi training camps in its Punjab province and 17 in Pakistan occupied territory where 2500 jehadis are being trained to be infiltrated into India. This year alone Pakistani army so far has done 197 cease fire violations despite there being an official commitment from Pakistan, existing since 2003, that it will not allow its territory to be used against India by Pakistan based jehadis. Most of the major terror strikes in major towns of India including 26/11 Mumbai attack have been Pakistan sponsored. Still our Prime minster Dr manmohan Singh is harbouring a dream of Pakistan having good relations with India and India is bending backwards to accommodate Pakistan.

China whose mineral rich Xinxiang province having 10.2 million Muslim population is facing a major uprising from these Uyghur Muslims. This uprising has direct connections with the Pakistani based jehadis. Still china is going all out not only to arm Pakistani army but has recently agreed to construct three nuclear reactors in Pakistan against all norms because Pakistan has not signed CTBT. Saudi Arab the most important country in west Asia has been mentor of Pakistan for decades. Any time it is prepared to bailout Pakistan from any major economy crisis.

Pakistan keeps these jehadis occupied lest they create havoc in Pakistan itself. Second it deals with its arch enemy India without shedding blood of its single soldier.

The whole world knows that anywhere and everywhere if a jehadi strike takes place be rest assured that it will have link with Pakistan. In Pakistan the world’s most wanted jehadi and professor of terror Mr Hafiz Mohammad Syeed who heads the jehadi organisation Lashkar-e-Toiba is an icon. The lashkar –e-toiba a Punjab based terror organisation has now strength of 3 lakhs. It came up as anti India jehadi organisation but has morphed into a global capability. Haqqani network and Afghan Taliban, again operating from Pakistani soil are currently busy in Afghanistan against American forces. However once US draws down from Afghanistan and these people oust the shaky regime of Krazai they will be free by end of next year.

All in all there are about half a million jehadis operating from Pakistan who are well armed and trained. Bulk of them are illiterates and come from very poor families. having brought up in madras’s, they have been so badly brainwashed that for them being a jehadi and killing innocent people are of other faith is a god ordained duty. Truth of the matter is these jehadis who have to lose nothing, be it America, China, Britain, Saudi Arabia, India the whole world is afraid of them. It is this fear of the whole world of these jehadis which Pakistan and especially Pakistani army is exploiting. The world mistakenly believes that if anybody who can control them it is Pakistani army.

The recruiting areas of Pakistani army, which is 70 percent Punjabi, are the same as these jehadis specially of L-e-t.Meanwhile the Afghan Taliban and Haqqqani network who are basically pakhtoons, constitute the rest of 30 percent of Pakistani army. In addition despite all the hype given to Pakistani army as being highly professional force, truth is that it is a political army with 20 billion dollar business running of its own. Such armies do not fight. Additionally this army has been highly radicalised, thanks to Gen Zia ul haq opening admission to army of madarsa educated youth and declaring Pakistani army not an army to defend the country but to defend Islam.

Pakistani Army is having a very cosy relationship with these jehadis. In actual fact for them these jehadis are cannon fodder to be used and forgotten. All the developed countries of the world know that once America pulls out from Afghanistan these jehadis are going to claim from roof tops that they first defeated one super power Russia and now other super power America thus proving to the Muslim world that jehad is still relevant in 21st century. As such world will see more such terror activity.

We must form a long term policy to deal with Pakistan and this new threat. The three Army Chiefs must be included in cabinet committee on security on permanent basis.

We must understand that today the fear of these jehadis is resulting in large inflow of military and economic aid to Pakistan from all quarters. Everybody from developed world is prepared to pay as long as Pakistani army keeps them away from these countries shores. The country under biggest threat is India. Pakistani army will take all the money and aid offered to it from the developed world at the same time direct these jehadis towards India. By this it kills two birds with one stone. First it keeps these jehadis occupied lest they create havoc in Pakistan itself. Second it deals with its arch enemy India without shedding blood of its single soldier.

It is really pathetic that when such dark clouds of terror are gathering on our horizon our political masters and their bureaucratic advisers are just not sounding worried maybe all this is beyond their comprehension. Our efforts to make friends with Pakistan will just not gel because Nawaz Sharif and his civilian government do not have any say over army. Besides Navaz sharif is also party to it. This time the Pakistan sponsored jehad will include human bombs and other mass killing apparatus not seen before in India.
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It is very important that Indian political masters wake up and hold an all party meeting on the issue earliest. We must form a long term policy to deal with Pakistan and this new threat. The three Army Chiefs must be included in cabinet committee on security on permanent basis. We must acquire whatever additional arms and gadgets necessary to deal with this threat. We must plan to light as many fires within Pakistan as they are doing in India by covert means. We should not lose sight of the fact that Baluchistan and Sind may not like to be with Pakistan and Afghan Pushtuns who form a formidable 48 percent population of Afghanistan south of Kabul in Afghanistan and large number of Pakistani Pushtuns south of Durand line in Pakistan pakhtoonwala province may like to unite to form an independent pakhtoonistan. Answer is to become proactive and not remain reactive.